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“I will deliver this people from the power of the grave;  
    I will redeem them from death.  
Where, O death, are your plagues? 
    Where, O grave, is your destruction?” 
 
- Hosea 13:14, NIV 
 
 
“Since the children have flesh and blood, he too shared in their humanity so that by his 
death he might break the power of him who holds the power of death—that is, the devil” 
 
- Hebrews 2:14, NIV 
 
 
“Sceleratum est, cum noveris, pium et sanum esse alicuius sensum, ex verbis incommode 
dictis statuere errorem.” 
 
- Martin Luther, WA 39/II, 95 
ABSTRACT 
DOMINUS MORTIS: MARTIN LUTHER ON THE  
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David J. Luy 
 
Marquette University, 2012 
 
 
Contemporary literature broadly presupposes that Luther‟s Christology represents 
a definitive course correction within Christian reflection upon the doctrine of God. The 
hinge point of Luther‟s innovation, according to this understanding, resides in his 
apparent endorsement of a mutual transfer of predicates between the divine and human 
nature of Christ. This mutuality represents a significant radicalization of pre-existing 
theological opinion, which is content to affirm the statement „God suffers‟, for instance, 
only in the carefully restricted sense that Christ (who happens to be divine) suffers 
according to His human nature. According to this more traditional explanation, it is not 
the divinity of Christ per se, which suffers, but only the single, acting subject who is both 
divine and human. Luther‟s principal innovation in relation to these matters, is widely 
supposed to reside in his eschewal of such predicational restrictions. For him, God truly 
suffers in His own nature. He does so by virtue of a reciprocal idiomatic exchange 
between Christ‟s divinity and humanity. Such, in any case, is the historical narrative now 
prominent within studies of Luther‟s theology. 
 The point possesses more than a merely antiquarian, or reductively historical 
interest. Luther‟s construal of God‟s suffering is a central feature within contemporary 
appraisals of his theological vision. His perceived christological innovation has also 
funded a host of constructive appropriations of his legacy across the many sectors of 
modern theological inquiry. The prevailing narrative is frequently invoked 
soteriologically  to insist that human redemption relies upon the genuine participation of 
God‟s essence in creaturely vulnerability. In its most programmatic expressions, this 
interpretation of Luther has buttressed the rather generic perception within contemporary 
theology that Luther engineers a re-conceptualization of the Christian doctrine of God, 
which is significant primarily because it enables a more radical recognition of God‟s 
immanent involvement with the created order. Thus construed, Luther has understandably 
been mined as an invaluable resource for modern theologies of divine passibility, which 
tend to stress the „historicization‟ of God‟s being as opposed to putatively static 
alternatives espoused within preexisting theological tradition. It is the intent of this study 
to critique the interpretation of Luther‟s Christology used to underwrite this reception, 
and thus create the conditions necessary for an alternative appropriation of the reformer‟s 
thought within contemporary discourse. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
It is rather common within contemporary appraisals of Luther‟s significance to 
detect in his writings an abrupt turning point in the history of reflection upon the doctrine 
of God. Luther is supposed to espouse an understanding of the divine being, which 
departs in fundamental and portentous respects from previous inquiry. The contents of 
this departure signal for many contemporary theologians nothing less than the inception 
of an alternative dogmatic trajectory within Christian thought; a trajectory whose mantel 
would later be taken up in earnest especially in the latter half of the 20
th
 century. At its 
root, the seminal divergence responsible for this generic perception can be reduced to a 
single, positive affirmation, which Luther is supposed to endorse: God suffers, and does 
so in His very nature. The existence of this claim in Luther‟s theology is the touchstone 
for many contemporary receptions of his thought.  
How precisely one ought to interpret this affirmation, however, or elaborate upon 
its full significance are questions susceptible to a variegated array of response. The 
suffering of God in Luther‟s theology has been construed, for instance, as emblematic of 
a reconfigured theological epistemology, which brushes aside every attempt to know or 
identify God by way of conceptual abstraction; that is, apart from God‟s own scandalous 
self-presentation in the sufferings of Christ.
1
 Luther‟s „passionate‟ doctrine of God has 
also frequently been identified as a preparatory station of development in the 
Vorgeschichte of Hegelian philosophy, with its characteristic insistence that divine being 
                                                             
1For an example of this reception, see Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ 
as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 65-75.  
2 
 
actualizes itself in and through dialectical engagement with created history.
2
 Such 
proposals are representative of kind of constructive reception elicited by the widespread 
identification of novelty within Luther‟s theology, but  they are far from exhaustive in 
scope. They represent creative permutations of an underlying historical constant, which 
permeates contemporary appraisals of Luther‟s significance. Each presupposes that the 
reformer formulates an essentially unprecedented doctrine of God‟s being and thus 
introduces a monumental fork in the weaving path of dogmatic development.  
The historical basis for all such “divergence receptions” consists ultimately in a 
hugely influential interpretation of Luther‟s Christology, which has accrued considerable 
momentum within Luther scholarship during the past fifty years. Unlike preexisting 
models of christological description, this interpretation urges, Luther insists that the 
incarnate Christ suffers, not just according to the human nature, but in His divinity as 
well. Luther‟s patristic and medieval forebears sought rather diligently to avoid such an 
implication. Within classically developed treatments of the “communication of 
attributes”, the ascription of suffering is limited exclusively to the humanity of Christ, 
and to the single Person in whom this human nature possesses its individual mode of 
existence. Although the divine nature shares the same means of individuation (the one 
Person of Christ), the traditional view denies there to be a symmetrical conditioning of 
natures, in which the divinity can share in Christ‟s human sufferings.     
Luther‟s widely alleged modification of this formulation appears trivial on first 
glance. It suggests merely that the reformer excises the symmetrical restriction, and 
advocates an application of human predicates not exclusively to Christ per se, but also to 
                                                             
2See, for instance, Peter Hünermann, “Geschichte der Christologie: Geschichte Jesu Christi mit 
den Menschen? ” Theologische Quartalschrift 164 (1984): 102-120.  
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Christ‟s divine nature. The import of the adjustment, however is only deceptively slight. 
To insist that divinity can and does suffer raises urgent and far-reaching questions about 
the nature of deity in the first place. Once the embedded implications of Luther‟s 
christological claim are traced outwards, it becomes clear that many classically binding 
assumptions about the being of God must either be destabilized or altogether banished. In 
this way, Luther‟s christological divergence intrinsically commends the more expansive 
conclusion that the reformer inaugurates a massive re-conceptualization of the doctrine of 
God.
3
  
The “divergence reading” of Luther‟s Christology also functions as a historical 
reference point within contemporary debates concerning the theological 
conceptualization of God‟s immanence within the created order. These debates usually 
have at their center of orbit the doctrine of divine impassibility. The development and 
content of a widespread reaction against this doctrine are well chronicled in recent 
literature.
4
 Suffice it here to state that impassibility has come to represent for many 
                                                             
3The logical relationship expressed in this sentence stands at the center of the present work. It will 
assume that the prominent reception of Luther as a decisive turning point in the history of dogmatic 
reflection upon God more or less stands and falls depending upon the legitimacy of Luther‟s widely alleged 
christological adjustment. If the latter interpretation accurately describes Luther‟s treatment of Christ, then 
the former appropriation of his theology must be accepted as well.    
4
A sampling of the myriad recent publications that address this debate include Thomas G. 
Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame, 2000); D. Stephen Long, 
Speaking of God: Theology, Language, and Truth (Grand Rapids, Mich: Wililam B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 
2009); David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids, 
Mich: W.B. Eerdmans, 2003); David Bentley Hart, "No shadow of turning: on divine impassibility." Pro 
Ecclesia 11, no. 2 (March 1, 2002): 184-206; James Keating and Thomas Joseph White, Divine 
Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering (Grand Rapids, Mich: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 
2009); Daniel Castelo, The Apathetic God: Exploring the Contemporary Relevance of Divine Impassibility 
(Milton Keynes, U.K.: Paternoster, 2009); Richard E. Creel, Divine Impassibility: An Essay in 
Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 
Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and Authorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010); Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought, 
The Oxford Early Christian studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Robert W. Jenson, 
Systematic Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). A fuller bibliographical overview of its 
scope and origins may be found in the citations contained within these materials. 
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modern theologians an unnecessary, and rather egregious conceptual obstruction, which 
bars the way to adequate rendering of God‟s intimate involvement with His creation. 
Those appreciative of Luther‟s christological „adjustment‟ detect in it a seminal precursor 
of a critical and necessary objection to bad dogma. Luther‟s passibilist description of God 
in Christ is esteemed to take the reality of divine immanence with a greater degree of 
seriousness than prior formulations of doctrine were capable even to entertain.
5
 In this 
way, Luther‟s Christology is leveraged constructively against perceived inadequacies of 
the tradition—conceptual abnormalities, which are latent within the articulations of 
classical dogma. The reformer is enlisted as a catalyst for outlining new structures of 
thought, which are more transparent to God‟s passionate involvement in the Person and 
work of Christ.  
Luther‟s seminal adjustment is adjudicated favorably, so long as his modern 
appraisers malign the doctrine of impassibility as theologically problematic. Those who 
defend divine impassibility within contemporary debates over divine immanence 
understandably advance an alternative evaluation. The claim that God can suffer is 
regarded by these „defenders‟ not as dogmatic progress, but regress. Criticisms of divine 
passibility, like the arguments of those who defend it, are far from homogenous. Some 
worry that a rejection of divine impassibility signals a forfeiture of God‟s transcendence. 
Others lament the apparent re-paganization of God, which such a claim seems to connote. 
Many insist that an ontological entanglement of God within the mélange of finitude 
formulates a „tragic‟ description of God‟s being, which undermines the reality of 
                                                             
5This is not to say that Luther gets things exactly right in the appraisal of many contemporary 
divine passibilists. Many who purport to follow in Luther‟s legacy understand themselves to extend the 
trajectories in his thought to a more satisfying degree of internal consistency.   
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redemption.
6
 Perhaps most seriously, a number of recent theologians suggest that the God 
thus „entangled‟ seems implicitly to require suffering in order to achieve His own self-
constitution; an entailment, which portends chilling implications for questions of 
theodicy.
7
 Evaluated within these adjudicatory prisms, Luther‟s widely alleged dogmatic 
novelty appears far less friend than foe.  
The fact that Luther‟s christological adjustment has been assessed in the service 
of such widely divergent conclusions only bears witness to the presuppositional plurality 
now operative within theological discourse. This plurality represents a major reason why 
debates over divine immanence are ongoing, and exhibit little indication that an 
abatement of the controversy ought soon to be anticipated. The evaluative discrepancy 
must not be allowed, however, to obscure the underlying agreement this discourse 
highlights as it pertains to the historical description of Luther‟s significance. The 
fundamental elements of Luther‟s christological contribution remains more or less the 
same, regardless of whether the central „adjustment‟ is regarded to be a swerve into 
heterodoxy, or an urgently needed course correction away from non-biblical 
conceptualities. Despite the starkly opposed evaluative options now on offer, the 
specification of Luther‟s relation to modern debates represents something of a fixed 
constant. Whether lauded as a Moses leading theology out from its Hellenist captivity, or 
decried as an Ahaz offering up idolatrous sacrifice to proto-Hegelian Baals, Luther is 
deemed significant on all sides because his Christology is supposed to pioneer a 
fundamentally new doctrine of God.  
                                                             
6That is, a God who cares, but can‟t really help.   
7See, for instance, David Bentley Hart, “No shadow of turning: on divine impassibility” Pro 
Ecclesia 11, no. 2 (March 1, 2002): 184-206. 
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It is the burden of the present work to demonstrate that the underlying historical 
consensus (to which subsequent chapters will refer as the „divergence thesis‟) is 
mistaken. The consensus facilitates a misleading appraisal of Luther‟s contemporary 
significance because it presupposes at its root an inaccurate specification of Luther‟s 
doctrine of Christ. Contrary to widely held opinion, Luther nowhere rejects the doctrine 
of divine impassibility. A close examination of the reformer‟s texts uncovers an abiding 
commitment to this doctrine as a guiding norm for christological description. 
Accordingly, Luther‟s Christology can no longer be identified as a seminal hinge point in 
the development of an alternative doctrine of God. By demonstrating all this to be true, 
the present study will create the conditions necessary for an alternative appropriation of 
Luther‟s significance within contemporary theology.  
The intent of this work is therefore not entirely deconstructive in nature. Its 
purpose is not merely to expose the divergence thesis‟ exegetical weaknesses, and leave 
the matter there to rest. This study acknowledges, along with the reading it intends 
otherwise to falsify, that Luther does lay special emphasis upon the radical immanence of 
God in Christ and therefore represents an essential conversation partner for ongoing 
constructive endeavors to forge adequate doctrinal conceptualizations of this reality. It 
seeks constructively to resituate the nature of this engagement by correcting the 
divergence thesis‟ wrongful specification of Luther‟s original, christological 
commitments. Although its focus rests primarily upon the more basic matter of historical 
accuracy, the present study also addresses questions of constructive import. It explores 
what significance Luther‟s rendering of divine immanence can still possess once he is 
shown no longer to reject the doctrine of divine impassibility. The central goal of what 
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follows, then, is to create the conditions necessary for an alternative appropriation of 
Luther‟s Christology, and outline a few programmatic gestures of what such an 
appropriation might entail. 
The execution of this task unfolds in three stages of argument, which are sub-
divided into five major chapters. The first stage includes only one chapter (chapter 1), 
and includes a careful specification of the divergence thesis, as expressed in major 
historical and theological literature composed during the past half century. This 
preparatory identification is necessary, because it excavates and outlines the essential 
exegetical and conceptual claims upon which the self-purported descriptive legitimacy of 
the divergence thesis finally rests. The second stage of the argument contains three 
chapters (chapters 2-4) and is by far the most extensive. On the basis of the specification 
outlined in chapter one, this stage of the argument sequentially addresses each of the 
divergence thesis‟ essential claims, and thus demonstrates the nature and extent of its 
quantifiable, historical inaccuracy.  
The product of this sequential analysis is the decisive refutation of the divergence 
thesis as a viable interpretation of Luther‟s Christology.8 In addition to this refutation, 
these chapters will also provide an alternative specification of Luther‟s theology as it 
pertains to each stage of the analysis. The third stage of the argument (chapter 5) is 
constructive in nature. It focuses upon the task of redirecting contemporary 
appropriations of Luther‟s theological significance. The space necessary for this 
„redirection‟ is established on the basis of the alternative specification of Luther‟s 
christological views provided in chapters two through four. As the result of the three 
                                                             
8This refutation also intrinsically destabilizes the appraisals of Luther, whether positive or 
negative, which the underlying „divergence interpretation‟ has mediated.    
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stages of argument, the present study will demonstrate the inadequacy of the prominent 
divergence reception and provide the outline for a historically responsible alternative.    
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THE ROAD OFT-TAKEN: A THEMATIC ANATOMY 
OF THE DIVERGENCE THESIS 
 Logically speaking, the attempt to verify or refute a given conceptual construction 
depends intrinsically upon the extent to which that construction‟s essential elements are 
accurately identified. In the absence of such identification, it can never be clear whether 
one‟s argument truly ever „hits‟ its intended target. In the case of the multi-tiered 
interpretation of Luther‟s Christology that this study refers to as the „divergence thesis‟, 
the importance of this anterior analytical requirement is paramount. The breadth and 
diversity of scholarly work on Luther‟s doctrine of Christ is vast. The success of this 
dissertation‟s attempt to engage this literature critically will depend upon its ability to 
isolate the logically and historically circumscribed elements of interpretation that lend the 
„divergence reception‟ of Luther‟s theology its apparent legitimacy. To neglect this task 
would effectively preclude not only the success, but also the very possibility of the 
refutation that is embedded in this study‟s governing thesis. 
This chapter sketches a thematic anatomy of the divergence thesis, which 
organizes and bibliographically documents the governing interpretive claims that reside 
within it. The literature survey provided in the pursuit of this task does not purport to 
provide a comprehensive treatment of modern scholarship on the Christology of Martin 
Luther. It seeks, far more modestly, to call the reader‟s attention to the various 
interpretive claims, which, interpreted from a retrospective vantage point, collectively 
account for the broad plausibility it now enjoys in contemporary theology. These claims 
also furnish the core basis of the divergence thesis‟ self-avowed legitimacy. 
10 
 
 
 
 The purpose of this chapter is therefore descriptive and diagnostic. It aspires to 
paint a clear picture of what the divergence thesis is. It identifies which are the main 
interpretive elements necessary for defending its claim to historical legitimacy. By 
isolating the sequential logic through which these elements are typically arranged in 
relation to one another, this description also documents why and how recent interpreters 
of Luther‟s Christology have tended to conclude that his thought embraces a conceptual 
trajectory, which leads beyond classical distinctions designed to distinguish between the 
self-existence of God and the unfolding process of world history; a trajectory that many 
associate predominantly with the legacy of G. W. F. Hegel.
1
 This chapter‟s description is 
also diagnostic, in the sense that the identification of essential interpretive elements also 
exposes the specific claims, which may be scrutinized in this study‟s subsequent task to 
de-validate the divergence reception of Luther‟s significance.  
This chapter may therefore be understood as a conceptually organized literature 
review whose contents furnish the objects of critique and counter-argument in later 
chapters. This preparatory analysis will enable the subsequent criticisms to focus upon 
demonstrably refutable (and thus, also potentially verifiable) aspects of interpretation, 
                                                             
1
In the appraisal of most of the Luther scholars surveyed in this chapter, the classical conceptual 
bifurcations referenced above serve only to mitigate if not entirely obscure the radicality of God‟s 
immanent involvement with the full situation of human beings in the fallen world. The extent to which a 
Hegelian metaphysics endorses the actual historical development of God depends upon one‟s assessment of 
Hegel‟s understanding of the „propleptic‟ anticipation of Spirit prior to the dialectical process of its self-
actualization. At the very least, Hegel understands the proleptic  moment of God‟s immanent self-
understanding always to presume the dialectical process of God‟s internal differentiation in the positing and 
subsequent sublation of Spirit‟s own negation in the stream of created history. For more on Hegel‟s 
conception of the relation between God and history, see Peter Crafts Hodgson, Hegel and Christian 
Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005); Quentin Lauer, Hegel's Concept of God, SUNY series in Hegelian studies (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1982); Cyril O'Regan, The Heterodox Hegel, SUNY series in Hegelian studies 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).   
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and thereby avoid the hazards of generalized or vague counter-assertion.
2
 The tangible 
product of this chapter consists in a final series of concrete questions, which will 
determine the focus of each subsequent chapter. Before turning to the literature survey, it 
will be helpful, first of all, to provide a preliminary specification of the divergence thesis‟ 
centrally orienting claims. The logical organization of these claims lends the entire study 
its macro-structure. 
A Preliminary Survey of the Operative Logic 
 In its simplest and strongest form, the divergence thesis operates on three planes 
or „tiers‟ of analysis. When taken cumulatively, these tiers triangulate the „vector‟ of 
Luther‟s theology in terms of a fundamental deviation from the traditional 
conceptualities, which are operative in both patristic and medieval accounts of the 
hypostatic union.
 3
 Because he deviates in this way, Luther‟s Christology is assumed, 
rather naturally to contain as its embedded implication a sweeping reconfiguration of the 
                                                             
2The risk of these problems is undoubtedly heightened by the broadly inter-disciplinary and trans-
historical nature of the divergence reception itself. This is simply to acknowledge the fact that the 
interpretation under critical scrutiny throughout this dissertation is comprised of a wide set of claims whose 
disciplinary setting runs the gamut of historical time periods and academic fields (I.E. the history of 
Christology in general, the appropriation of Chalcedon in the medieval period, the relation of Luther to 
patristic and medieval dogma, the development of modern philosophy and its pertinence to Christian 
theological reflection, etc). Moreover, these various internally constitutive parts are advanced either 
partially or entirely by a wide array of authors whose particular views on a variety of other matters is quite 
heterogeneous (in some cases, even their particular relation to the „divergence thesis‟ as I have defined it, 
varies rather dramatically). All of these factors heighten the importance for this dissertation to be 
abundantly clear in its identification of the core claims that constitute a logical thread of unity within an 
otherwise bewildering complexity, and focus its critique on these carefully demarcated claims so as to 
enable transparent and focused engagement of the kind that maintains the analytical possibility for 
verification or refutation. In the view of the current author, fulfilling this requirement is essential for the 
critical investigation in subsequent chapters to possess any traction whatsoever, and avoid deteriorating into 
nothing more than naked, that is, baseless counter-assertion.    
3Just how important this conceptual inheritance is for patristic/ conciliar Christology is a topic 
open to debate. Those scholars included in our survey who argue in favor of Luther‟s basic 
Chalcedonianism tend, unsurprisingly, to insist that these commitments are ancillary in nature. Their 
removal by Luther is thus characterized as dogmatically „therapeutic‟ rather than dogmatically 
„deconstructive‟.    
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God-World relation in general. The three layers of this conceptual anatomy are mutually 
reinforcing. They relate to one another within a fairly straightforward linear sequence of 
progressive argument. Organized according to this logic, the central tiers of the 
divergence thesis include the following: 1) an implication-laden reconceptualization of 
the metaphysics of the hypostatic union; 2) a soterio-logic, which not only assumes but 
actually depends upon the suffering of Christ‟s divinity; and 3) a resultant modification of 
God‟s relation to the world, which blurs (or at least reinterprets) the mode of divine 
involvement within history. Each „rung‟ of this progression will now be expounded with 
a bit more specificity. 
  The first tier of analysis includes two fundamental claims. In the first place, it 
contends that Luther decisively rejects the late medieval means of conceptualizing the 
hypostatic union through use of the quasi-Aristotelian concept of „suppositional 
carrying‟.4 Scholars who advocate some version of this „rejection‟ differ from one 
another, to some extent, when it comes to identifying the alternative conceptual model 
                                                             
4This model of explanation is an application of the Aristotelian-inspired distinction between a 
thing‟s essential „what-ness‟ and the individuated existent thought to sustain or „carry‟ (hence suppositio) 
that „what-ness‟ into discrete ontic expression. In the case of the incarnation, such a framework suggests 
that the subsistence of the human nature of Christ cuts against the general tendency elsewhere for specific 
natures to attain individual expression through their own self-supposition (I.E. individual „rockness‟ 
subsists through self-individuating „rock-supposits‟, etc), a pattern that, in the instance of Christ having 
both a human and divine nature would entail a Nestorian doctrine of two persons. So, in order to sidestep 
this heretical entailment, the schoolmen of the late medieval period insisted upon the subsistence of the 
human nature of Christ through an extraordinary instance of „alien‟ suppositional carrying; that is, that the 
human nature comes to subsist individually exclusively in and through the divine supposit of the Word 
which assumes it into union with itself, and thus effectively takes the place of the human self-supposition 
that would ordinarily be the metaphysical ground for its individual existence. For more on the expansion of 
Aristotelian philosophy to make sense of the hypostatic union, see Marilyn McCord Adams, “What‟s 
Metaphysically Special about Supposits? Some Medieval Variations on Aristotelian Substance” 
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (2005): 15-52. See also her essay “Relations, Inherence, and 
Subsistence; or, Was Ockham a Nestorian in Christology” Nous 16 (1982): 62-75. See also the fuller 
discussion of medieval metaphysics of the incarnation in chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
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with which Luther supplants the scholastic alternative.
5
 All agree, however, upon the core 
notion that Luther discards „suppositional carrying‟ and moves on to a unitary, 
explanatory mechanism, which tries to deliver a more intimate rendering of the relation 
between divinity and humanity.
6
  
 Within this more intimate union, Luther is alleged to endorse a sympathetic co-
suffering of Christ‟s divine nature. This introduces the first tier‟s second major claim. 
The claim that Luther endorses a passibilist recalibration of Christology constitutes the 
descriptive nucleus of the divergence thesis. In view here is a widely accepted 
interpretive judgment, which identifies in Luther‟s Christology an alternative treatment of 
the communicatio idiomatum. The core claim, which is necessary to the progression of 
the divergence thesis‟ logical sequence is the assertion that Luther endorses a mutual 
exchange of attributes between the humanity and divinity of Christ, and thus insists that it 
is not only Christ‟s human nature, which is effected by suffering and death, but the divine 
nature as well. This position deviates traditional treatments of the communication of 
idioms, in which God „suffers‟ in Christ only in the sense that the divine Logos is the 
single subject of the incarnation, and thus the rightful predicational recipient of all that 
belongs to either of Christ‟s natures.  The divine nature per se does not and indeed cannot 
suffer. Christ suffers, according to this view, but only on account of the human nature, 
which He assumes. Exactly how and to what extent Luther is thought to controvert this 
                                                             
5One important variable has to do with the mechanism through which Luther understands the 
hypostatic union in general, a question that will be treated in the first sub-unit of the first tier. Is Christ, for 
Luther, simply a composite product of the union between divinity and humanity? A dialectical union of 
opposites? A Werkzeug of the divine effects? A dynamically actualized speech event? The scholars 
included in this chapter differ in their answer to these questions, though not always in mutually exclusive 
ways. The main point is that their various points of view share in common a few main interpretive 
ingredients that the survey below will distill. 
6I insert the word „tries‟ because not all of the interpreters surveyed within this chapter believe that 
Luther is successful in achieving this higher unity.   
14 
 
 
 
point of view depends on a number of factors that will be explored in detail later in the 
chapter. Suffice it here to say that an essential component of the divergence thesis 
consists in its claim that Luther‟s treatment of the communicatio idiomatum endorses a 
communication of human attributes to the divine nature, and that this „exchange‟ 
especially includes the experience of suffering.  
 If it is true that Luther deviates from doctrinal and philosophical constraints 
designed to preserve the impassibility of God, what account may be given of theological 
rationale according to which he pursues this solitary doctrinal course? For a number of 
scholars, the answer to this question is to be found mainly if not exclusively within the 
domain of Luther‟s soteriology. This line of reasoning comprises the second tier of the 
divergence thesis‟ analysis. According to such a view, God can only redeem insofar as 
He truly enters into the human situation and genuinely suffers the defects of sin, 
corruption and death in genuine solidarity with His covenant creatures. The salient 
feature of this claim is not the theme of solidarity itself, something many theologians of 
antiquity also emphasize, but the narrower allegation that Luther affirms a form of 
solidarity, which entails the actual passibility of divinity itself in Christ‟s saving work. 
 The final tier of the logical sequence draws each of the preceding threads 
together. It deduces on the basis of tiers one and two that Luther introduces (or at least 
tacitly assumes) an alternative framework for making sense of God‟s relation to the 
world. Instead of the putatively static metaphysics of his forebears, Luther is said to 
embrace the intrinsic, ontological relationality between God and the created order. 
Luther‟s Christology and soteriology are taken as tangible indication of the fact that the 
perceived incongruities of classical philosophy (infinity and finitude, eternity and history, 
15 
 
 
 
etc) no longer function as procrustean bed of theological inquiry. Instead, Luther points 
the way forward to a historicized metaphysics; a point of view, which recognizes the self-
actualization of God within the unfolding process of historical development; the apex of 
which is the Christ event itself, wherein divinity and humanity are taken up into 
previously unforeseeable synthesis with one another.
7
  
 The logical sequence of interpretation, which animates the divergence reception 
of Luther‟s Christology may therefore be recapitulated as follows.  
 A twofold christological adjustment (rejection of suppositional carrying along 
with insistence upon the predication of human attributes to the divinity of Christ) is 
oriented towards a soteriology of suffering solidarity of which the essential passibility of 
God is a requisite constitutive part. The far sweeping implications of these doctrinal 
adjustments represent the inauguration of a historicized metaphysics which does away 
with a classical account of God‟s being as existing wholly and immutably intact in 
isolation from the events of salvation history.        
 
The internal relationships that unite the three elements of this sequence are 
important to the shape of this dissertation‟s argument as it will unfold in subsequent 
chapters. As a preliminary methodological consideration, it may be observed that the 
various elements comprising the argument‟s anatomy stand or fall, to some extent, 
together. It is feasible, for instance, that an interpreter of Luther could argue for the third 
tier (a renovated understanding of the God-world relation) in the absence of tiers one and 
two, but such a claim would be rendered rather tenuous by its tacit admission that Luther 
still operates effectively within traditional doctrinal parameters, which grate intrinsically 
                                                             
7Here again, there exists considerable diversity of opinion on what all of this means exactly for 
how to appropriate Luther‟s theological insights into the present. I do not mean in this overview to over-
determine the theological uses to which this general notion of Luther‟s „historicizing metaphysics‟ has been 
or could be put. The reception of Hegel is itself an infinitely complex enterprise, and not one that this 
dissertation will seek artificially to simplify. The main point here is that the interpretation of Luther‟s 
Christology and soteriology outlined in tiers one and two has made his thought appear congenial, in the 
eyes of a number of scholars and theologians, to a rejection of classical metaphysics (also not a 
homogenous concept!) in favor of an understanding of God and history in which there is more openness to 
a relationship of mutual conditioning between them.   
16 
 
 
 
against the notion of a reciprocally conditioning overlap between God‟s being and the 
events of history. In a similar manner, it would be strange to claim that Luther endorses a 
soteriology of divine passibility, while conceding that he retains a traditional 
christological restriction of „suffering‟ to Christ‟s human nature. Such a point of view 
could be rationally defended only if a rather egregious, conceptual inconsistency were 
shown to afflict Luther‟s thought, a thesis that, speaking from a historical vantage point, 
can count only as a proposal of exegetical last resort.  
So, although it would be an overstatement to insist that the three tiers of the 
analysis just described are reciprocally entailing, it may reasonably be observed that the 
disparate components of the divergence thesis garner a cumulative rhetorical strength that 
is, in many ways, greater than the logical sum of its parts. It is upon the strength of these 
claims not just separately, but especially cumulatively that the legitimacy of the 
divergence reception clearly depends. To de-validate one element of this logical sequence 
is to weaken each of the subsequent claims that build upon that element‟s momentum. 
Moreover, the extent to which the claims of each tier are shown to be misleading is the 
extent to which the divergence reception as a whole is deprived of its fundamental 
warrant. It will be the task of subsequent chapters actually to pursue the sequential 
refutation of the major, mutually reinforcing elements. In this chapter, the sole task 
resides in documentation. It must demonstrate the widespread acceptance of these various 
interpretive claims within scholarship, and highlight the way in which versions of the 
logical anatomy sketched in this preliminary overview have, in fact, served to commend 
the factual basis of the divergence reception.
8
   
                                                             
8Three disclaimers must be expressed that will alert the reader to the precise way in which I intend 
this logical presentation of the divergence thesis‟ anatomy to function. In the first place, it must be 
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A Sequentially Organized Review of the Literature 
Each of the subject headings within this section corresponds with a specific „tier‟ 
of the divergence thesis‟ analysis of Luther‟s Christology. Because the organization is 
topical in nature, the claims of individual scholars will sometimes appear in several sub-
section, rather than merely in one. The advantage of this presentation format is the fact 
that it locates focus on the interpretive elements themselves, and thus highlights what is 
logically, and historically most important to the divergence thesis‟ descriptive viability. 
The intended product of this survey will be an extracted set of very specific claims and 
questions, which will provide determinate grist for critical adjudication in subsequent 
chapters of the dissertation.
 9
      
                                                                                                                                                                                     
recognized that the three-tiered logical sequence is a synthetic and heuristic construct designed to cull 
together and summarize a broad range of trajectories and commitments throughout the major scholarship 
on Luther‟s Christology. One will seek in vain to find it stated in its entirety as transparently and succinctly 
in the actual literature as it is summarized here. It will be the burden of the central section of this chapter to 
demonstrate that both the elements themselves and their thematic organization accurately reflect genuine 
patterns in the study of Luther‟s Christology, and not artificial fabrications. The closest one comes to a full 
version of this logical sequence occurs in the work of Johann Anselm Steiger and Dennis Ngien, whose 
positions are mentioned in the introduction and will also be surveyed below. Second, the logical sequence 
is organized in light of a „retrospective observation of effects‟ and does not necessarily reflect the self-
alleged conceptual trajectory of every scholar whose work will be mentioned in the forthcoming survey. 
Discursive footnotes will alert the reader to the few exceptions where this is the case when appropriate. The 
reason these authors have been included in this survey arises from the fact that they endorse an 
interpretation of Luther‟s thought that, whether by their intention or not, aligns on the particular level with 
claims this dissertation deems necessary to the success of the divergence thesis. In the interest of breadth, 
then, their work has been engaged. Third, because the logical sequence provided above is a hermeneutical 
tool for making sense of the main building blocks enlisted to endorse the divergence reception, it should 
not be confused with an attempt on the author‟s part to isolate a mono-causal thread responsible for the 
historical proliferation of a prevalent understanding of Luther‟s Christology. The intent is rather to 
consolidate together the most important and often-invoked interpretive elements enlisted in its defense and, 
by consolidating them together, to engage with the „divergence thesis‟ in its strongest possible form of 
expression. The author is well aware of the fact many contemporary theologians, for instance, would feel 
compelled to adhere to the divergence reception of Luther even in the absence of some or even all of these 
elements. The present dissertation does not mean to address the more subjective question of whether such a 
reception of Luther ought to be entertained, but whether such a reception can be justified on the basis of 
Luther‟s actual historical points of view as has so often been alleged implicitly or directly. 
9The intent of the following overview is not a comprehensive presentation of each author‟s work, 
but a chronicling of the interpretation history of a number of specific claims which together have lent 
plausibility to the broader divergence reception outlined in the introduction of this study. In several cases, 
the scholars whose work is surveyed below would be uncomfortable if not entirely opposed to this 
18 
 
 
 
Luther‟s Two-Fold Divergence from the Late-Medieval Metaphysics of the Incarnation 
 The first tier of the logical anatomy includes two separate, but closely inter-
related claims. In the first instance, it suggests that Luther decisively rejects the late 
medieval nominalist account of the hypostatic union in terms of „suppositional carrying‟. 
It also argues that Luther insists upon a mutual communication of attributes between the 
two natures of Christ. At the heart of this second claim is the insistence that, for Luther, 
the divine nature participates directly in all that pertains to the Son‟s humanity, including 
its capacity for, and experience of suffering. These two claims are often oriented towards 
one another. The second (divine suffering) may be viewed either as the practical outcome 
of the first (a more intimate account of union), or the first may be understood simply as a 
necessary preparatory dogmatic adjustment for securing the second.
10
 Despite this close 
inter-connectivity, clarity demands that each sub-division of this „tier‟ be presented in 
distinct successive phases. This approach will be adopted in the organization of what 
follows.  
Sub-Division 1: A Rejection of Suppositional Carrying in Favor of an Alternative 
Definition of Christ‟s „Person‟ 
  
In his highly influential 1966 essay “Gott ist Mensch: Zur Lehre von der Person 
Christi bei den Ockhamisten und bei Luther”, Reinhard Schwarz begins with a reiteration 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
association. The inclusion of their views as part of the logical substructure that buttresses the broader thesis 
of „macro-conceptual divergence‟ (that is, from classical to historicized metaphysics) is justified by the fact 
that the various „micro-conceptual divergences‟ they defend may be (and have been) enlisted in service of 
the more expansive narrative of macro-divergence. This qualification is necessary to avoid leaving the 
impression that the work of the major authors surveyed below has been pressed artificially into a pre-
determined procrustean bed, and thus that violence has been done to their actual point of view.  
10These options are not mutually exclusive. They differ only in the perception of which „aspect‟ is 
the determinative one for Luther. In either case, the two are interpreted as mutually entailing.  
  
19 
 
 
 
of Karl Holl‟s pronouncement that, though Luther thought he was simply repeating 
classical dogma, he actually interprets its major doctrines in an idiosyncratic and, by the 
standards of the early church, nearly heretical manner.
11
 Schwarz endorses a version of 
Holl‟s insight, and suggests that the inadvertent idiosyncrasy of Luther‟s position most 
visibly manifests itself in a highly critical appraisal of Ockhamist Christology, which he 
derides at one point as crude (geschmacklos) and outrageous (ungeheuerlich).
12
 The five 
sections that comprise Schwarz‟s essay seek to document the nature of Luther‟s criticism 
of late medieval Christology and identify what it is that Luther evidently found so 
offensive about it.  
 At the heart of Luther‟s harsh criticism is his decidedly negative appraisal of 
„suppositional carrying‟ the explanatory model through which late medieval scholastics 
interpret the hypostatic union. According to Schwarz, Luther reacts against the ostensibly 
extrinsic or remote relationship that this descriptive model creates between the divine 
Person of the Logos and Christ‟s human nature. The originating factor behind this distant 
association is a philosophical principle, which Schwarz characterizes as the “neuralgic 
point” of Ockhamist Christology: the axiom that uncreated Being must be kept strictly 
separate from created being. This principle is laconically enunciated, for Schwarz, in the 
                                                             
11“In seiner Christologie hat Luther das altkirchliche Dogma nicht unbedacht nachgesprochen, 
sondern nach seinem Verständnis der Sache interpretiert.” Reinhard Schwarz, "Gott ist Mensch : zur Lehre 
von der Person Christi bei den Ockhamisten und bei Luther" Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 63 
(1966): 289. Schwarz goes on to quote Karl Holl‟s verdict: “Denn in Wahrheit hat Luther das alte Dogma 
nicht nur aufgenommen, sondern fortgebildet, und zwar in einer Weise, die, wenn man den Standpunkt der 
alten Konzilien einnimmt, überall nahe an das Ketzerische anstreifte.” This quote originates in Karl Holl, 
Gesammelte Aufsa tze zur Kirchengeschichte, I (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1928), 71.  
12Reinhard Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch”, 292. Schwarz is echoing here a line from a christological 
disputation from 1540. This text, very important in his interpretation, will be discussed at some length in 
chapter 2. 
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dictum: “nulla proportio est finiti ad infinitum”.13 The problems with Ockhamist 
Christology, to which Luther reacts, are primarily a function of its attempt to affirm 
Christological teaching only under the supervision of the restrictive boundaries erected 
by this philosophical rule. For Schwarz, the late medieval rendering of suppositional 
carrying is the regrettable conceptual byproduct of this ill-fated enterprise.  
 How is it exactly that Luther criticizes and rectifies the extrinsicism of late 
medieval Christology? Schwarz addresses this question in the second major section of his 
essay. He does so by drawing especially from a christological disputation composed by 
Luther in the year 1540.
14
 The main object of Luther‟s discontent, as expressed in this 
disputation, is the customary scholastic expression that the divine Person merely „carries‟ 
the human nature. Luther objects to this way of speaking, according to Schwarz, because 
the term „carrying‟ connotes a relationship between God and man that is far too distant.15 
The formulation practically denies the human nature any share in the personal existence 
of Christ, thus implicitly rendering the incarnate Son something less than fully God and 
fully man.
16
 Such a view is able, in Luther‟s view, to affirm the phrase „Christ is human 
Person‟ only on the basis of a fundamental equivocation of terms.  
The statement is true, in other words, only if the term „person‟ is stripped of all 
durable content. The resultant fissure of meaning can be explicated by the juxtaposition 
(and analysis) of two christological statements: 1) „Christ is a divine person‟; and 2) 
                                                             
13
Ibid., 300-301. “Dieses Axiom ist der neuralgische Punkt der ockhamistichen Christologie.”   
14That is, Luther‟s “Disputation on the Divinity and Humanity of Christ”, located in WA 39/II, 95, 
34ff.  
15Reinhard Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch”, 301-2.  
16Ibid., 302. In light of this criticism, Schwarz surmises: “Es ist praktisch der Vorwurf des 
Doketismus, den Luther gegen die ockhamistische Christologie erhebt.”   
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„Christ is a human person‟. According to the rules of late medieval description, the first 
statements means that Christ is a divine suppositum. On the other hand, the second 
statement really only means that Christ is a divine suppositum, which „carries‟ a human 
nature along with it.
17
 This rather sophisticated sleight of hand is necessary, on Schwarz‟s 
account, in order to maintain the semantic affirmation of christological teaching within a 
philosophical context (nulla proportio est finiti ad infinitum) intrinsically hostile to its 
original contents. The result, from Luther‟s alleged point of view, is nothing less than a 
functional denial of the incarnation beneath a thin veil of superficial assent.    
 On first glance, it appears that Luther is content simply to reiterate the substance 
of traditional Christology and eschew the tensions created by late medieval, nominalist 
philosophy. According to Schwarz, however, Luther‟s incredulous reaction to 
suppositional carrying betrays a deeper reformulation of church teaching than the initial 
impression of Luther‟s traditionalism might indicate.18 The crucial shift that takes place 
has to do with Luther‟s re-interpretation of Christ‟s Personhood. For him, Christ is 
constituted in and through the joining of divinity and humanity, thus making the incarnate 
Person a kind of dynamic mixture or composite.
19
 Although Schwarz admits that Luther 
                                                             
17
 Ibid., 302-3. Schwarz advances this interpretation on the basis of a disputation on John 1:14 
from 1539.  
18Ibid., 304. “Auf den ersten Blick scheinen Luthers christologische Äußerungen nicht mehr zu 
sein als seine Bekräftigung des altkirchlichen Bekenntnisses…Luthers nachdrückliches Festhalten am alten 
Bekenntnis ist aber getragen von einem spezifischen Verständnis der „Sache‟.” In this way, Schwarz 
basically corroborates Holl‟s programmatic statement cited at the outset of his essay. The „first glance 
traditionalism‟, which Schwarz and Holl acknowledge, is likely an allusion to Luther‟s regular assent to 
creedal orthodoxy.  
19Ibid., 304-5. This is the critical claim that will prove to be so influential in later studies of 
Luther‟s Christology. The point is not that Christ is now a tertium quid, but that divinity and humanity play 
an equally constitutive role in the personal existence of His incarnate Personhood. A composite view 
flattens the asymmetry of traditional, christological dogma. The late medieval notion of suppositional 
carrying expresses this asymmetry well by according clear pride of place to the identity of Christ as divine. 
In this view, the humanity is merely a contingently appropriated identity—and not one that ontologically 
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continues to invoke semantic formulations, which are reminiscent of the late medieval 
view, he insists that such instances are always superficial. The apparent endorsement of 
suppositional carrying, which they suggest is disrupted by Luther‟s ardent insistence that 
the event of the incarnation brings about a constitutive change in „what‟ the person of 
Christ is, a view that shatters the fundamental trajectory of late medieval Christology.
20
  
The real source of the disagreement between Luther and the Ockhamists resides at 
the level of conceptual presuppositions. Whereas the latter begins with an abstractly 
derived postulate (the philosophical assumption that an infinite distinction must always 
separate divinity and humanity from one another), Luther‟s begins with the identity of 
God and man in the person of Christ. He ignores a priori questions of „whether‟ such 
unity is philosophically possible, and contents himself with the biblical affirmation of its 
actuality.
21
 On the basis of this fundamental difference, Luther‟s Christology not only 
departs not only from the view of his immediate predecessors, but also redirects from the 
meaning of Chalcedonian Christology.
22
 What Schwarz characterizes as an 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
alters the divine Son. By rejecting this asymmetry, Luther implicitly overturns patristic christological 
norms, even though his proximate „target‟ is late medieval Christology.    
  
20Ibid., 305. “Die Annahme der menschlichen Natur bedeutet indessen nicht eine Aufnahme in 
suppositale Abhängigkeit, sondern ein Geschehen im Sein der Person….” Thus, although Schwarz 
concedes that Luther‟s proximate target is the Ockhamists, he still evidently feels that the differences 
between Luther and his context run more deeply than just an intra-medieval christological dispute in which 
major structural assumptions are held on all sides. See ibid, 306.  
21See ibid., 306-8. This distinction is a hallmark of modern Luther research as a device for 
distinguishing the reformer from his scholastic context. In the opinion of this author, such a sharp 
procedural bifurcation represents an artificial polarization of both groups by underestimating the extent to 
which medieval theologians sought to reason-out from the biblical witness on the one hand, and the extent 
of Luther‟s employment of reason in theology on the other—the latter‟s well-known diatribes against 
philosophy notwithstanding. This pattern of interpretation will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 4.  
22 The reader should note that this inadvertent deviation (inadvertent because, as Holl notes, 
Luther thought he was simply Chalcedonian) is not viewed to be a failure or defect of Luther‟s Christology 
in Schwarz‟s essay. To be sure, there will be scholars later (most notably Beer and Schmidt) who would 
use this interpretation as the basis of a trenchant criticism of Luther‟s theology. Schwarz, though, seems to 
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unsatisfactorily „extrinsic‟ relation between Christ‟s natures must be dissembled in favor 
of a new relation capable of securing a real communication of attributes between 
humanity and divinity. 
Theobald Beer‟s magisterial study, Der fröhliche Wechsel und Streit: Grundzüge 
der Theologie Luthers is strangely congenial to the arguments advanced by Reinhard 
Schwarz, although Beer directs his interpretation to a very different evaluative end.
23
 Like 
Schwarz, Beer thinks that Luther decisively rejects the late medieval doctrine of 
suppositional carrying. In Beer‟s interpretation, however, the result of the shift is not an 
increased emphasis upon the unity of divinity and humanity (even if this may have been 
Luther‟s intent), but a conceptual fissure of unresolvable, diametric antithesis.24  
For Beer, Luther‟s doctrine of Christ creates an insidious dualism because it 
advances a functional definition of „divinity‟ and „humanity‟ within the economy of 
salvation; an anti-metaphysical reduction that creates an oppositional relation between 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
fall in the larger group of those who view main ingredients of traditional Christology (at the very least, its 
antiquated conceptual scaffolding) to be problematic, and therefore are rather congenial to Luther‟s alleged 
modifications.   
23
Theobald Beer, Der fröhliche Wechsel und Streit: Grundzüge der Theologie Luthers (Leipzig: 
St. Benno-Verlag, 1974). 
24Beer provides a multi-tiered investigation of Luther‟s treatment of the „wonderful exchange‟, a 
soteriological motif he claims to occupy so central a position in his theology, that it conditions all other 
salient aspects of the reformer‟s thought. In the course of his book, Beer argues that Luther‟s unique 
rendering of this motif depends upon the doctrine of divine monergism as expressed, most prominently in 
Beer‟s presentation, in the motif of the Devil (or Leviathan) being „tricked‟ by the apparently helpless 
humanity of Christ. At the root of this image for Beer is a fundamental bifurcation between divine activity 
and human passivity, and Beer suggests that this programmatic dualism is reflected at every level of 
Luther‟s theology. The result of this bifurcation manifests itself in Luther‟s alleged tendency to separate all 
the various aspects of his theology into two, fundamentally unrelated and often diametrically opposed 
domains. So, for instance, there is a radical division between imputed righteousness (the grace of God) and 
actual righteousness (the gift of God). Or, there is the radical demarcation of Gospel over against Law that 
characterizes Luther‟s theology as a whole. See ibid., 13-33; 360-61. For one example of Beer‟s emphasis 
upon the pure passivity of the humanity in Luther‟s theology, see ibid., 328. See also 344. An important 
goal of Beer‟s study is to interpret Luther in his own context and vocabulary, and thus shed light on  
whether the alleged points of convergence between modern day ecumenical conversation partners are real 
or only illusory. 
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„natures‟. Luther‟s functionalist Christology ironically precludes the possibility of any 
real affirmation of the hypostatic union.
25
 Luther does not identify Christ as a „Person‟ in 
the traditional sense, but invents his own description.
26
 The incarnate „person‟, for 
Luther, is theologically interchangeable with a “combative unity of functions”.27 Because 
he continues to use the ordinary theological vocabulary, Luther initially seems to build 
his theology on the basis of traditional conceptualities. In reality, he subverts this 
traditional vocabulary by inserting a foreign element. The poisoning assumption is 
Luther‟s view that divinity and humanity are always engaged with one another in a 
relation of antithesis, which can only intersect in a functional concursus of otherwise 
immiscible operations. In order to explicate the underlying transformation of meaning 
effected by Luther‟s appropriation of traditional terms, Beer seeks to demonstrate the 
way in which the reformer co-opts classical vocabulary, and enlists it for his own 
idiosyncratic purposes. 
Beer admits, for instance, that Luther continues to enlist the language of 
„suppositional carrying‟. He insists like Schwarz, however, that the reformer makes use 
of this vocabulary in a manner rather different from his late medieval teachers. For 
                                                             
25Because the only Christ that matters for Luther is the Christ for us, Beer perceives him to reject 
any reflection upon the metaphysical realities necessary for securing the union of divinity and humanity in 
a way that goes beyond sheer juxtaposition. For an example of Beer‟s suggestion of Luther‟s indifference 
or hostility towards abstract questions concerning „what‟ Christ is, see ibid.,  329-31. For Beer‟s claim that 
Luther „functionalizes‟ the doctrine of two natures and thus creates potential problems for his attempt to 
affirm the hypostatic union in any traditional sense, see ibid., 382-3.  
26That is, he does not regard the „Person‟ of Christ as a suppositum; an entity ontologically distinct 
from the two natures individually subsisting through it. 
27Ibid., 398. “Die christliche Metaphysik definiert dieses „Wer‟ [that is, the question of „who‟ 
Christ is] nicht-hellenistisch als Suppositum der Person, Luther dagegen als kämpferische Einheit von 
Funktionen.” For confirmation of this claim, Beer turns to the 1540 disputation and interprets it in a way 
remarkably similar to the afore-described essay by Reinhard Schwarz. See Ibid., 404-6.  
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Luther, all of the terms traditionally intended to express the source of union take on a 
merely linguistic function. Suppositional carrying is no longer used as a descriptive 
analogy through which to make conceptual sense of Christ‟s two natures subsist together 
within a higher order of union. Instead, it is used to express a chronologically sequential 
distinction. It distinguishes between a non-connotative description of divinity and 
humanity on the one hand, and a connotative treatment of the two on the other; that is, it 
provides only a functional analysis of the incarnation. Christ‟s natures may be analyzed 
as they „act‟ separately (abstractly), or within the dynamic coordination of their 
antithetical functions, which coincide in the work of Christ (concretely).
28
 The result is 
not, in either case, a robust account of genuine union. Luther‟s rejection of the 
philosophical substance of suppositional carrying, Beer suggests, it is the separation 
rather than the unity of divinity and humanity that ends up inadvertently being 
emphasized in his thought.
29
  
Because he banishes metaphysical analysis, Luther must simply „position‟ 
humanity and divinity in sheer juxtaposition with one another and interpret their union in 
the terms of a dynamic union of opposites whose respective, immiscible functions 
redemptively coincide for a single goal.
30
 Because there is no higher conceptual plane 
                                                             
28Ibid., 406. This interpretation of the abstract/ concrete is rather common in the interpretation of 
Luther‟s Christology. Its adequacy will be addressed in chapter 2.  
29
Ibid., 412. Here Beer points out that major images enlisted in Luther‟s vocabulary (for example, 
the theme of „covering‟) point more to the separation then the unification of divinity and humanity. This 
claim cuts against the insistence among other Luther‟s scholars that Luther‟s Christology lays primary 
emphasis upon the union of divinity and humanity in Christ. See, for instance Ian D. Kingston Siggins, 
Martin Luther’s Doctrine of Christ, Yale Publications in Religion, 14 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1970), 227. 
30Thus, according to Beer, the communicatio idiomatum expresses for Luther not the unity of God 
and man, but the struggle between divinity and its contrary form. See Theobald Beer, Der fröhliche 
Wechsel und Streit, 380.  
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retained for a classical explanation of the real union between natures, Beer chastises 
Luther‟s Christology as crypto-Nestorian. This is because Luther does not base the union 
of divinity and humanity in the internal continuity of the pre-existent Son as the abiding 
single subject, but in a concept of „composition‟ in which divinity and humanity come 
together in standing tension.
31
 So, although many of Luther‟s statements make him 
appear Chalcedonian (an ostensible source of ecumenical ressourcement), the reality 
beneath Luther‟s traditional vocabulary is a Christology that departs rather dramatically 
from the tradition.
32
  
Marc Lienhard‟s influential book Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ is more 
optimistic than Beer in affirming the extent of Luther‟s christological traditionalism. 
Despite this alternative evaluation, Lienhard acknowledges many of the alleged 
„deviations‟ in Luther‟s Christology that cause a scholar like Beer to doubt his 
orthodoxy.
33
 Their analysis differs, so far as the present topic is concerned, not so much 
                                                             
31Ibid., 380-81. “Im fröhlichen Wechsel ist nicht der Gottmensch in der Einheit mit dem 
Präexistenten, wie im Christushymnus des Philipperbriefs, der Handelnde. Die Vereinigung von Gottheit 
und Menschheit wird nur als ein Kompositum bezeichnet…” 
32Beer‟s controversial interpretation of Luther‟s theology has been the object of serious criticism 
from a number of fronts. A thorough evaluation of his views lies outside the scope of this dissertation. 
However, it is interesting to note the fact that, although Beer‟s conclusions have often been received with 
trenchant disapproval, the interpretation of Luther‟s Christology upon which these conclusions are based is 
not terribly idiosyncratic when compared objectively (that is, denuded of the intrinsically evaluative 
trajectory that conditions Beer‟s argument) with the other points of view articulated in the last fifty years. 
Like many others, he asserts that Luther redefines humanity and divinity in „functional‟ or „dynamic‟ 
categories in a way that is intentionally oriented towards soteriological considerations. Along with many 
others, he concludes that this point of view carries with it a „composite‟ doctrine of Christ‟s person that 
rejects the late medieval nominalist notion of suppositional carrying. While these insights are carried by 
Beer to evaluative ends that differ rather dramatically from the majority of other authors in this survey, this 
fact should not obscure the extent to which his interpretation is reinforced by standard interpretations 
advanced elsewhere. Thus, Ulrich Asendorf is perhaps a bit hasty when he argues that the books by 
Lienhard, Nilsson and Vorländer all refute Beer‟s interpretation of Luther‟s Christology. See Ulrich 
Asendorf, Die Theologie Martin Luthers nach seinen Predigten (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1988), 199 n. 303.  
33Marc Lienhard, Luther, Witness to Jesus Christ: Stages and Themes of the Reformer's 
Christology (Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1982).The origin of Lienhard‟s diachronic study of 
Luther‟s Christology is an attempt to confront Congar‟s verdict that Luther‟s soteriology reflects a 
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in the interpretation they assign to Luther‟s apparent rejection of late medieval 
Christology, but in the varying assessment of the implications each author detects in this 
rejection for Luther‟s subsequent ability to remain within the parameters of Chalcedonian 
orthodoxy.
34
 Like Beer, Lienhard claims that Luther defines the „Person‟ of Christ as the 
concrete product of two natures coming together, although he admits that it is sometimes 
difficult to discern exactly what Luther has in mind.
35
 What is clear, in Lienhard‟s 
interpretation, is that Luther redefines personhood, contrary to the tradition, for the sake 
of enabling a mutual sharing of attributes between the two natures of Christ.
36
 Unlike 
Beer, then, Lienhard does not understand Luther‟s reconfiguration of this doctrine to 
leave the two natures standing in irresolvable antithesis with one another. If anything, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
heterodox Christology in which the humanity is entirely passive. See ibid, 13-4. For an affirmation of 
Luther‟s (pre-medieval) orthodoxy, see 18-26. Lienhard‟s original French edition of this book appeared in 
1973. See Marc Lienhard, Luther  t moin  e J sus-Christ  les  tapes et les th mes  e la christologie  u 
r formateur (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1973). A German edition also appeared in 1980. Marc Lienhard, 
Martin Luthers christologisches  eugnis  Entwicklung un  Grun z ge seiner Christologie (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980). Lienhard does not understand these „deviations‟ as swerves into 
heterodoxy, but as a resolution of inadequate conceptualities in the tradition. 
 
34Stated more specifically, I mean here to suggest that on the specific question of Luther‟s 
acceptance of suppositional carrying, both agree Luther to reject it and embrace a point of view entailing a 
„composite‟ understanding of the Person of Christ.  
35For the former claim, see ibid., 231. For the latter admission, see ibid., 230-31; 330. The 
difficulty stems from Luther‟s continued use of „assumption‟ language whose traditional intent was to 
locate personal continuity in the unchanged life of the divine Son, a perspective that, indirectly at least, 
serves to retain the doctrine of divine impassibility that Lienhard elsewhere argues Luther to reject. 
Lienhard‟s solution to this tension is to suggest that Luther espouses an exaggerated doctrine of the 
anhypostasis/ enhypostasis distinction in which the assuming divine Person itself enters a new reality 
through the full communicative participation of humanity with divinity and vice versa. See Ibid, 230-35; 
and 328-34. 
36So, Lienhard‟s synthetic summary on Luther‟s account of personhood: “the person of the Son 
unites in itself the two natures, but in this hypostatic union a history begins, an intimate communion which 
Luther calls personal, in which the divine nature participates in the human suffering, and reciprocally the 
human nature participates in the divine ubiquity. The divine hypostasis thus truly descends into the history 
of human beings. It does not remain beyond them as an unchanging concept, but participates entirely in the 
history of Jesus of Nazareth. This is why Luther uses the term person in a double sense: on the one hand, to 
designate the eternal author of the act of redemption founded on the enhypostasis, namely the Logos; on the 
other hand, to designate the concretum in which, on the basis of the enhypostasis, the Logos and humanity 
are intimately united for our salvation.” Ibid., 235.  
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Luther‟s emphasis upon the radical union of the two natures together is so acute that it 
occasionally borders upon Eutychianism or Monophysitism.
37
 Both scholars conclude 
that Luther defines the personhood of Christ with a theory of „composition‟, which cuts 
against the late medieval doctrine of suppositional carrying. So far as Lienhard‟s 
importance in the outline of this chapter is concerned though, it must primarily be 
observed that the alleged reconfiguration of the doctrine of Christ‟s person he finds in 
Luther is oriented entirely in service of an alleged reciprocal exchange of the predicates 
of divinity and humanity in which the divine nature of Christ is said equally to share in 
the sufferings of the human nature.
38
 This orientation of the first christological 
divergence in Lienhard‟s work provides additional corroboration for the sequential 
organization through which this literature review has been organized. 
Die Christologie in Martin Luthers sp ten Disputationen by Axel Schmidt 
reiterates and extends many aspects of Theobald Beer‟s interpretation of Luther‟s 
Christology. Unlike Beer, Schmidt limits his study to Luther‟s late disputations, which he 
regards as faithful and concise recapitulations of the reformer‟s theology as a whole.39 
                                                             
37Lienhard expresses this concern in ibid., 317; 344; 387. Another way of articulating the relation 
between Lienhard and Beer on this question would be to say that both agree Luther rejects the metaphysical 
strategy of locating the union of divinity and humanity in a supposit or individual substance that is 
somehow ontologically prior to and unchanged by the assumption of humanity. They disagree, however, on 
what Luther proposes as a replacement for this point of view. For Beer, the clear alternative is sheer 
juxtaposition, whereas for Lienhard the secondary vehicle of union remains (a concept of Person) but is 
reconfigured in such a way that its ontology is at least partially constituted in and through the event of the 
natures coming together. This parting of ways is important because it reflects both the reason why thinkers 
like Beer belong within the logical anatomy of the divergence reception, and why and how their particular 
understanding of Luther‟s divergence takes them in a direction that differs from the broader reception 
treated in this dissertation.  
38See Ibid., 233. This orientation provides additional confirmation for the logical arrangement 
through which the literature covered in this chapter has been organized.     
39
Axel Schmidt, Die Christologie in Martin Luthers sp ten Disputationen (St. Ottilien: EOS 
Verlag, 1990): 2. 
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Like previous Roman Catholic critics of Luther‟s Christology, Schmidt presupposes a 
mutually determinative relation between Luther‟s soteriology and his Christology, and 
argues on its basis that, although Luther often enlists traditional christological 
vocabulary, the quasi-dualist antinomies that fracture his understanding of salvation 
preclude any meaningful affirmation of the personal unity of divinity and humanity in 
Christ.
40
 Schmidt seeks to document the fissure‟s existence on the basis of Luther‟s late 
christological disputations.
41
  
At the root of Luther‟s christological problems, for Schmidt, is an irresolvable 
antithesis between theology and philosophy that casts its shadow over the reformer‟s 
thought as a whole.
42
 Luther‟s inability to maintain an orthodox doctrine of either the 
Trinity or Christ is but one byproduct of a deeper problem in the DNA of his theology 
itself. According to Schmidt, Luther‟s rejection of the late nominalist view of 
suppositional union catches the reformer on the horns of a rather ironic dilemma. On the 
one hand, Luther‟s rejection is animated by a concern for a deeper mode of union. Yet, 
the very distinction he denies provides the only conceptual vehicle capable of securing 
union without sheer antithesis.
43
 Without the conceptual framework of suppositional 
carrying, Luther‟s Christology must terminate, inevitably, either in a relation of standing 
dialectical opposition (as Beer argues), or distinction-erasing, synthetic fusion. Schmidt 
concedes that Luther tries to affirm the Chalcedonian definition as normative. In the 
                                                             
40On the alleged mutual determinacy of these loci, see ibid., 14-5; 178-80. Beer pursues a similar 
line of argument Theobald Beer, Der fröhliche Wechsel und Streit: Grundzüge der Theologie Luthers 
(Leipzig: St. Benno-Verlag, 1974). Among the first to advance a version of this opinion is Yves Congar.  
41In doing so, he leans rather heavily upon the work of Reinhard Schwarz.   
42See Axel Schmidt, Die Christologie in Martin Luthers sp ten Disputationen, 220-33.  
43That is, a unity without mixture or separation. 
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absence of a philosophically dense distinction between „persons‟ and „natures‟, however, 
Schmidt concludes that Luther inadvertently espouses a form of monophysitism with 
paradoxically Nestorian resonances to it.
44
 Like Schwarz and Beer, Schmidt argues that 
although Luther sometimes sounds as if he retains the late medieval mechanism of 
suppositional carrying (and with it a traditional rendering of the distinction between 
persons and natures), he actually rejects it in favor of an alternative proposal.
45
 
Another important book recently arguing for a dramatic departure on Luther‟s 
part from the explanatory mechanism of suppositional carrying is Christus Praedicatus et 
Creditus: Die reformatorische Christologie Luthers in den Operationes in Psalmos 
(1519-1521) by Florian Schneider.
46
 Schneider suggests that Luther develops a decidedly 
„reformational Christology‟ in his second commentary on the Psalms; that is,  he 
articulates a doctrine of Christ closely coordinated with the new doctrine of justification 
that emerges in his thought for the first time towards the end of the second decade of the 
                                                             
44Ibid., 247. That is, Luther holds the union together only on the basis of a dialectical fusion of 
opposites. Without a second conceptual tier in place to hold these two things together (I.E. a suppositum), 
Luther is left with either a monophysite account of their union, or a Nestorian account of their distinction. 
The dialectical character of Luther‟s thought tends in both directions, and hence Schmidt‟s invention of an 
unprecedented (and apparently self-contradictory) heresy to describe the contents of Luther‟s thought. The 
reason that Luther is deemed primarily to be a monophysite is because he clearly lays emphasis upon 
„union‟, but does so without a doctrine of Christ‟s „Person‟ as distinct from the natures. See also ibid, 199-
200. For Schmidt‟s interpretation of Luther‟s view of the hypostatic union, see 234-50. The reader should 
also note that Schmidt appeals explicitly to Lienhard‟s interpretation of Luther on the „person‟ of Christ to 
support his understanding. See ibid, 246 n. 73. The root of this dialectical Christology and its alleged 
rejection of „Person‟ as a „subsisting supposit‟ are located finally by Schmidt in Luther‟s defective 
soteriology, which is the driving force of his theology. Ibid., 250. 
45Schmidt concedes Luther‟s apparent traditionalism in ibid., 241; 246-7. Schmidt draws support 
for his interpretation of a fundamental departure from both Schwarz and Lienhard. For Schmidt‟s 
interaction with Schwarz, see ibid., 234f. For his citation of Lienhard, see page 246. Schmidt is critical of 
Schwarz‟s pessimistic interpretation of Ockhamist Christology, preferring instead to see it as a particular 
vocabulary for affirming a traditional distinction. However, despite his criticism of Schwarz on the 
nominalists, he accepts his view that Luther criticizes their Christology and diverges decisively from it. 
Here we see an example of a common analysis with internally divergent evaluations.    
46Florian Schneider, Christus praedicatus et creditus: die reformatorische Christologie Luthers in 
den "Operationes in Psalmos" (1519-1521), dargestellt mit  est n igem  ezug zu seiner 
Fr hzeitchristologie (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2004). 
31 
 
 
 
16
th
 century.
47
 As the result of this shift, Luther no longer concerns himself with an 
„abstract‟ or „formal‟ presentation of Christ. His interest is limited to reflection upon 
Christ only as conjoined with the believer‟s subjective appropriation of salvation. This 
new dogmatic orientation carries with it, for Schneider, a fundamental shift away from 
classical Christological reflection.
48
 One of its more prominent consequences is the fact 
that Luther no longer conceives of „natures‟ as static but rather as dynamic, or functional 
realities.
49
 Luther‟s Christology is no longer bound to abstract, scholastic conceptualities, 
but refers instead to the subjective consciousness of the man Christ.
50
 Interpreted in this 
manner, Schneider suggests that Luther‟s doctrine of a radical simultaneity between 
Jesus‟ divinity and humanity demolishes Aristotelian philosophy with its restrictive 
prohibition against a „coincidence of opposites‟.51  
So, Luther is alleged by Schneider to move beyond not just the late medieval 
understanding of „suppositional carrying‟ but beyond the formulation of two-nature 
Christology itself, since there is no longer a simultaneity of two distinct substantial-
                                                             
47
 See ibid., 2-3; 10; 61; 100. 
48Ibid., 81. So, for instance, Schneider here insists that Luther no longer entertains the notion of a 
Christ in himself, but knows only of the Christ pro nobis. The ontological implications of this view are 
made clear in the following statement: “Christus mag auch Person für sich selbst sein, aber erst im Sich-
selbst-Ausschenken hat er seine eigentliche Identität. Luthers These lautet, daß Christus gerade in seinem 
Für-uns-Sein sein An-sich-Sein realisiert.” 
49Ibid., 115-6.   
50Ibid., 117. “Im Zentrum stehen nicht die der Zweinaturenlehre verpflichteten scholastischen 
physischen und hyperphysischen Kategorien (persona, natura, substantia, suppositum, pars inferior et 
superior etc.), sondern die von Christus gemachte und insofern subjektbezogene Gewissenserfahrung.” 
Also important is Schneider‟s explanation on page 177: “ Die Einheit zwischen Menschlichem und 
Göttlichem wird nicht mehr mit Hilfe von Naturkategorien beschreiben, sondern durch konkrete 
Bewußtseinsgehalte Christi. Es geht Luther nicht um die Simultaneität zweier substanzontologisch 
verstandener Naturen. Vielmehr werden dynamische und affektuale Begriffe zur Beschreibung des polaren 
Seins Christi in Anschlag gebracht.”  
51Ibid., 176. Here there is a latent similarity with Schwarz, who also argues that the actuality of 
divine-human union overcomes all discourse, which questions its philosophical possibility.   
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ontological natures. Instead, the person of Christ is constituted through the dynamic and 
subjective coming together of contrary predicates within the concrete consciousness of 
Jesus.
52
 For Schneider, it is enough in Luther‟s mind simply to assert paradoxical 
statements of the being of Christ within an acutely sharpened, discursive polarity. Luther 
redefines the personhood of Christ as the “concrete speaking together of opposites” in 
which such polarities collide. The personal union of divinity and humanity is termed a 
„Sprachereignis‟.53 Luther overcomes the Ockhamist notion of a suppositional union by 
understanding the person of Christ to be the result of a speech event that takes place in 
the prayer of Christ.
54
  
In this sub-section‟s brief documentation, it has become clear that a common 
thread unites a number of recent, major works on Luther‟s understanding of the 
hypostatic union. According to this view, Luther clearly rejects the late medieval doctrine 
of Christ‟s personhood and supplanting it with something radically different.55 In most 
cases, this radically different alternative is characterized as advocating a „composite‟ 
understanding of the hypostatic union, although what exactly is meant by this varies from 
author to author. In order to explore a commonly identified product (and impetus) of this 
reconfiguration, this chapter now turns to the second aspect of the divergence thesis‟ first 
                                                             
52Ibid., 198-9.  
53See ibid., 181 and 190. See also 209-10; 351-5.  
54
Ibid., 190.  
55We may also note that Schneider understands an important result of this reconfiguration to be the 
attribution of suffering to the divine nature over against the lingering docetism of the tradition. This again 
demonstrates the logical inter-connectivity between various tiers expressed in the sequential arrangement of 
this chapter. See Schneider, 135; 148; 355. Another book that reproduces the main themes of Schwarz‟s 
seminal essay as far as Luther‟s relation to suppositional carrying is concerned is Stefan Streiff,  Novis 
linguis loqui  Martin Luthers Disputation   er Joh 1,14 "verbum caro factum est" aus dem Jahr 1539 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1993). 
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tier of analysis; the allegation that Luther‟s doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum 
espouses a two way communication between natures in which the divine nature suffers. 
This survey will require tracing additional claims made by authors already cited, and 
introducing others who build upon their work.  
Sub-Division 2: The Divine Nature of Christ also Suffers 
The focus of Schwarz‟s essay rests primarily upon Luther‟s rejection of the late 
medieval nominalist mechanism for conceptualizing the hypostatic union. In addition to 
this main emphasis, however, Schwarz also makes it clear that the primary intended 
result of Luther‟s christological adjustment is an altered understanding of the relationship 
that exists between Christ‟s natures. According to Schwarz, Luther measures the success 
or viability of any doctrine of the hypostatic union against its capacity to support a robust 
account of the communication of idioms.
56
 Such an account includes, for Schwarz, the 
mostly unprecedented assertion that the divine nature shares also in the attributes of the 
human nature.
57
 The result, as Schwarz briefly indicates, is that, although Luther 
continues to enlist qualificatory addenda such as secundum humanitatem, which are 
                                                             
56Reinhard Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch”, 309. It is fairly common, within recent scholarship on 
Luther‟s Christology, to insist that Luther lays a previously unprecedented degree of emphasis upon the 
communication of idioms.  See, for instance Oswald Bayer, "Das Wort ward Fleisch: Luthers Christologie 
als Lehre von der Idiomenkommunikation," In Creator est creatura (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 23; 
and Johann Anselm Steiger, and Carolyn Schneider, "The Communicatio Idiomatum as the Axle and Motor 
of Luther's Theology." Lutheran Quarterly 14, no. 2 (June 1, 2000): 125. The present author regards claims 
of this kind to be overstatements. Luther‟s late medieval predecessors were highly concerned with the 
communicatio idiomatum, and discussed it at considerable length. So far as patristic precedent is concerned, 
it hardly seems fair to suggest that this doctrine is uniquely central for Luther, when John Anthony 
McGuckin can summarize of Cyril of Alexandria that “the communicatio is shorthand for his whole 
doctrine of the incarnation as a transforming transaction whereby human nature is appropriated by God and 
deified in the process.” John Anthony McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological Controversy: 
Its History, Theology, and Texts, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae, v. 23 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 192.  
57Ibid., 311-2. “Es soll nur unterstrichen werden, daß Luther ebenso die andere Seite der 
communicatio idiomatum ganz erst nimmt. Die göttliche Natur hat teil an allen Eigentümlichkeiten der 
menschlichen Natur, also an allem, was zum irdischen Dasein des Menschen gehört.” 
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traditionally intended specifically to protect the abiding impassibility of divinity, his 
doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum makes clear that the divine nature of Christ truly 
suffers along with the humanity.
58
 Such addenda do not, then, in any way suggest that 
Luther proscribes a real, two-way communication between natures. Their function, in 
Schwarz‟s interpretation, is simply to identify the proper nature from which equally 
shared attributes like suffering derive their origin within the concretion of Christ‟s 
Person.
59
 Luther‟s christological course correction includes an affirmation of divine 
suffering. 
Also seminal in the development of the divergence interpretation of Luther‟s 
Christology, though more restrictively occupied with Luther‟s doctrine of the 
communicatio idiomatum is the work of Kjell Ove Nilsson, whose book Simul: Das 
Miteinander von Göttlichem und Menschlichem in Luthers Theologie first appeared in 
1966, more or less at the same time as the essay by Schwarz.
 60
 There is, for Nilsson, a 
clear terminological continuity between Luther and the theologians of medieval 
scholasticism in their shared use of vocabulary such as „person‟, and „nature‟, but he 
insists a vast difference to separate the way in which both groups make use of these 
terms. While the scholastics identify persons and natures as static metaphysical 
substances possessing certain pre-determined properties, Luther fills them with „dynamic‟ 
                                                             
58Ibid., 311-3. So, Schwarz argues, although it is clear to most that Luther thinks the humanity can 
and does share in the attributes of divinity (as the Eucharistic debates demonstrate), he stresses the fact that 
he insists upon the reverse of this relationship just as seriously.  
59Ibid., 312-3. As we have already commented, this „sequential‟ interpretation of Luther‟s 
language will be addressed as a central component of the second chapter.   
60Kjell Ove Nilsson, Simul: Das Miteinan er von G ttlichem un  Menschlichem in Luthers 
Theologie, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Bd. 17 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1966).   
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content.
61
 This means, for Nilsson, that humanity and divinity are defined primarily in 
light of their respective „roles‟ in the salvation event.62 Nilsson is less clear in his book 
than the essay by Schwarz on how exactly this new content pushes Luther‟s definition of 
„personhood‟ away from the views of late medieval nominalism.63 The functionalizing 
(non-speculative) impetus of his interpretation could certainly be taken to imply that the 
personal union ought simply to be understood in terms of an inseparable, dynamic co-
working of divinity and humanity in the same salvific event that is itself constitutive of 
the Person. Nilsson stops short of this view, though. His treatment is more attentive to the 
ongoing role of traditional concepts within Luther‟s vocabulary that proscribe such a 
position, even if he thinks ultimately that Luther‟s Christology fundamentally transforms 
this vocabulary from the inside out.
64
  
                                                             
61Ibid., 186-7. “Man darf Luther zufolge den Naturen keinen naturalistischen und metaphysischen 
Inhalt beilegen, sondern muß sie in einer dynamischen, beweglichen und lebendigen Weise definieren, so 
daß der Begriff Natur eigentlich die Bedeutung Werk erhält, menschliches Werk und göttliches Werk.” 
“Divinitas und humanitas sind keine quantitative Größen oder metaphysichen Kontraste, sondern diese 
Worte sind auf eine neue Weise zu verstehen, und nicht nur, als bezeichneten sie ein Verhältnis zwischen 
Unendlichem und Endlichem, Volkommenem und Unvollkommenem, Unveränderlichkeit und Wechsel.” 
Nilsson does not think, though, that this means that Luther wanted to eliminate completely the concept of 
nature from his theology. At the very least, the conservative tendencies of his theology show up in his 
preservation of the term even if, as Nilsson suggests, he attaches to it his own peculiar meaning. 
62Ibid., 232-3. Nilsson admits that Luther also assigns certain „metaphysical‟ predicates to the 
natures, but claims that this aspect of his thought is secondary to his dynamic emphasis. Nilsson makes a 
similar point on page 209 when he claims: “Hier finden wir also wieder, daß Luthers Auffassung von den 
Naturen Christi nicht durch abstrakte und spekulative Erwägungen bestimmt ist. Entscheidend ist vielmehr 
die Darstellung von Leben und Versöhnungswerk Christi, sein Kampf und Sieg, seine Entblößung und 
Verherrlichung. Dies drückt Luthers Beschreibung dessen, was Göttlich und Menschlich ist, seinen 
Stempel auf.”These sorts of claims bear a striking resemblance to Beer‟s claim that Luther „functionalizes‟ 
the two natures of Christ, though Nilsson would certainly not share Beer‟s appraisal of the shift. 
63Nilsson‟s characterization of „scholastic Christology‟ is mostly content to comment that it is 
„speculative‟, „abstract‟, and „metaphysical‟ and does not, for the most part, get in to the finer points of 
which explanatory mechanisms are enlisted to make sense of the hypostatic union.  
64Ibid., 179-81. Note, for instance, Nilsson‟s affirmation here that the divine Person assumes to 
itself a human nature, thus avoiding the implication that the Person of Christ is constituted by the coming 
together of dynamic natures. Lienhard will also affirm something like this, though still suggest that the 
divine Person enters a new mode of existence in the incarnation, thus rendering Christ‟s person a 
composite. On Lienhard, see above.  
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Nilsson‟s primary attention rests upon Luther‟s doctrine of the communicatio 
idiomatum, which he takes to be the organizing center of the reformer‟s entire theology.65 
His book seeks on the basis of this conviction to interpret Luther‟s doctrine of Christ 
(along with other major aspects of his theology) entirely in light of it.
66
 So, what is the 
communication of attributes in Nilsson‟s interpretation of Luther, and what sort of 
exchange between divinity and humanity does it inaugurate? For Nilsson, Luther‟s 
treatment of the communicatio idiomatum is motivated entirely by soteriological 
concerns.
67
 Nilsson shares Schwarz‟s view that the medieval period makes use of 
secundum quid qualifiers in order to protect the integrity of a preconceived philosophical 
polarity between divinity and humanity. This is a starting point that Luther simply does 
not share.
68
 Luther‟s focus is soteriologically determined, and this entails a fundamental 
re-definition of what one means by „nature‟, „person‟, „God‟, „humanity‟, etc. Luther‟s 
doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum appears in some cases to dissolve the distinction 
between natures altogether, and thus tend towards a species of monophysitism. Nilsson 
insists, however that such an accusation falls well short of Luther‟s actual point of view.69 
The main point is simply that divinity and humanity are united in a single act of God, 
                                                             
65Ibid., 228. “Hier können wir nun folgende These aufstellen: weil für Luther alles darauf 
ankommt, daß Christus wirklich das einheitliche, gottmenschliche Erlösungswerk pro nobis ausgeführt hat, 
und weil die Einheitlichkeit dieser Handlung ihrerseits mit der unitas der Person zusammenhängt, wobei 
die communicatio-Lehre das Zentrum bildet, deswegen macht die communicatio idiomatum das Herzstück 
der Theologie Luthers aus.” 
66In this respect, Nilsson is an interesting precursor to the work of later scholars like Johann 
Anselm Steiger who will later claim Luther‟s unique doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum to be the 
center and animating principle of his entire theology. For more on Nilsson‟s interpretation of the 
communication of attributes as well as others following in his wake, see below. 
67Ibid., 227.  
68Ibid., 237. This, despite the fact that Nilsson is clearly aware that Luther continues to make use 
of such qualifiers. See, for instance, his citation of similar phrases in Luther on page181. The question of 
how these qualifiers are employed in Luther‟s theology will be a major point of focus in chapter 2.   
69
Ibid., 237-8.  
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which is carried out by Christ, an act in which the distinct soteriological functions 
pertaining to each nature remain distinguishable from one another.
70
  
Luther will often speak of this lingering distinction in rather traditional ways, by 
Nilsson‟s own admission. This may make it appear that he accepts the classical 
proscriptive boundaries, which deny any sharing of Christ‟s divine nature in the 
sufferings of the human nature. Nilsson argues, however, that Luther pushes beyond 
these restrictive borders, even though later Lutheran theology re-erects them.
71
 Although 
there is at least a verbal tension in Luther‟s discussion of this question (stemming from 
his concern to emphasize both union and distinction), Nilsson concludes that, in the final 
analysis, Luther embraces the genus tapeinoticum (the communication of human 
attributes to the divine nature) as the symmetrical correlate of the genus maiestaticum 
(the communication of divine attributes to the human nature).
72
 Nilsson makes sense of 
Luther‟s occasional caveat that divinity does not suffer, by emphasizing the reformer‟s 
oft-enlisted distinction between abstract and concrete statements. Nilsson insists that this 
distinction is used by Luther to differentiate statements, which apply to each nature „prior 
to‟ or „outside‟ of their union in Christ (abstract), and statements, which now apply 
                                                             
70
Ibid., 244-5.   
71Ibid., 237-8 n. 37-8.  
72Ibid., 249-50. The fact that Nilsson admits an unevenness in the evidence for this interpretation 
is to his credit. Not all proponents of the divergence interpretation are so forthcoming about the fact that 
Luther at least sounds in many places like he reproduces the traditional view which denies any suffering of 
the divine nature. How such apparently heterogeneous evidence ought to be interpreted will be another key 
focus of chapter 2. The genus mentioned here reflect the later language that emerged in the intra-Protestant 
and intra-Lutheran debates of the mid to late 16th century. Very briefly, the genus maiestaticum refers in 
this literature to the real sharing of the human nature in the predicates of divinity (most famously, the 
possibility or actuality of the human nature being present in more than one place as would be necessary for 
its real presence in the Lord‟s Supper). The genus tapeinaticum refers to the sharing of the divine nature in 
the predicates of the human nature. The Christology of the Lutheran confessions rejects this genus, 
although the confessions do not name it as such.  
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equally to both natures on the basis of their union (concrete).
73
 So, while „divinity-
considered-on-its-own‟ does not suffer, the divine nature does suffer within the 
hypostatic union.
74
 
Marc Lienhard acknowledges an apparent endorsement of divine impassibility in 
several of Luther‟s written texts. He argues, though, that this traditional point of view is 
progressively mitigated over the course of Luther‟s theological development. Lienhard 
points to an implicit departure from the doctrine of divine impassibility already in some 
of Luther‟s very early works, but suggests that it took some years for this seminal insight 
to develop and consistently integrate with the more technical aspects of Luther‟s 
theological vocabulary like his discussion of the communicatio idiomatum.
 75
 In fact, 
Lienhard admits that Luther never carried this progression to its entirely consistent end. 
He points out vestiges of the classical view (I.E. that the divine nature does not suffer), 
which remain even in the later years of Luther‟s life.76 Despite these mitigating factors, 
however, Lienhard is convinced that Luther clearly espouses a mutual communication of 
attributes between natures, a communication which includes the sharing of Christ‟s 
                                                             
73Ibid., 255-7. This seems to be the explanatory mechanism through which Nilsson also makes 
sense of secundum quid qualifiers in Luther‟s christological vocabulary. Here we observe yet another 
„sequential‟ interpretation of Luther‟s qualificatory discourse.  
74Nilsson summarizes his interpretation in the following closing statement: “Göttliches und 
Menschliches haben beide ihre speziellen Eigenarten und können niemals gegenseitig identifiziert werden; 
sie sind im Gegenteil die äußersten Gegensätze ihrer selbst, aber durch die communicatio idiomatum ist 
Gott mit dabei, offenbart er sich und handelt er mit dem Menschlichen zusammen, und dadurch sind Gott 
und Mensch in Christus zu einer Einheit verbunden, sodaß alles, was in Hinsicht auf Person und Werk 
Christi über die Gottheit gesagt werden kann, auch der Menschlichkeit gilt—und umgekehrt, jedoch ohne 
alle Verwandlung oder Vermengung.” Ibid., 260.  
 
75Marc Lienhard, Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, 25; 53. For Lienhard, the Alexandrian notion of 
a one-way communication from divinity to humanity risks Docetism; a verdict that reveals some of the 
presuppositions that animate his views of Christology in general. See ibid., 336.  
76Thus, there is an unresolved fracture in Luther‟s thought, as Lienhard explains in ibid., 379.  
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divinity in the sufferings of his humanity.
77
 The break with traditional conceptualities 
may not be as tidy as one could hope, but the break nevertheless exists. 
Luther‟s use of qualifying distinctions traditionally enlisted to proscribe this 
implication (secundum quid qualifiers and the abstract/ concrete distinction) is interpreted 
by Lienhard through frameworks similar to those already developed by Schwarz and 
Nilsson. In the final evaluation, Lienhard suggests that the contents of Luther‟s new 
christological point of view comports rather awkwardly with the traditional vocabulary 
that Luther enlists as a matter of habit and cultural inertia. In order to articulate Luther‟s 
views with a greater degree of consistency, one would need to do away with the 
analytical categories Luther takes for granted by virtue of his late medieval context.
78
 
Important works by Johann Anselm Steiger and Dennis Ngien also detect in 
Luther‟s treatment of the communicatio idiomatum includes a semi-revolutionary 
endorsement of divine passibility.
79
 Like Nilsson, Ngien acknowledges the textual 
difficulties involved with making this case. He concedes that Luther‟s insistence upon 
divine suffering emerges only occasionally within the reformer‟s late writings. Earlier 
works preserve the proscriptive contents of traditional descriptions, which rule out any 
suffering of Christ‟s divinity as such. In this respect, Ngien shares Lienhard‟s view that 
                                                             
77Ibid., 31; 138; 339-42. 
78Ibid., 345; 374. Here we see a „new wine in old wine skins‟ interpretation. For more on this, see 
chapter 4.   
79See Dennis Ngien, The Suffering of God According to Martin Luther's 'Theologia Crucis' 
(Vancouver: Regent College Pub, 2005); Dennis Ngien, “Chalcedonian Christology and Beyond: Luther‟s 
Understanding of the Communicatio Idiomatum” Heythrop Journal 45 (2004): 54-68; Johann Anselm 
Steiger, "Die communicatio idiomatum als Achse und Motor der Theologie Luthers: Der "fröhliche 
Wechsel" als hermeneutischer Schlüssel zu Abendmahlslehre, Anthropologie, Seelsorge, Naturtheologie, 
Rhetorik und Humor" Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 38, no. 1 
(January 1, 1996): 1-28. See also Steiger‟s later articulation of this same argument in Steiger, Johann 
Anselm. F nf  entralthemen  er Theologie Luthers un  seiner Er en: Communicatio, Figura, Imago, 
Maria, Exempla. Leiden: Brill, 2002.   
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Luther‟s work is internally inconsistent, even if both ultimately insist the overall 
trajectory of the reformer‟s to tilt decidedly in the direction of a doctrine of divine 
passibility. Florian Schneider postulates a similar commitment to the suffering of the 
divine nature in Luther‟s presentation of the communication of idioms, and argues that 
Luther‟s reconfigured Christology as a whole overcomes the latent docetism of the 
patristic and medieval tradition.
80
 This same basic point of view is reflected quite broadly 
throughout modern literature on Luther, whether historical or theological in nature.
81
 
Luther‟s alleged christological rejection of divine impassibility is dependent upon 
the more fundamental claim that he also rejects the overarching framework of late 
medieval Christology in general. The two are genetically related in the view of many 
authors because Luther‟s ardent commitment to a doctrine of reciprocal communicative 
exchange seems to require a complete overhaul of the late medieval conceptualities. Its 
theory of the hypostatic union is especially egregious, because „suppositional carrying‟ is 
assumed to permit only an „extrinsic‟, if not quasi-Nestorian, account of the relationship 
                                                             
80Florian Schneider, Christus Praedicatus et Creditus, 117-9; 135; 148. “Die kreuzes- und 
leidenstheologischen Aussagen Luthers implizieren eine kritische Stimme gegen das Axiom von Gottes 
Unveränderlichkeit und Leidensunfähigkeit.” For Schneider, the main point has to do with the 
unprecedented depth to which Luther was willing to attribute the full experience of „Anfechtung‟ to Christ, 
an attribution that traditional christological commitments prevented others in the tradition from 
entertaining. With Schneider, it is not so much a matter of affirming the mutual communication between 
humanity and divinity, but a complete reconfiguration of the categories responsible for the question itself. 
Nevertheless, within this „reconfiguration‟, he is clear that God truly participates in experiences or 
activities associated with the humanity.   
81A few examples here include Jens Wolff, Metapher und Kreuz: Studien zu Luthers Christusbild 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 426; Sibylle Rolf, “„Christum und nichts anders‟: die Kommunikation 
von Gott und Mensch und die Predigt des Evangeliums” Luther 80, no. 3 (January 1, 2009): 158 n. 26; 
Robert Kolb, Martin Luther: Confessor of the Faith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 115; Jürgen 
Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology, 
trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 232-3; and Ted Peters, God--
the World's Future: Systematic Theology for a Postmodern Era (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 206-9. 
Thomas Weinandy seems to presuppose more or less the same interpretation of Luther, but would evaluate 
the resultant shift rather differently. See Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, Ind: 
University of Notre Dame, 2000), 185. 
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between divinity and humanity in Christ. Luther‟s divergence away from suppositional 
carrying is a necessary „clearing of the ground‟ to make space for the dynamic, and 
communicative character of his thought.
82
  
A Soteriology of Requisite Divine Passibility 
 The previous section‟s documentation of the divergence reception‟s first „tier‟ of 
analysis focused primarily upon „whether‟ Luther deviates from late medieval 
Christology according to recent major literature, and if so, „how‟ he does so. The result of 
the survey so far has shown that much scholarship assumes an affirmative response to the 
former question, and insists that Luther‟s endorsement of divine passibility represents an 
essential starting point for addressing the latter. The second tier of analysis, presented in 
the current section, turns its attention to the question of „why‟. That is: if it is true that 
Luther is so intent upon securing the suffering of God in Christ, why is this commitment 
so important to him? Although it would be an overstatement to suggest that all who argue 
for some version of the divergence thesis think that Luther‟s rationale is entirely 
soteriological in nature, this section will demonstrate that many scholars do in fact point 
in this direction.
83
  
 The seeds of this view are already embedded, it seems, in the claim articulated by 
Kjell Ove Nilsson that Luther‟s Christology is driven predominantly by matters of 
soteriological concern. Such a posture certainly implies that the suffering of the divine 
nature (which Luther is assumed by Nilsson to affirm) is somehow redemptively 
                                                             
82A recent essay that lays considerable emphasis upon the „communicative structure‟ of Luther‟s 
theology is Sibylle Rolf, “„Christum und nichts anders‟”, 150-169.  
 
83One reason for this trend is the fact that most scholars view Luther‟s Christology to be 
determined completely by soteriological concerns. Such a claim is often intended to differentiate Luther‟s 
theological style from medieval theology that is often characterized, by contrast, as highly speculative.  
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necessary.
84
 Ian Kingston Siggins is more direct in his book Martin Luther’s Doctrine of 
Christ when he suggests that Luther‟s soteriology actually depends upon a rejection of 
divine impassibility.
85
 In a similar vein, Marc Lienhard implies that impassibility is 
basically incompatible with Luther‟s soteriological claim that Christ actually bears the 
sins of humanity.
86
 Florian Schneider understands Luther‟s reformational Christology to 
be oriented towards his new doctrine of justification by faith. This includes, for him, an 
insistence that God meet human beings where they are, and thus share completely in the 
forsakenness of their situation.
87
 Thus, while the central focus of these few authors lies 
primarily elsewhere, each endorses the notion that Luther‟s soterio-logic requires a 
mutual communicative exchange in which Christ‟s divine nature suffers. 
The most explicit assertion of the association between Luther‟s alleged 
christological deviation and a soteriologically necessary denial of divine impassibility is 
                                                             
84 For Nilsson‟s comments on the centrality of soteriology in these matters, see Kjell Ove Nilsson, 
Simul, 207; 227; 237; 243. A particularly clear statement appears on page 257: “Diese Kommunikation in 
Christus zwischen Person und Natur, Natur und Natur, vom Menschlichen zum Göttlichen und vom 
Göttlichen zum Menschlichen, ist für Luther der entschiedende “Artikel”. The logic described above, 
though, does not emerge as forcefully in Nilsson as it does in later authors.   
85Ian Kingston Siggins, Martin Luther’s Doctrine of Christ, 241. Siggins is a unique case because 
he argues that the overall shape of Luther‟s thought points in the direction of divine passibility, but laments 
the fact that Luther himself seems not to have realized this. In this respect, Siggins is among the most 
severe examples of the „new wine in old wine skins‟ interpretation, because he thinks Luther does not do 
away with the doctrine of divine impassibility in his discussion of the communication of attributes, but 
claims that he would need to do so in order for the more central emphases of his theology to function 
properly. In an ironic way then, Siggins reinforces the accuracy of this chapter‟s sequential arrangement, 
but disagrees implicitly with the interpretations of Luther‟s Christology that correspond with it. His 
solution is to „fix‟ Luther in order to help him be more consistent with his own best ideas. See more on 
Siggins in the documentation of the third tier below.   
86Marc Lienhard, Martin Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, 138. In other words, this soteriological 
trope is considered to be intrinsically incompatible with the doctrine of impassibility. The strength of this 
assertion, though, is mitigated by the fact that the vast majority of the confessional Protestant tradition 
accepted this theory of the atonement and still maintained a classical doctrine of divine impassibility.   
87Florian Schneider, Christus Praedicatus et Creditus, 191 “Die Überwindung der Sünde in 
Christus uns zugute muß zunächst die Sünde nochmals schrecklich groß machen, so groß, daß ein Riß 
durch Gott selbst geht, daß er sich selbst in einem sich gegen ihn selbt richtenden Willen gegenübertreten 
muß.”  
43 
 
 
 
expressed in the work of Johann Anselm Steiger, and Dennis Ngien.
88
 Steiger‟s essay, 
“Die communicatio idiomatum als Achse und Motor der Theologie Luthers”, builds upon 
the work of Schwarz, Nilsson and Lienhard. He reiterates the prominent claim that Luther 
overturns the impassibilist „veto‟ that casts its shadow across patristic and medieval 
treatments of the communication of attributes.
89
 Whereas John of Damascus, for instance, 
limits his discussion of reciprocal attribution in order carefully to proscribe the suffering 
of Christ‟s divinity, things are “entirely different” [ganz anders] for Luther, who Steiger 
insists removes this limit and embraces a fully reciprocal exchange between natures.
90
 
Steiger traces the theological extension of this „exchange theme‟ of reciprocal exchange 
in relation to a number of aspects of Luther‟s theology. The first and most important 
consequence of Luther‟s position is soteriological in nature. According to Steiger, 
Luther‟s christological adjustment is geared towards a soteriology of communicative 
exchange wherein humanity receives a share in all that belongs to divinity, and vice 
versa.
91
 A central ingredient of this exchange in Steiger‟s interpretation is the genuine 
sharing of God in the defects of human existence.
92
  
                                                             
88This association is also advanced by the Erlangen theologian, Werner Elert. See Volker Keding, 
“Wider das Apathieaxiom: Die theopaschitische Christologie des späten Elert und ihre 
Wirkungsgeschichte” in Mit  em Menschen verhan eln   er  en Sachgehalt  es Evangeliums   ie 
 e eutung  er Theologie Werner Elerts f r  ie Gegenwart, eds. Rudolf Keller and Michael Roth 
(Erlangen: Martin-Luther-Verlag, 2004), 97.  
89For Steiger‟s citation of these authors, see Johann Anselm Steiger, “Die communicatio 
idiomatum als Achse und Motor der Theologie Luthers”, 1 n. 1. For his insistence that Luther intensifies 
the communicatio idiomatum to include the suffering of the divine nature, see ibid, 3-5.  
90Ibid., 3. 
91“Dieses soteriologische Theologoumenon verdankt sich christologischer Reflexion; man könnte 
auch sagen: Luther hat die Christologie konsequent auf die Soteriologie angewandt, indem er beide Lehren 
synoptisch gelesen und die eine auf die andere angewandt hat.” Ibid, 5-6.  
92Ibid., 5-7.  
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Dennis Ngien agrees entirely with the claim that Luther moves beyond a 
traditional doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum, and embraces a relationship between 
natures that includes the suffering of the divine nature of Christ. The defense of this basic 
thesis is the main trajectory of his essay, “Chalcedonian Christology and Beyond: 
Luther‟s Understanding of the Communicatio Idiomatum.”93 The decidedly soteriological 
trajectory of Luther‟s revolutionary position becomes clear in the third section of Ngien‟s 
essay, entitled, “God‟s Suffering and Soteriology”.94 Here, Ngien mounts his argument 
largely on the basis of a section of Luther‟s 1539 treatise “On the Councils and the 
Church” where the reformer states: 
“Unless God is in the balance and throws his weight as a counterbalance, we shall 
sink to the bottom of the scale. … If it is not true that God died for us, but only a man 
died, we are lost. But if God‟s death and God dead lie in the opposite scale, then his side 
goes down and we go upward like a light or empty pan. Of course, he can also go up 
again and jump out of his pan. But he could not have sat in the pan unless he became a 
man like us, so that it could be said: God dead, God‟s passion, God‟s blood, God‟s death. 
According to his nature God cannot die, but since God and man are united in one person 
it is correct to talk about God‟s death when that man dies who is one thing or one person 
with God.”95 
 
Ngien does not address in his discussion here the important qualifier “according to his 
nature God cannot die” which would seem, prima facie, to complicate the blatantly 
passibilist interpretation he assigns to this passage, although he elsewhere addresses 
                                                             
93Dennis Ngien, “Chalcedonian Christology and Beyond: Luther‟s Understanding of the 
Communicatio Idiomatum” Heythrop Journal 45 (2004): 54-68. Ngien‟s point of view is that Luther 
maintains the traditional position at many points in his life, but that there are a handful of texts in his corpus 
that unambiguously move beyond it.  
94Ibid., 59-60.  
95This section is copied from ibid., 59 where the author quotes The Formula of Concord‟s 
rendering of WA 50, 590.  This same quote occupies a central place in Steiger‟s presentation. Johann 
Anselm Steiger, “Die communicatio idiomatum als Achse und Motor der Theologie Luthers”, 6-7.   
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disclaimers of this kind through an explanation of the concrete/ abstract distinction that 
echoes points of view already espoused in previous scholarship.
96
  
 The directness of Ngien‟s appropriation of this text warrants verbatim 
documentation: 
 “In order to redeem human beings from the power of death, God has to co-suffer 
and co-die in Christ. That is why Luther makes use of his image of the scale, to illustrate 
that God can go down, can rise and jump out of his pan. God lets himself be overtaken by 
death in the suffering and dying of Jesus, and yet he remains the victor over death. The 
divine nature was present throughout the earthly life of Jesus, and was not untouched by 
the whole affair of the incarnation. With this it becomes clear how closely the two-nature 
Christology and soteriology are linked in Luther‟s thinking. It is a theological axiom that 
Christ be affected by suffering even according to the divine nature, otherwise salvation 
through Christ’s suffering is inconceiva le to him.”97 
 
Here we see that, for Ngien, Luther‟s alleged reconfiguration of Christology is a basic 
requirement of his soteriology. The theme of God‟s full and redemptive participation in 
the predicament of post-lapsarian humanity stipulates the capacity of divinity to suffer. 
This soterio-christological symmetry is an important binding thread that unites this 
chapter‟s sequential presentation of the divergence reception. Although there is some 
disagreement among the scholar‟s surveyed thus far concerning the extent to which 
Luther consistently realized this symmetry, the fundamental notion that the logic of his 
soteriology requires christological deviation remains more or less a constant.
98
 Thus, 
                                                             
96Dennis Ngien, “Chalcedonian Christology and Beyond”, 62; 65. According to Ngien, and others 
already surveyed above, this distinction points to the fact that God only suffers in and through the incarnate 
unity with the human nature. Outside of the incarnation, or before it, divinity does not and cannot suffer. 
Thus, the emphasis in this explanation of the distinction rests upon a sequential or temporal analysis. When 
Luther says “God cannot suffer”, this is taken to mean that divinity by itself (in eternity) does not suffer, but 
this statement is not thought to mitigate the subsequent reality that divinity does suffer in and through the 
incarnation of Christ. Chapter 2 of this dissertation will address the adequacy of this interpretation.  
97Ibid., 59. Emphasis mine. 
 
98A notable exception here is Theobald Beer who likewise argues for a christological divergence, 
but thinks the source of Luther‟s novelty lies not so much in a soteriology of divine solidarity, but in 
Luther‟s tendency to proliferate antithetical dualisms. As we have already explained, Beer is included here 
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viewed retrospectively, the sequential thrust of the divergence thesis‟ cumulative 
argument could be summarized in the following manner:  
Luther‟s commitment to a soteriology of God‟s radical participation in the lowly 
estate of sinners requires as its internal presupposition the capacity of God‟s nature to 
suffer, or experience genuine vulnerability. This capacity is secured only insofar as the 
traditional proscriptions against divine suffering, which govern the traditional treatment 
of the communicatio idiomatum, are overcome. The radical account of union between 
divinity and humanity that emerges in Luther‟s counter-proposal, moreover, stands in 
diametrical tension with the nominalist notion of suppositional carrying (with its guiding 
axiom: nulla proportio est finiti ad infinitum), which not only accepts but actually 
intensifies the classical proscriptions whose pagan philosophical derivation obstructs the 
realization of Luther‟s soteriological trajectory. This conceptual framework must 
therefore likewise be jettisoned in favor of an unmitigated affirmation of real and 
reciprocal communion between God and man in the person of Christ. 
 
It is this basic logical organization of Luther‟s theological commitments that has 
mediated the broad perception of his ongoing significance that this dissertation seeks to 
engage. A central implication of such an interpretive synthesis, as represented by the 
third „tier‟ of our survey, is the conviction that Luther inaugurates a fundamentally new 
account of God‟s being in relation to the progress of salvation history. In the following 
documentation of this „third tier‟, we will explore a number of instances in which the 
sequential progression so far traced is enlisted to reinforce this extension of Luther‟s 
theology.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
because he reiterates an interpretation of Luther‟s Christology that comports in many particulars with those 
scholars whose work points more neatly along the trajectory of the divergence reception. The organization 
of this chapter is not intended to suggest that every point along the way must point in the direction of a 
historicized doctrine of God. It would be more accurate to say, more modestly, that the interpretations 
charted here have been appropriated in this way; and, in many cases, that this trajectory has often been 
cited as a major motivating factor for the alleged christological divergence defended by so many. Other 
appropriations of this „logic‟ are to be found in a number of systematic uses of Luther over the last several 
decades. Most conspicuous here is the work of Jürgen Moltmann, but his understanding of Luther‟s 
soteriological significance is by no means an isolated phenomenon.  
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A Fundamentally New Doctrine of God  
To this point, we have occupied ourselves with the documentation of several 
commonplace interpretations of Luther‟s theology as it pertains specifically to technical 
aspects of his Christology and their relation to his broader soteriological commitments. 
This discussion has therefore been confined primarily to synchronic or micro-diachronic 
assessments of Luther‟s thought; that is, analyses that fall within the chronological 
parameters either of a given set of discrete texts (I.E. his late christological disputations 
as in the case of Schwarz), or within the proscribed limits of Luther‟s theological 
development over the course of his life (I.E. the allegedly coherent contours of his 
soteriological vision in the wake of his first articulation of justification by faith alone). In 
this section, we reflect upon a prominent „macro-diachronic‟ construal of Luther‟s 
significance in light of these interpretive building blocks. The advance to questions of the 
meta-narratival variety is encouraged by gestures in the direction of a retrospective 
evaluation of Luther‟s significance in light of modern concerns that show up in the 
concluding remarks of several scholars documented above. The pregnant trajectories of 
these vestigial „gestures‟ have subsequently been taken up by contemporary theologians 
eager to plot the cartography of modern theological trends and thus specify their apparent 
precursory development. It must be clear in addressing this phenomenon, though, that 
such an enterprise departs from the task of „Luther-interpretation‟ in the strict sense. Our 
concern, first and foremost, is to document the way in which the sequential interpretation 
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of Luther‟s Christology plotted above has been used in constructive efforts to mine the 
radiating implications of Luther‟s ostensible novelty.99 
Speaking rather generally, we may summarize at the outset that the theoretical 
extension of the divergence interpretation tends to include two central elements that 
together frame contemporary perceptions of Luther‟s ongoing significance. The first 
component asserts a decisive overthrow, on Luther‟s part, of the classical doctrine of 
God, with its putatively Greek a priori definition of divine attributes.
100
 One correctly 
detects here a considerable overlap between the modern historiography of Luther‟s 
theology and the broader narrative of „hellenization‟ that has been used as an explanatory 
device for making sense of early Christian doctrinal development. Situated by such a 
narrative, Luther emerges as an early de-hellenizer; an abject opponent of every attempt 
to define the being of God in the terms of classical theism.
101
  
The second central element of the extension is positive in nature. It focuses upon 
the new doctrine of God, with which Luther supplants its philosophically corrupted 
                                                             
99This documentation is necessary for at least two reasons. 1) The historical task is often (if not 
always) reciprocal in nature. Interpretations make way for narratives of significance, and narratives of 
significance often encourage retrospective interpretations of figures on the plane established by them. A 
full account of a reception, then, requires description of both cause (interpretation) and effect (significance) 
because the progression between these stages is seldom one-way. 2) For better or worse, the broader 
perceived significance of Luther‟s thought in relation to modern questions has served often as a framework 
for the interpretation of his thought. The particular conceptual extension examined in this section goes a 
long way in documenting the central claims responsible for recurrent assessments of Luther‟s fundamental 
theological contributions. All of this adds to the interpretive thicket that together constitutes the divergence 
reception as defined in this dissertation.    
100I am thinking here, primarily, of immutability, simplicity, impassibility and the like.   
101The question of whether this characterization is fair to patristic or medieval modes of thought 
need not detain us here. For our purposes, the salient fact is that Luther has been interpreted frequently on 
the terrain of such a narrative. There is also some overlap here with Heidegger‟s influential critique of 
onto-theology, which is sometimes invoked by those concerned to develop theology beyond all 
metaphysics, and beyond the question of „being‟ altogether. Heidegger, himself, paves the way for such a 
reception. See, for instance, Merold Westphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology: Toward a Postmodern 
Christian Faith (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 4  
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precursor. What is generally regarded as central to Luther‟s alternative account is its stark 
recognition of God‟s passionate involvement in history. It acknowledges that God, like us 
(though not perhaps in exactly the same way), is conditioned by the events of salvation 
history and does not remain unchanged by His association with them. The passibility of 
God is an emblematic outgrowth of this insight. The constructive pay-off for 
contemporary theology is an ostensibly more robust doctrine of divine immanence.  
Premonitions of the „immanence extension‟ may be detected in the seminal essay 
by Schwarz only on the basis of indirect inference. In his interpretation, Luther diverges 
from late medieval theology primarily because he adopts a christological first principle 
that forfeits all a priori conceptions of the divine being, a point of view that places Luther 
at odds with the nominalist penchant for beginning with a doctrine of divine-human 
incommensurability. In light of Schwarz‟s earlier comment that the nominalists faithfully 
redact the christological views of the early church, is it too much to conclude that he 
conceives of this shift as touching upon the most basic doctrinal assumptions of the early 
church? Does Schwarz understand classical Christian theism as a whole to be supervised 
by the very same a priori commitments that Luther would later overthrow? At the very 
least, we may observe that, for Schwarz, the central dividing line between Luther and the 
late medieval objects of his critique resides in the fact that, while the latter takes it‟s 
starting point from pagan philosophy, Luther begins with the actual union of God and 
man in Jesus Christ, and thinks outwards only on its basis. One must be careful here to 
not place words in Schwarz‟s mouth. Nevertheless, whether intentional or not, the reader 
is certainly left with the implication that Luther, for the first time in the history of 
dogmatic development, pulled back the Hellenistic veil that had long attenuated the 
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capacity of theological reflection to affirm fully the mystery of God‟s real union with 
humanity in Christ. Such an implication portends far-reaching adjustments on Luther‟s 
part to the traditional doctrine of God, adjustments that scholars writing in Schwarz‟s 
wake declare more transparently than he does.
102
   
One such scholar is Ian Kingston Siggins who argues that the central, abiding 
trajectory of Luther‟s thought carries theology beyond the static God of the philosophers 
and embraces a more dynamic understanding of God‟s being. This position characterizes 
Siggins‟ presentation of Luther‟s Christology, although, as we have noted, he thinks 
Luther‟s discussion of the communicatio idiomatum is diluted by traditional concepts that 
no longer fit well within his overall point of view. So, Siggins claims, although it is clear 
that Luther entirely rejects the doctrine of divine impassibility and affirms over against it 
the genuine suffering of God, his attempt to speak within the traditional christological 
categories inherited from his context leaves the awkward impression that he ascribes 
suffering only to the humanity, a point of view Siggins views as incoherent and probably 
Nestorian.
 103
 Siggins‟ explanation of this phenomenon makes it rather clear that he views 
this uncharacteristic regress (that is, Luther‟s denial of divine suffering in his technical 
explanation of the communication of idioms) as standing in awkward tension with the 
                                                             
102Even Nilsson, who published his important book in the same year as Schwarz‟s essay, espouses 
a markedly starker appraisal of Luther‟s relation to the apparent Hellenism of the tradition‟s doctrine of 
God, although Nilsson, like several others, argues in favor of Luther‟s fundamental traditionalism in other 
respects. His ability to mount this „traditionalist‟ argument depends upon an ancillary relation between an 
alleged center of patristic Christology, and the broader philosophical vocabulary through which this center 
was expressed. Such a strategy has been adopted by several other scholars who likewise seek to defend 
Luther‟s Chalcedonianism, though still embrace the main elements of the divergence interpretation.   
103For the former concession, see Ian Kingston Siggins, Martin Luther’s Doctrine of Christ, 237. 
For the latter verdict, see page 128. 
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rest of Luther‟s theology, and so he laments the fact that Luther was not more consistent 
in his re-interpretation of the relation between divinity and humanity in Christ.
104
  
The fact that Luther speaks in terms of this traditional framework at all, is 
accidental to his intentions, an inadvertent byproduct of the time in which he lived. It is 
not in any way a central piece of his evangelical theology.
105
 The explosive materials of 
Luther‟s theology lie, for Siggins, always somewhat muted in nucleic dormancy, never 
erupting to the point that the restrictive structures of static orthodoxy are set aside, as they 
would need to be for the reconfiguration they anticipate to achieve complete consistency. 
The relation of all this to Siggins‟ interpretation of Luther‟s reconfiguration of the 
doctrine of God is visible in a particularly impassioned paragraph that shows up towards 
the end of his magisterial study:  
“If only Luther had rigorously pursued his own counsel into the realm of dogma! 
But remnants of the philosophers‟ God persist, despite his radical insistence that 
whatever rational apprehension of God we may possess, it is to be abandoned for the 
lively knowledge of the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. This should lead to a 
complete reworking of the truth enshrined in the sentence, „Christ maintained His 
Godhead unaltered when He became man.‟ For it should mean that even what we know 
of God‟s unchangeability is determined by what we discover of it through faith in Christ. 
And this God is not the almighty incomprehensible First Cause of the schools, but a God 
whose mercy is from everlasting to everlasting. „Since that Day God speaks to us Himself 
through His Son and Holy Spirit. Now we hear a fatherly voice proclaiming sheer 
unfathomable, ineffable love and mercy, utterly nothing but blessing, nothing but 
goodness, sweetness, and love. For that is what it means to be God.‟”106 
 
                                                             
104So, Siggins comments: “In short even though Luther‟s presentation of the communicatio 
idiomatum is technically tenable, it creates an impression alien to his design. Fortunately, it is a minor 
incident in his biblical exegesis; and at most points Luther is content to confess the unity of the natures on 
the ground that the biblical account means what it says”. Ibid., 234.   
105“Luther‟s struggles with the formal categories of Christological theory arise from traditional 
familiarity, not from evangelical concern; and he is therefore unsuccessful in reinterpreting the old 
orthodoxy in terms of his new and living faith” Ibid., 239.  
106Ibid., 240.  
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 Siggins represents a minority voice in our survey. Like others within the afore-
outlined sequence, he defends the overall interpretation that Luther rejects the doctrine of 
divine impassibility, and in so doing, liberates theology from its stifling philosophical 
overlord. However, he suggests (over against the vast majority of other scholars) that this 
is true not on the basis of, but in spite of Luther‟s treatment of the communicatio 
idiomatum. Siggins argues in this limited context that Luther inexplicably retains the 
traditional position that only the humanity of Christ suffers. Thus, there is in Luther 
something like an unrealized fissure between the genuinely evangelical contents of his 
theology, and the analytical categories through which he articulates his christological 
point of view, namely, the remnants of a philosophical tradition from which he implicitly 
departs.
107
 Thus, for Siggins, Luther inaugurates a new doctrine of God on the basis of his 
redefinition of divinity and humanity, but Luther himself never worked out this new 
vantage point consistently even in the area of his own Christology. He cracks the 
foundation of classical theism, but leaves much of the edifice standing in place, ready to 
be toppled by later theologians who would take up the trajectories of his work more 
consistently.  
 Lienhard‟s reflection upon Luther‟s trans-historical significance in this area is 
much the same, although he is more specific about what exactly Luther contributes to 
modern theology than Siggins, and more optimistic about the extent to which Luther 
progressively overcomes the internal fissure between old and new within the 
                                                             
107This internal fissure is illustrated by Siggins statement that Luther‟s soteriological emphases 
cannot survive if the doctrine of impassibility is retained. Ibid., 241.  
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development of his thought.
108
 Luther‟s Christology, as presented in the conclusion of 
Lienhard‟s book, is significant above all for its discovery of the historicity of divinity, a 
framework that overcomes the platonic doctrine of God that dominates the theological 
framework of Luther‟s predecessors and contemporaries.109 In the modern period, 
theology has learned that „persons‟ are not entities defined by their possession of a 
„nature‟. Instead, persons are their „history‟, an insight Lienhard suggests Luther to have 
acknowledged.
110
 Thus, Luther emerges in Lienhard‟s closing evaluation as an important 
precursor (perhaps the hinge point) leading up to modern trends in the doctrine of God 
such as historicism and the affirmation of divine suffering.  
 Axel Schmidt likewise suggests Luther‟s Christology to point forward to 
decidedly modern frameworks in both theology and philosophy. For instance, Luther‟s 
account of the union of divinity and humanity in Christ, engineered in absence of a 
traditional metaphysical distinction between „person‟ and „nature‟, has as its only 
conceptual avenue a kind of proto-Hegelian dialectical union of opposites which creates 
an unresolved fissure running through the heart of Luther‟s theology. Schmidt‟s 
evaluation of Luther‟s attempt to locate the union of divinity and humanity upon the same 
plane of history (that is, without the help of the classical distinction between „nature‟ and 
„person‟) is obviously markedly different than those who see the historicization of God‟s 
being as a necessary step beyond theology‟s restrictively Hellenistic past. Nevertheless, 
                                                             
108See, here, primarily, the section “Luther and the Modern Evolution of Christology” in Marc 
Lienhard, Martin Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ, 391f. On the „fissure‟ in Luther‟s thought according to 
Lienhard, see above. 
109Ibid., 391-2.  
110Ibid., 393.  
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Schmidt shares the opinion that Luther‟s adjustments to Christology carry with them a 
trajectory that leads forward into German Idealism.
111
 
 Johann Anselm Steiger argues that Luther‟s treatment of the communicatio 
idiomatum only continued the historicization of metaphysics already implicit in the two-
nature doctrine of the early church. Luther is significant because he carried this process 
into a position of more radical internal consistency.
112
 The reformer‟s transformation 
(N.B.: not eradication for Steiger) of the early Church‟s Greek metaphysics is thus 
interpreted with a nod towards Hegel, who would later take up Luther‟s theological 
mantel through his organization of history as the self-emptying of Geist. Steiger is unique 
in the sense that he asserts here no fundamental breech with the patristic or medieval 
doctrine of God, only the continuation of an uncompleted (to that point) process of 
metaphysical historicization.
113
 Luther‟s significance, though, is still located here in the 
terms of a „transition‟ away from the relatively pre-historicized account of God‟s being in 
the patristic and medieval periods. Luther nudges dogmatic development onwards in the 
direction of modern conceptual frameworks (Hegel in particular) that reflect upon the 
inter-relatedness of God and man in Christ with a greater seriousness and internal 
consistency.
114
   
                                                             
111See, for example,  Axel Schmidt, Die Christologie in Martin Luther’s Disputationen,  323 n. 14.  
112Johann Anselm Steiger, "Die communicatio idiomatum als Achse und Motor der Theologie 
Luthers”, 6. “Luther hat die metaphysische Ontologie der altkirchlichen Zwei-Naturen-Lehre soteriologisch 
gedacht und so die Metaphysik vergeschichtlicht und damit einen der Alten Kirche bereits begonnenen 
Vergeschlichtlichungsprozeß der Metaphysik konsequent vorangetrieben.” 
113Ibid., 27-8.  
114A similar point of view that predates Steiger is an essay by Hünermann. Hünermann also thinks 
Luther points the way forward in the direction of Hegel, but carries out his reconfiguration of Christology 
only incompletely. See Peter Hünermann, "Geschichte der Christologie : Geschichte Jesu Christi mit den 
Menschen?" Theologische Quartalschrift 164 (1984): 102-120. Luther‟s Christology of reciprocal 
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 Florian Schneider agrees. Because the unity of Christ‟s person is constituted by a 
linguistic concursus of contrary affections, Luther‟s view of the death of Christ is said to 
contain profound implications for the very life of God.
 115
  In particular, Schneider‟s 
proposal highlights the fact that God also is qualified by the event of the incarnation and, 
in a certain way, actually dependent upon it for the final constitution of His being.
116
 
“Through this linguistic activization and dynamization, Luther freed Christology from the 
efforts [Bemühungen] of ancient metaphysics.”117 This conceptual liberation points the 
way forward to a more modern Christology with its openness to the historicity and 
passibility of God.
118
 
  The motif of an all-embracing break on Luther‟s part from a classical doctrine of 
God (as motivated by his Christology and soteriology) is perhaps nowhere stronger than 
in the recent work of Dennis Ngien. One finds inklings of the broader, synthetic narrative 
in the conclusion to his oft-cited essay, “Chalcedonian Christology and Beyond”, 
composed in 2004.
119
 More developed, though, is the cumulative argument set out in the 
published version of Ngien‟s doctoral dissertation, The Suffering of God according to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
exchange, it should be noted, is the logical link upon which this entire account of the reformer‟s perceived 
significance hangs.  
 
115Florian Schneider, Christus Praedicatus et Creditus, 184. 
116Ibid., 148. Schneider points here in a footnote to a comment by Eberhard Jüngel on the 
historicization of God‟s being. 
117Ibid., 354.  
118Ibid., 355. 
119In the last section, for instance, Ngien argues for a line of continuity between Luther and 
modern theologians such as Moltmann and Jüngel. See Dennis Ngien, “Chalcedonian Christology and 
Beyond”, 65.  
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Martin Luther’s ‘theologia crucis’.120 In this book, Ngien assesses the extent to which the 
suffering of God in Christ is constitutive of God‟s very being in Luther‟s theology.121 
Ngien suggests the doctrine of impassibility belongs entirely to an a priori definition of 
the divine being that flatly contradicts the biblical testimony.
122
 Luther, on the other hand, 
begins with Scripture and thus liberates theology from its “captivity to Hellenized or any 
a priori theological formulations.”123 This means, first and foremost, that God reveals 
himself to us in and through the sufferings of Christ; a suffering in which the divine 
nature clearly participates in Ngien‟s interpretation. As Ngien reflects upon this shared 
suffering of the divine nature in Christ, he articulates the implicit doctrine of God‟s being 
that Luther develops therein: “Luther conceives the theology of the Trinity in such a way 
that it includes the Incarnation and Passion of God in Christ, not as an addendum but as 
ontologically constitutive of God.”124 
 In these ways, the divergence interpretation of Luther‟s Christology and the 
soteriology it animates has informed broader theological receptions of Luther‟s 
significance, which identify him as an early departure away from the classically 
developed doctrine of God‟s being, and towards a historicized account. Such a reception 
depends and builds upon the various interpretive elements, which the preceding threefold 
survey has isolated. In order to create the conditions necessary for an alternative 
                                                             
120Dennis Ngien, The Suffering of God According to Martin Luther's 'Theologia Crucis' 
(Vancouver: Regent College Pub, 2005).  
121See a condensed version of Ngien‟s entire argument in ibid., 1-2.  
122See his characterization of theology before Luther in chapters 1 and 2.   
123Ibid., 41.   
124Ibid., 151-2. Ngien concedes that Luther never argues that the Father suffers. Only the 
sufferings of the divine Son are ontologically basic to the life of the Trinity in Ngien‟s view.  
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reception, then, it is necessary to consider in subsequent chapters whether the divergence 
thesis represents a historically legitimate appraisal of Luther‟s ideas.  
An Agenda for Subsequent Examination 
 Based upon the definition and documentation of the divergence thesis in the 
preceding sections, we may turn now to the task of isolating the essential questions with 
which subsequent chapters of this dissertation will be occupied. These questions identify 
the fundamental issues upon which the verification or refutation of the divergence 
reception stands or falls.   
Does Luther reject the late medieval nominalist doctrine of suppositional carrying and 
replace it with a new mechanism for describing the union of natures in Christ? 
 
It is crucial that the reader notice here that the question is not whether Luther 
differs from late medieval thinkers such as Ockham, D‟Ailly and Biel in any respect, for 
surely he is no mere puppet of their views! Instead, it asks whether there exists adequate 
evidence to postulate a rejection on his part of the doctrine of suppositional carrying.
125
 
Assessing this question must take into account the fact that suppositional carrying is not a 
monolithically determinate theory of christological explanation, but remains open to 
                                                             
125This question need not directly engage the question of whether or not the rather critical 
presentation of Ockhamist Christology found in Schwarz is entirely correct, nor whether his pessimistic 
evaluation of the subsequent extrinsic relation between human nature and divine person represents an 
accurate depiction of late medieval thought. For a trenchant criticism of Schwarz along these lines, see 
Graham White, Luther as Nominalist: A Study of the Logical Methods Used in Martin Luther's 
Disputations in the Light of Their Medieval Background (Helsinki, Finland: Luther-Agricola-Society, 
1994), 271-80. There exists considerable diversity within medieval scholasticism concerning the range of 
broader christological opinion with which the theory of suppositional carrying is paired. Schwarz comes 
close to acknowledging this internal variety in at least one place in his essay.  Ibid, 300. “Man kann die 
Intention der skotistisch-ockhamistischen  Christologie anti-eutychianisch nennen und kann darin ein 
berechtigtes Bestreben erblicken, die in der Hochscholastik festgelegte Position der Subsistens-Theorie mit 
ihrem anti-nestorianischen Zug nach der Gegenseite hin abzusichern.” Schwarz may intend by this 
statement strongly to differentiate a subsistence theory of the hypostatic union from later reflection upon 
Christ in terms of „suppositional carrying‟. Whether such a bifurcation is appropriate is a question we will 
explore in chapter 2. 
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varieties of expression.
126
 In order to determine, then, whether Luther moves beyond the 
parameters of late medieval Christology, we will first need to ascertain what are the 
essential features of „suppositional carrying‟, which characterize the theory in its broadest 
conceptual outline. Based upon this broad definition, the investigation will then stand in a 
position to ascertain the extent of Luther‟s allegiance to late medieval conceptualities. To 
do this, we will need to evaluate not only the „negative evidence‟ Schwarz and others 
furnish to establish Luther‟s divergence from late medieval Christology, but also 
„positive counter-evidence‟ in Luther‟s writing that seems to suggest an ongoing 
acquiescence on his part to the theory of „suppositional carrying‟.127 
Does Luther‟s treatment of the communicatio idiomatum apply „suffering‟ to the divine 
nature of Christ? 
 
 
 This second question enjoys a higher degree of simplicity than the first. Its 
adjudication requires an appraisal of Luther‟s treatment of the communication of idioms, 
especially in the works that flow from his pen in the last decade and a half of his life. 
This focus upon Luther‟s later theological output is a function of the fact that most 
interpreters documented in our survey acknowledge Luther to articulate some version of 
the traditional position on the communication of attributes during the early years of his 
                                                             
126That is to say, while the theory does stipulate some things, there are many subsidiary questions 
that it leaves unaddressed; questions over which adherents of the theory in general can and do disagree.    
127 This will involve, for example, appraising the extent to which Luther‟s Christology retains a 
few characteristic analytical entailments of the theory itself. Examples of these entailments include: 1) an 
asymmetrical treatment of the relation between the person of Christ and the divine nature on the one hand, 
and the human nature on the other; 2) a use of „supposit logic‟ for specifying and adjudicating the truth-
value of christological statements; 3) a denial that the person of Christ is a „composite‟; and 4) a strategy of 
establishing the continuity of subjectivity between the eternal Logos and the incarnate Christ that depends 
upon a non-composite understanding of the person.  
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theological output.
128
 Because this interpretation implicitly grants the fact that Luther‟s 
earlier position still proscribes the suffering of the divine nature, the majority of our 
attention will focus upon those texts in which most scholars suggest there to be an 
unambiguous departure. The examination of this question will also be informed by a 
survey of late medieval predication theory, which will help to measure the relative extent 
of Luther‟s semantic novelty, for instance, when he insists upon the phrase that „God 
suffers and dies‟.  
Does Luther‟s soteriology depend upon the divine nature of Christ suffering along with 
the humanity?  
 
 
 To ask whether a particular christological affirmation is required by Luther‟s 
soteriological commitments is to invite analysis of a more synthetic nature, and requires 
some apprehension of Luther‟s broad theological vision as a whole. The potential 
interpretive hazards that attend such a generalized form of inquiry are legion. In order to 
mitigate the risk of unchecked generalization, the initial probative discussion set forth in 
chapter four will confine itself primarily to the task of adjudicating the textual merits of 
the view that Luther‟s soteriology requires the suffering of the divine nature. It will do so 
by examining carefully each of the central texts adduced by proponents of the divergence 
thesis as evidence that divine passibility is a central entailment of Luther‟s soteriology. 
As a supplementary exercise, chapter four will also provide a constructive 
reinterpretation of the soterio-logic embedded within these texts, and others that reflect 
upon the nature and purpose of God‟s involvement in the sufferings of Jesus. 
 The third tier of the divergence thesis rests upon the historical legitimacy of tiers 
one and two, and thus stands or topples entirely on their basis. Because of this, the 
                                                             
128
Exceptions to this trend include the work of Erich Vogelsang and Florian Schneider.   
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present study will not labor the reader with any discrete discussion of an additional 
diagnostic question designed to secure the validity or invalidity of Luther‟s alleged 
reconfiguration of the doctrine of God. If the preliminary assertions of the divergence 
thesis are refuted successfully, it will simply be assumed that the „historicizing‟ reception 
of Luther‟s ideas is exegetically misguided. The final chapters will be occupied instead 
with the task of re-imagining a contemporary appropriation of Luther‟s Christology no 
longer based upon the premise of seminal divergence. 
Conclusion: The Thesis Re-visited 
 It is now possible to restate the central thesis of this dissertation with greater 
specificity. The subsequent chapters will argue in favor of four, implication-laden claims: 
1) Luther‟s writings nowhere evince a fundamental rejection of the late medieval theory 
of suppositional carrying. On the contrary, a careful study of pertinent texts demonstrates 
an abiding adherence to this explanatory model. 2) Luther‟s doctrine of the communicatio 
idiomatum clearly and intentionally retains the doctrine of divine impassibility and 
nowhere endorses a mutual sharing of attributes between natures. 3) Luther‟s 
soteriological vision, far from requiring the affirmation of divine passibility, depends, in 
fact, upon its rejection. The fourth claim represents a cumulative judgment. 4) The 
reception of Luther‟s theology, which locates a major aspect of his contemporary 
significance in the perception of a fundamental re-direction of the doctrine of God, is 
misleading—at least insofar as it claims a divergence interpretation of Luther‟s 
Christology as its underlying historical warrant. It will be the task of subsequent chapters 
to substantiate the aforementioned claims, and explore a few of their most important 
implications for a renovated appropriation of Luther‟s Christology.  
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DETRACTOR OR DEBTOR?: LUTHER ON THE LATE MEDIEVAL 
METAPHYSICS OF THE INCARNATION 
 The „divergence reception‟ of Luther‟s doctrine of Christ chronicled in the 
previous chapter has at its foundation the postulation of a two-fold doctrinal deviation in 
Luther‟s christological discourse away from the theological framework of the late 
medieval tradition. This deviation is fundamental to all subsequent tiers of the reception, 
because it represents for it the conceptual point at which the fabric of an antiquated 
metaphysics first begins to tear, thus giving way to a radically different alternative. 
Luther‟s „new‟ Christology could accordingly be likened to a small stone cast upon the 
placid waters of the medieval theological system, the effect of whose initial impact  
radiates steadily outwards, reordering the very nature of theology itself. The implication 
of all this, is that the construal of Luther‟s „technical‟ Christology scrutinized in the next 
two chapters stands at the very center of the „divergence reading‟ as a whole. It 
represents, in a very real sense, the reception‟s sine qua non, the evidentiary basis upon 
which it either stands or falls. What follows will seek to refute the textual interpretation 
requisite to this construal‟s legitimacy, and thus, in effect, destabilize the foundation 
upon which the subsequent reception is built. 
Because the first „tier‟ of alleged divergence is essentially two-fold, its analysis in 
this study is divided correspondingly into two major chapters. The first chapter asks 
whether it is true that Luther‟s writings exhibit a clear rejection of „suppositional 
carrying‟ as an interpretive device for making sense of the hypostatic union. In the 
second chapter, the focus shifts to Luther‟s treatment of the communicatio idiomatum. It 
attempts to ascertain whether Luther indeed moves beyond a traditional commitment to 
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divine impassibility, and embraces the suffering of Christ‟s divine nature. Both chapters 
ultimately argue in favor of a negative response to each of these questions, and suggest as 
a positive alternative that Luther remains very much within the parameters of late 
medieval discourse, at least so far as the two isolated issues are concerned. Luther does 
not reconfigure late medieval Christology in the way that has so often been suggested, 
and does not claim that the divine nature suffers in and through its hypostatic union with 
the humanity of Christ.    
The Issue of Suppositional Carrying  
Lying at the evidentiary foundations of the divergence thesis is an interpretation 
of Luther‟s Christology that pits him decisively over against late medieval conceptions of 
the hypostatic union. In particular, Luther is supposed to reject the scholastic view that 
the unity of humanity and divinity may be understood in the descriptive terms of „alien 
suppositional carrying‟. For those interpreters committed to the trajectory of reception 
outlined in the previous chapter, the basic rationale that animates Luther‟s departure from 
this „descriptive mechanism‟ is his unwillingness to accept the extrinsic relationship that 
such an understanding appears to create between God and man in Christ.
1
 In order to 
address the veracity of this claim, the present chapter includes two major sub-sections. 
The first reflects upon the medieval backdrop over against which Luther‟s views are 
                                                             
1We have also noted a few interpreters who suggest a dualism of sorts to animate Luther‟s 
rejection of this christological theory. These authors are important insofar as they provide evidence in favor 
of divergence that we shall have to evaluate. However, the trajectory of their analysis differs from the 
reception that is the focus of this dissertation. Whether their „quasi-dualist‟ account of Luther‟s theology is 
adequate is a question for another publication. All we may say in terms of evaluation here is that this 
construal hinges also, at least in part, upon the legitimacy of Luther‟s rejection of suppositional carrying. 
Thus, although what follows will not seek directly to draw this conclusion, the argument in favor of 
Luther‟s retention of this doctrine presents significant obstacles for the validity of the „dualist‟ reading of 
Luther as well.    
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widely deemed novel. The second will evaluate the textual basis upon which the 
comparative „novelty‟ of his own position has been alleged.  
The Putative ‘Whence’ of Christological Divergence   
Luther and His Late Medieval Context  
 
 
 It goes without saying that an accurate appraisal of Luther‟s relation to the 
medieval doctrine of suppositional carrying requires some prior delineation of the 
medieval doctrine itself. The same is naturally true of the next chapter‟s focus upon the 
communicatio idiomatum. In light of this methodological prerequisite, the present sub-
section will attempt to furnish a historical baseline against which the alleged conceptual 
divergence of Luther from his immediate context may objectively be adjudicated. With 
the exception of Schwarz whose criticism of nominalist treatments of the hypostatic 
union rests upon a fairly extensive interaction with scholastic writings, the majority of 
characterizations of late medieval Christology within the divergence interpretation are 
content simply to define it through the employment of pejorative monikers such as 
„Nestorian‟, „static‟, „abstract‟, or „speculative‟.2 The problem with this mode of 
depiction resides in the fact that the characterizations listed here all manifest a 
combination of both description and evaluation on the part of their authors. As such, they 
risk, in the case of the divergence thesis, presuming the very point they wish to prove; 
                                                             
2See for instance Marc Lienhard, Luther, Witness to Jesus Christ: Stages and Themes of the 
Reformer's Christology (Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1982), 30; 387-9; Ulrich Asendorf, Die 
Theologie Martin Luthers nach seinen Predigten (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 197; Vidar 
L. Haanes, "Christological Themes in Luther's Theology" Studia Theologica 61 (2007): 23-9; Florian 
Schneider, Christus praedicatus et creditus: die reformatorische Christologie Luthers in den "Operationes 
in Psalmos      -        argestellt mit  est n igem  ezug zu seiner Fr hzeitchristologie (Neukirchen-
Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2004), 102-3; Athina Lexutt, "Christologie als Soteriologie: ein Blick in die späten 
Disputationen Martin Luthers," in Relationen (Münster: LIT, 2000), 205-7. To some extent, these authors 
document the importance of Schwarz‟s essay not only for creating broad perceptions about Luther‟s 
christological commitments, but also for establishing a lens through which medieval Christology is 
interpreted.  
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namely, that late medieval Christology is deeply problematic (for whatever reason), and 
that Luther does well to deviate from it.
3
  
Schwarz‟s essay is obviously more nuanced in its approach, but its presentation of 
late medieval Christology is also somewhat idiosyncratic when compared with pertinent 
scholarship of recent vintage, and the evaluative characterization of this period that flows 
from his analysis is inordinately derogatory as a result.
4
 This fact commends prior 
specification of the contents of medieval Christology in general, and the doctrine of 
suppositional carrying in particular. This specification, carried out under the supervision 
of mainstream medievalist scholarship, will provide the plumb-line over against which to 
measure the nature of Luther‟s relationship to late medieval Christology in subsequent 
sections of the chapter. Space will obviously preclude a comprehensive introduction to 
the formative characteristics of late medieval Christology. For the sake of much-needed 
focus, then, this survey will concentrate its attention upon the intent and intrinsic 
commitments that attend a doctrine of „suppositional carrying‟ as an explanatory model 
for making sense of the hypostatic union.
5
  
                                                             
3For a nuanced argument against the verdict that Ockham‟s philosophical commitments preclude 
his affirmation of Chalcedonian Christology, see Marilyn McCord Adams, “Relations, Inherence, and 
Subsistence; or, Was Ockham a Nestorian in Christology” Nous 16 (1982): 62-75.For an examination of 
how this pejorative pattern of examination shapes the divergence thesis, see the discussion in chapter 5. 
4For a devastating argument to this effect, see the interaction with Schwarz in Graham White, 
Luther as Nominalist: A Study of the Logical Methods Used in Martin Luther's Disputations in the Light of 
Their Medieval Background. Helsinki, Finland: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994), 271-80. I will also 
document several problematic aspects of Schwarz‟s analysis in light of the forthcoming survey of medieval 
Christology below.  
5This survey will also focus primarily upon those aspects of this „intent‟ that a divergence 
interpretation would assume Luther to reject. Obviously, space precludes a comprehensive treatment of 
suppositional carrying in all its doctrinal particularity and complexity.The second part of this chapter will 
also consult the late medieval predication theory through which this understanding of union was carried to 
linguistic expression especially through extensive reflection upon the communicatio idiomatum.  
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 At the outset of this survey, we will do well to admit the fact that referring to the 
„late medieval‟ or „nominalist‟ theory of suppositional carrying is misleading insofar as 
such qualifications are taken to imply that the notion of Christ‟s human nature being 
carried by an alien suppositum (the divine Person) is peculiar only to the theologians of 
the late medieval period. To be sure, nominalist Christology (which is also by no means 
homogeneous) makes ample use of this theory as the basis for reflection upon the 
hypostatic union. The doctrine itself, however, is much older, and is espoused by a far 
broader number of medieval theologians than the designation „late medieval‟ or 
„nominalist‟ can accommodate.6 The concept of alien suppositional carrying as a mode of 
christological analysis is the result of a gradual process in which the philosophical 
vocabulary of antiquity was calibrated in order to express and specify an orthodox 
doctrine of Christ. Although the appropriation of Chalcedon in the West is complex and 
circuitous, we may, for the purposes of this survey, condense the contents of orthodox 
                                                             
6Because of this fact, we may dissociate ourselves from the closely related question of whether 
Schwarz‟s particularly severe presentation of the Ockhamist reception of this theory is accurate. This is 
because the endorsement of „suppositional carrying‟ is paired, in the history of medieval theology, with any 
number of variant attempts subsequently to specify the sort of relation that emerges between the divine 
Person and human nature in the incarnation. Thus, even if we were to grant: 1) that Schwarz‟s radically 
extrinsic interpretation of Ockhamist Christology is accurate; and 2) that Luther finds such a view 
offensive; we would still, on that account, not be justified in concluding that Luther obviously rejects the 
doctrine of „suppositional carrying‟ altogether, for the affirmation of the theory itself is broader than its 
particular appropriation in late medieval nominalism. This is not, however, in any way to concede the 
accuracy of Schwarz‟s interpretation of the Ockhamists. What I am trying to demonstrate here is that the 
underlying organization of Schwarz‟s argument in favor of his allegation that Luther rejects suppositional 
carrying constitutes a non sequitur, and that this fact has implications for the extent to which we must 
engage it on its own terms. The overall plausibility of his essay rests upon the following elements: 1) A 
radically extrinsic interpretation of Ockhamist Christology; and 2) an identification of this extrinsicism 
with suppositional carrying as such. Since Luther lays emphasis on the real union of divinity and humanity 
and criticizes doctrines of the incarnation that artificially „externalize‟ this relationship (that is, he rejects 
element 1), Schwarz‟s essay is able to argue plausibly that he also rejects suppositional carrying (on the 
basis of the identification expressed in element 2). Although I think a good case can be made that Schwarz 
caricatures the Christology of late medieval nominalism (thus questioning the validity of element 1), the 
limits of space lead me to point out, more straightforwardly, that the identification of Ockhamist 
Christology (however extrinsic it may be) with suppositional carrying is false because many medieval 
theologians who were not Ockhamists assumed it to be true. This alone is sufficient to mitigate the major 
traction of Schwarz‟s argument. Again, for a criticism of element 1, that is, Schwarz‟s interpretation of 
Ockhamist Christology, see the afore-referenced section of Graham White, Luther as Nominalist.   
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Christology through use of its determinate, conciliar vocabulary.
7
 The Chalcedonian 
definition asserts Christ to be both fully divine and fully human; and yet, despite this 
duality of natures, Christ is understood to exist always as only one single person 
(hypostasis) in whom these natures exist together inconfusedly, unchangeably, 
indivisibly, and inseparably.
8
 
 The attempt to articulate and expound this doctrine in the prevailing philosophical 
vocabulary of the mid to late medieval period required of its practitioners an assortment 
of fairly complex, conceptual adjustments, because a strictly Aristotelian articulation of 
the hypostatic union would terminate necessarily either in blatant contradiction 
(descriptive nonsense) or rank heresy (Nestorianism).
9
 A brief survey of a few pertinent 
aspects of Aristotelian philosophy will illustrate why these undesired theological results 
                                                             
7The reception of Chalcedon in the West was obstructed by inadequate historical and textual 
information during the medieval period. This inadequacy seems to have been largely mitigated by the 13th 
century, although Luther‟s knowledge of Chalcedon was deepened significantly by publications addressing 
it during his own life time. For a discussion of the sources upon which Luther relied, especially in his 1539 
treatise “On the Councils and the Church”, see Dorothea Vorländer, Deus incarnatus: die 
Zweinaturenchristologie Luthers bis 1521, Untersuchungen zur Kirchengeschichte, Bd. 9 (Witten: Luther-
Verlag, 1974), 34. See also Mark Edwards, Luther's Last Battles: Politics and Polemics, 1531-46 (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), 93-6, especially n. 94. I am grateful to Gregorio Montejo for alerting 
me to the historical problems associated with speaking of the „reception‟ of Chalcedon in the medieval 
West without recognition of the circuity involved in its transmission. I am using Chalcedon as a baseline 
for orthodox Christology, in part, because this same approach is adopted by Marilyn McCord Adams and 
Allen Bäck in their work on medieval doctrines of Christ.  
8For a helpful treatment of the major christological controversies leading up to Chalcedon, see 
John Anthony McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological Controversy: Its History, Theology, 
and Texts (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994).   
9This is not to imply that medieval theologians sought intentionally to „Aristotelianize‟ theological 
discourse, or that their work is rightly understood in this light. It would be more accurate simply to 
acknowledge that their reflections upon traditional dogma took place within a definite philosophical context 
that, in the mid- to late-medieval period anyways, was heavily influenced by Aristotle, and, as a result, their 
treatment of Christology in particular reflects a decisively Aristotelian vocabulary. The main point of this 
survey, though, is not how Aristotelian the medieval theologians are, but how extensively they calibrate 
and modify Aristotle‟s philosophy in order to express a traditional doctrine of the hypostatic union. For a 
succinct summary of the theological dilemma that emerges from Aristotle‟s views, see Marilyn McCord 
Adams, “What‟s Metaphysically Special about Supposits? Some Medieval Variations on Aristotelian 
Substance”. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (2005): 30.   
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are practically predetermined unless Aristotle is seriously „adjusted‟ for christological 
use.  
Aristotle‟s analysis of individual existents proceeds on the basis of a fundamental 
distinction between „primary substances‟ and „secondary substances‟. A „primary 
substance‟ refers to an individuated existent as such, whereas a „secondary substance‟ 
designates this existent‟s „whatness‟. It specifies what kind of thing this primary 
substance is. So, in the case of Socrates, a „secondary substance‟ analysis specifies the 
fact that Socrates is „human‟ (so, secondary substance = „humanity‟), but the „primary 
substance‟ refers to the individual person of Socrates himself. This same fundamental 
distinction is reflected in the alternative terminology often invoked in medieval discourse 
of supposita and naturae. Within this vocabulary, a suppositum refers to the primary 
substance, which „carries‟ (suppono) the generic secondary substance into individuated 
existence; whereas a nature denotes the secondary substance, which is thus „carried‟.10  
 Salient for the purposes of the present survey is the fact that, for Aristotle, there is 
always a one to one ratio between primary and secondary substances within an individual 
existent. The man Socrates‟ secondary substance (his humanity) reflects essentially what 
he is (human). The notion that an individual person (like Christ) could possess two 
natures, or secondary substances, would entail, for Aristotle, one of two logical 
consequences. On the one hand, insofar as Christ is truly just one primary substance or 
suppositum (as Chalcedon demands), the assertion of Christ simultaneously possessing 
two natures (or „secondary substances‟) collapses into sheer contradiction. No primary 
                                                             
10On this distinction, see Marilyn McCord Adams, “What‟s Metaphysically Special about 
Supposits? Some Medieval Variations on Aristotelian Substance”. 16. See also Marilyn McCord Adams, 
Christ and Horrors: The Coherence of Christology, Current Issues in Theology (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 110-14.  
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substance can be, as to its essence, two „kinds‟ of things simultaneously. „Beulah the 
cow‟ simply cannot be, at the same time and in exactly the same way, „Beulah the 
donkey‟. For Aristotle, the notion of a two-natured suppositum would be tantamount to 
the self-contradictory idea of a „square-circle‟. In a strictly Aristotelian environment, the 
existence of two secondary substances simply entails two corresponding primary 
substances.  
Under the constraints of this logical impasse, one could seek, then, to resolve the 
contradiction by embracing a second purely Aristotelian alternative and concede that 
Christ is actually somehow two persons or two supposits that exist beside one another,  
one divine and the other human. This option avoids contradiction to be sure, but resolves 
the problem (from the perspective of Chalcedonian orthodoxy anyways) in a decidedly 
heretical direction. Orthodoxy demands that Christ be one person. Otherwise one invites 
a Nestorian bifurcation of Christ into two acting subjects. Since the two „strictly 
Aristotelian‟ options terminate in either contradiction (that is, simply asserting nonsense) 
or heresy (allowing the philosophical vocabulary to corrupt Christian content), it is 
understandable that the medieval theologians deemed this philosophical framework to 
require a bit of creative tweaking in order for it to comport with their theological 
intentions.
11
 
 According to Marilyn McCord Adams, it is Boethius (c. 480-525) who first 
attempts to apply the conceptual vocabulary of Aristotle‟s Categories beyond the realm 
of earthly existents, to which Aristotle thought their viability restricted. Boethius extends 
                                                             
11The extent and depth of this conceptual tweaking goes beyond what we are able to detail here. 
For a more nuanced presentation, see Marilyn McCord Adams, “What‟s Metaphysically Special about 
Supposits?”, 15-52. See also Marilyn McCord Adams, Christ and Horrors, 124. 
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Aristotle‟s descriptive grammar to characterize objects of theological reflection as well.12 
In order to do this, he suggests that Christian theology should conceptualize the union of 
God and man in Christ as a unique event in which the divine suppositum (that is, the 2
nd
 
person of the Trinity) assumes to itself not a self-individuated human person, but an 
otherwise intact human nature. That is, while Boethius may not deny the general viability 
of Aristotle‟s prescriptive one-to-one ratio between primary and secondary substances, 
the incarnation represents for him at least one instance in which this otherwise 
predictable pattern is strangely interrupted. In the hypostatic union, the one primary 
substance/ supposit of the 2
nd
 person of the Trinity „carries‟ into discrete expression not 
only its own nature, but also the human nature of Christ, which would ordinarily be its 
own suppositum, but in this case depends upon the divine Word in a relation of „alien 
suppositional carrying‟.13 Boethius evidently views the Aristotelian framework as 
furnishing a useful vocabulary for articulating of the Christian confession that God 
became man in Christ within Chalcedonian parameters.
14
 
                                                             
12 Boethius was a late patristic theologian whose work would later be highly influential for the 
scholastic theologians of the medieval West. My presentation of Boethius‟ significance depends here upon 
Marilyn McCord Adams, “What‟s Metaphysically Special about Supposits?”, 16; 22-5.  
13Speaking more accurately, the divine nature is its own suppositum. The distinction between 
primary and secondary substance as invoked here is not meant to imply the presumption of a generic 
category of „God-ness‟ in which the three persons of the Trinity share equally. To do so would suggest a 
„quaternity‟ and the theologians of both the patristic and medieval periods avoided such a connotation on 
both philosophical and theological grounds.   As we have already mentioned, this way of describing the 
incarnation is actually impossible within a consistently Aristotelian framework. See Marilyn McCord 
Adams, “What‟s Metaphysically Special about Supposits?”, 32-3. See also Marilyn McCord Adams, Christ 
and Horrors, 111. “Unmodified Aristotelian essentialism raises a problem for how a substance individual 
could have two substance-natures essentially, in such a way that it could not exist without them. 
Unmodified Aristotelian essentialism rests here, because it doesn‟t envision any other way for a substance 
individual to have or be characterized by a substance-kind.” 
14See Marilyn McCord Adams‟ detailed presentation of how Scotus and Ockham explore this 
„exception‟ in her afore-referenced essay “What‟s Metaphysically Special about Supposits?”. As Adams 
comments in an earlier essay, these complexities sprout from the distinction medieval explanations of the 
incarnation create between “being an individual created substance nature and being a suppositum of such a 
nature”. Marilyn McCord Adams, “The Metaphysics of the Incarnation in some Fourteenth-Century 
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 This quasi-Aristotelian motif would later become a mainstay in medieval 
reflection upon the person of Christ, at least in the work of the scholastic theologians 
pertinent to the question pursued in the present study. Despite whatever other points of 
difference distinguish their work from one another, Bonaventure, Aquinas, Scotus, 
Ockham, D‟Ailly, and Biel all share as a function of their common discursive 
environment an attempt to engage christological questions through the heuristic 
philosophical mechanism of alien suppositional carrying. Speaking in a general sense, the 
broad intent of this mechanism, so far as the medievals were concerned anyways, was to 
express the doctrine of the incarnation in a way that fulfills four main criteria: 1) a 
genuine union of two fully intact natures (divine and human); 2) within a single, 
undivided person; 3) without the entailment of blatant contradiction; and 4) without the 
entailment of any „ontological conditioning‟ or „fundamental change‟ to the divine 
nature.
15
 So far as the task of defining the medieval doctrine of the suppositional union is 
concerned, then, we can suggest the following as a preliminary working designation: 
The medieval account of the hypostatic union as „suppositional carrying‟ reflects 
the attempt to articulate a Chalcedonian understanding of Christ (that is, two complete 
natures united in but one person) through a tailored application of Aristotelian 
philosophical vocabulary in which the self-suppositing divine nature is said to assume an 
intact human nature, which would, under normal circumstances exist on the basis of its 
own individuating self-supposition; but in this unique case, is sustained instead by the 
divine suppositum in a relationship of alien suppositional carrying. The medieval 
articulation of this phenomenon is supervised, moreover, by a consistent desire to avoid: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Franciscans”, in Essays Honoring Allan B. Wolter, eds. Kenny Kretzmann and Pinborg (St. Bonaventure, 
N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1985), 26. 
 15 On the use of qualification in medieval Christology as a means of bypassing contradiction, see 
Allan T. Bäck, “Aquinas on the Incarnation,” New Scholasticism 56 (1982): 127-45; and Allan T. Bäck, 
“Scotus on the Consistency of the Incarnation and the Trinity,” Vivarium 36 (1998): 83-107. For a 
discussion of the fourth desideratum, see Marilyn McCord Adams, Christ and Horrors, 125-7. 
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1) the proliferation of blatant contradiction; and 2) the suggestion that the divine nature 
(or divine person) incurs ontological change as the result of this unique relationship.
16
         
 
The conceptual difficulty associated with maintaining each of the four desiderata 
contained in this heuristic definition at the same time accounts, to some extent, for the 
overwhelming complexity of christological discussion in the medieval period.
17
  
Although Reinhard Schwarz describes with fair accuracy the central conceptual 
mechanics of „suppositional carrying‟, he flattens the diversity of medieval opinion, 
which fits within this descriptive model. For instance, he creates the mistaken impression 
that the theory as such entails a highly specific and, in his estimation, rather thin account 
of the subsequent relation that emerges in it between humanity and divinity in general, 
and of the divine person to the human nature in particular.
18
 Rhetorically, Schwarz‟s 
over-determinate rendering of suppositional carrying encourages his readers to agree that 
                                                             
16 I emphasize the qualifier medieval here, because both Richard Cross and Marilyn McCord 
Adams defend a doctrine of suppositional carrying for use in modern theology, but suggest it be paired with 
a doctrine of God no longer bound to the presupposition of divine impassibility. Thus, my claim here (and 
in the first chapter) is not that it is impossible to affirm suppositional carrying and not retain a doctrine of 
divine impassibility. My argument is based upon the fact that Schwarz and others interpret Luther‟s alleged 
rejection of divine impassibility to require an overthrow of the medieval doctrine of the hypostatic union. In 
response, I mean simply to prove that: 1) he does not reject suppositional carrying; and that 2) his 
articulation of it, unlike Cross and Adams, retains the traditional doctrine of divine impassibility that, in the 
medieval period, supervised the modalities of its expression. The argument, then, is intentionally 
cumulative. Merely disproving Luther‟s rejection of suppositional carrying would not entail his retention of 
divine impassibility—a point both Cross and Adams‟ constructive work demonstrates. This is not intended 
to function as a comprehensive definition of the theory itself, but to establish its broadest boundaries. Our 
definition is considerably less determinate than the one presumed by Schwarz, but his interpretation of 
Luther‟s Christology would still place Luther at odds with our broader characterization (especially with 
respect to the 4th criterion). Whether or not this interpretation is accurate will be the question pursued in a 
subsequent section of this chapter.   
17My definition is „heuristic‟ because I am „abstracting‟ from standard secondary literature the 
main values that their description of medieval Christology reflects. By culling these values into a 
centralized definition, it is hoped that we will gain a reliable point of departure for the subsequent task of 
evaluating the extent of Luther‟s adherence to the medieval view. This summary is not intended in any way 
to supplant the historical descriptions upon which it is entirely dependent. Readers interested in context-
specific manifestations of medieval Christology on a particular level should consult the works consulted in 
this section‟s footnotes.    
18See Reinhard Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch”, 293-8.  
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Luther obviously rejects such a view on account of his characteristic and emphatic 
affirmation of a real union between God and man in Christ; an affirmation that Schwarz‟s 
idiosyncratic portrayal of late medieval Christology practically prohibits.
19
 In the absence 
of this narrowly pejorative presentation of the doctrine of suppositional carrying, 
however, the rhetorical strength of Schwarz‟s implicit, trajectory-laden contrast is abated. 
Space is thus created for a renovated appraisal of the relation between Luther and his late 
medieval teachers. The following section will pursue this re-appraisal, and seek to 
evaluate whether or not Luther actually departs from suppositional carrying as he is so 
often claimed to do. This question will be adjudicated not only on the basis of explicit 
statements about the theory from his writings, but also by discerning the extent to which 
Luther honors the directive criteria identified above as representative of generic 
„medieval intent.‟20  
Luther’s Rejection of Suppositional Carrying  Fact or Fiction? 
This section seeks, on the basis of the previous characterization of suppositional 
carrying, to examine the extent to which Luther continues to operate within its main 
theological parameters. Methodologically, the organization of this examination will 
depend upon two important factors. In the first place, it recognizes the fairly obvious fact 
that Luther never composed a treatise whose sustained focus is the hypostatic union as 
                                                             
19Over-determinate both in the sense that suppositional carrying is be treated as a uniquely 
Ockhamist phenomenon and in the rather narrow and pessimistic assessment of the kind of union between 
humanity and divinity such a model is said to allow; namely, one of only sheer juxtaposition.   
20Again, I am not claiming here that the four-fold definition provided above furnishes a 
comprehensive summation of medieval christological intent. Instead, it seeks to articulate the broad 
commitments to which medieval theologians understood themselves responsible, and emphasizes especially 
those aspects of these commitments which divergence interpreters would ordinary assume Luther to object. 
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such.
21
 This does not reflect any lack of interest on Luther‟s part in christological 
questions. It also does not mean that the vocabulary and concepts of late medieval 
Christology are altogether absent from Luther‟s theological vernacular. It does mean, 
however, that sorting through his views on the metaphysics of the incarnation could 
require an eclectic accumulation of otherwise unconnected textual fragments from his 
corpus in order to „stitch together‟ a determinate rendering of his ideas. Thankfully, the 
second methodologically-directing factor removes the need for this historically 
hazardous, evidentiary eclecticism.  
It does so by calling attention to the fact that the major authors who argue in favor 
of a divergence interpretation do so on the basis of a fairly select assemblage of texts in 
which Luther is presumed to reject the doctrine of suppositional carrying more or less 
explicitly. This argument is advanced, moreover, with the exception of Reinhard 
Schwarz, in full acknowledgement of the fact that Luther elsewhere and somewhat 
regularly enlists the language of suppositional carrying, even in the later years of his life 
from whence the alleged evidence of divergence is derived. The argument in favor of 
divergence, then, is not that Luther intentionally and self-consciously rejects the doctrine 
of suppositional carrying to such a consistent extent that all ancillary semantic reflections 
of it are expunged from his vocabulary. Instead, Luther‟s rejection of suppositional 
carrying is established on the basis of a select series of texts in which he is supposed 
                                                             
21Or, perhaps a bit more specifically, he never addresses in a direct and prolonged way the precise 
sorts of questions that would make diagnosing his actual place within the constellation of late medieval 
opinion straightforward.  While it is tempting to identify some of Luther‟s early marginal notations as an 
exception to this rule, Schwarz‟s (broadly accepted) insistence that Luther initially imbibed and later 
digressed from late medieval Christology attenuates the value of these texts as direct evidence. In other 
words, Schwarz already concedes that Luther‟s early writing reflect a late medieval point of view, so 
arguing this point at great length would not yield any progress so far as our attempted evaluation of the 
divergence thesis is concerned.  
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either explicitly to denigrate the doctrine itself, or implicitly to deviate from its central 
intent. The texts that form the core of evidence are deemed sufficiently clear by 
advocates of the divergence thesis to warrant according them a status of hermeneutical 
control over other texts whose utilization of „supposition language‟ could be taken as a 
prima facie indication that Luther actually remains within the parameters of late medieval 
christological discourse.  
The contours of this argument contain implications for the methodology of what 
follows. In the first place, the form of the divergence argument renders it superfluous to 
expend significant space in the present discussion furnishing fragmentary instances of 
verbal acquiescence to the doctrine of suppositional carrying. The authors mentioned in 
the first chapter do not deny that such texts exist. This section‟s focus will rest instead 
upon those texts essential to the legitimacy of the argument that Luther rejects 
suppositional carrying. It will demonstrate the inadequacy of a divergence interpretation 
of these texts. In so doing, it will expose Luther‟s alleged deviation from the concept of 
suppositional union to lack evidentiary warrant. A careful analysis of the most frequently 
„divergence texts‟ actually reveals Luther‟s ongoing assent to a medieval view of the 
hypostatic union, at least so far as the model of suppositional carrying is concerned. To 
the examination of texts, the present section now turns. 
At the headwaters of the divergence thesis‟ evidence are texts in which Luther 
seems explicitly to take up cudgels against the doctrine of suppositional carrying, by 
criticizing one of its essential concepts. Without question, the most important text in this 
respect comes from the disputation “de divinitate et humanitate Christi” held at the 
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University of Wittenberg in February of 1540.
22
 The original composition of this 
disputation was provoked by the opinions of one Caspar Schwenckfeld (1489-1561), a 
so-called „radical reformer‟, who insisted that that it is erroneous to refer to Christ as a 
„creature‟.23 Luther takes exception to Schwenckfeld‟s criticism and seems especially 
concerned about its apparently burgeoning influence. He responds to Schwenckfeld in the 
disputation by concentrating on questions of theological language, and christological 
rules of predication. From this semi-polemical vantage point, Luther also reflects upon 
the nature of the hypostatic union, whose ontological uniqueness is the source of the 
linguistic complexity he hopes to clarify.
24
    
 Luther‟s fundamental response to Schwenckfeld is that his criticisms miss their 
mark. They presume a doctrinal meaning that the phrase „Christ is a creature‟ does not 
actually convey. Schwenckfeld errs in this way, because he does not understand 
christological speech, which is always prone to misinterpretation when dogmatic intent is 
wholly ignored. Even an author whose intent is identifiably orthodox can have his words 
twisted into the defense of rank heresy. Such ambiguity will always exist, in Luther‟s 
judgment, because human speech can never perfectly encapsulate or reflect its theological 
subject matter. In order to document this phenomenon, he furnishes a litany of statements 
from traditional sources, which enlist descriptive language that carries with it latent 
                                                             
22WA 39/ II: 92-121.  
23Schwenckfeld also seems to have asserted the noncreatureliness of Christ‟s glorified humanity. 
For more on Caspar Schwenckfeld, see Mitchell Tolpingrud, “Luther‟s Disputation Concerning the 
Divinity and the Humanity of Christ” Lutheran Quarterly 10 (1996): 151; Paul L. Maier, Caspar 
Schwenckfeld on the Person and Work of Christ:  A Study of Schwenckfeldian Theology at Its Core (Assen: 
Van Gorcum, 1959); R. Emmet McLaughlin, Caspar Schwenckfeld, Reluctant Radical: His Life to 1540, 
Yale Historical Publications, 134 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). For Luther‟s precise 
treatment of christological predication, see the second part of this chapter.  
24Thus, not unlike the medieval theologians surveyed above, the question of language and „proper 
predication‟ is inextricably linked with Luther‟s understanding of Christology in general.   
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connotations or trajectories that could be deemed theologically problematic. It is from 
this litany of examples that the main evidence in favor of Luther‟s explicit rejection of 
suppositional carrying is derived. In theses 46 through 48, Luther remarks: 
 “46. But none have spoken more awkwardly [insulsius] than the Nominalists 
[Moderni], as they are called, who of all men wish to seem to speak most subtly and 
properly. 
         47.  These say that the human nature was sustained or "supposited" by the divine 
nature, or by a divine supposite. 
         48. This is said monstrously and nearly forces God as it were to carry or bear the 
humanity.”25 
 
It is not difficult to understand why this text has been utilized so often to 
corroborate the claims of the divergence interpretation. Luther clearly identifies the 
medieval framework of suppositional union (thesis 47), and criticizes the image it evokes 
as monstrous [portentose] (thesis 48). What room is there, beneath the weight of this 
harsh repudiation, to suggest that Luther maintains any kind of allegiance to the late 
medieval christological framework appropriated during the years of his theological 
education? His comments here seem to establish the very opposite.  
Such is the straightforward assumption of scholars who identify in Luther a 
fundamental christological divergence. Theses 46-48 practically provide the 
methodological premise of Reinhard Schwarz‟s essay. Because he assumes this text 
clearly to demonstrate that Luther does reject late medieval Christology, Schwarz focuses 
                                                             
25 I am using in this section the excellent translation of the Luther‟s 1540 disputation carried out 
by Christopher Brown, available online at: 
http://www.iclnet.org/pub/resources/text/wittenberg/luther/luther-divinity.txthttp. Another translation of 
this disputation in English is found in Mitchell Tolpingrud, “Luther‟s Disputation Concerning the Divinity 
and the Humanity of Christ” Lutheran Quarterly 10 (1996): 151-78. When available, this chapter will make 
use of broadly available translations of Luther‟s works in English, and furnish pertinent sections from the 
original text in the footnotes. WA 39/ II, 95. “46. Nulli vero insulsius loquuntur, quam Moderni, quos 
vocant, qui omnium volunt subtilissime et propriissime loqui videri. 47. Hi dicunt , humanam naturam 
sustentari seu suppositari a divina natura, seu supposito divino. 48. Hoc et portentose dicitur et cogit pene 
Deum velut portare vel gestare humanitatem.”  
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upon explaining for his reader what exactly about suppositional carrying Luther finds so 
offensive.
26
 Others, like Beer and Schmidt, suspect Luther implicitly to reject the late 
medieval model based upon their analysis of other elements in his theology, but turn to 
this quote for a final verification of the theological „breach‟ they allege.27 In both cases, 
whether enlisted as a premise to get the argument off the ground in the first place, or as 
final confirmation of an interpretation advanced on the basis of other factors, theses 46-
48 occupy a crucial position in the scholarly defense of the divergence thesis. But are 
Luther‟s comments here as unambiguously dismissive of „suppositional carrying‟ as it 
first appears? A re-consideration of the argument in light of its context furnishes reason 
to question the „rejection reading‟, despite its prima facie plausibility.  
The broad intent of Luther‟s argument in this section of the disputation is to 
suggest and illustrate the fact that christological speech conveys, by virtue of its unique 
subject matter, a correspondingly unique significatory content, even though this new 
content is communicated through the very same vocabulary used in ordinary discourse. 
As a result of the underlying shift in semantic reference, one must be careful to avoid 
drawing the mistaken conclusion that theological language necessarily behaves or 
functions in the same way as its enlisted words and concepts function within mundane 
spheres of description. Schwenckfeld‟s reaction to the phrase „Christ is a creature‟ 
illustrates when this significatory transition of meaning is insufficiently appreciated. For 
Luther, Schwenckfeld errs because he interprets the term „creature‟ to connote a thing 
separated from divinity, as it often does when enlisted within an ordinary sphere of 
                                                             
26Reinhard Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch”, 301-2. See especially note 43 in this respect.  
27Theobald Beer, Der fröhliche Wechsel und Streit, 413; Axel Schmidt, Die Christologie in Martin 
Luthers sp ten Disputationen, 234.  
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discourse. The glaring problem, of course, is that no (orthodox) Christian writer of the 
past defines the „creatureliness‟ of Christ in this manner.28 It is malicious, on Luther‟s 
account, to criticize theological statements on the basis of ancillary linguistic 
connotations, which their authors do not intend.  
The unique referential object of christological speech renders all human 
vocabulary and grammar finally inadequate to bear witness to its intended content. The 
mystery of the incarnation exceeds the grasp of reason and language. Because of this 
basic semantic incapacity, one could distill all manner of heretical meanings from even 
the most circumspect analogies and explanations, even when the intended meaning is 
soundly orthodox. Luther does not think that all descriptions are thereby rendered equally 
valid, but insists that the evaluation of christological speech must always account for 
intent.
29
 After all, even an apparently orthodox formulation of words could conceal 
heterodox content, if the underlying descriptive intent or meaning deviates from the 
catholic faith.
30
 Luther urges caution and insists that the use and analysis of christological 
speech always requires a somewhat flexible analysis, which takes into account the 
intrinsic deficiencies that attend the application of ordinary vocabulary to transcendent 
subject matter. The identification of intent is a mooring principle of interpretation. The 
                                                             
28 WA 39/ II, 94. “21. Nam creatura veteris linguae usu et in aliis rebus significat rem a divinitate 
separatam infinitis modis.” Ibid.. “27. Qui enim dicunt, Christum esse creaturam, veteris linguae usu, id est, 
separatam, nulli unquam fuerunt christiani.” Luther points out in the next thesis that an ordinary meaning of 
„creature‟ would be applied to Christ only by Arius and those who follow his teaching.  
29Luther acknowledges the importance of accurate description, and urges that only the most 
careful analogies be used among those uneducated in the faith.   
30Ibid., 96. “61. Tanta est simplicitas et bonitas Spiritus sancti, ut homines sui, dum falsa 
loquuntur grammatice, vera loquuntur sensu. 62. Tanta est versutia et malitia sathanae, ut homines sui, dum 
vera loquuntur grammatice, id est, verbis, mendacia loquantur theologice, id est, sensu. 63. Hic potest dici: 
Si mentiris, etiam quod verum dicis, mentiris; e contra, si verum dicis, etiam quod falso dicis, verum dicis. 
64. Hoc est, quod dicitur haereticum esse, qui scripturas aliter intelligit, quam flagitat Spiritus sanctus.  
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attentive listener refuses to allow the unintended connotations of an author‟s enlisted 
vocabulary to derail him from it.
31
   
In order to concretize the importance of this kind of receptive flexibility, Luther 
provides a series of illustrations containing statements from past theologians, each of 
which attempts to speak coherently about the union of God and man in Christ. The 
unintended theological connotations that attend these various examples demonstrate, for 
Luther, the way in which the theologian‟s task must always limp and struggle along with 
analogies and vocabulary intrinsically inadequate to it. The intent of the illustrations is to 
document how theologians whose meaning Luther deems orthodox can nevertheless be 
interpreted in heterodox ways if one is inclined to quibble over the various unintended 
trajectories of their descriptive vocabulary.
32
  
It is within this series of illustrations that one finds Luther‟s oft-referenced remark 
about the notion of „suppositional carrying‟ being somehow „monstrous.‟ Given the 
overarching intent of this section, it now appears rather unlikely that Luther‟s point here 
is to counsel the rejection of this doctrinal model as a whole. Such a conclusion would 
capitulate to Schwenckfeld‟s inordinate policing of theological language on the grounds 
of its unintended heretical connotations; the very practice Luther seeks here to criticize!
33
 
                                                             
31For more on the precise matter of Luther‟s new theological language, see the subsequent 
discussion and attendant footnotes associated with Luther‟s 1539 “Disputation concerning the Passage „The 
Word Became Flesh‟”.   
32Ibid., 95. “49. Sed omnes illi recte et catholice sapiunt, ideo condonanda est illis incommoda 
locutio.” 
50. Quia rem ineffabilem volebant effari, deinde omnis similitudo claudicat nec unquam (ut dicunt) currit 
quatuor pedibus.” 
33The reader will also note that two other analogies from this section are admitted by Luther to 
suggest unwanted consequences, but are a consistent and favored component of Luther‟s christological 
vocabulary elsewhere; namely, the analogy of fire and iron, and body and soul.   
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No, the main trajectory of Luther‟s discourse highlights a methodological posture shared 
with his medieval predecessors; namely, that the analogical vocabulary of theological 
inquiry ought not be pushed too far, or carried outside the carefully proscribed boundaries 
of its explicitly intended use.
34
 At most, Luther‟s comments about late medieval 
Christology reflect his recognition that the metaphor of „carrying‟ contains problematic 
resonances of meaning that ought carefully to be avoided. The pertinent question 
regarding thesis 46 and following, then, is not: should the doctrine of suppositional 
carrying be rejected? Instead, we ought to ask: what unintended resonances of meaning 
does this description create? Why does Luther think that these resonances are 
theologically problematic? Does his caution comport with standard medieval 
qualifications, or does his critical analysis betray a fundamentally new theological 
trajectory?  
These are the real question, which must occupy our attention. Advocates of a 
divergence interpretation will clearly insist that something disruptive and implicitly 
revolutionary is at work in Luther‟s comments here. For Beer and Schmidt, Luther‟s 
critical comments ultimately manifest the reformer‟s fundamental aversion to non-
soteriologically determined metaphysics, thus confirming their suspicion that he 
implicitly dismisses the distinction between „person‟ and „nature‟ altogether. 
For Schwarz, the comments illustrate Luther‟s rejection of late medieval Christology as a 
docetic corruption.
35
 Each of these renderings depends upon a perception of Luther‟s 
                                                             
34See, for instance, Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 78.  
35Reinhard Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch”, 301-2. “Es ist praktisch der Vorwurf des Doketismus, den 
Luther gegen die ockhamistische Christologie erhebt. Das Menschsein Gottes in Christus kann seines 
Erachtens nicht mit Begriffen wie sustenare oder suppositare humanam naturam gedeutet werden.” 
Schwarz develops this interpretation on the basis of an earlier christological disputation of 1539. This 
disputation, and Schwarz‟s interpretation of it, will be addressed later in the present chapter.  
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theological sensibilities as distilled from elsewhere in his thought. Neither appeals 
directly to the 1540 text as such in order to defend its construal of how Luther thinks the 
language of „carrying‟ is potentially problematic. The result is a hermeneutical spiral, 
which creates the impression of evidentiary progress, but actually only defers the issue in 
question to texts located elsewhere in Luther‟s corpus. If these „corroborating texts‟ 
themselves depend upon a determinate „divergence rendering‟ of these several theses 
(utilized as either the cornerstone or capstone of the divergence reading as a whole), then 
advancing a divergence reading of the 1540 disputation on their basis introduces a 
circular logic that tries to assume what it first must prove.
36
  
But is the mere fact of Luther‟s concern about the language of „carrying‟ evidence 
of novelty? Graham White argues the opposite more likely to be the case. In his book 
Luther as Nominalist, White contends that Luther‟s critical remarks in this section of the 
disputation comport rather seamlessly with a blatantly medieval (in fact, specifically 
nominalist) constellation of theological and philosophical concerns.
37
 The latent risk with 
the language of „carrying‟, when applied to the incarnation, is that such an image 
suggests that the divine Person would become a composite entity in doing so. On the late 
medieval account, such an implication is problematic for a number of reasons. At the 
                                                             
36That is, it risks creating a logical relationship of symbiotic dependency between the two 
following statements: 1) The 1540 disputation communicates a rejection of suppositional carrying because 
ancillary factors in Luther’s theology show this to be true; and 2) Ancillary factors in Luther‟s theology 
portend a rejection of suppositional carrying, because the 1540 disputation shows this to be true. The only 
way to address this potentially circular form of argument is to investigate each evidentiary component and 
ask whether either (separately or together) demonstrates the rejection of suppositional carrying attributed to 
it. If these components fail to demonstrate such a rejection, then the methodology will be shown to be 
misleading, and it may be concluded that Luther‟s explicit affirmation and use of supposit vocabulary 
elsewhere should not be dismissed so hastily as an accidental discursive residue denuded of its original 
theological content.    
37For White‟s interpretation of the 1540 disputation, see Graham White, Luther as Nominalist, 
231-98.  
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very least, it seems to imply that the immutable, impassible, and simple divine Son is the 
passive recipient of ontological conditioning. In order to bypass this implication, 
nominalist theologians were cautious when using „compositional‟ language to carefully 
delimit its meaning so as to proscribe any unintended semantic consequences. As White 
points out, theologians writing in the tradition of Ockham tend to exercise particular 
diligence in this regard.
38
  
 Interpreted in this way, Luther‟s complaint about suppositional carrying 
expresses a theological sensibility, which he learned under the tutelage of the very 
medieval theologians Beer, Schmidt, and Schwarz assume him so ruthlessly to criticize! 
In White‟s interpretation, Luther‟s derision of suppositional carrying as „monstrous‟ 
reflects a theological intent wholly consonant with the Christology of late medieval 
nominalism. The broader context of Luther‟s comment buttresses the accuracy of this 
view. Throughout the section, Luther furnishes a series of examples, which create the 
false impression that Christ is a composite entity.
39
 If White‟s construal of Luther‟s intent 
is accurate, then one could advance the case, contra Schwarz et al, that Luther is, in fact  
nowhere more medieval in his christological predilections than when he cautions against 
                                                             
38Ibid., 254-5. For more on the language of „composition‟, see below.   
 
39Thesis 45 is especially clear in this regard, which immediately precedes Luther‟s depiction of 
suppositional carrying. WA 39/II, 95. 35. “Nulli enim fuerunt unquam patres aut doctores, qui non 
improprie sint locuti, si dicta eorum cavillari velis 36. Sedulius poeta christianissimus canit: Beatus autor 
seculi servile corpus induit, idque per totam ecclesiam, 37. Cum nihil possit magis dici haereticum, quam 
humanam naturam esse vestem divinitatis. 38. Non enim vestis et corpus constituunt unam personam, sicut 
Deus et homo constituunt unam personam. 39. Tamen piissime sensisse Sedulium, caetera carmina probant 
evidentissime. 40. Eadem ratione haereticum esset vulgatum illud: Tota trinitas operata est incarnationem 
filii, sicut duae puellae tertiam induunt, ipsa simul sese induente. 41. Ita scholastici aliqui, dum divinitatis 
et humanitatis habitudinem sentiunt similem esse unioni formae ad materiam, non possent defendi. 42. Alii 
contra esse habitudinem similem materiae ad formam, multo ineptius, si iudicentur rigide, loquuntur. 43. 
Neque illa consisteret, ubi divinitatem igni et humanitatem ferro similant, etiamsi sit pulcherrima 
similitudo. 44. Neque illam ferre liceret, quam Athanasius ponit: Sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est 
homo, ita Deus et homo unus est Christus. 45. Omnes enim negant, Christum esse compositum, etsi 
constitutum affirmant. 
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the unwanted „composite‟ connotations that attend the language of suppositional 
„carrying‟!40  
 But is White correct? The opening theses of Luther‟s argument lend significant 
reason to think so. In this section, Luther enlists the distinction between concrete and 
abstract predication as a way of clarifying the way in which certain ascriptions must be 
applied to Christ.
41
 While a nuanced discussion of this distinction‟s significance for 
Luther‟s treatment of the communicatio idiomatum must be deferred until the second part 
of this chapter, certain aspects of his discussion are crucially important here, because they 
manifest an underlying asymmetry within Luther‟s Christology, which mirrors medieval, 
theological intent.  
 Luther is rather specific in this section of the disputation that, because the 
person of Christ cannot be identified with „humanity‟, the application of human 
predicates to Christ must always observe the semantic restriction that such applications 
take place „in the concrete‟. That is, they refer to the person of Christ, on account of 
something that truly belongs to Christ (His humanity). Christ, however, is not identical 
either with His humanity, or humanity in general. What is most telling is Luther‟s 
subsequent admission that this restrictive distinction no longer applies when divine 
predicates are in view, at least not in the same way. “In the divine predicates or attributes 
                                                             
40White‟s interpretation carries the advantage of contextual sensitivity since thesis 45 deals 
directly with the risk of some christological language to imply a composite doctrine of Christ. In light of 
this fact, one is led to question how likely it is for Luther to worry in one moment about implying 
composition, and in the next to jettison the very conceptual vehicle through which this connotation is 
avoided. For more on the complex question of whether Christ is a composite, see below. Ibid., 95. “45. 
Omnes enim negant, Christum esse compositum, etsi constitutum affirmant.”   
41This distinction between abstract and concrete predication is a fairly prominent medieval 
semantic device enlisted to distinguish between property ascriptions that refer either to the person of Christ 
(concrete), or to one of His two natures (abstract).   
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there is not a difference of this kind between the concrete and the abstract.”42 Luther‟s 
eschewing of this distinction as it concerns divine predicates reflects the fact that, unlike 
the incarnate Son‟s contingent relation to His humanity, Christ is identical with His 
divinity, just as the doctrine of suppositional carrying insists Him to be.  
 A composite rendering of this text would only be „feasible‟, in other words, if 
Luther endorsed a symmetrical application of the abstract/concrete distinction. In that 
case, neither humanity nor divinity would relate to Christ in a relation of identity, because 
the person of Christ would itself be understood as the mutually-conditioned product of 
union. Luther forecloses this symmetry, however, and thus evidently understands the 
person of Christ to be coextensive with the divine nature, which assumes to itself a 
human nature. This exegetical intuition secures further corroboration in argument twenty 
eight of the public disputation‟s published transcript. Here, Luther attends in greater 
detail to the assertion that Christ is a creature, the very affirmation that makes 
Schwenckfeld uneasy. In his response, Luther tangibly reflects an ongoing retention of 
the doctrine of suppositional carrying.  
 “But when we call Christ a creature, we understand the divine person which 
assumed a human nature.  Nor is the creature in Christ the subject [suppositum], not even 
according to philosophy, but something assumed. Christ, being created, is not separated 
from God.  Therefore he is not a creature in the old sense of the word”.43 
                                                             
42Translation by Christopher Brown. WA 39/ II, 93. “9. In divinis praedicatis seu idiomatibus non 
est differentia talis inter concreta et abstracta.” 
  
43Translation by Christopher Brown. Emphasis mine WA 39/II, 118a. “Nos autem dicentes 
Christum creaturam intelligimus divinam personam, quae assumpsit humanam naturam. Non est autem 
suppositum, neque in philosophia, illa creatura in Christo, sed assumpta. Christus creatus non est separatus 
a Deo. Ergo non est creatura in vetere significatione.” Theobald Beer, somewhat strangely, refers his reader 
to this text as further evidence that Luther rejects the idea of a divine suppositum entirely. Theobald Beer, 
Der fröhliche Wechsel und Streit, 408 n. 83. Beer overlooks the fact that Luther is referring here to the fact 
that the human nature is not a suppositum, the salient fact that complicates the semantics of the word „man‟ 
as applied to Christ, since ordinary usage of the term does refer to a human suppositum. This point is 
pursued at greater length in the 1539 disputation discussed below. Beer‟s ability to quote this text in 
defense of his position is a function of the truncated form in which it appears in his discussion. From this 
response of Luther, he cites only the following: “Es gibt kein Suppositum, auch nicht in der Philosophie.” 
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So, although theses 46-48 may create the initial impression that Luther rejects 
suppositional carrying, consultation of the larger context, yields that Luther intends 
nothing of the sort. To the contrary, the christological disputation of 1540 only manifests 
the extent to which Luther continues to presuppose the medieval doctrine‟s fundamental 
accuracy. The existence of any divergence on his part must be demonstrated elsewhere. 
Another source of evidence for the divergence interpretation consists in texts 
where Luther enlists specific christological vocabulary that appears to reflect a 
„composite‟ account of Christ‟s person. For instance, Luther will refer to the hypostatic 
union as a compositus or additus, and occasionally enlists semantically related verbs such 
as copulatio, constitutio or coniunctio; all of which seem to denote either a unitive theory 
of dialectical aggregation (Beer and Schmidt), or suggest that the Person is itself 
somehow constituted or ontologically conditioned by the union of natures (Schwarz and 
Lienhard).
44
  If proven to carry either of these meanings, this vocabulary would indeed 
clearly contradict the doctrine of suppositional carrying; at least in its medieval form of 
articulation.
45
  
This rhetorical force of this argument is rather clear. It exploits an indisputable 
characteristic of Luther‟s christological discourse; namely, his occasional tendency to 
describe the hypostatic union with vocabulary that seems to connote a „parts ontology‟ of 
                                                             
44For the various citations highlighted in this respect, see Reinhard Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch”, 
304-5 n. 55-7; Theobald Beer, Der fröhliche Wechsel und Streit, 327; 333; 400-401; 404 n. 81; 406-8;  and 
Axel Schmidt, Die Christologie in Martin Luthers sp ten Disputationen, 237; 248.   
 45On the distinction between union and aggregation, see Marilyn McCord Adams, Christ and 
Horrors, 125.  
86 
 
 
 
the incarnate Person of Christ.
46
 The fact that Luther even goes so far as to refer to Christ 
explicitly as a compositus appears to cement the inevitable conclusion advanced by 
advocates of the divergence thesis that he clearly rejects the late medieval doctrine of 
suppositional carrying. For how can the incarnate Christ ontologically be identified 
entirely with the divine Logos (as this doctrine insists) if Christ is said to be a composite 
of divinity and humanity? Doesn‟t such a designation entail the allocation of some degree 
of constitutive force to the human nature with respect to the personal subsistence of 
Christ? Isn‟t this exactly what Luther means to express by saying that the one Person is a 
composite; that is, constituted in some way by both divinity and humanity?  
Such is the understandable appeal of those who argue for some version of the 
divergence interpretation. They contend that this vocabulary paints a picture of Christ‟s 
being that simply cannot exist within the framework of suppositional carrying since it 
entails a compound ontology of the incarnate Person, rather than identifying the 
incarnation‟s active subject with the immutable, simple and impassible divine Logos, 
who assumes the human nature to Himself in a relation of suppositional dependency. The 
salient difference between these two perspectives has to do with whether the assumption 
of the human nature is viewed to be ontologically „informing‟ so far as the identity of the 
incarnate Person is concerned. The strength of this construal as an interpretation of 
Luther‟s vocabulary depends entirely upon the assumption that the word compositus (and 
others like it) unambiguously conveys the meaning assigned to it by advocates of the 
divergence thesis; namely, that the utilization of such terms denotes a rejection of 
                                                             
46One example of this language is to be found in a text from Luther‟s 1532 interpretation of Psalm 
45. See WA 40/II, 517b.    
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suppositional carrying ipso facto.
47
 This assumption, however, is demonstrably 
inaccurate. 
In fact, the language of Christ as a „composite‟ is a fairly consistent aspect of the 
ordinary discursive vernacular of medieval theology. This observation effectively rebuts 
any notion that the term „compositus‟ in and of itself may be taken as indication of an 
intrinsic rejection of suppositional carrying. To be sure, theologians of the mid to late 
medieval period sought rather assiduously to avoid any suggestion that the Person of 
Christ is somehow ontologically constructed or conditioned as the result of the hypostatic 
union. Also out of bounds within a medieval frame of reference would be an aggregate 
doctrine of Christ‟s personhood as one finds in the interpretation of Luther‟s Christology 
advanced by Beer and Schmidt. These problematic connotations notwithstanding, many 
theologians of the medieval period frequently make use of the language of „composition‟ 
as a way of expressing certain aspects of Christ‟s unique identity.48  
                                                             
47Here, as in the case of the 1540 disputation, divergence interpreters seek to buttress the 
plausibility of their interpretation on the basis of other texts that seem to endorse their overall point of view. 
In some cases, Luther‟s use of this vocabulary is confirmed to denote divergence on the basis of the 1540 
text itself. This sort of interconnectivity of interpretive claims makes the task of analyzing and evaluating 
the central argument in favor of divergence somewhat slippery. A careful reader will find herself directed 
(somewhat sporadically) back and forth between a number of (allegedly) mutually reinforcing interpretive 
judgments. The initial impression created by this approach leaves the reader with a sense that whatever 
claim is advanced in the main text is buttressed by clear texts taken from elsewhere in Luther‟s writings. I 
have tried already in this chapter to show a few ways in which this impression is misleading, since the texts 
cited are often far more ambiguous than their use as documentary support would seem to suggest. In many 
cases, the textual interpretations these footnotes presume to be true are themselves dependent upon the 
interpretive claim advanced in the main argument their citation is intended to justify. In an attempt to break 
through this potential circularity, this chapter attempts to parse apart each of the centrally constitutive 
analytical and interpretive components that together recommend the veracity of the divergence thesis, and 
assess their demonstrative value seriatim.   
48This is not to deny the fact that many medieval theologians were also hesitant about this 
language to the point of advising strongly against its use altogether. The point in this brief overview is not 
to provide a comprehensive treatment of this question in medieval Christology, but rather to document the 
fact that the appearance of this vocabulary in Luther‟s writings should not be viewed in any way as unique, 
and should certainly not be interpreted to denote an unambiguous repudiation of suppositional carrying.   
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According to Walter Principe, the original source of this medieval descriptive 
convention is to be found in John of Damascus, a theologian of the 7
th
 and 8
th
 century 
whose writings are referenced rather extensively in Peter Lombard‟s Sententiae, the 
standard theological textbook of the medieval period.
49
 The 12
th
 century theologian Hugh 
of St. Cher, as but one example of this reception, regularly refers to Christ as a composite 
person; a description whose intent Walter Principe helpfully elucidates. 
“Hugh of Saint-Cher is a strong defender of the concept of the persona 
composita; for him it is an expressive way of stating that through and in the union of the 
Son of God is really, physically united to human nature, and to a human nature itself 
composed of body and soul. For him—and in this he differs from Alexander of Hales—
the composition evoked by the phrase is to be thought of as exclusively in the human 
nature; taken as a whole, the phrase persona composita indicates that the divine person is 
truly united to and physically present in a composite human nature. The Incarnate Word 
is not, however, to be thought of as a whole composed of several parts; if body and soul 
may be said to be parts of the Son of God, they are so only in the sense that the simple 
divine person, who adds nothing to his own being by the union, unites to himself a human 
nature itself composed of parts.”50 
 
Here we may observe that, although the language of composition is applied to the person 
of Christ, the intended meaning is actually restricted to the human nature, since the 
incarnate Word is itself not capable of any composition or change.
51
  
 A similar qualification is to be found in the work of Thomas Aquinas in the 13
th
 
century, who also embraces composition terminology as a means of describing Christ. In 
                                                             
49Walter H. Principe, William of Auxerre’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union, The Theology of the 
Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century, vol. 1 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 1963), 87. For specific citations, see note 55. 
50Walter H. Principe, Hugh of St. Cher’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union, The Theology of the 
Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century, vol. 3 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 1970), 147. Philip the Chancellor adopts a similar position. See Walter H. Principe, Phillip the 
Chancellor’s Theology of the Hypostatic Union, The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early 
Thirteenth Century, vol. 4 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1975), 145.   
51Thus highlighting once again the normative status of the fourth criterion included in the original 
designation of medieval intent provided above.  
89 
 
 
 
his article, “Christ as Composite according to Aquinas”, Michael Gorman directs us to 
the most important section of Aquinas‟ Summa Theologiae on this topic. 
 “The person or hypostasis of Christ can be considered in two ways. One way is as 
something that exists in itself; in this way it is completely simple, as is the nature of the 
Word. The other way is as a person or hypostasis to which it is proper to subsist in some 
nature; in this way, the person of Christ subsists in two natures. Thus, although there is 
only one subsisting thing in this case, there are nevertheless two principles of subsistence. 
Thus he can be called a composite person, insofar as he is the one thing subsisting in two 
ways.”52 
 
Like Hugh of St. Cher, Aquinas affirms that Christ is a composite, but immediately 
qualifies the sense in which this description must be interpreted. As Gorman goes on to 
explain, Aquinas makes it rather clear that the divine nature (which Aquinas understands 
to be equivalent with the divine Word) is not in any way changed through the event of the 
incarnation. God does not undergo any process of „becoming‟ as the language of 
composition could be taken to imply.
53
 
Even many of the late medieval nominalist, whom Luther is assumed 
categorically to reject, continue to defend the descriptive value of the statement that 
Christ is a composite, so long as this language is properly qualified. Nicholas of Oresme, 
for instance, whose tractate on the communication of idioms (c. 1361) appears to have 
framed many of the late medieval debates concerning the communication of idioms, 
explicitly affirms that Christ may be called a composite, but insists that this may be said 
                                                             
52ST III, q. 2, a. 4 as quoted in Michael Gorman, “Christ as Composite according to Aquinas” 
Traditio 55 (2000): 143. Gorman‟s article provides a very helpful discussion of why and how Aquinas 
sometimes uses the language of composition as a descriptor of Christ‟s person. See also Richard Cross, The 
Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 51-61; 197-8; and Eleanore Stump, “Aquinas‟ Metaphysics of the 
Incarnation”, 206-7. 
53On this, see Michael Gorman, “Christ as Composite according to Aquinas”, 148-52.  
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only according to the humanity.
54
 Oresme carefully proscribes any notion that the joining 
of divinity and humanity somehow „makes‟ or „forms‟ the person of Christ as discrete 
parts ordinary constitute a whole.
55
 Despite these caveats, however, the use of 
„composition terminology‟ is approved for carefully proscribed, christological use. 
Theologians in the tradition of Ockhamism admittedly tend to be rather hesitant in this 
regard, although Scotists are apparently less so.
56
 Now we come to the main point of this 
brief survey. If compositional christological vocabulary is deeply engrained within the 
fabric of medieval theological discourse, then why should its appearance in Luther‟s 
writings be identified as an obvious novelty? 
Axel Schmidt directly acknowledges the existence of medieval precedent, and 
concedes the attendant implication that compositional language does not necessarily 
evince a composite account of Christ‟s person in the revolutionary ways previously 
described.
57
 Why is it, then, that Schmidt is so quick to accuse Luther of doctrinal 
deviation, when he exonerates patristic and medieval antecedents on the same evidence? 
The reason, of course, is because Schmidt already assumes that Luther rejects 
suppositional carrying. Luther‟s meaning must lie elsewhere because the fact of his 
divergence is presupposed on the basis of other factors. Here again the occasional 
                                                             
54
Ernst Borchert, Der Einfluss des Nominalismus auf die Christologie der Spätscholastik nach dem 
Traktat "de communicatione idiomatum" des Nicolaus Oresme, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie 
des Mittelalters 35, 4/5 (Münster i. W. 1940), 15.  
55 For a description of Oresme‟s articulation of this principle, see ibid., 111. For the text of 
Oresme‟s explanation, see the edition of his tractate in the appendix of Borchert, 7-8. This is a qualification 
that is later taken up by the late medieval theologian Pierre d‟Ailly among others. For an overview of its 
reception in later theology, see Graham White, Luther as Nominalist, 255.  
56Ibid., 254. White‟s interpretation of the 1540 disputation leads him to suggest that Luther 
actually sympathizes far more with the caution of the ockhamists than with the comparatively more 
unguarded use of compositional language enlisted in scotist Christology.   
 57Axel Schmidt, Die Christologie in Martin Luthers sp ten Disputationen, 249 n. 87. It is only fair 
to assume that Beer, Schwarz and Lienhard are similarly aware of these antecedents.  
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circularity of the argument for divergence manifests itself. What ordinarily would not 
count as clear evidence of a deviation from suppositional carrying (the mere use of 
compositional language) is admitted as such, because Luther is thought elsewhere (I.E. 
his late christological disputations) to embrace this deviation explicitly.
58
 Theobald Beer, 
although less forthright in his admission of medieval precedent for this compositional 
vocabulary, marshals the „composite evidence‟ in a similar way, by using the already-
analyzed theses from the 1540 disputation as hermeneutical confirmation for his 
interpretation.
59
 But if the 1540 disputation provides no such corroboration, then the 
secondary argument evaporates along with it. A careful exegesis of the 1540 text 
therefore kills two evidentiary birds with one stone.  
Another source of evidence used to defend the divergence interpretation consists 
of texts in which Luther is alleged to embrace a symmetrical account of divinity and 
humanity as they relate to the Person of Christ. Such an account differs from the standard 
medieval point of view, as we have already explained, because it refuses to differentiate 
between the distinct ways in which Christ relates to His divine nature on the one hand, 
and to His human nature on the other; preferring instead simply to assert their union in a 
more straightforward fashion.
60
 The result of such symmetry is a composite doctrine of 
Christ in which both divinity and humanity exert a common constitutive role in the 
                                                             
58See ibid., 249.  
59
Theobald Beer, Der fröhliche Wechsel und Streit, 405.  
60As described in previous sections of this chapter, the asymmetrical account of this relation in 
medieval Christology derives from the fact that whereas Christ simply is divine (that is, the Person of 
Christ is identical with the pre-incarnate divine Logos), Christ is human only in the sense that the divine 
Person has assumed into suppositional dependency a fully intact human nature. This suppositional 
dependency does not carry with it any notion of ontological conditioning for the medievals, even though 
they will still insist that the relation of „personal carrying‟ is sufficient for securing the validity of the 
incarnation. Although Schwarz does not specifically invoke this language, it is clear from his account that 
he understands Luther to reject this prohibition against ontological conditioning; a correlate of his 
composite doctrine of Christ‟s personhood.   
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ontological makeup of the incarnation‟s acting subject. It should be clear by this point in 
the chapter why such a view is understood by advocates of the divergence interpretation 
to grate against the doctrine of suppositional carrying. For Schwarz, the symmetry of 
Luther‟s position is the heart of the reformer‟s anti-docetist correction of nominalist 
Christology. By according the human nature an equally ontologically determinative status 
in the existence of the theandric Person, Schwarz understands Luther to override the 
philosophical axiom of late medieval scholasticism, which stipulates an unbridgeable gap 
between divinity and humanity. For Schmidt and Beer, on the other hand, the symmetry 
of Luther‟s position provides evidence that, although he sometimes speaks as if he retains 
a traditional distinction between „person‟ and „nature‟, the actual contents of his 
christological explanation betray the traditionalist façade. The result of the distinction‟s 
practical betrayal is that Luther is forced to affirm the unity of divinity and humanity on a 
univocal metaphysical plane, thus necessitating his composite doctrine of the hypostatic 
union (through juxtaposition or aggregation). The result is a dialectical nestorianism with 
oddly monophysite resonances.  
Some of the evidence marshaled in favor of this allegedly „symmetrical‟ 
christological vantage point depends upon texts far more ambiguous than their use by 
advocates of a divergence interpretation would seem to suggest. Schwarz, for instance, 
lays special emphasis upon Luther‟s rather emphatic endorsement of the statement that 
“God is man”, and implies that such a statement alone demonstrates an obvious, 
fundamental departure from late medieval Christology.  Schwarz reaches this conclusion 
because, on his account, the doctrine of suppositional carrying allows its practitioners to 
speak of the incarnation only in a far more logically circuitous, and tentative way. 
93 
 
 
 
Luther‟s forthrightness in these statements, accordingly, is taken as indication that he cuts 
through arcane metaphysical qualifications, which actually denude the doctrine of the 
hypostatic union of its fundamental content.
61
 Luther is alleged to stress a degree of 
identity between the divinity and humanity of Christ, which intrinsically overrides the 
asymmetrical distinctions ingredient to the doctrine of suppositional carrying. Luther‟s 
zeal for the reality of the incarnation leads him to transgress traditionally erected, 
metaphysical borders. 
In a parallel line of argument, Schmidt and Beer allege Luther‟s apparent elision 
of the distinction between Persons and natures on the basis of his strident, and apparently 
unprecedented identification of divinity and humanity in Christ. Taking up a designation 
rather common in recent literature, Beer and Schmidt suggest that Luther‟s Christology 
depends upon the existence of a radical union of opposites; and by this they mean to 
suggest that Luther‟s doctrine of the hypostatic union entails a fundamental contravention 
of ordinary reason, and simply contradicts the rules of philosophical grammar (I.E. the 
rule of non-contradiction).
62
 Although many scholars understand the resultant 
propositional paradox this creates in a positive light, for Beer and Schmidt, it represents a 
                                                             
61Reinhard Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch”, 303-4; 307-8. “Dass Gott Mensch geworden ist, dass der 
Schoepfer und das Geschoepf in Christus dieselbe Person ist, gerade darauf baut die Theologie”.  Schwarz 
assumes that no medieval theologian could say such a thing; an assumption that the next chapter shows to 
be utterly unfounded. Despite this fact, one finds permutations of this claim scattered across contemporary 
interpretations of Luther‟s significance. In its least guarded form, these interpretations make it seem as if 
Luther is the first theologian in the history of Christendom to actually affirm the doctrine of the 
incarnation. 
62See, for instance, Axel Schmidt, Die Christologie in Martin Luthers sp ten Disputationen,202; 
244-5. Schmidt‟s main evidence is that Luther asserts creator and creature to be one. Schmidt‟s rationale 
behind a decisively novel interpretation of this assertion (for surely he is aware that Christian theologians 
had been saying similar things long before Luther was born) is again the 1540 disputation, which, in his 
mind, expunges the possibility that this union could be envisioned in terms of a „personal‟ union. In other 
words, Luther must be trying simply to force a unity on the same ontological plane. Here again, though, if 
the interpretation of the 1540 disputation is incorrect, then this evidence also fails.   
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desperate and ultimately fruitless attempt on Luther‟s part to secure a conceptually 
durable explanation of the hypostatic union.
63
 This attempt is fruitless, because it 
implicitly forfeits the necessary distinction between persons and natures that any such 
explanation would require. The so-called „identity of opposites‟ upon which Luther 
settles is seen, then, as a counterfeit simulacrum of orthodox Christology. It enables 
hollow affirmation of union, which scrambles (unsuccessfully) to find a way to deny the 
very entailment its practical rejection of the distinction between persons and natures 
necessitates; namely an unresolved, quasi-Nestorian fissure between divinity and 
humanity.   
In both instances, the argument depends upon the notion that Luther asserts 
something that is clearly impossible to affirm within a medieval frame of reference, with 
its decidedly asymmetrical account of the incarnate Person of Christ.
64
 Neither set of 
textual evidence succeeds, though, in establishing that something this radically new must 
                                                             
63 The alleged paradox has its roots in Luther‟s alleged attempt to engage divinity and humanity on 
the same ontological plane. Whereas the doctrine of suppositional carrying provides a kind of internal 
differentiation that parses this relationship, the „coincidence of opposites reading‟ rejects this asymmetrical 
arrangement and tries to stand the divine nature and human nature on an equal playing field. The resulting 
account of union makes it plausible to wonder how it is possible to maintain both sets of Chalcedonian 
proscriptions at the same time, even though most authors will insist this to be the case. Here I would tend to 
agree with Schmidt and Beer that there seems to be a necessary choice between either a kind of 
monophysite mixture of divinity and humanity such that the only differentiation available would be 
analeptic in nature (that is, one that must recall the prior differentiation that no longer perdures in any  
actual once the incarnation has taken place), or the union itself must be a mere juxtaposition or perhaps 
agential coordination of two fundamentally separate entities (thus, Nestorianism). Schmidt and Beer‟s 
problem, in my view, is not so much in their theological analysis of this view, but in their failure to see that 
Luther does not endorse it. It is understandable, on the basis of the literature predating their work that they 
would draw the conclusion that he does, but this dissertation hopes to demonstrate some key ways in which 
this reading is inadequate.   
64The claim between these two groups is once again remarkably similar, despite the fact that they 
argue for radically different appraisals of Luther‟s alleged innovation. Schmidt, for instance, agrees with 
Schwarz‟s point that Luther is arguing for a degree of unification between God and man that is simply 
beyond the capacity of medieval Christology to affirm. Whereas Schwarz thinks this fact proves Luther‟s 
correction of late medieval docetism, Schmidt thinks his proposal terminates in philosophical nonsense; 
and places Luther in the unintended conundrum of having to vacillate between either sheer juxtaposition of 
natures (Nestorianism) and a divine-human mixture (monophysitism).   
95 
 
 
 
be read into the data, nor even that it is exegetically plausible to posit such novelty. In 
fact, a consideration of Luther‟s allegedly innovative language in relation to its medieval 
context once again seriously attenuates the likelihood of such an interpretation. For 
Schwarz‟s argument in this area to succeed, it would need to be true that late medieval 
Christology is incapable of affirming the dogmatic assertion that „God is man‟. But 
doesn‟t such an interpretation strangely presuppose that Luther‟s scholastic predecessors 
can‟t uphold the doctrine of the incarnation? Surely such a view is the product of 
Schwarz‟s own anachronistic prejudice, rather than the result of historical exegesis of late 
medieval views interpreted on their own terms. In any case, there is simply no evidence 
to commend the conclusion that Luther‟s statement that „God is man‟ implies a 
fundamental departure from the doctrine of his scholastic teachers.   
In reality, one finds that the phrase „God is man‟, along with others expressing 
appreciably more radical content, is the explicit object of late medieval assent; albeit 
always under the supervisory conditions of very specific qualifications.
65
 Schwarz 
himself tacitly recognizes this to be true, as reflected in his detailed treatment of Gabriel 
Biel‟s interpretation of “God is man”.66 The pertinent question, then, is not whether such 
a statement (God is man) is affirmed (for all orthodox theologians of the time period 
surely intend to uphold the doctrine of the incarnation!), but how it is interpreted. 
                                                             
65See the discussion of this phrase provided in Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 
185-9.  
66Reinhard Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch”, 322f. The products of this survey are the pessimistic 
account of nominalist Christology that we have already suggested form the baseline of comparison against 
which Schwarz adjudicates Luther‟s relationship to suppositional carrying. Space precludes a point by 
point analysis of Schwarz‟s view here. The question that concerns us is whether Luther‟s own view of this 
statement entails a rejection of suppositional carrying as specified above. For a devastating criticism of 
Schwarz‟s interpretation of Biel, see Graham White, Luther as Nominalist, 271-80. White‟s argument in 
this respect provides further corroboration of the fact that Schwarz‟s diagnosis of Luther is incorrect, since 
he has skewed the data by advancing an inordinately pejorative account of Biel, only then to prove on its 
basis that Luther moves beyond it.  
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Schwarz seeks to dissociate Luther from his late medieval environment not because one 
explicitly affirms the incarnation while the other explicitly does not, but because he 
thinks the late medieval doctrine of suppositional carrying impedes this genuine 
affirmation, and understands Luther‟s apparent rejection of it to provide a much needed 
conceptual course correction.  
If this is the case, though, then the mere statement “God is man” in Luther‟s 
writing hardly counts as evidence one way or the other. Its presence is decidedly 
ambiguous so far as the question of Luther‟s alleged divergence is concerned. Like theses 
46-48 of the 1540 disputation, as well as Luther‟s use of compositional vocabulary, its 
demonstrative value relies entirely upon a verification of the divergence thesis based 
upon additional factors. The same verdict applies to texts in which Luther is understood 
to embrace a doctrinally unprecedented understanding of the hypostatic union in terms of 
a „coincidence of opposites‟, as Schmidt and Beer contend. The colorful christological 
language thought to furnish evidence for this view is identifiable within the patterns of 
patristic and medieval discourse, and as such, cannot bear the demonstrative weight the 
divergence interpretation seeks to assign to it.
67
  In short, neither proves a „symmetrical‟ 
account of Christ‟s Person as it might initially seem.  
                                                             
67
One very early instance of such juxtaposition of opposites occurs in the writings of 
Ignatius of Antioch. Note, for instance, the following christological reflection as quoted in 
Thomas Weinandy, “Ignatius of Antioch”, in The Zondervan Handbook to the History of Christianity, 
edited by Jonathan Hill (Oxford: Lion Publishing), 51. “Very Flesh, yet Spirit too; Uncreated, and yet born; 
God-and-Man in One agreed, Very-Life-in-Death indeed, Fruit of God and Mary‟s seed. At once 
impassible and torn by pain and suffering here below: Jesus Christ, whom as our Lord we know.” Bernard 
of Clairvaux (1090-1153) is also rather fond of juxtaposition of opposites language. See, as an example of 
this, the texts referenced in Walter Allgaier, Der "froehliche Wechsel" bei Martin Luther; eine 
Untersuchung zu Christologie und Soteriologie bei Luther unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der 
Schriften bis 1521 (Dissertation: Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1966), 119. 
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Perhaps most important to a „symmetrical‟ interpretation of Luther‟s Christology 
is a divergence appraisal of Luther‟s 1539 “Disputation concerning the Passage: „The 
Word Was Made Flesh.‟”68 Rather like the 1540 text, the disputation of 1539 turns on a 
question of theological language.
69
 Theses 4-7 of the disputation introduces a statement, 
which Luther assumes to have originated from the Sorbonne faculty in Paris. This 
statement
 
argues that truth is exactly the same, whether articulated in theology or 
philosophy.
70
 Luther makes it rather clear, even at the outset of his argument, that he 
regards this seamless understanding of the relation between disciplines as grossly 
deficient. Much of the disputation is occupied with an attempt to demonstrate why such a 
view is unsatisfactory, and argue in favor of a preferable alternative. Luther‟s efforts 
along these lines are complex, and the development of his argument touches upon a range 
of far-reaching issues, many of which lie outside the scope of this chapter. At the heart of 
his counter-proposal, is his insistence that theological and philosophical speech must be 
parsed into two distinct spheres of discourse, both of whose contents agree generally with 
„truth‟ in a final sense (thus avoiding any notion that these „spheres‟ are mutually 
                                                             
68WA 39/II, 1-33. English translation available in LW 38, 235-77.   
69For a helpful overview of the central themes covered in this disputation see Reijo Työrinoja, 
“Proprietas Verbi: Luther‟s Conception of Philosophical and Theological Language in the Disputation: 
Verbum caro factum est (Joh. 1:14), 1539”. Faith, Will, and Grammar: Some Themes of Intensional Logic 
and Semantics in Medieval and Reformation Thought, Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Society, no B 15 
(Helsinki: Vammalan Kirjapaino Oy, 1986), 143-78; and Graham White, Luther as Nominalist, 124-80. 
70WA 39/II, 3-4. “4. Sorbona, mater errorum, pessime definivit, idem esse verum in philosophia et 
theologia. 5. Impieque damnavit eos, qui contrarium disputaverunt. 6. Nam hac sententia abominabili 
docuit captivare articulos fidei sub iudicium rationis humanae. 7. Hoc erat aliud nihil, quam coelum et 
terram includere in suo centro aut grano milii.” For a discussion of the actual historical document to which 
Luther may be referring, see Reijo Työrinoja, “Proprietas Verbi”, 145-6. See also Stefan Streiff, "Novis 
linguis loqui  Martin Luthers Disputation   er Joh 1,14 "verbum caro factum est" aus dem Jahr 1539 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1993), 72-90. Streiff argues on page 41 of the same book that 
Luther means to attack a central tenet of scholastic theology in general. White and Työrinoja both suggest, 
on the contrary, that the discussion Luther is taking up is one over which there was much diversity of 
opinion throughout the late medieval period. In this light, both Streiff and Schwarz appear hasty in their 
attempt to distill here a fundamental shift over against medieval dogma in general.  
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contradictory), but reflect upon the peculiar objects of their analysis in different ways and 
according to different rules of speech.
71
 This overall proposal is reflected in the theses 
that circumscribe the disputation as a whole.  
“1. Although the saying, “Every truth is in agreement with every other truth,” is to be 
upheld, nevertheless, what is true in one field of learning is not always true in other fields 
of learning.”72 
 
“40. We would act more correctly if we left dialectic and philosophy in their own area 
and learned to speak in a new language in the realm of faith apart from every sphere. 
41. Otherwise, it will turn out that, if we put the new wine in old wineskins, both of 
them will perish; this is what the Sorbonne did. 
42. In articles of faith, the disposition of faith is to be exercised, not the philosophical 
intellect. Only then will we truly know what this means: “The Word was made flesh.”73 
  
 For the sake of focus, the following discussion will seek neither to provide a 
nuanced analysis nor evaluative appraisal of this programmatic proposal. It will ask, more 
                                                             
71That Luther wants to avoid contradiction is rendered clear in his claim in thesis 1 that one must 
uphold the notion that all truth agrees with truth. WA 39/II, 3. “1. Etsi tenendum est, quod dicitur: Omne 
verum vero consonat, tamen idem non est verum in diversis professionibus.”The semantic yield of Luther‟s 
proposal manifests itself in the notion of a „new language‟ or „grammar‟ whose words continue to signify 
the same objects as in their more mundane usage, but do so in a different way or with a new modality. 
Although interpretations of this phenomenon in Luther‟s thought are legion, suffice it here to suggest that 
Luther‟s concern is to reserve some continuity of meaning between „new‟ and „old‟ in order to bypass the 
kind of sheer equivocation that would cause theology to degenerate into linguistic nonsense; while, at the 
same time, his insistence that this signification operates in a new way as the result of its referential 
transition upon a unique and transcendent object. Although Luther‟s occasionally sharp distinction between 
philosophy and theology has made it appear plausible to a handful of scholars that his thought produces a 
„double theory‟ of truth, such a construal succeeds only to the extent that the first aspect of this tension is 
either ignored or seriously downplayed. How exactly Luther balances his position between the Scylla of 
seamless univocity and the Charybdis of pure equivocation, and whether or not the result is logically 
tenable are not questions that may occupy our attention here. For a helpful treatment of the theme of „new‟ 
and „old‟ language in Luther‟s theology, and its relation to univocation and equivocation, see Graham 
White, Luther as Nominalist, 177-9; 299-348; and Stefan Streiff,  Novis linguis loqui  Martin Luthers 
Disputation   er Joh 1,14 "verbum caro factum est" aus dem Jahr 1539 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and 
Ruprecht, 1993). Streiff, however, is dependent upon Schwarz for his construal of Luther‟s relation to late 
medieval Christology.  
72 LW 38, 239. WA 39/II, 3  “1. Etsi tenendum est, quod dicitur: Omne verum vero consonat, 
tamen idem non est verum in diversis professionibus.” 
73 LW 38, 242. WA 39/II, 5. “40. Rectius ergo fecerimus, si dialectica seu philosophia in sua 
sphaera relictis discamus loqui novis linguis in regno fidei extra omnem sphaeram. 41. Alioqui futurum est, 
ut vinum novum in utres veteres mittamus, et utrumque perdamus, ut Sorbona fecit. 42. Affectus fidei 
exercendus est in articulis fidei, non intellectus philosophiae. Tum vere scietur, quid sit: Verbum caro 
factum est.” 
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modestly, what the disputation suggests about Luther‟s relation to late medieval 
Christology; the very question treated so prevalently by „divergence interpretations‟ of 
this work.
74
 Such a concentration does not stray too far, though, from the central concern 
of Luther‟s argument. Christology occupies an important place in the argument, because 
Luther thinks it especially clear that the purported univocity of the Sorbonne‟s statement 
shipwrecks itself on the shoals of christological description. The centrality of this 
contention is clear already in theses two and three, where Luther remarks: 
“2. In theology it is true that the Word was made flesh; in philosophy the statement is 
simply impossible and absurd. 
3. The declaration, “God is man,” is not less but even more contradictory than if you 
would say, “Man is an ass.””75 
 
How exactly Luther thinks the Sorbonne‟s account of theology and philosophy 
flounders christologically is made clear in the published record of the ensuing academic 
                                                             
74
For a treatment of the broader issues at stake (for instance, Luther‟s understanding of the 
relation between theology and philosophy), see the pertinent discussions in Reijo Työrinoja, “Proprietas 
Verbi: Luther‟s Conception of Philosophical and Theological Language in the Disputation: Verbum caro 
factum est (Joh. 1:14), 1539”. Faith, Will, and Grammar: Some Themes of Intensional Logic and Semantics 
in Medieval and Reformation Thought, Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Society, no B 15 (Helsinki: 
Vammalan Kirjapaino Oy, 1986), 143-78; Stefan Streiff,  Novis linguis loqui  Martin Luthers Disputation 
  er Joh 1,14 "verbum caro factum est" aus dem Jahr 1539 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 
1993); Graham White, Luther as Nominalist: A Study of the Logical Methods Used in Martin Luther's 
Disputations in the Light of Their Medieval Background (Helsinki, Finland: Luther-Agricola-Society, 
1994); Christine Helmer, The Trinity and Martin Luther: A Study on the Relationship between Genre, 
Language and the Trinity in Luther's Works, 1523-1546 (Mainz: P. von Zabern, 1999); and Bengt 
Hägglund, Theologie und Philosophie bei Luther und in der Occamistischen Tradition; Luthers Stellung 
zur Theorie von der doppelten Wahrheit (Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1955). 
75 LW 38, 239. WA 39/II, 3. “2. In theologia verum est, verbum esse carnem factum, in 
philosophia simpliciter impossibile et absurdum. 3. Nec minus, imo magis disparata est praedicatio: Deus 
est homo, quam si dicas: Homo est asinus.” Despite Schmidt‟s suggestion that such juxtapositions show 
how Luther simply wishes to bulldoze philosophical distinctions altogether; or Schwarz‟s contention that 
Luther simply casts aside the restrictive framework of bad philosophy, we must observe that Luther is far 
from unique here. The very same line of thought is entertained, for instance, by the late medieval scholastic 
Gabriel Biel. See Biel, Gabriel, Wilfrid Werbeck, Udo Hofmann, Martin Elze, Renate Steiger, Hanns 
Rückert, and Volker Sievers, Gabrielis Biel collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum: Liber tertius, 
Gabrielis Biel Collectorium Circa Quattuor Libros Sententiarum (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr-P. Siebeck, 
1979), 174. Biel is acknowledging the objection that it seems absurd to affirm the incarnation, because, in 
philosophy God and man are “termini disparati”. This mirrors the progression of Luther‟s argument in a 
1537 sermon on John 3 that we will investigate in the second part of this chapter.   
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debate provided in the Weimar edition of Luther‟s works.76 These texts show the heart of 
his criticism to be an accusation that the Sorbonne can sustain a univocal coordination of 
theology and philosophy regarding the statement „God is man‟, only if it admits two, 
basically equivocal designations of the term „man.‟ Ordinarily, the term „man‟ refers to a 
human nature or a rational animal, which subsists as its own supposit. A „man‟, in other 
words, is a human secondary substance, which is carried into individually subsistent 
existence on account of its own nature alone.
77
 This definition, however, simply does not 
work if transitioned univocally into the theological sphere.  The incarnate Son of God 
simply is not a „man‟ in this philosophical sense since, on the scholastic account anyway, 
Christ is „human‟ only in the sense that the divine Person assumes a human nature into a 
relation of alien suppositional dependency.
78
  
It is therefore rather misleading to claim complete univocity of meaning between 
the following two statements: 1) „Socrates is a man‟; and 2) „Christ is a man.‟ The 
assertion of complete significatory univocity is inappropriate in this context because an 
important transition of meaning differentiates the function of the term „man‟ in both 
cases.
79
 Albeit ostensibly slight in its extent, such a differentiation of meaning forecloses 
                                                             
76The Weimar edition preserves three written accounts of the proceedings. The discussion above 
will seek to avoid drawing any significant conclusions from aspects of one version or another whose 
contents are clearly idiosyncratic in comparison with its counterparts.  
 77Marilyn McCord Adams points out that, in late medieval discourse, a “man is a nature composed 
of body and intellectual soul that is sustained by no suppositum or it is a suppositum that sustains such a 
nature composed of body and intellectual soul.” See Marilyn McCord Adams, “Relations, Inherence and 
Subsistence”, 69. The human nature of Socrates, in other words, is its own suppositum according to this 
description. See her further discussion on page 72. 
78WA 39/II, 10b. 
79This differentiation does not affect the truth-value of the statement „Christ is man‟ in Luther‟s 
mind because it rightly names the fact that Christ, like all other human beings, is in possession of a 
completely intact human nature. This fact, though, does not necessarily mean that Christ relates to his 
human nature in exactly the same way that ordinary human beings do, a caveat buttressed by late medieval 
accounts of the incarnation in terms of alien suppositional carrying. Once this caveat is acknowledged, 
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the validity of any syllogism whose premises depend upon a consistently stable definition 
of the term „man‟. If all this is true, Luther argues, the initial, programmatic statement 
affirming a seamless harmony of discursive meaning across the disciplinary boundary of 
theology and philosophy succeeds only by cannibalizing itself. The thesis of undisturbed 
univocity, in other words, depends in its execution upon an equivocation of terms. Such, 
in rather broad outline, are the grounds upon which Luther criticizes the Sorbonne 
statement.  
The salient question for the purposes of this study, is what Luther‟s critical view 
of the Sorbonne statement suggests about his relation to the Christology of late medieval 
nominalism. Authors who interpret the disputation as evidence in favor of a divergence 
insist that Luther‟s argument reflects a fundamental rejection of suppositional carrying. 
For Reinhard Schwarz, the complaint about equivocation is itself intended primarily to 
express Luther‟s dissatisfaction with a nominalist account of Christ‟s humanity as a non-
personal, ontologically non-informing accident somehow carried along by the divine 
Suppositum.
80
 The problem with such a view, in Schwarz‟s construal, is that it fails to 
secure the genuine „truth value‟ of the incarnation. To be sure, the nominalists think that 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
though, a theologian is faced with a significant methodological choice. Either one will try to ambiguate the 
ordinary meaning the word „man‟ so as to include the unique instance in which the divine Person assumes 
to itself a human nature in an attempt to achieve a thorough-going discursive symmetry between theology 
and philosophy; or, one will admit the different way in which Christ is called man, thus leaving relatively 
undisrupted the integrity of philosophical discourse, while at the same time finding a way to uphold and 
talk about the unique event of the incarnation. Marilyn McCord Adams illustrates rather helpfully how 
currents in late medieval theology and philosophy contributed to the urgency of this question specifically in 
relation to the vocabulary of supposits. See her essay: Marilyn McCord Adams, “What‟s Metaphysically 
Special about Supposits?”. Luther‟s treatment of the Sorbonne statement in the 1539 disputation appears to 
have far more to do with these methodological concerns, rather than with any attempt on his part to suggest 
the fundamental bankruptcy of late medieval Christology in general. To the contrary, it is precisely because 
Luther retains a late medieval point of view that he suggests a totally univocal position to be problematic.  
80That is, the notion that Christ‟s humanity is not expressed personally in the sense that the divine 
Supposit is identified with the person of Christ.   
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suppositional carrying enables the confession that God became man, but Schwarz deems 
the semantically circuitous way in which they qualify this statement to terminate in a kind 
of semantic illusion or betrayal. That is, although the medieval theologians find a way to 
enable assent to the doctrine of the incarnation, the actual contents of their view can 
really only affirm that “God is God” and “man is man.”81 All of this amounts, for 
Schwarz, to a theological equivocation of massive proportions. In light of this analysis, 
Schwarz understandably assumes that Luther‟s pervasive rant against equivocal language 
accordingly has as its final target a nominalist understanding of the incarnation in terms 
of suppositional carrying. Framed in this manner, Luther‟s argument would proceed 
basically as follows: 
1. If a seamless continuity exists between theological and philosophical spheres 
of discourse, then all theological statements must fall within the boundaries of 
pre-determined philosophical possibility. 
2. If theological statements must fall within these restrictive boundaries, then the 
incarnation must be construed in such a way that avoids any true unity of 
infinity (God) with the finite (man). 
3. But if the incarnation is interpreted in this way, then theology is forced into a 
logically futile attempt to affirm union (the doctrine of the incarnation) while 
at the same time actually denying it.   
4. The result is an interpretation of the statement „God is man‟ (suppositional 
carrying) that denudes this confession of its actual content.  
5. Thus, what begins in an attempt to secure the univocity of signification 
between philosophical and theological discourse terminates in an equivocal 
explication of the incarnation. 
6. Therefore, it is inappropriate to assert a seamless continuity between 
theological and philosophical spheres of discourse. 
 
The problem with this construal is that Luther‟s complaint against equivocation in the 
1539 disputation does not sprout from his underlying rejection of suppositional carrying, 
but emerges precisely because he accepts a late medieval account of the metaphysics of 
                                                             
81See Streiff‟s representation of Schwarz‟s argument in Stefan Streiff, "Novis linguis loqui": 
Martin Luthers Disputation   er Joh 1,14 "verbum caro factum est" aus dem Jahr 1539 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1993), 62 
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the incarnation as normative. By missing this aspect of the disputation, Schwarz‟s 
interpretation distorts, and very nearly inverts the actual intent of Luther‟s critique. So far 
as the christological application of the Sorbonne‟s statement is concerned, Luther regards 
its claim in favor of a seamless continuity between theological and philosophical 
discourse as misleading not because such a view terminates in an unacceptable 
Christology, but because it artificially cloaks important (medieval) christological 
distinctions that he assumes to be valid. One clear illustration of this phenomenon is to be 
found in argument‟s 3a and 4, as recorded in the „C‟ account of the public debate.82    
The objection to which Luther responds in this section is the assertion that the 
term „man‟ is, in fact, attributed univocally of God (that is, the second Person of the 
Trinity), and that one may therefore licitly refer to God as a „thinking animal‟.83 Luther‟s 
concern in this response is not to confute or criticize the proposed predication that God 
(in Christ) is a rational animal, but focuses instead upon the major premise understood to 
get this predication off of the ground, namely, the assumption that the term „man‟ is 
applied to God univocally; that is, in the same way that it is applied to human beings 
other than Christ. Luther addresses the point as follows: 
“When I speak of God as man, I cannot deny that he is a thinking animal; here the 
Scholastic theologians have admitted that Christ was a rational animal and man. 
However, they distinguish senses of the word “man” and say that it is equivocal, so that, 
when it refers to anyone of the human race apart from the incarnation, it designates a 
person subsisting by himself. This is a philosophical meaning. It has another meaning 
when it is said about Christ. Here one does not interpolate that fictitious philosophical 
                                                             
82These recorded arguments correspond with theses 3 and 4 of the published disputation.   
83As a caveat, it may be observed that the adjudication of statements such as this one (which may 
appear rather strange) is a persistent custom of nominalist Christology, especially in its extensive 
discussions regarding the communication of attributes. For more on this practice, see the second part of this 
chapter.   
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concept of a person. For here a new word is coined, designating the divine person 
sustaining our human one, as a white person signifies a man who maintains whiteness.”84 
  
It is crucially important for the purposes of this section to explicate the significance of 
what Luther is arguing here. Assumed in his response is the observation that an ordinary 
meaning of the term „man‟ cannot be applied without modification to the incarnate 
Person of Christ. The reason for this is that an ordinary application of „man‟ designates 
not a human nature, but a human person. That is, it refers to a self-subsisting entity or 
suppositum. But this cannot apply to Christ, Luther continues, because Christ is not a 
self-subsisting human nature, but a divine person carrying a human nature. Thus, while 
we may observe that the term „man‟ continues to denote an entity possessing an intact 
human nature (otherwise Luther would be forced to reject the truth value of the statement 
that Christ is a rational animal), the relation of this human nature to the person in which it 
subsists differs rather markedly from ordinary usage. Whereas „man‟ usually refers to a 
human person, as applied to Christ it signifies a divine person, albeit one that sustains a 
genuine human nature.  
The main point we must glean from this discussion is that Luther‟s complaint is 
emphatically not that the doctrine of suppositional carrying introduces an unacceptable 
equivocal representation of the incarnation as Schwarz alleges. To the contrary, it is 
precisely because Luther endorses the metaphysical qualifications embedded within this 
                                                             
84 LW 38, 271. WA 39/II, 10c. “Quando dico Deum hominem, non possum negare, quod et sit 
animal sensitivum; hic theologi scholastici concesserunt, quod Christus esset animal rationale et homo. 
Distinxerunt autem homines, et significat aequivocum, ut, quando significat aliquem de genere humano 
extra incarnationem, significat personam per sese subsistentem. Haec est significatio philosophica. Alia est, 
quando de Christo dicitur. Hic non supponit illam fictam personam philosophicam. Hic enim fit novum 
vocabulum significans personam divinam sustentantem nostram humanam, ut albus significat hominem 
sustentantem albedinem.” 
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doctrine that he counsels against cloaking these significatory qualifications underneath a 
misleading veneer of purported univocity of meaning.
85
 The progression of Luther‟s 
logic, then, may be summarized as follows: 
1. If the articulation of truth is exactly the same in theology and philosophy, then the 
common terms applied in each must share complete univocity of significatory 
meaning. 
2. If a completely univocal application of terms unites theological and philosophical 
spheres of discourse, it would need to be true, for instance, that the theological 
confession “Christ is man” expresses the exact same content as it does when the 
term „man‟ is applied to any other rational animal. 
3. This does not follow, though, since in the case of Christ, „man‟ denotes a divine 
Person carrying a human nature; whereas in other discursive settings it denotes a 
human Person subsisting in itself. 
4. Therefore, the articulation of truth cannot be exactly the same in theology and 
philosophy. 
 
The turning point in this logical sequence arrives in step three, where Luther 
acknowledges a differentiation of meaning precisely because he takes it for granted that 
                                                             
85 Schwarz justifies the transition of Luther‟s accusation of „equivocation‟ against the Sorbonne 
onto  late medieval Christology on the basis of Luther‟s reference to Gabriel Biel in WA 39/II, 11c-12c. 
“Univoce homo sumptum non verum est in theologia, sed in philosophia. Quando vero aequivoce non 
subsistit syllogismus 4 terminorum, sic ipsi Parisienses distinguunt, et tamen dicunt, idem esse verum in 
philosophia et theologia. Cur ergo distinguunt? Si esset idem, deberet etiam esse univocatio, idem verbum, 
eadem significatio. Nescientes ergo, quid dicant, tamen distinguunt a philosophia theologiam. Alii 
sumpserunt hominem univoce, ut Gabriel, ille incurrit in hunc syllogismum: Omnis homo est creatura. 
Occam voluit, non esse univocum, sed aequivocum, ut aliud sit humanitas in Petro, aliud in Christo. Homo 
in philosophia secundum naturam suam non significat filium Dei aut personam divinam. Hoc idem est, 
quod nos dicimus: communicatio idiomatum. Syllogismus non admittitur in mysteriis fidei et theologiae. 
Philosophia est error in theologia.” There are several reasons why interpreting this section as an indication 
that Luther means to jettison the doctrine of suppositional carrying is misleading. In the first place, such a 
reading is implausible because the very premise of Luther‟s response is that the univocal view does not 
work because, in theology, the word „man‟ refers to a divine Person, not a human one. The previous 
response (provided in the text above) confirms the fact that Luther means, by this, to affirm the doctrine of 
suppositional carrying rather than deny it. Second, Luther‟s use of Biel here is not meant to illustrate the 
bankruptcy of his Christology, but rather to show that, if one tries to use the term „man‟ in a univocal way, 
then one must reject the validity of any syllogism that depends upon Christ being a „man‟ in exactly the 
same way that we are, because this would imply that Christ is a human Person subsisting by itself. In other 
words, Luther is arguing that the Sorbonne may not have its discursive cake and eat it too. Either one must 
admit some kind of distinction of meaning in the word „man‟, and thus own up to a non-univocal  (though 
not necessarily starkly equivocal) relationship between theological and philosophical discourse (as Luther 
claims Occam to do), or, one must deny the unqualified validity of the syllogism that “Every man is a 
creature. Christ is a man. Therefore Christ is a creature” as Biel evidently does. Here again, the focus is on 
the nature of theological speech. The argument assumes and depends upon the legitimacy of the doctrine of 
suppositional carrying. Graham White helpfully situates Luther‟s comments on the term „man‟ to late 
medieval discussions over the same topic. See Graham White, Luther as Nominalist, 161-2. 
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the scholastic conception of the incarnate Christ as a divine Person carrying the human 
nature is normative. Interpreted in this way, Luther‟s argument presents itself as more of 
a plea for discursive honesty, than a revolutionary assault against late medieval 
Christology writ large. Schwarz‟s argument to the contrary represents a misconstrual of 
Luther‟s christological views. Luther‟s complaint against the Sorbonne statement is 
funded, not by his implicit rejection of late medieval Christology as equivocal in its 
account of Jesus‟ humanity, but by his fundamental presupposition of the doctrine of 
suppositional carrying as a valid explanation of the hypostatic union.
 86
  
Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, Axel Schmidt‟s treatment of the 1539 
disputation actually reinforces this criticism of Schwarz, even though he also purports to 
find in the disputation evidence of divergence. Schmidt acknowledges that Luther‟s 
explicit discussion of the Person of Christ in this disputation mirrors the late medieval 
account. This fact perplexes him because he has already concluded that Luther rejects late 
medieval Christology. Schmidt‟s solution to the resultant evidentiary quandary is to 
suggest that two irreconcilable strands exist within Luther‟s theology, and that each of 
these strands manifests itself in the 1539 text. Schmidt admits the presence of a 
conservative element in which Luther retains a basically medieval description of the 
hypostatic union. In making this concession, Schmidt inadvertently controverts the 
validity of Schwarz‟s interpretation of the disputation, as described above. In addition to 
                                                             
86This interpretation, namely, that Luther‟s complaint against the Sorbonne statement arises 
because he accepts suppositional carrying, and not because he rejects it, is collaborated by other sections of 
the recorded debate, and is reflected in versions „A‟ and „B‟ as well as the quote from the „C‟ version 
provided above. See, for example, WA 39/II, 16a. “Ego capio hominem dupliciter uno modo pro substantia 
corporali per se subsistente, alio modo pro persona divina sustentante humanitatem. Est hoc, quaeso, 
theologiam et philosophiam conciliare, cum distinguis, imo hoc ipso, quod univoca distinguifices?” Luther 
also cites scholastic christological distinctions as evidence against the argument that „man‟ is applied to 
God univocally. See WA 39/II, 10b.  
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the „conservative element‟, however, Schmidt also isolates a „progressive‟ strand in 
Luther‟s argument, which contradicts his apparent traditionalism. This strand is visible, 
Schmidt insists, in Luther‟s analysis of syllogisms within the disputation. Here we find an 
unresolved fissure between theology and philosophy, which Schmidt identifies as the 
source of Luther‟s doctrinal idiosyncrasies.87  
Whereas late medieval thinkers customarily refute heretical syllogisms through an 
analysis of premises, Luther appears in this disputation simply to discard the validity of 
syllogistic reasoning altogether. Schmidt concludes from this approach that Luther 
understands the doctrine of the incarnation simply to contradict philosophical reason, 
thus yielding, as it were, a double account of truth. Christologically speaking, the result 
of all this is to forfeit any need for a distinction between persons and natures, since this 
differentiated analysis (once introduced in order to bypass philosophical contradiction) is 
no longer necessary. In any case, even if this distinction were desired by Luther, his 
antipathy towards even a ministerial role of philosophically derived distinctions would 
bar its actual use. Thus, Luther is forced simply to assert a dialectical union of man and 
God in a way that contravenes reason. Thus, although Luther tries to speak like a late 
medieval theologian in certain respects, his antipathy towards philosophy introduces a 
bifurcation of thought that bears doctrinal fruit in an aggregate doctrine of Christ‟s 
Person. 
Schmidt‟s appraisal of the 1539 disputation suffers, though, from a number of 
exegetical deficiencies. Perhaps most glaring: the entire trajectory of his interpretation 
depends upon the fact that, while it concedes Luther explicitly to assert one thing to be 
                                                             
87For Schmidt‟s argument to this effect, see Axel Schmidt,  Die Christologie in Martin Luthers 
sp ten Disputationen, 202-10; 220-27. For the language of a progressive versus conservative strain, see 
201; 283-4. 
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true (suppositional carrying/ distinction between person and nature), it must make the 
case that the ancillary discursive furniture of Luther‟s argument implicitly proscribes his 
doing so. In other words, it is a construal that depends on adjudicating what Luther must 
be saying, at the direct expense of what Luther actually says. He overstates, for instance, 
the extent to which Luther‟s analysis of syllogism unambiguously denotes a wholesale 
rejection of philosophical reasoning within theology. Reijo Työrinoja, for instance,
 
 
argues that the way in which Luther arbitrates syllogistic legitimacy within the 
theological sphere continues to reflect standard late medieval practice.
88
  
Whether or not Työrinoja‟s interpretation turns out finally to be convincing is not 
a question we have space to arbitrate here. However, does it not seem far preferable to 
interpret Luther‟s intent in a way that comports with his affirmation of suppositional 
carrying elsewhere in the disputation rather than postulate the existence of two radically 
incongruent trajectories of christological discourse within the same text? Schmidt‟s 
„solution‟ in other words, can count only as an exegetical avenue of last resort. The 
exegesis on which his view depends succeeds only by destroying the coherency of the 
text itself; that is, by presuming within it the existence of an irresolvable fracture of 
meaning. Ironically, adopting this approach violates a principle of reasoning famously 
defended by the very thinkers whose Christology Schmidt thinks Luther rejects, namely, 
that “plurality should not be posited without necessity.”89 
 
                                                             
88
See the discussion in Reijo Työrinoja, “Proprietas Verbi”, 143-78. For a helpful discussion of the 
artificial way in which Luther‟s view of philosophy has been polarized in much recent scholarship, see 
Christine Helmer, The Trinity and Martin Luther, 50-56. 
  
89See the reference to this phrase in Armand Augustine Maurer, The Philosophy of William of 
Ockham in the Light of Its Principles (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1999): 51 n. 116.  
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Conclusion  
At the beginning of this chapter, we observed the fact that each of the major 
advocates of divergence acknowledge there to be texts in Luther‟s corpus, both early and 
late, that express at least superficial acquiescence to the language of suppositional 
carrying.
90
 Despite the fact that this concession plausibly implies an ongoing acceptance 
of suppositional carrying as an explanation of the hypostatic union, advocates of the 
divergence thesis argue rather forcefully that Luther, in fact, decisively rejects this 
account in favor of a „composite‟ doctrine of Christ. They advance this argument on the 
basis of the following interpretive claims: 
1. Luther explicitly rejects suppositional carrying as „monstrous‟ in his 1540 
“Disputation on the Divinity and Humanity of Christ”. 
 
2.  Luther clearly utilizes compositional descriptive vocabulary, which reflects 
an irreducibly different doctrine of Christ‟s Person than the one endorsed in 
late medieval Christology. 
 
3. Luther asserts a degree of unity between divinity and humanity in Christ not 
possible for the doctrine of suppositional carrying to secure.  
 
4. Luther‟s 1539 “Disputation Concerning the Passage: „The Word Was Made 
Flesh” establishes a rejection of suppositional carrying either: 1) by deriding 
this doctrine as an equivocal affirmation of the incarnation (Schwarz); or 2) by 
creating an antithetical relation between philosophy and theology to the extent 
that the distinction between person and nature is effectively destroyed 
(Schmidt). 
 
In the course of this section‟s discussion, we have suggested that each of these 
claims fails as a valid interpretation of the pertinent textual data. The context of the 
comments in the 1540 disputation demonstrate Luther‟s focus to be upon the unintended 
consequences of semantic assertions he otherwise accepts to be valid, a point reinforced 
                                                             
90Reinhard Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch”, 305; 335-6 n. 156; Theobald Beer, Der fröhliche Wechsel 
und Streit, 406; and Axel Schmidt, Die Christologie in Martin Luthers sp ten Disputationen, 234-5; 241-3.   
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by the fact that the theses directly preceding those in question express primary concern 
about the implication of Christ being a composite being. The compositional language that 
Luther does invoke elsewhere falls well within the ordinary parameters of medieval 
discourse, and thus fails as clear evidence for any dramatic divergence. Similarly 
ambiguous are the various places in Luther‟s writing where he registers a robust 
affirmation of the union between God and man in Christ. Claims of this kind can count as 
evidence of divergence only once it is assumed that similar expressions of unity are 
simply impossible within a late medieval christological framework; an assumption belied 
by the actual christological discourse of the period. Finally, the 1539 disputation‟s central 
complaint against the Sorbonne‟s implicitly equivocal position is sustained, not by 
Luther‟s underlying rejection of suppositional carrying, but by his continuing assumption 
that this mode of christological explanation is normative; a fact made rather clear by 
Luther‟s designation of the „man‟ Christ as a “persona divina sustentante 
humanitatem”.91 Since all of this evidence lacks demonstrative force, we must accept the 
transparent indications elsewhere in Luther‟s writing that he continues to affirm the 
doctrine of suppositional carrying, and reject the argument that this verbal assent is 
merely illusory in nature.  
 
                                                             
91
WA 39/II, 16a.   
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THE SUFFERING OF GOD IN CHRIST: A 16
TH
 CENTURY BREAKTHROUGH? 
 The present chapter focuses on the second aspect of the divergence thesis‟ first 
tier of analysis. The issue directly in question throughout is Martin Luther‟s conception 
of God‟s participation in the sufferings of Christ.  A specific understanding of this 
conception is crucially important to the divergence thesis as a whole. The bulk of 
emphasis in recent literature pertinent to this area falls squarely upon the reformer‟s 
allegedly „unique‟ treatment of the communication of idioms. The uniqueness of Luther‟s 
position is purported in this literature to consist in his forthright endorsement of a 
„reciprocal exchange‟ between Christ‟s natures within which there is not just a 
participation of the humanity in divine attributes, but also a participation of Christ‟s 
divinity in human characteristics, including a direct experience of its suffering. This 
second communicative „direction‟ (that is, the translation of human properties to divinity) 
is the conceptual lynchpin of the divergence thesis as a whole. What may seem initially to 
be only a small and therefore inconsequential conceptual adjustment turns out to be, as it 
were, the modern camel poking its nose beneath the medieval theological tent. For once 
the predicational asymmetry characteristic of a classical understanding of the 
communicatio idiomatum is destabilized, an entire constellation of theological 
assumptions appears ripe for reformulation.  
First to go is obviously the doctrine of divine impassibility itself, which Luther‟s 
position is alleged unequivocally to jettison. This preliminary course correction, however, 
is but one small part of a much more profound recalibration, which theoretically recasts 
the nature of God‟s relationship to the world. This „recalibration‟ is precisely the 
doctrinal dividend advocates of the divergence reception generally understand Luther‟s 
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christological adjustment to enable. Because of this christological adjustment, Luther is 
supposed to clear away space for a more adequate conceptualization of God‟s immanent 
involvement within the created order. The legitimacy of this „reception‟ depends rather 
directly upon the interpretive judgment that Luther‟s doctrine of the communicatio 
idiomatum includes a participation of the divine nature in the sufferings of Christ‟s 
humanity. 
 As the result of this argumentative structure, the primary intent of this second 
christological chapter is to ascertain whether or not Luther does, in fact, predicate 
„suffering‟ of the divine nature of Christ, as divergence advocates are so wont to insist. In 
order to address this question, the subsequent discussion focuses its attention upon 
historical texts in which Luther‟s direct treatment of the communicatio idiomatum 
occupies center stage. At the outset, we must clarify and acknowledge the fact that 
Luther‟s understanding of the communication of attributes differs in at least one respect 
from many patristic and medieval antecedents.
1
  For scholastic thinkers of the medieval 
period, the communicatio idiomatum refers primarily if not exclusively to the predication 
of divine and human attributes to the single Person of Christ. Luther often describes the 
communication of idioms along these traditional lines, but there are also places where he 
introduces a second application. In these contexts, the communicatio idiomatum also 
describes the participation of Christ‟s human nature in predicates that belong properly to 
His divine nature. This much is abundantly clear from Luther‟s occasional argument for 
                                                             
1Whether or not there exists significant patristic precedent for Luther‟s point of view is not a 
question that may detain us here. Certainly, there are many patristic theologians who envision a 
divinization of Christ‟s humanity, which takes place as the result of communicative exchange. It remains a 
question for future study whether and how these precursors might relate to Luther‟s own view, developed 
hundreds of years later within a different intellectual context.    
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the possibility of Christ‟s real presence in the Lord‟s Supper on the grounds that the 
humanity of Christ shares in divine omnipresence.
2
 
 The question this chapter addresses is not whether Luther occasionally interprets 
the communication of idioms as a sharing between Christ‟s two natures, but whether this 
sharing is presented by him as „bi-directional‟. Is there, along with the human nature‟s 
participation in the divine majesty also a real participation of Christ‟s divinity in the 
suffering vulnerability of His humanity? Theologically speaking, a great deal hinges upon 
the arbitration of this question. In terms of Luther‟s relation to his context, one may note 
the fact that, although his endorsement of a divine to human communication of attributes 
is admittedly somewhat „unique‟ against the backdrop of medieval christological opinion, 
this view by itself need not destabilize the classically developed doctrine of God. There is 
nothing outrageously controversial about Luther‟s assumption that the human nature of 
Christ is both passible and mutable. In this sense, the idea that Christ‟s humanity could be 
„altered‟ or „elevated‟ in some respects through the hypostatic union does not fall prey to 
the same theological and philosophical restrictions that apply in the case of the divine 
nature. To speak of an ontologically conditioning participation of the humanity in the 
majesty of God initiates no essential contradictions so far as longstanding conceptions of 
„human nature‟ are concerned.3  
                                                             
2For a thorough discussion of ubiquity, see Jörg Bauer, “Ubiquität”, in Creator est Creatura: 
Luther’s Christologie als Lehre von  er I iomenkommunikation, hrsg. Oswald Bayer und Benjamin 
Gleede, Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann, bd. 138 (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 186-301. The 
capacity of Christ‟s human nature to be in more than one place at the same time is not the only application 
of this communicative principle in Luther‟s Christology, even if confessional debates later in the 16th 
century tended to focus in upon it. The present survey accepts this aspect of Luther‟s Christology, but will 
not expend additional space seeking either to verify or expand upon its degree of importance within 
Luther‟s theology as a whole. The following chapter will, however, reflect upon the soteriological 
significance of a „one-way‟ communication of attributes between natures. 
3That is, insofar as this „ontological conditioning‟ avoids the implication that Christ‟s genuine 
humanity is somehow dissolved or transformed through metamorphosis into something other than really 
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To speak of an ontologically conditioning participation of divinity in the death 
and suffering of humanity, however, initiates an essential contradiction to longstanding 
conceptions of divinity. That is, a two-way rendering of the communication of idioms 
requires as its direct entailment the severing of a number of conceptual moorings 
basically intrinsic to the classically developed doctrine of God, a point already outlined 
earlier in this chapter. The salient question for this part of the chapter is whether Luther 
endorses, in addition to his ordinary analysis of the communicatio idiomatum as a 
reference to the mutual application of predicates to the single Person of Christ, a one-
way, or two-way doctrine of communicative sharing between Christ‟s humanity and 
divinity. In what follows, I will argue that Luther clearly endorses a „one-way‟ 
communication of attributes, a position that he makes rather clear by his unwavering 
proviso that the divine nature does not, and indeed can not suffer.
4
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
human. Luther clearly rejects such a view, predominantly in his complaints against the radical reformer 
Caspar Schwenckfeld in his 1540 “Disputation on the Divinity and Humanity of Christ.” There are 
important precedents, moreover, in both patristic and medieval contexts, for christological views that 
exploit the mutability of Christ‟s humanity and do so without any implication that Christ ceases thereby to 
be human in any sense. For the patristic period, see the description of Gregory of Nyssa‟s “transformational 
Christology” in John Behr, The Nicene Faith: Part 2, Formation of Christian Theology, vol. 2 (Crestwood, 
NY: St. Vladimir‟s Seminary Press, 2004), 436-51. In the medieval period, at least Johannes of Mirecourt 
is willing to entertain the possibility of a human body being present in more than one place at a time. He 
advances this possibility not on the basis of the communication of idioms, but through recourse to the 
potential absoluta Dei. The very fact that such a thing is viewed as possible, though, shows that spatial 
circumscription is not viewed to be as essential to human nature as, for instance, impassibility is to the 
divine nature. Even in their most wildly speculative moments, the nominalist theologians do not suggest 
that it would ever be possible for divinity to suffer. Ernst Borchert, Der Einfluss des Nominalismus auf die 
Christologie der Spätscholastik, 84. It also seems fair to say that any christologically oriented doctrine of 
divinization entails some form of intrinsic human mutability. This at least would seem necessary if there is 
truly to be a genuine participation of human beings in the majesty and splendor of divine nature.  
4
This view will be shown in subsequent chapters to possess important implications for 
characterizing the basic shape of Luther‟s soteriological vision. It will also be deemed rather important for 
the task of responsibly appropriating Luther‟s christological witness in a contemporary theological context. 
In addition to the fundamental concern of this section to specify Luther‟s understanding of divine suffering, 
however, we must also acknowledge the subsidiary purpose of this investigation to corroborate the thesis 
already advanced that Luther retains a medieval doctrine of suppositional carrying as the underlying 
metaphysic through which he makes sense of the hypostatic union. This corroboration is possible, because 
the nature of Luther‟s predication theory provides a crucial insight into the conceptual sub-structure of his 
doctrine of Christ. His analysis of various „predicates‟ provides, as it were, a looking glass into the way in 
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Contracting the Sphere of Inquiry 
Before turning to a nuanced examination of the pertinent christological texts this 
section begins by narrowing the sphere of investigation. Unlike the relative scarcity of 
texts in which Luther specifically addresses the doctrine of suppositional carrying, the 
doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum is one to which the reformer turns rather often 
throughout the course of his lifetime.
5
 It would be inadvisable for this chapter to attempt 
a comprehensive synthesis of Luther‟s position as expressed in these texts. The focus of 
what follows is restricted, more narrowly, to those texts that pertain either directly or 
indirectly to Luther‟s understanding of the relation between the divine nature of Christ 
and its mode of participation in human sufferings.
6
  
  Even within this smaller grouping of texts it is possible to isolate a few texts in 
particular, and direct primary exegetical attention to them. This is because most 
divergence interpreters of Luther‟s Christology concede the significant fact that broad 
swaths of the reformer‟s writings retain a thoroughly traditional point of view regarding 
the suffering of God in Christ. Dennis Ngien, for instance, furnishes an impressive series 
of texts from Luther‟s corpus in which any communication of human predicates to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
which the reformer conceptualizes the hypostatic union. The importance of this fact, for our purposes, is 
that it affords an opportunity to test part I‟s claims vis-à-vis Luther‟s retention of the doctrine of 
suppositional carrying. In particular, we may test the previously advanced contention that Luther continues 
to assume an „asymmetrical‟ doctrine of Christ‟s Person by measuring the extent to which such a view is 
manifest in a similarly asymmetrical predication structure. Does Luther distinguish, in other words, the 
application of divine and human attributes through a clearly differentiated mode of analysis? Although the 
abiding focus of this section will fall upon the first and primary objective, namely, triangulating Luther‟s 
precise views of divine suffering, the discussion in it will also furnish additional evidence in support of the 
claims advanced in part I.  
5The frequency of these references has prompted a handful of scholars to characterize the 
communicatio idiomatum as the governing nerve center of Luther‟s theology.   
6Indirect evidence includes, for instance, any text in which Luther specifies the precise way in 
which the predicates of Christ‟s humanity are applied to Christ as compared with the predicates of His 
divinity.   
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divine nature is specifically prohibited.
7
 Marc Lienhard is a bit less forthright perhaps, 
but nevertheless grants the existence of a „traditional strain‟, especially in a number of 
Luther‟s early writings.8  
Acknowledging these „impassibilist texts‟ to exist constrains the advocates of a 
divergence interpretation to one of two hermeneutical options. Either the existence of a 
gradual chronological development must be superimposed upon Luther‟s writing, in 
which he incrementally moves beyond the christological proscriptions of his medieval 
past, or one must acknowledge a fundamental and unresolved inconsistency within 
Luther‟s written corpus. It could also be argued that that the implicit trajectory of 
Luther‟s theological vision points in the direction of a radically new understanding of 
divine suffering, but fails to articulate this understanding with a satisfying degree of 
consistency.
9
  
The divergence interpretation simply cannot claim that Luther comprehensively 
overturns a traditional understanding of divine suffering and espouses a two-way 
communication of attributes with unwavering constancy. It must argue, instead, that 
                                                             
7See the various citations provided in Dennis Ngien, “Chalcedonian Christology and Beyond”, 54-
8. Ngien concedes not only that Luther retains the traditional view, but does so at least as late as 1544, the 
year before he died.  
8
See, for instance, Marc Lienhard, Luther, Witness to Jesus Christ: Stages and Themes of the 
Reformer's Christology (Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1982), 169-71. 
9 Along these lines, it is sometimes suggested that Luther and his Protestant followers, were 
motivated politically to stress their continuity with catholic doctrine in order to preserve some measure of 
religious toleration in the eyes of their Roman Catholic superiors such as the emperor Charles V. In this 
sense, Luther‟s own claim in his Schmalkald articles to share his opponents doctrine of God and 
Christology is seen as a disingenuous, though perhaps necessary product of political savvy.  Thus, Luther‟s 
significance is measured not so much in light of his actual theological proposal, but in terms of the grander 
conceptual elaborations this proposal is perceived to have enabled. Luther is understood to be among the 
first to poke his head above the clouds of the late medieval christological fog, but the limitations of his own 
historical circumstances cause him, as it were, to bob continually above and below—never breaking 
through into a consistent articulation of his own best insights. One of the earliest interpreters of Luther to 
argue this point is Albrecht Ritschl, who complains that Luther and Melanchthon both fall back into a 
scholastic mode of theology which Ritschl understands to be a dead end. For more on this, see chapter 4.    
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Luther‟s clear endorsement of a two-way doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum in a 
few textual loci justify the larger conclusion that Luther effectively disrupts the classical 
doctrine of God by insisting upon the suffering of the divine nature in Christ, even though 
this position is not articulated with even consistency throughout his theological writings. 
As in the previous section‟s discussion of Luther‟s relation to suppositional carrying, this 
argument succeeds by assigning hermeneutical pride of place to a circumscribed canon of 
texts within a larger assortment of otherwise variegated evidence.  
 The pertinence of this brief taxonomical survey to the present section‟s central 
argument is again methodological in nature. In light of the argumentative form assumed 
by a divergence interpretation of Luther‟s doctrine of the communication of attributes, 
there emerge two available avenues for pursuing its refutation. The first, and weaker of 
the two, would be to challenge the hermeneutical arbitration of the two alleged „sets‟ of 
texts within Luther‟s writing, and suggest a divergence resolution of the tensions between 
them to be inadequate.
10
 More incisive is the second avenue of criticism, which will be 
pursued in this section‟s forthcoming discussion. This avenue denies that the evidence is 
really mixed at all by demonstrating that even the texts considered by divergence 
interpreters to contain Luther‟s clearest articulations of a two-way communication of 
attributes still reflect a traditional commitment to divine impassibility. By refuting the 
passibilism often assigned to these texts, this chapter will thus excise the sole evidentiary 
                                                             
10That is to say, even if the select number of texts that divergence advocates enlist do contain 
language that expresses a two-way communication of attributes, this alone does not explain how 
interpreters are justified in according to these texts determinative weight for establishing where Luther‟s 
basic theological predilections lie. It seems to the present author that some discussion of the warrant behind 
this hermeneutical shift is needed. Would it not be at least as feasible to interpret these few texts in light of 
the many others that express clearly an alternative point of view? We will not pursue these questions at 
great length in the discussion that follows. Instead, we will seek to demonstrate the more devastating point 
that even the select texts that seem to express a divergence point of view do not actually do so.    
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warrant for a divergence rendering of these matters in the first place. The methodological 
structure of this counter-argument will therefore not require a redundant documentation 
of texts in which Luther is already acknowledged by scholars on all sides to espouse 
merely a one-way doctrine of the communication of attributes. Such documentation 
would be superfluous, since the most responsible forms of the divergence interpretation 
are advanced in full cognizance of these texts. Instead, the main body of text will occupy 
itself with loci in which Luther is alleged unambiguously to express a two-way 
understanding of communicative exchange.  
Dispensing a Few, Prominent Evidentiary Non-Sequiturs  
 Some of the texts adduced as evidence of a new, passibilist element in Luther‟s 
doctrine of the communication of attributes can be refuted only by means of careful and 
prolonged exegetical argument.
11
 The probative value of many other texts commonly 
cited, however, dissipates with relative ease. Foremost among the latter are instances in 
which Luther directly affirms some version of the statement that, in Christ, “God 
suffers.” Paul Althaus, for instance, points to a text from Luther‟s 1540 “Disputation on 
the Divinity and Humanity of Christ” which states: “What Christ has suffered should also 
be attributed to God for they are one.”12 According to Althaus‟ assessment, this text 
conveys a commitment on Luther‟s part to dei-passionism, and thus entails a departure 
from the traditional doctrine of divine impassibility.
13
 Althaus is not at all unique in his 
                                                             
11These instances occupy the focus of the following section.   
12 Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1966), 197 n. 44. Althaus quotes here from WA 39/II, 121.  
13By this term, Althaus means to differentiate Luther from the early church heresy of 
„patripassionism‟, since Luther asserts only the suffering of the divine Son, and not the Father as well. This 
distinction appears rather frequently in the explanation of Luther‟s commitment to divine passibility.  
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attempt to draw such a conclusion.
14
 The initial plausibility of his interpretation melts 
away, however, under the heat of closer scrutiny. 
 A „dei-passionist interpretation‟ of texts like the one Althaus cites is deficient 
because it wrongly assumes that the mere application of human attributes to „God‟ 
automatically disrupts the conceptual landscape of patristic and medieval discourse. The 
inaccuracy of this assumption is easily demonstrated. Many precedents for the operative 
ascriptive practice are detectable in the history of theological development prior to 
Luther. Perhaps most conspicuous in this regard is the well-known Chalcedonian 
endorsement of the Marian term Θεοτόκος (bearer of God), a designation that 
unambiguously stipulates the application of human predicates not just to „Christ‟, but to 
„God‟ as well.15 Although the history of subsequent theological development is 
circuitous, it bears observing here that this basic predicational trajectory would later be 
explicated in the more blatant claims of canon 10 of Constantinople II (553) which insists 
that one of the Trinity has suffered for us.
16
 Those patristic thinkers who endorse 
statements of this kind, it bears clarifying, intend no implicit rejection of divine 
impassibility. Cyril of Alexandria, for instance, whose vitriolic exchanges with Nestorius 
were part of the impetus eventually leading to the chalcedonian definition, was quite clear 
                                                             
14 See, for instance, Bernard Lohse, Luther’s Theology  Its Historical an  Systematic 
Development, trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999), 230.  
15Richard Price and Michael Gaddis, The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon, vol. 3, Translated 
Texts for Historians , 45 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005), 179-80. 
16Gilles Emery, OP, “The Immutability of the God of Love and the Problem of Language 
Concerning the „Suffering of God‟”, in Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering, eds. 
Keating, James, and Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, Mich: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 2009), 31.  
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about his abiding commitment to this doctrine, even as he insisted upon the legitimacy 
and necessity of theological statements such as “God suffers.”17  
Medieval authors also endorse this mode of predication. Scholars who emphasize 
the obvious centrality of the communicatio idiomatum in Luther‟s theology, have 
sometimes failed to reflect adequately upon the extent to which this centrality is itself 
likely a product of the late medieval environment in which the reformer was educated, 
rather than an innovation of his own fabrication. Fourteenth century theological 
discussion, in particular, is rife with interest and rigorous debate over the theory and 
practice of christological predication.
18
 Insufficient emphasis upon, or awareness of the 
intellectual milieu stretching especially between the 14
th
 and 16
th
 centuries has sometimes 
led scholars to assign an inordinate degree of novelty to aspects of Luther‟s christological 
discourse that are, in fact, rather prosaic once situated in the framework of a late 
medieval setting.  
Robert Kolb, for instance, avers that Luther‟s affirmation of christological 
doctrine introduces “dramatically non-traditional expressions”, such as: “„Mary makes 
broth for God,‟ Mary suckles God with her breasts, bathes God, rocks and carries God, 
                                                             
17For a thorough treatment of Cyril‟s Christology, see John McGuckin, Saint Cyril of Alexandria 
and the Christological Controversy, 175-226. See also Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible 
God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought, The Oxford Early Christian studies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 135-71. 
18A dated, but still invaluable window into the complexities of this discourse is available in Ernst 
Borchert, Der Einfluss des Nominalismus auf die Christologie der Spätscholastik nach dem Traktat "de 
communicatione idiomatum" des Nicolaus Oresme, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des 
Mittelalters 35, 4/5 (Münster i. W. 1940). Awareness of this 14th and 15th century literature makes the 
ordinary custom of introducing Luther‟s Christology predominantly in relation to 5th century debates 
between Cyril and Nestorius appear historically unhelpful. To be sure, Luther is aware of these patristic 
debates, but his own point of access into the doctrine of Christ is the late medieval setting in which he lived 
and breathed. Thus, the practice of referring to Luther as Cyrillian or hyper-Alexandrian, while perhaps 
illuminating in some respects, represents a historically tendentious mode of classification. Luther‟s textual 
valorization of Cyril and denigration of Nestorius and Eutyches in such texts as his 1539 “On the Councils 
and the Church” is far from unique within the medieval period.   
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and Pilate and Herod crucified and killed God, „the infant Christ, lying in the cradle, 
suckled by the Virgin Mary, created heaven and earth‟”.19 How exactly the „non-
traditional‟ character of such statements ought to be situated, is not something Kolb 
neatly specifies for his reader. In the context of his main argument, the emphasis seems to 
fall upon the fact that Luther appropriates a broadly traditional (that is, patristic) 
Christology, but does so through creative and, non-traditional vocabulary. Thus, Kolb 
emphasizes the conceptual continuity Luther‟s statements have with the Council of 
Ephesus‟ much earlier affirmation that God lay in Mary‟s womb.20  A few pages later, 
however, Kolb argues that, for Luther, the divine nature shares in attributes of the human 
nature, thus registering his ostensible assent to a two-way understanding of the 
communicatio idiomatum.
21
 The overall thrust in Kolb seems to be upon Luther‟s unique 
emphasis upon the radical union between God and man in Christ.
22
  The dramatic novelty 
he attributes to Luther‟s speech, though, could certainly be taken to suggest the 
introduction of a foreign element in Luther‟s appropriation of the tradition.  
Such an implication is pursued less ambiguously, for instance, in the recent work 
of Johann Anselm Steiger. He calls attention to similar statements in Luther‟s writings, 
gleaned, in his case, from the reformer‟s 1539 treatise “On the Councils and the Church” 
and also from a sermon preached in December of 1525. Of these texts, Steiger remarks: 
                                                             
19This amalgamation of quotes provided in Robert Kolb, Martin Luther: Confessor of the Faith 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 112. See the appropriate citations to Luther‟s texts in note 18. It 
is somewhat unclear how Kolb situates the significance of this quote.  
20
Ibid.., 112-3. 
21Ibid.., 115.   
22Kolb leans rather heavily upon Lienhard‟s construal of Luther‟s Christology throughout his 
discussion. Whether or not he shares Lienhard's understanding of Luther's new ontology of Christ's Person, 
and fundamental trajectory beyond divine impassibility is not discussed explicitly. See ibid.., 110 n. 4; 111 
n. 5 and n. 11; 112 n. 14; 113 n. 21; 115 n. 32; 116 n. 35, 36 and 40; 117 n. 43.   
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“Since, on the basis of the communicatio idiomatum, all things that apply to the human 
nature of Christ are also applied to the divine nature, Luther can preach that the Creator 
was born (nascitur creator) and that the Word of God lay in a manger”.23 One notes in 
this statement that Steiger equates the attribution of human predicates to God in Luther‟s 
discourse with an attribution of suffering to the divine nature.  Because of this „semantic 
equation‟, he identifies in such ascriptions an implicit conceptual swerve away from the 
previously normative tendency to regulate the communicatio idiomatum with an 
underlying, axiomatic commitment to divine impassibility.
24
 Steiger‟s semantic equation 
appears not only logically premature, but altogether unlikely, once the linguistic 
complexities of late medieval discourse are taken into account.
 25
 Allegations like those 
he advances depend upon the validity of two rather tenuous assumptions: 1) that the 
blatant ascription of human predicates to God is clearly novel when compared with the 
ordinary patterns of late medieval christological discourse; and 2) that this mode of 
                                                             
23Johann Anselm Steiger, “Die communicatio idiomatum als Achse und Motor der Theologie 
Luthers”, 4. “Da aufgrund der communicatio idiomatum alle Dinge, die von der menschlichen Natur Christi 
gelten, auch seiner göttlichen zugeeignet werden, kann Luther predigen, daß der Schöpfer geboren wird 
(»nascitur creator«) und daß das verbum Dei in der Krippe liegt.” The English translation provided above is 
taken from Johann Anselm Steiger, “The Communicatio Idiomatum as the Axle and Motor of Luther‟s 
Theology”, trans. Carolyn Schneider, Lutheran Quarterly 14 (2000): 127. 
24Steiger provides an example of this „regulation‟ in the work of John of Damascus who 
occasionally speaks as if there were a fully reciprocal exchange of attributes between natures, but 
proscribed this possibility through his ongoing commitment to divine impassibility. Luther‟s unflinching 
ascription of human predicates to God indicates, for Steiger, that Luther fundamentally rejects this 
inconsistency. “Ganz anders jedoch Luther.” He does not address, however, whether or not Luther similarly 
proscribes the suffering of the divine nature as we shall in fact argue in what follows. Johann Anselm 
Steiger, “Die communicatio idiomatum als Achse und Motor der Theologie Luthers”, 3-4.  
25By „semantic equation‟, I refer to Steiger‟s evident assumption that „the Creator is born‟ is 
simply equivalent to „the divine nature is born‟; or that „God suffers‟ entails „the divine nature suffers‟. To 
assume this semantic equation is to overlook the thorough and meticulous ways in which theology since the 
patristic period has distinguished these two types of claims. In light of this tradition, of which Steiger is 
undoubtedly aware, one is forced to ask why a statement that can just as easily be found among patristic or 
medieval proponents of divine impassibility ought to be enlisted as clear evidence of an entirely different 
meaning when found in Luther. 
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ascription reflects an intrinsic endorsement of divine passibility.
26
 Structurally, the 
second of this pair (doctrinal deviation) draws its exegetical plausibility entirely from the 
presupposed validity of the first (novelty). If Luther's statements are shown not to be 
novel when compared with the ordinary discourse of late medieval christology, the notion 
that he intends by them to express a fundamentally 'new' doctrinal content loses its 
evidentiary point of departure. The plausibility of a divergence interpretation of this 
textual data erodes, then, if it can be demonstrated that antecedent equivalents for this 
sort of language exist in the theological milieu of Luther's immediate theological context. 
A few examples of late medieval discourse demonstrate rather easily the 
prevalence with which blatantly human predicates are assigned to God because of the 
hypostatic union. Petrus of Palude (c. 1275-1342), for instance, affirms that, in Christ, 
God “sees”, “eats” and “suffers.”27 Robert Holcot (c. 1290-1349) claims, a bit more 
controversially perhaps, that one may say that God can be deceived or even die, on 
account of the humanity of Christ.
28
 In a similar vein, Heinrich Totting of Oyta (c. 1330-
1397) insists that the actions and sufferings of the humanity must apply to the divine 
suppositum on account of the communicatio idiomatum. On this basis, he affirms that 
“God suffered, died and moved about spatially.”29 Nicholas Oresme (1323-1382) assents 
to a similar point of view, stating that, in Christ, God is born of the virgin, suffers, and 
                                                             
26These sorts of statements also have significant patristic precedent, though that falls outside the 
immediate scope of this chapter. 
27Ernst Borchert, Der Einfluss des Nominalismus auf die Christologie der Spätscholastik, 79.  
28Ibid., 85. Adam Wodeham (c. 1295-1358) likewise affirms the statement that “God died”, 
although specifies the sense in which this is true. For him, this statement signifies that the human body with 
which the divine hypostasis is joined dies. The salient point, then, as we shall discuss below, is not whether 
such statements are affirmed, but how they are affirmed. In this case, the qualificatory discourse is essential 
for apprehending the meaning behind the assertion in question. Ibid., 86. 
29Ibid., 96. Michael Aiguanis also affirms the statement: “A creature bore the creator.” Ibid., 87. 
124 
 
 
 
dies.
30
 Luther‟s own exposure to the peculiarities of this late medieval semantic analysis 
is a function of his scholastic training, in which he perused and commented upon several 
authors whose work reflects similar patterns of predication application. William of 
Ockham (c. 1287-1347), for instance, explains that the Son of God is incarnate, died, and 
suffered, and likewise that a „man created the stars‟.31 Gabriel Biel (c. 1420-1495) 
advances a similarly direct application of human predicates to „God‟. In his commentary 
on the third book of Lombard‟s Sententiae, for instance, he asserts that, in Christ, “God is 
temporal, corruptible, passible, mortal, etc”, and that man is “God, eternal, infinite 
creator, etc”32. 
 This brief survey dispossesses Luther‟s aforementioned christological statements 
of the apparent novelty, upon which many arguments in favor of the divergence thesis 
depend.
33
 Although it may be the case that Luther exercises some degree of unique 
                                                             
30Ibid., 110.  
31Marilyn McCord Adams, “Relations, Inherence, and Subsistence”, 68. Here in Ockham‟s 
statement we see the way in which the limits of the communicatio idiomatum are tested also by applying 
divine attributes or actions to Christ understood as a human being or as „man‟.  
32Text cited in Ernst Borchert, Der Einfluss des Nominalismus auf die Christologie der 
Spätscholastik, 151. “Exemplum primi, ut quod concretum divine nature, scilicet deus, predicator de 
concreto humane nature scilicet homo, et econverso, dicendo, homo est deus, deus est homo, homo est 
eternus, infinitus creator, etc. Deus est temporalis, corruptibilis, passibilis, mortalis, etc. Exemplum 
secundi, Christus est deus, Christus est homo, etc. Dicitur notanter concretorum, quia abstracta naturam non 
predicantur de seinuicem.” Important here is Biel‟s distinction between abstract and concrete statements. A 
great deal hinges, so far as the topic of this dissertation is concerned, upon how exactly Luther makes use 
of this distinction, and whether he actually vests it with his own new meaning. For further discussion of this 
important text from Biel, see below. 
33One example of how this presumed novelty functions in the context of theological argument 
appears in Eberhard Jüngel‟s essay "Vom Tod des lebendigen Gottes: ein Plakat." Zeitschrift Für Theologie 
Und Kirche 65, no. 1 (January 1, 1968): 93-116. Jüngel detects major christological shifts at work in 
Luther‟s disagreement with Zwingli over the real presence of Christ in the eucharist. On pages 103-4, he 
turns his attention specifically to the communicatio idiomatum and comments. “Später trägt Luther seine 
Lehre von der communicatio idiomatum noch pointierter vor und weiß sich mit ihr von der Tradition 
(Zwinglis und der Scholastik) geschieden: »Hoc idem est, quod no dicimus: communicatio idiomatum.« 
»Hoc idem«--das ist die Behauptung, das Wort »Mensch« bezeichne den Gottessohn oder die göttliche 
Person. Und entsprechend kann es nun heißen: »Vere dicitur: Iste homo creavit mundum et Deus iste est 
passus, mortuus, sepultus etc.« So wird die Rede vom Tode Gottes möglich”. The great irony of this last 
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creativity in doing so, his application of human attributes directly to God is not at all 
unusual once framed in relation to the late medieval scholastic context with which he was 
familiar. This fact is rather important, because the vast majority of scholars who find in 
Luther a „clear‟ endorsement of divine passibility, do so on the basis of texts that advance 
instances of such application. Because Luther does not wince away from the statement 
that „God suffers‟ but actually insists upon it, many interpreters assume that he must 
implicitly be criticizing the patristic and medieval doctrine of divine impassibility. Such 
an assumption depends, however, upon the presumption that the insistence itself 
introduces some kind of fundamental novelty, which it clearly does not. If Luther‟s 
comments lack novelty, as this section has demonstrated, then it must be concluded that 
the attempt to enlist them as evidence of christological divergence is completely 
unwarranted. It simply does not follow that, because Luther endorses statements such as 
“God suffers”, “God lies in a manger”, or the like, that he therefore reorders the 
communicatio idiomatum to include the suffering of the divine nature. Recognition of this 
fact, in effect, strips the divergence reading of its most frequently cited evidence.
34
  
At the Root of the Issue: Modes of Christological Qualification 
  In the late medieval period, christological statements of the variety discussed in 
the previous section are almost always accompanied by a highly refined qualificatory 
semantics. This discourse is intended to specify a given statement‟s licit theological 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
observation is the fact that Jüngel‟s cited examples are not at all unusual for medieval christological 
discourse. It is because of his exposure to medieval texts that Luther affirms of Christ that “this man created 
the stars”, and “this God died and was buried”. The dispossession of novelty severely mitigates the viability 
of Jüngel‟s reception of Luther‟s significance, which he develops in the remainder of the essay.  
34These statements are the most frequently cited, but the real strength of the divergence argument 
lies elsewhere.   
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sense, and thereby exclude any number of possible linguistic connotations whose 
meaning the author deems improper for one reason or another. For example, although 
many medieval theologians affirm the validity of the statement that „God suffers‟, this 
affirmation is qualified in such a way so as to protect and maintain the enduring 
impassibility and immutability of the divine nature as such.
35
 The real question then, so 
far as Luther‟s understanding of divine suffering is concerned, is not whether Luther ever 
applies human predicates to „God‟ (for many in the medieval period do the same), but 
whether he blatantly forgoes, modifies or explicitly rejects the late medieval qualificatory 
discourse through which the impassibility of the divine nature is traditionally protected. 
To what extent, in other words, does Luther imbibe and manifest the characteristic 
qualifications and semantic provisos through which scholastic authors register their 
ongoing commitment to divine impassibility?   
 Although the majority of textual evidence adduced to prove Luther‟s rejection of 
these qualifications consists of predicate applications proved in the last section to lack 
demonstrative force, there are a handful of additional texts also utilized by advocates of 
the divergence thesis that warrant further consideration. Dennis Ngien, for instance, 
points to a sermon on the Gospel of John preached in 1537, in which Luther states: “the 
two natures dwell in the Lord Christ, and yet He is but one person. These two natures 
retain their properties, and each also communicates its properties to the other”.  36 Here we 
have a genuine instance in which Luther‟s language appears to exceed the scope of 
                                                             
35See the preliminary discussion of these qualifications in the opening section of this chapter‟s first 
part.    
36LW 22, 491-2. Quoted in Dennis Ngien, “Chalcedonian Christology and Beyond”, 59. The 
original text for this sermon is to be found in WA 47, 199. “Jhr wisset, das do sej die Communicatio 
Idiomatum, das in dem herrn Christo sein zweierlej naturn und doch nur eine Person, und das diese zwo 
naturen furen und behalten, ja mit einander teilen ire eigenschafften.”   
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patristic and medieval semantic parameters. By suggesting that each nature 
communicates its own peculiar properties to its counterpart, Luther seems to commit 
himself to a two-way doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum; a view that would 
naturally include, by extension, his assent to a sharing of Christ‟s divinity in the 
sufferings of His humanity. Texts to a similar effect are identified by Ngien also in 
Luther‟s 1540 “Disputation on the Divinity and Humanity of Christ”, as well as in a late 
installment of Luther‟s Table Talk.37 Because Ngien‟s treatment of these texts is most 
specific and extensive, the following discussion will focus upon his exegesis as 
representative of the divergence reading in its clearest and most concentrated form.  
 Ngien‟s interpretation possesses an undeniable prima facie legitimacy, at least so 
far as the 1537 text from Luther‟s sermon on John is concerned. To be sure, the 
possibility for alternative exegetical renderings has sometimes been clouded by an 
excessive predisposition towards the identification of disruptive novelty in Luther‟s 
christological semantics as a whole.
38
 Yet, it remains the case that these texts seem 
                                                             
37WA TR 6, 68. “Das aber von der Communication, Mittheilung einer Eigenschaft der Natur 
gesagt und beweiset ist (nehmlich, daß geborn werden &c. der göttlichen Natur auch zugeeigent und von 
ihr gesagt wird per communicationem idiomatum),  dasselbige soll auch verstanden werden von der 
Communication und Mittheilung der andern Eigenschaften, als leiden, sterben, begraben werden &c.. 
Wiewol sie eigentlich der menschlichen Natur gebühren und zustehen, doch gibt sich die göttliche Natur in 
Christo drunter und leidet &c. auch nach dem Spruch Pauli Röm. 8: (1, 331) ““Wir müssen dem Ebenbilde 
des Sohns Gottes gleich werden”” &c.. Jtem: ““Der seines eigen Sohns nicht verschonet, sondern hat ihn 
für uns dahin gegeben &c..”” Und in der ersten Epistel zun Corinth. am 2. Cap.: ““Denn wo sie die 
(Herrlichkeit) erkannt hätten, hätten sie den Herrn der Herrlichkeit nicht gecreuziget.”” Jtem zun Philippern 
2: ““Jesus Christus, ob er wol in göttlicher Gestalt war, denn er war Gott gleich, doch nahm er 
Knechtsgestalt an, ward gleich wie ein ander Mensch und an Geberden wie ein Mensch erfunden, 
erniedriget sich selber, und ward gehorsam bis zum Tode, ja zum Tode am Creuz.”” Deßgleichen singet die 
Kirche: ““Vita in ligno moritur”” (das Leben stirbt am Holz &c.). Darüm soll man gewiß gläuben, daß 
Alles, so der menschlichen Natur in Christo eigentlich zusteht und widerfährt, dasselbige wird auch 
communicirt, zugeeignet und gegeben der göttlichen Natur. Also daß recht und wahrhaftig gesagt wird: 
Gott wird geborn, gestillet oder gesäuget, lieget in der Krippen, frieret, gehet, stehet, fället, wandert, 
wachet, isset, trinket, leidet, stirbt &c..” Ngien also thinks Luther‟s 1539 treatise “On the Councils and the 
Church” recommends this two-way position. Because of its explicitly soteriological frame of reference, 
however, we will defer investigation of this text until the next chapter. 
38As in the case of the texts discussed in the previous section.   
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legitimately to point in the direction of a bi-directional doctrine of the communication of 
attributes. This preliminary concession notwithstanding, the following discussion will 
argue against Ngien‟s interpretation of these texts, and suggest that, once situated in 
broad context, Luther‟s intent turns out rather explicitly to retain an ongoing commitment 
to the doctrine of divine impassibility. 
 The crux of the issue, so far as a divergence interpretation is concerned, resides in 
Luther‟s apparent insistence upon the ascription of human predicates not simply to the 
one Person who happens to be the divine Son (something for which there is extensive 
patristic and medieval precedent), but also to the divine nature itself. Such an insistence 
seems not only to forgo, but actually bulldoze the qualificatory discourse enlisted within 
medieval Christology to protect the impassibility and immutability of Christ‟s divinity. 
And indeed, this is precisely the conclusion that divergence interpreters wish to draw. 
There is good reason to question the viability of this interpretation, however. In his 1537 
sermon on John 3, for instance, Luther also insists that Christ‟s divinity and humanity 
both “retain their properties”.39 What can such a proviso communicate, if Luther intends 
by the previous statement to indicate a two-way communication of attributes between 
natures? If, for instance, the divinity of Christ is impassible by nature, and retains this 
property even in the event of the incarnation, how can it also be true that Christ‟s divinity 
shares in the sufferings of the humanity? Wouldn‟t that be self-contradictory?  
To be sure, there are ways to reconcile this apparent tension of meaning within a 
divergence rendering of Luther‟s Christology. One could say, for instance, that the 
divinity retains its own properties in the sense that its sufferings stem not from a 
                                                             
39WA 47, 199.  
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condition of existence intrinsic to itself, but from its union with the humanity of Christ. In 
that sense, though the divinity is rightly said to suffer, it does not suffer on account of its 
own peculiar properties, but solely through its participation in the properties of the human 
nature to which it is hypostatically joined. In this explanation, the tension of meaning 
embedded within Luther‟s statement resolves itself in favor of its latter half, namely, the 
ostensible affirmation of a two-way communicative exchange between the Christ‟s 
humanity and divinity. If we limit ourselves entirely within the parameters of the two 
sentences cited by Ngien, then the plausibility of this hypothetical „resolution‟ cannot be 
denied.
40
  
Equally plausible, however, is an interpretation of Luther‟s statement that resolves 
the apparent tension of meaning in favor of the statement‟s first half, namely, the 
governing qualification that each nature retains its own discrete properties.
41
 In either 
case, one must admit that the precise form of Luther‟s language presents some degree of 
awkwardness, or at least inexactitude. That is, whether Luther intends by his statement to 
communicate either the impassibility or passibility of Christ‟s divinity, the verbal 
formulation he adopts to express himself is not immediately transparent to his underlying 
intent. Standing on its own, the textual tension simply remains; an exegetical obstacle 
with which the would-be interpreter must wrangle. 
                                                             
40It could also be argued that impassibilty simply never was a genuine property of divinity, and 
therefore does not need to be „retained‟. This option, however, is much more difficult to sustain, since 
Luther often states rather forthrightly that God cannot suffer. Interpreters like Ngien must find a way to 
explain these statements.  
41The tension is apparent, because Luther‟s language in these statements is also understandable 
from within a medieval frame of reference. We will provide evidence to this effect in the closing portion of 
this section.   
130 
 
 
 
Earlier texts from Luther‟s career furnish reason to entertain the possibility that 
the intent of his ostensibly „two-way‟ language may actually fall within the parameters of 
characteristic medieval intent. One such text is taken from Luther‟s 1528 Confession 
Concerning Christ’s Supper, in which Luther harshly criticizes Ulrich Zwingli‟s use of a 
rhetorical device (alloeosis) as a means for interpreting christological grammar. In the 
context of this larger criticism, Luther turns to the question of divine suffering for an 
illustration of his point:  
“Now if the old witch, Lady Reason, alloeosis‟ grandmother, should say that the 
Deity surely cannot suffer and die, then you must answer and say: That is true, but since 
the divinity and humanity are one person in Christ, the Scriptures ascribe to the divinity, 
because of this personal union, all that happens to humanity, and vice versa. And in 
reality it is so”.42 
 
This text is remarkably similar to the 1537 sermon text cited above by Ngien. In the 
statement from 1528, Luther insists that everything pertaining to the humanity must be 
ascribed to the divinity of Christ. Strictly speaking, this way of summarizing the 
communicatio idiomatum swerves indeed from the ordinary intent of late medieval 
Christology, since the latter restricts the application of all christological predicates to the 
one Person of Christ, who is both God and man. The medieval view prohibits the 
extension of these predicates to „divinity‟ as such; a term that ordinarily denotes the 
divine nature. On the basis of this text alone, then, one could justifiably suspect Luther to 
define the communication of attributes in terms of a two-way exchange between Christ‟s 
two natures, thus buttressing a divergence interpretation of his thought.  
                                                             
42 LW 37, 210. WA 26, 321a. “Ob nǔ hie die allte wettermecherynn fraw vernünfft der 
Alleosis grosmutter sagen würde / Ja die gottheit kan nicht leiden noch sterben / Soltu antworten / 
Das ist war · Aber dennoch weil Gottheit vnd menscheit ynn Christo eine Person ist / so gibt die 
schrifft / vmb solcher personlicher einickeit willen auch der gottheit / alles was der menscheit 
widderferet / vnd widderümb / Vnd ist auch also ynn der warheit”  
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 To advance such a view on the basis of this text, however, turns out to be an 
overly hasty misconstrual of Luther‟s position. Luther specifically prohibits the notion of 
a two-way communication within this text. He does so through qualifactory elucidations, 
which accord rather seamlessly with the ordinary medieval view of the communicatio 
idiomatum.  
“Indeed, you must say that the person (pointing to Christ) suffers, and dies. But 
this person is truly God, and therefore it is correct to say: the Son of God suffers. 
Although, so to speak, the one part (namely, the divinity) does not suffer, nevertheless the 
person, who is God, suffers in the other part (namely, in the humanity).”43   
 
In this clarifying statement, Luther makes it quite clear that his initial statement does not 
endorse the suffering of the divine nature, even if that is how it first appears. His point is 
rather that the one Person of Christ is the acting subject of human predicates, and that 
this Person is, at the same time, fully divine. This clarification is evident not only on the 
basis of Luther‟s direct application of all predicates here to the Person of Christ rather 
than to the divine and human natures, but also because he specifically stipulates that 
Christ does not suffer in his divinity, but only in his human nature.
44
 Luther‟s complaint 
                                                             
43 LW 37, 210. Emphasis mine. WA 26, 321a. “Denn das müstǔ ia sagen / Die person (zeige 
Christum) leidet stirbet / Nǔ ist die person warhafftiger Gott / drumb ists recht geredt / 
Gottes son leidet· Denn ob wol das eine stuck. (das ich so rede) als die gottheit ,, nicht leidet 
/ so leidet dennoch die person / welche Gott ist / am andern stucke / als an der menscheit” 
44Luther continues to make this point clear through a number of analogies that stipulate how a 
predicate may be attributed to a given subject on account of one „part‟, while that same predicate is not true 
of another „part‟. LW 37, 211. “Just as we say: the king‟s son is wounded—when actually only his leg is 
wounded; Solomon is wise—though only his soul is wise; Absalom is handsome—though only his body is 
handsome; Peter is gray—though only his head is gray. For since body and soul are one person, everything 
that pertains to the body or the soul, yes, to the least member of the body, is correctly and properly ascribed 
to the entire person. This is the way people speak throughout the world, not only in Scripture, and it is the 
truth. For the Son of God truly is crucified for us, i.e. this person who is God. For that is what he is—this 
person, I say, is crucified according to his humanity.” WA 26, 321a-322a. “Gleich als man spricht / des 
koniges son ist wǔnd so doch / allein sein bein wund ist / Salomon ist weise / so doch allein sein seele 
weise ist Absalom ist schone / so doch allein sein leib schon ist Petrus ist graw / so doch allein sein hewbt 
graw ist Denn weil leib vnd seele eine person ist / so wirds der gantzen person recht vnd wol zugeeigent / 
alles was dem leibe odder seele / ia dem geringsten gelied des leibs widderferet // Dis ist die weise zu reden 
ynn aller wellt / nicht allein ynn der schrifft / Vnd ist dazǔ auch die warheit / Denn ynn der warheit ist 
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against Zwingli is not that he rejects the suffering of the divine nature, but because 
Luther thinks the semantic analysis summarized in the rhetorical term alloeosis eschews 
the unity of Christ, and speaks as if divinity and humanity act as their own discrete 
subjects.
45
 
 Because Luther‟s publication against Zwingli appears approximately nine years 
before the text cited above from his 1537 sermon on John chapter three, it cannot count in 
any direct way as contextual evidence constraining Luther‟s probable meaning in the 
latter. This concession notwithstanding, the text from 1528 surely attenuates the prima 
facie legitimacy of Ngien‟s interpretation of the 1537 text, and others like it.46  It is at 
least worthwhile to ask why Luther can invoke these ostensibly „two-way‟ descriptions in 
one instance and specify that he intends by them simply that the attributes of both natures 
are applied to a single acting subject (the person of Christ), why should it be concluded 
so abruptly that their appearance elsewhere must indicate a genuine, bidirectional 
communication of attributes in which the divine nature suffers?
47
 The 1528 text illustrates 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Gottes son fur vns gecreutzigt / das ist / die Person / die Gott ist / Denn sie ist / Sie (sage ich) die person ist 
gecreutzigt nach der menscheit” 
45 LW 37, 211. “But this damned alloeosis exactly inverts the matter and changes it so that it 
ascribes to the parts what Scripture assigns to the whole person.” WA 26, 322a. “Aber die verfluchte 
Aleosis keret solchs stracks vmb / vnd wil wechseln vnd den stucken zu eigen / das der gantzen persone 
ynn der schrifft zugeeigent wird”. Whether or not Luther‟s interpretation of Zwingli‟s Christology is 
accurate is a question we need not examine here. Our concern extends only to what Luther felt it necessary 
to say of Christ vis-à-vis the communication attributes.  
46Ngien cites the 1528 text and seems to concede it to express a traditional point of view. 
However, he fails to notice or acknowledge that this earlier text employs the very same „two-way‟ language 
that he will later argue to demonstrate the suffering of divinity in the 1537 sermon.  
47The difficulty stems from the fact that Luther seems occasionally to use the term „divinity‟ to 
refer narrowly to the divine nature; and sometimes as a way of referring to the divine Person who becomes 
incarnate. Thus, in the 1528 text, when he insists upon divinity or deity suffering, he is referring to the fact, 
as the medieval also emphasize, that the Scriptures ascribe suffering to God because the single Person who 
is God suffers according to His humanity. One possible root for this ambiguity is the fact that, in late 
medieval Christology, the divine nature simply is the divine Person, whereas the same mode of 
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the possibility one interpretive alternative, which ought to be considered. The key 
question thus becomes: which interpretation comports best with Luther‟s overall 
argument within the sermons on John that were preached in the late 1530‟s? 
  In the case of the specific statement Ngien gleans from Luther‟s 1537 sermon on 
John 3, it is important, first of all, to situate Luther‟s discussion of the communication of 
attributes in relation to the larger theological question his sermon addresses. The 
Scripture text in this instance is John 3:35, which reads: “The Father loves the Son and 
has placed all things in his hands.”48 On the basis of this text, Luther poses an interesting 
theological problem for consideration. “Now the question arises again: How do we 
harmonize these two facts: that He is Lord over all and that at the same time He is a 
human being? If He is God, how could God give Him all? If He is God, He has always 
possessed everything.”49 On the basis of these questions, Luther is afforded the 
opportunity to reflect at some length upon the issue of christological speech. In particular, 
he is forced to grapple with how one may licitly refer human predicates (in this case, the 
fact that Christ „receives‟ something) to an acting subject who is divine. The question 
itself betrays Luther‟s ongoing indebtedness to a classical frame of reference vis-à-vis the 
doctrine of God. Its operative assumption resides in an underlying assumption of his that 
part of what it means for God to be God is that He cannot properly be said to receive 
something, since this would suggest not only a preexisting defect on the part of the divine 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
identification is not possible when one is speaking of the human nature. This is a possibility we will later 
have occasion to explore in relation to a significant text from the late medieval scholastic Gabriel Biel. 
48 The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version. (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1989). 
49 LW 22, 491. WA 47, 199. “Hie ist nun ein Frage: wie wil sichs reumen, so ehr ein Herr 
ist uber alles, und ist gleichewohl auch mensch? So ehr den Gott ist, wie hatt ehr ihme alles 
gegeben? ist ehr Gott, so hat ehrs zuvor alles”. 
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being, but also God‟s innate capacity to experience change. If Luther did not deem these 
implications to be theologically unacceptable, there would be no reason for the question 
he poses to arise in the first place.  
 Luther addresses his question by appealing to the doctrine of the communication 
of attributes, reminding his hearers that the unity of God and man in Christ is such that 
human predicates are ascribed to God and vice versa. It is from this section that Ngien 
gleans his primary evidence for a reciprocal exchange of properties between the divinity 
and humanity of Christ. A brief survey of a few examples will again demonstrate why 
such an interpretation possesses some degree of prima facie plausibility. Luther‟s 
preliminary summation of the doctrine surely leaves the door open for Ngien‟s construal. 
“You know about the communication of properties: two natures dwell in the Lord Christ, 
and yet He is but one person. These two natures retain their properties, and each also 
communicates its properties to the other.”50 In a subsequent elaboration of his point, 
Luther even seems to corroborate the divergence thesis directly by specifically endorsing 
the application of Christ‟s human sufferings to His divine nature.      
“The two natures, the human and the divine, are inseparable. They are so united in 
one Person that the properties of the one nature are also attributed to the other. For 
instance, mortality is peculiar to human nature; now that the human nature is united in 
one Person with the divine, death, exclusively the attribute of the human nature, is also 
                                                             
50LW 22, 491-2. WA 47, 199. “Jhr wisset, das do sej die Communicatio Idiomatum, das in 
dem herrn Christo sein zweierlej naturn und doch nur eine Person, und das diese zwo naturen 
furen und behalten, ja mit einander teilen ire eigenschafften.” This is the primary text cited by Ngien, 
as we have already documented above. We must also cite in Ngien‟s favor Luther‟s subsequent summary: 
“Since His incarnation the two natures are united; and the divine nature confers its properties on the human, 
and, vice versa, the human on the divine.” LW 22, 493. “Do ehr aber nun mensch ist, do tragen die 
zwo naturen ir eigenschafft zusamen, und gibt die gottliche natur der menschlichen ire 
eigenschafft, und hinwidder die menscheit auch der gottlichen natur.” WA 47, 200. 
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ascribed to the divine. Now we can say: “God became man, God suffered, and God 
died.”51 
 
Here it is important to recall, however, that Luther‟s overarching concern in this 
section is to reflect upon how certain attributes or actions, which are clearly human in 
derivation, may be applied to the Person of Christ who is also divine. The difficulty 
involved with this, as we have already noted, stems from the ontological distinction 
separating divinity and humanity which Luther seems to acknowledge as valid. The 
overall shape of Luther‟s argument that emerges from this acknowledgment may be 
summarized in the following statement. 
 Although unbroachable polarities between humanity and divinity seem to 
proscribe any mutual predicational transfer, the union of God and man in Christ is such 
that the application of human properties „to God‟ is licit, and indeed necessary.  
 
Luther explicates this line of reasoning in an important paragraph of his sermon.  
“Since the two natures are united in one Person, the effect is that the properties 
are also united. Admittedly, the properties of the divine nature have nothing in common 
with human nature. I shall go beyond this and say that there is still less relation between 
God and man. Yet these two natures are so united that there is only one God and Lord, 
that Mary suckles God with her breasts, bathes God, rocks Him, and carries Him; 
furthermore, that Pilate and Herod crucified and killed God. The two natures are so 
joined that the true deity and humanity are one. Now if the true God dwells in Christ, 
who was born of Mary, that is, the God who made and created all, we must say that the 
deity and the humanity joined not only their natures but also their properties, except for 
sin.”52  
                                                             
51 LW 22, 492.WA 47, 199. “Gleich wie die zwo naturen, die menscheit und Gottheit, 
unzertrennet sein, sondern also vereiniget in einer person, das was von einer natur geredet wirdt 
der andern auch zugeschrieben, als sterben ist menschlicher natur eigen, do ist den die 
menschliche natur vereiniget in einer person mit der Gottheit, das der todt, der doch allein der 
menschlichen natur wirdt zugesprochen, auch der Gottheit zugeeigent wirdt, und dan gesagt 
wirdt: gott ist mensch worden, Gott hat gelidden und ist gestorben.”  
52LW 22, 492-3. WA 47, 200. “Den die zwo naturen sind in einer person vereiniget, drumb sind 
die folge und eigenschafft auch vereiniget. Und ist war, das die eigenschafft der gottlichen natur rejmet sich 
nicht mit der menschlichen natur, und ich wil noch mehr sagen: Gott und mensch rejmet sich noch weniger, 
und dennoch sind die zwo naturen also vereiniget, das do Ein Gott und Herr sej, das Maria Gott seuget mit 
ihren brusten und Gott badet, wieget und hebet, item Pilatus und Herodes Gott gecreutziget und 
todtgeschlagen haben, und reimen sich die zwo naturn also zusamen, das die ware gottheit und menschheit 
ein dieng ist. So nun ein warhafftiger Gott in Christo ist, der geborn ist aus Maria, das ist: der alles gemacht 
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Structurally, we can observe that the progression of thought encapsulated within 
this paragraph is comprised of four implicit components.  
1. Preliminary Concession: The properties of divinity and humanity are 
irreducibly different from one another. 
2. Apparent Semantic Implication: This irreducible difference renders it 
ostensibly impossible and therefore improper to apply human properties to a 
divine subject (as John 3:35 apparently does by suggesting that Christ 
„receives‟ something) 
3. Salient Theological Reality: Yet, God and man are united in the person of 
Christ. 
4. Semantic Re-Calibration: Therefore divine properties may be spoken of man, 
and human properties of God. 
 
The crucial question has to do with whether and how Luther ascribes validity to 
components one and two of this fourfold progression. To what extent do these 
qualifications retain legitimacy after the union of God and man in Christ? In what ways 
must the new, christologically defined semantic context still respect the ontological gap 
between divinity and humanity with which Luther begins his discussion? Is the gap 
merely displaced?    
For Ngien, Luther‟s Christology presupposes a genuinely diachronic ontological 
shift, which narrows the gap between divinity and humanity. Whereas in His pre-
incarnate state, the eternal Son is indeed incapable of suffering per se, this property of 
divinity „adjusts‟ in the event of the incarnation. Once united with a human nature 
capable of suffering, the divine nature becomes a genuine participant in creaturely 
passibility. We are labeling this interpretation „diachronic‟ because the properties of 
divine being undergo a sequentially mediated transformation. This transformation is 
precisely what creates the fundamentally new semantic context to which Luther now 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
und geschaffen hat, so mus man sagen, das sie nicht allein ihr natur zusamen gefast und getragen haben, 
sondern auch ihre eigenschafften, ausgenommen die Sunde.” 
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appeals.
53
 The original polarity between divinity and humanity is overcome (or at least 
attenuated) through an ontologically conditioning event in which attributive proscriptions 
formerly appropriate (components one and two) forfeit their ongoing viability when once 
God actually becomes man.
54
 Within this view, the predicational restrictions reflected in 
Luther‟s original question (how can God be said to „receive‟ something?) possess validity 
only in the sense that they used to be true.
55
 The obsolete ontological realities they 
express, however, must not be allowed to qualify christological discourse in the present. 
The notion that divinity cannot suffer is true when the divine being is conceived in its 
anterior, pre-incarnate status. It becomes inapplicable once God assumes human flesh, 
however. Luther‟s solution to the question of how God can „receive‟ something, 
according to Ngien‟s interpretation, is to emphasize a diachronic contrast between 
„divinity-by-itself‟, and „divinity-in-union-with-humanity‟. The conceptual tension is 
resolved by the „reality-altering‟ event of the incarnation, which distinguishes these two 
discrete objects of semantic reference.
56
        
                                                             
53In order to bypass the implication here that the divine Son or the Trinity becomes „something 
else‟ in this process, Ngien suggests that the being of God is constituted in such a way that this event is 
always included. See Dennis Ngien, The Suffering of God According to Martin Luther's 'Theologia Crucis' 
(Vancouver: Regent College Pub, 2005), 151-2. 
54
Here we have another expression of the deep inter-connectivity between parts one and two of 
this chapter. Ngien‟s construal of Luther‟s proposed semantic shift presupposes a doctrine of the hypostatic 
union that is ontologically conditioning so far as the divine person is concerned. Although he does not 
name it as such, this view points strongly in the direction of a „composite‟ doctrine of Christ‟s person.   
55Or, perhaps, they are true only when treated in a context (perhaps philosophy) that abstracts from 
the reality of the incarnation. Of course, this would still represent a diachronic shift because, although 
philosophy may speak in this way, Luther is not reticent to insist that God truly has become man. In that 
sense, philosophy no longer could be seen to refer to „the real‟, but to a set of circumstances (separation of 
divinity and humanity) that no longer exist. Ngien gestures in this direction by seeing the „abstract‟ as the 
perview of philosophy, and the „concrete‟ as pertaining to theology. See Dennis Ngien, The Suffering of 
God According to Martin Luther's 'Theologia Crucis', 82.   
56Again, Ngien does not want to make of the pre-incarnate and incarnate Son two Persons. 
Nevertheless, his arbitration of Luther‟s qualificatory discourse depends upon Luther granting at least some 
previous validity to statements such as „God cannot suffer‟ that no longer attains because of a diachronic 
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A diachronic interpretation capably preserves the viability of the divergence 
thesis, but is it faithful to Luther‟s actual point of view? Subsequent qualificatory 
discourse within Luther‟s sermon on John 3 suggests not. This discourse reflects what 
could be termed a „synchronic‟ application of attributive proscriptions.57    
“Throughout his entire Gospel John speaks of Christ as a true and natural human 
being, and also as divine. Here he refers to Christ, who was born, was baptized, and has 
disciples, as a real human being; at the same time he declares that all that is God‟s alone 
was given into His hands. He employs the term “given to Him,” which again applies to 
the human nature. 
Thus the two natures are united in one Person, and there are not two Christ‟s. 
Therefore, when you hear it said that God gave all things into Christ‟s hands and that He 
raised Him from the dead, remember that this is spoken of Christ as man. Then again, 
when we hear the expression: “He is seated at the right hand of God the Father,” bear in 
mind that the human nature is united with the divine. To be in heaven and to be on earth 
are one thing, just as to be crucified and to live are one thing. We spoke of this before in 
chapter six. If you are perplexed by the statement that Christ died and that He is alive, 
you might find it still stranger to hear that Christ is God and man in one Person, that 
Christ died on the cross as a man, and that He nonetheless remains Christ in eternity. 
You must learn to brush aside all such doubts and misgivings. We are also called 
Christians because we acknowledge Christ in His doctrine. How can anything be given to 
Him? According to His deity, He does not receive anything; but God gave all to Christ 
inasmuch as God and man are one Person.”58 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ontological shift mediated by the event of the incarnation. For more on Ngien‟s treatment of this discourse, 
see below.   
57That is, a mode of qualification, which retains components one and two of the afore-outlined argument 
even after the event of the incarnation (at the very least, Luther denies that divinity undergoes any 
diachronic change).   
58
LW 22, 493-4. Emphasis mine. WA 47, 200-201. “Und redet Joannes durch sein gantz 
Euangelium von Christo als einem pur lautern menschen und widerumb &c.. Alhier redet ehr von Christo, 
der geborn und getaufft ist, und der discipulos hat, als der warhafftig ein naturlicher mensch ist, und 
dennochs gibt ehr ihme alles in seine Hende, das gott allein gehoert, und dennochs spricht ehr: ihme 
gegeben. Das stehet einem menschen zu. Also sindt die zwo naturen vereiniget in einer person, das do nicht 
zwene Christus sind. Drumb wen du horest einen spruch von Christo, das im Gott alles in seine hende gebe 
und ihnen von den todten erwecke, Solches ist dan von Christo geredet als einem menschen. Widerumb 
saget man: ehr sitzet zur rechten hand gottes des vaters, Do wirdt vereiniget die menschlich natur mit der 
Gottheit, und ist dan gecreutziget werden und leben ein dieng, undten und droben sein ein dieng, wie wir 
droben im 6. cap. auch gesagt haben. Stost dich das nun fur den kopff, das Christus gestorben sej und lebe, 
viel mehr solt dich das seltzam duncken, das Christus Gott und mensch sej eine Person, das Christus am 
Creutze stirbet als ein mensch und bleibet doch Christus in ewigkeit. Also solt ihr Euch gewehnen, das ihr 
richtig hindurch gehet durch alle ergerniss, und wir heissen auch drumb Christen, das wir ihnen erkennen 
aus seiner lehre. Wie kan im dan etwas gegeben werden? Nach der Gottheit nimpt ehrs nicht, sondern weil 
Gott und mensch eine person ist, do hat ehr Christo gegeben.”  
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What we find in these paragraphs is an elaboration of Luther‟s underlying point 
about christological speech, which he expresses through differentiated, specificatory 
predicate analysis; that is, through statements or phrases that identify the specific „part‟, 
„property‟, or „component‟ by virtue of which a given predication is truly, or validly 
applied to Christ.
59
 In this case, Luther is rather clear that it is according to Christ‟s 
human nature that He is said to receive all things from God. He also clarifies by way of 
specificatory restriction the implication this analysis is intended to proscribe, namely, that 
the ascription of these human properties and activities proceeds „according to His deity.‟  
This discourse problematizes Ngien‟s interpretation, because it reflects Luther‟s 
ongoing assumption that „divinity‟ cannot directly receive gifts, suffer or die, even in the 
case of the incarnate Christ. As in his 1528 “Confession concerning Christ‟s Supper,” 
Luther‟s point in the 1537 sermon is rather that the one Person, who is both divine and 
human, is the attributive recipient of properties belonging to both natures. Because of this 
fact, one may freely affirm the Johannine text which describes Christ (who is divine) to 
receive all things from God, without implying that this ascription applies directly to the 
Son‟s divinity. The specificatory discourse enlisted to explain this point makes it rather 
clear that Luther does not think this christologically oriented, semantic shift entails the 
passibility of the divine nature. To the contrary, such an implication seems rather overtly 
to be disallowed.  
                                                             
59These nouns appear in quotation marks because none is strictly appropriate for referring to the 
humanity of Christ as understood by Luther or his medieval predecessors. Here we find ourselves within 
the same dilemma engaged so prolifically during the medieval period, namely, what language can be used 
to refer to an object that is, by definition, entirely unique?   
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Luther attends to similar qualifications in a number of other sermons on John 1-4, 
all of which were preached between the years of 1537-1540, during Johannes 
Bugenhagen‟s (1485-1558) visitation errand to Denmark. A brief sampling of this 
peripheral evidence will reinforce the conclusion that Luther does not think the divinity 
of Christ is ontologically conditioned by the actions and properties that are properly 
derived from the His humanity. For instance, in an explanation of John 1:4, “In Him was 
life,” Luther calls attention to the  enduring invulnerability of Christ‟s divinity throughout 
His passion: “Therefore He does not die according to His divine nature and come back to 
life; He is life, not only in Himself, but everything that lives has life in Him and through 
Him, especially man.”60 More closely reminiscent of Luther‟s comments on John 3:35 is 
an earlier homiletical reflection upon John 3:12: “No one has ascended into heaven but 
He who descended from heaven.” Luther admits how strange it appears to say of a person 
who is God (and thus omnipresent) that He „descended.‟ 
“How can reason harmonize the declaration that He descended and yet dwells 
above, that He ascended again and yet was continuously above in heaven? No human 
heart or mind can conceive such a thought. Reason says that it is impossible for one to 
descend from heaven and yet remain in heaven at the same time. Therefore we Christians 
are regarded as extremely stupid people to believe things that are impossible and 
diametrically opposed to reason.”61    
                                                             
60 LW 22, 30. WA 46, 561. “Darumb stirbet er nicht nach seinem Goettlichen wesen und 
wird widerumb lebendig, sondern er ist das Leben, nicht allein in jm selber, sondern alles, was da 
lebet, das hat das Leben in jm und durch jn, sonderlich der Mensch.” This section from John 1 is 
also a very important of Luther‟s soteriological application of two-nature Christology, a point we will have 
occasion to explore at some length in the following chapter.  
61 LW 22, 322. WA 47, 51. “Das ist das Zeugniss und die seltzame predigt, die allein 
Christo zustehet, und wie kan sich auch die Vernunfft schicken in diese seltzame rede, das sie 
kondte vernemen, wie sich das zusamen reime: Herab fharen und gleichwohl droben sein, und 
wider hinauff fharen und doch stets droben gewesen. Das kan in keines menschen hertzen noch 
gedancken kommen. Es ist unmuglich, sagt die vernunfft, das vom himel herab steigen und 
gleichwohl droben bleiben kundte bejdes zu gleich war sein. Darumb sind wir Christen aus der 
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In an attempt to reconcile this tension, Luther allocates a significant amount of his 
subsequent discussion to the matter of christological predication, and the communication 
of attributes. Here again, the salient point Luther stresses is the fact that Christ is one 
Person existing in two natures, and that this theological reality carries with it unique 
semantic implications.  
“But there is only one Son; and yet there are two natures, which gave Mary the 
right to say: “This Son Jesus, whom I bore and suckled on my breasts, is the eternal God, 
born of the Father in eternity, and also my Son.” And God says likewise: “Mary‟s Son is 
My only Son.” Thus Mary is the mother of God. And Christ, together with God the 
Father and the Holy Spirit, is very God from eternity who became man in time. So God 
the Father does not have a son apart from Mary‟s, nor does Mary have a son apart from 
God the Father‟s. This is the foundation on which our faith rests: that Jesus Christ has 
two natures even though He is one indivisible Person. There are not two sons and two 
persons; there is one Son and one Person.”62 
 
Luther‟s primary point in this section echoes his interpretation of John 3:35. He 
argues, essentially, that one may rightly ascribe human predicates (such as spatial 
movement) to Christ who is God, without thereby suggesting that the divine nature of 
Christ is thereby affected. Christ‟s deity always remains what it was, according to Luther, 
and suffers no change when human properties or activities are applied to Christ. In order 
to make this clear, Luther furnishes his hearers with the analogy of a human person 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
massen nerrissche leute, das wir solch unmoglich dieng gleuben, so stracks wider die Vernunfft 
strebet.” 
62LW 22, 323-4. WA 47, 52. “Aber es ist nur ein Sohn, und doch zwo Naturn, das Maria 
also kan sagen: Dieser Sohn Jhesus, den ich geborn und an meiner brust geseuget hab, ist ewiger 
Gott und vom Vater in Ewigkeit geborn, Gottes Sohn, und auch mein Sohn. Dergleichen saget 
Gott auch: Marien Sohn ist mein einiger Sohn. Jst also Maria Gottes Mutter, und Christus 
warhafftiger Gott von ewigkeit mit gott dem vater und dem Heiligem Geist und zeittlich mensch 
geborn worden, das Gott der vater nicht einen andern Sohn hat den Maria, noch Maria einen 
andern Sohn den Gott der vater. Das ist der grund, darauff unser glaub stehet, das Jhesus Christus 
zwo naturn hab, ob er schon ein einige, unzertrenliche person ist. Es sind nicht zwene sohne noch 
zwo personen, sondern ein Sohn und eine person.” 
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comprised of body and soul, which illustrates how speech can sometimes refer to a whole 
as if undifferentiated, even when there exists within that whole constituent realities that 
relate to that particular reference rather differently. A human stabbed by a knife will not 
customarily specify that she is stabbed according to her corporeal body, but refers the 
action to the whole of her person. Nevertheless, this does not mean that a person‟s soul is 
somehow also stabbed by a knife as a consequence of the predication!
63
 Luther 
recognizes the same semantic patterns of whole-part specification within christological 
discourse. Of course it is true that God cannot move spatially, suffer or die, he reasons, 
but God and man are truly one Person in Christ, and therefore predicates deriving from 
one nature or the other can rightly be applied to the whole Person in which these „parts‟ 
together subsist.
64
  
“We are told here that Christ, true God and born as true man, descended 
according to His humanity, that God‟s Son died, descended into hell, and ascended again 
into heaven; that at the same time God remained in heaven, for the Godhead does not 
move about hither and thither but is omnipresent; and that according to His human 
nature, Christ ascended up above all. One may properly say that since there are two 
natures in one Being and Person, God‟s Son came down and entered the Virgin‟s womb 
and God‟s Son descended into hell. Although this really applied only to the human 
                                                             
63LW 22, 327-8. WA 47, 55-6. Of course, there are a number of ways in which this analogy falls 
short, as Luther himself acknowledges in his explanation.  
64Luther‟s use of this analogy need not commit him to a whole-parts analogy for the hypostatic 
union, as Richard Cross argues Aquinas to endorse. He is, of course, far from unique in the history of 
theology, in appropriating the body-soul metaphor for a christological purpose.   
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nature, by virtue of the personal union in Christ it is also ascribed to the other nature. 
“That which applies to one nature, applies to the entire person in the concrete.””65 
 
In this text we find an additional clue for how Luther intends the statements Ngien 
isolates, which seem, on a prima facie level, to indicate a two-way communication of 
attributes. In the penultimate statement of the paragraph, we find another instance in 
which Luther affirms that human properties are „ascribed to the other nature‟, a statement 
that, were it not for its immediate context, could easily count as evidence in favor of a 
divergence reading. But one need only consult the first half of the same statement to see 
that Luther cannot intend here an exchange of ontologically conditioning bi-
directionality, since he specifically restricts the various human predications directed to 
Christ as „really‟ applying to His human nature alone. A divergence interpretation of his 
explanation would also cut against the grain of the larger textual pericope, since Luther is 
arguing throughout that, although surely the divine nature cannot experience the things 
apparently attributed to it christologically in Scripture (a restriction that remains in force 
even after the incarnation has taken place), such attributions are, in fact licit, because they 
refer to the whole (Christ) on account of a specific „part‟ (the human nature).66  
                                                             
65 LW 22, 328. WA 47, 56. “Dergleichen wird alhier auch gesaget, das Christus, warer Gott 
und mensch geborn, sej herab gefharen nach seiner menscheit, und ist Gottes sohn gestorben und 
nidder in die Helle gefharen und wider hinauff in himmel gefharen und dennochs Gott, droben 
geblieben, den die Gottheit nirgends hin fheret, nicht dort oder da, sondern allenthalben ist, und 
nach der menscheit ist ehr hinauff uber alles gefharen. Noch sol man also sagen, dieweil in einer 
person und in einem wesen zwo naturn sind, das Gottes Sohn herab gestiegen sej in der 
Jungfrauen Marien leib und in die helle gefharen, wiewol solchs allein der menschlichen natur 
zustunde, jedoch wirds der andern naturn auch zugeeignet umb der personlichen einigkeit willen 
in Christo. Nam quae uni naturae conveniunt, toti personae conveniunt in concreto.” Luther‟s invocation 
here of the medieval distinction between abstract and concrete predication is extremely important, and will 
be the object of specific focus in the subsequent discussion of Luther‟s 1540 disputation.  
66Again, the term „part‟ appears here within quotation marks because a consistent application of 
this analogy yields implications that Luther, like many medieval authors who also use it, will want to avoid. 
It could be taken, for instance, to imply a composite doctrine of Christ‟s personhood as a „fusion‟ or 
144 
 
 
 
Prima facie impressions aside, these considerations render it rather clear that 
when Luther speaks in terms of human properties being ascribed to „divinity‟, he is 
expressing the point that the person of Christ, who is truly divine, is the attributive object 
to which all predicates are rightly assigned; and that in this sense, one may rightly say 
that God descended, receives gifts, suffers, is crucified, dies and so forth.
67
 In any case, 
the contextual qualifications that surround Luther‟s apparently novel statements in the 
John sermons proscribe concluding, on their basis, that Luther‟s Christology includes a 
clear commitment to divine passibility.
68
  
 The same is true of Luther‟s 1540 “Disputation on the Divinity and Humanity 
of Christ”, which Ngien similarly appropriates as evidence for a two-way communication 
between natures. To be sure, here again one finds a number of phrases in Luther‟s 
discourse that appear to point in such a direction. For instance, in his opening preface to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
„mixture‟ of two previously separate parts. These unwanted consequences are a large reason why the 
substance-accident model is generally preferred in medieval antecedents, an analogy that Luther also 
invokes rather prevalently. One example appears in the 1540 disputation itself in Luther‟s examination of 
how „whiteness‟ is ordinarily ascribed to a person or object. See below. 
67Without the apparent implication that each „nature‟ is conditioned thereby.   
68Subsequent sections of Luther‟s sermons on John from 1537-1540 continue to reinforce this 
argument. For instance, in another text commenting on John 3, Luther reflects upon the fact that the 
evangelist predicts Christ being lifted up upon the cross. In order to explain how such a thing may be 
spoken of Christ who is God, Luther says: “This applies properly only to His human nature, since God 
cannot suffer and be crucified. And yet Christ says here that the Son of God was given into death and was 
crucified. From this we learn about the “communication of properties,” the fact that the attributes of both 
natures pertain to the one Person, that the attributes of both natures inhere in the one person.” LW 22, 361. 
In the same section, he also states: “To be sure, Christ was crucified according to His humanity, and He 
created heaven and earth according to His divinity; but since this one Person is God and man, it is proper to 
say: God‟s Son is the Creator of heaven and earth, and God‟s Son was also crucified. One dare not divide 
the Person, leaving only the human nature; but one must bear in mind that this Person is also God.” LW 22, 
362. WA 47, 86. “Den solches eigenet auch der menschlichen naturn allein zu, den Gott hatt nicht konnen 
leiden noch ans creutz geschlagen werden. Noch spricht ehr alhier, das der Sohn Gottes sej in den tod 
gegeben und ans creutz gehenget worden, auff das wir hieraus lernen Communicationem Idiomatum, das 
die eigenschafft beider naturn sich zihen auff diese einige person, und also beider naturn eigenschafft zu 
stehen der einigen person.” WA 47, 87. “Nach der Menscheit, do ist wohl gecreutziget, und nach der 
Gottheit allein Himel und Erden geschaffen, aber dieweil diese Person Got und mensch ist, so wird recht 
gesaget: Gottes Sohn ist Schopffer himmels und der erden und wirdt auch gecreutziget. Man mus die 
Person nicht zutrennen, als, das alleine die Menscheit da bliebe, sondern sie auch Gott gewesen ist”.  
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the public debate, Luther comments “what is attributed to one nature is attributed to the 
other as well, because they are one person.”69 This mode of description clearly lays 
emphasis upon the personal union of God and man, but seems semantically to suggest 
that this union enables Christ‟s two natures to exchange with one another all of their 
respective properties.
70
 In this, Luther‟s vocabulary is strangely reminiscent of the 
sermons on John 1-4 from 1537-1540, as well as his earlier explanation in the 1528 
“Confession concerning Christ‟s Supper”. The question, which must be addressed, is 
whether Luther‟s language in 1540 is accompanied by similar mechanisms of 
qualification, which explicate his theological intent along similar lines. Locating these 
scattered statements within the framework of Luther‟s overarching argument throughout 
the disputation provides important preliminary clues about what this intent might be.   
 In some ways, the object of Luther‟s concern in this text is analogous to what 
was already found to be the case in his homiletic treatment of John 3:35. The 
fundamental question he is obliged to address, in both instances, is whether and how 
„human‟ properties may be predicated of Christ, even though He is fully divine. In the 
case of the 1540 disputation, the urgency of the riddle is impressed upon Luther, not by a 
specific scriptural text (like John 3:35, for instance), but by a series of recent and 
burgeoning complaints registered by Caspar Schwenckfeld that Lutheran theologians 
(along with Roman Catholic and Reformed counterparts) are wrong to endorse the 
                                                             
69Translation by Christopher Brown. WA 39/II, 98. “Non sunt duo filii, non duo iudices, non duae 
personae, non duo Iesus, sed propter unitam coniunctionem et unitatem duarum naturarum fit 
communicatio idiomatum, ut, quid uni naturae tribuitur, tribuitur et alteri, quia fit una persona.”   
70 Similar language shows up in at least two versions of the public debate. WA 39/II, 102a. 
“Crucifigi est unum idioma naturae humanae, sed quia duae naturae sunt in una persona unitae, tribuitur 
utrique naturae”; and WA 39/II, 108b “Est communicatio idiomatum. Hoc quod proprium est humanae 
naturae, est commune divinae.”  
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statement that “Christ is a creature”, on the grounds that the full divinity of Christ is 
called into question thereby.
71
 Although the focus of Luther‟s argument naturally rests 
upon defending the legitimacy of Christ‟s “creatureliness”, the disputation also deals with 
matters of christological predication in general, and the analysis of theological 
statements. This is because Schwenckfeld‟s complaint implicitly calls into question any 
instance in which an unambiguously human attribute is ascribed directly to Christ. 
Luther‟s strategy of response is accordingly wide-ranging in scope. It enlists the 
explanatory assistance of multiple predication examples, each of which serves further to 
de-validate Schwenckfeld‟s accusation.72  
 Schwenckfeld errs, according to Luther because he treats internally 
differentiated objects of reference (in this case, Christ) artificially as non-differentiated or 
uniform. He fails to account for the way in which predications often apply to their objects 
in an internally differentiated manner.
73
 Christologically, Schwenckfeld mistakenly 
assumes that the statement “Christ is a creature” applies to Christ simpliciter; that is, 
                                                             
71 For additional comments on the argument of the 1540 disputation, see the discussion already 
provided in the previous chapter regarding what it communicates about Luther‟s view of suppositional 
carrying.   
72Luther‟s tendency to clarify a particular matter of predication in light of others is also anticipated 
in the sermons on John, where, for instance, the question of Christ „receiving‟ something is elucidated in 
light of Christ also being said to suffer, die, be lifted up, and etc. Luther can adopt this more comprehensive 
mode of response because the root issue of predication uniting these various examples is the same, namely, 
may one licitly refer human properties to Christ who is the Son of God?  
73Graham White helpfully condenses Luther‟s response by isolating the central „fallacies‟ the 
disputation exposes within Schwenckfeld‟s apparent critique of the statement that “Christ is a creature.” 
See Graham White, Luther as Nominalist, 239-53. More specifically, White refers to two logical fallacies 
that Luther finds in Schwenckfeld‟s reasoning: 1) simpliciter and secundum quid; and 2) composition and 
division. See Ibid., 239. Luther lays explicit emphasis upon the latter of these fallacies, stating in the 
preface that Schwenckfeld‟s use of it is the “hidden tooth of the serpent.” WA 39/II, 99. “Schwenckfeld 
scelerate advertit: Ergo Christus simpliciter est creatura. Quare tu nequam non addis: Christus secundum 
divinitatem est creator? Ergo est creatus. Sed non addit, quia dicit: Ego sino ita debilitari meam 
conscientiam. Ideo omisi, id est, scelerate feci. Ipse utitur fallacia compositionis et divisionis. Hic est 
occultus morsus serpentis et verum sacrificium diaboli etiam apud papistas.” For more on the fallacy of 
secundum quid ad simpliciter, see Allan T. Bäck, “Aquinas on the Incarnation”, 137. 
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without restrictive or specificatory qualification. This strange flattening of christological 
discourse is the source of his confusion. Because of it, he argues in essentially the 
following way: 
1. Christ is divine. 
2. Divinity, by its very nature, is not created.  
3. The term „creature‟, however, denotes a being that is created. 
4. Therefore, it is false to say that „Christ is a creature‟.  
 
On the basis of this implicit reasoning, Schwenkfeld concludes that the phrase „Christ is a 
creature‟ is tantamount to an outright endorsement of Arianism. It appears to consign 
Christ to a merely „created‟ status. Luther‟s response to this line of reasoning seems, first 
and foremost, to be exasperation. Schwenckfeld evinces, for him, a truly stunning lack of 
logical-semantic sophistication, for which Luther knows not whether to credit ignorance 
or malice.
74
    
                                                             
74Luther expresses this point with characteristic vigor. WA 39/II, 97. “Causa huius disputationis 
est haec, quod volui, vos esse instructos et praemunitos ad futuras insidias diaboli, quia edidit quidam 
cavillationem quandam contra Ecclesiam. Non me hoc tam movet, quod homo indoctus, imperitus ac 
ignarus omnium quaerit sibi laudem et nomen aliquod, quam hoc, quod homines inferioris Germaniae moti 
sunt illius ineptis, stultis, imperitis, incultis ac ridiculis cavillationibus.” The reformer‟s incredulity on this 
score is a function of two primary observations, both of which are expressed in the theses of the disputation 
itself. In the first place, he notes that the presupposed meaning upon which Schwenckfeld‟s repudiation of 
the statement “Christ is a creature” is based entirely upon a rendering that mutilates its rather unambiguous 
intent within contemporary 16th century christological discourse, and (more prominently) the ancient 
Christian tradition. Schwenckfeld‟s inability to discern this fact, Luther speculates, must stem either from 
his unwillingness or inability to understand that the statement is ascribed accor ing to Christ’s humanity, 
and thus, without any accompanying denigration of the Son‟s full, and eternal divinity. Luther‟s frustration 
with this oversight is apparently compounded by his second observation, namely, that differentiated 
predications of this sort are by no means the provenance of theology alone, but are also native to ordinary 
human discourse. The statement: “The Ethiopian is white according to his teeth”, for instance, does not 
entail that the Ethiopian is white in every respect. Neither does it imply that the Ethiopian‟s „whiteness‟, 
applied in a more restricted manner (that is, according to his teeth), essentially conditions the pigmentation 
of any other dimensions of his corporeal existence. It would not preclude, for instance, affirming as equally 
valid the statement that “the Ethiopian is black according to his hair”. The extent to which this analogy is 
directly applicable to christological speech is somewhat limited for various reasons, a point that both 
Luther and the medieval scholastics who enlist it readily acknowledge.  
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    Luther‟s argument to the contrary nowhere denies Schwenckfeld‟s concern that 
the „non-created status‟ of the divine nature of Christ‟s divine nature be retained.75 The 
ground upon which Luther criticizes Schwenckfeld‟s christological semantics illustrates 
an underlying agreement with Schwenckfeld‟s governing insistence that the divinity of 
Christ is not ontologically conditioned by the creatureliness of His humanity. Luther‟s 
gripe with Schwenckfeld‟s criticism, then, is not that it wrongly defends the legitimate 
non-creatureliness of Christ (with respect to His divinity), nor that he expresses reticence 
to apply human predicates to the divine nature. Luther‟s fundamental concern is that the 
statement “Christ is a creature” does not mitigate either of these commitments, and never 
has. Predication referring to an individually subsistent whole does not entail an 
undifferentiated semantics. Indeed, forcing such a semantics would inevitably 
mischaracterize the various „parts‟ included within the intended object of descriptive 
reference. 
 The non sequitur standing at the center of Schwenckfeld‟s criticism, in other 
words, is his assumption that the assertion “Christ is a creature” is essentially equivalent 
with “Christ‟s divinity is a creature.” Luther rejects this equation. For him, „Christ is a 
creature,‟ reflects the fact that the Person of Christ possesses a human nature, which is 
undeniably created. With respect to His divine nature, Christ is not a creature, but the 
creator. The basis for such „differentiated speech‟, is the correspondingly differentiated 
union of divinity and humanity in the one Person of Christ. This union makes it possible 
to affirm Christ‟s creatureliness, and non-creatureliness, without the implication of 
                                                             
75In other words, he tacitly accepts the premises reflected in the first two steps of Schwenckfeld‟s 
argument, as summarized in the previous paragraph. This mirrors Luther‟s evident assumption in the John 3 
sermon that God cannot really receive anything.  
149 
 
 
 
logical contradiction. Schwenckfeld‟s failure to understand all this raises serious doubts 
in Luther‟s mind whether he grasps the full reality of the incarnation.76 
 Luther uses Schwenckfeld‟s evident confusion concerning the creatureliness of 
Christ as an occasion for general reflection upon modes of christological speech. The 
statements Ngien isolates from the 1540 disputation as evidence of an endorsement of 
divine passibility emerge from this subsidiary exercise. The larger context, which 
surrounds these „passibilist comments‟ mitigates the preliminary impression, upon which 
Ngien capitalizes, that Luther intends by them to affirm the suffering of Christ‟s divine 
nature. If his intent were to endorse this point of view, why would Luther go to such 
great lengths to demonstrate (contra Schwenckfeld) that property ascriptions referring to 
the single subject of Christ (such as creatureliness) do not entail any characterization of 
Christ‟s divinity? Why doesn‟t Luther simply attack Schwenckfeld‟s reticence to 
acknowledge that divinity is a creature, because the incarnation ontologically conditions 
the divine nature of Christ by way of two-way, communicative exchange? In other words, 
if Luther protects the divine nature from an ascription of „creatureliness‟ or the capacity 
to „receive‟ something, why would other human predicates—like the capacity to suffer—
by any different?  
 These plausibility questions would be largely irrelevant, of course, if it could be 
convincingly shown that Luther simply does ascribe suffering and other human 
predicates to the divinity of Christ within other sections of the disputation. This, however, 
is not the case. Luther employs clear specificatory qualifications, which supervise and 
                                                             
76This is why Luther registers his suspicion that Schwenckfeld‟s unwillingness to refer to Christ as 
creature harbors latently Eutychian sensibilities, by which he means that the genuine humanity of Christ is 
potentially compromised by being absorbed into divinity. WA 39/II, 95. How exactly this interpretation 
relates to the actual position of Eutyches in the christological controversies of the early church is not one 
that may detain us here.   
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restrict the meaning of the communicatio idiomatum. This discourse places unambiguous 
limits on how human idioma may be applied to Christ. So, for instance, one transcript of 
the public debate records the following, which is again strangely reminiscent of Luther‟s 
early treatment of John 3:35. 
 “Argument:  If Christ were true God, of the same essence with the Father, the 
Scripture would not teach that he received all things from the Father.  But Scripture so 
says.  Therefore he is not true God.” 
 
“I respond to the minor premise:  This [pertains to] his ministry and humanity.  For in 
divinity he is equal in power with the Father.”77 
  
Luther‟s response here that „receiving‟ pertains exclusively to the humanity of Christ 
underscores his acquiescence to the presupposition that the divinity of Christ cannot 
receive, a restriction that clearly retains its force even post-incarnation. The biblical 
statement that „Christ „receives‟ is nevertheless valid, because reference to the one 
Person, does not entail a symmetrical characterization of both natures.  
 This same pattern of differentiating analysis appears in Luther‟s analysis of the 
statement that „Christ‟ or „God suffers‟ elsewhere within the disputation.  
 “The Father does not will that the human nature should have to bear divine 
epithets…, despite the union, and yet sometimes [Christ] speaks of himself as of God, 
when he says, "The Son of Man will be crucified." To be crucified is a property of the 
human nature, but because there are two natures united in one person, it is attributed to 
both natures. Again, "Whoever believes in the Son has eternal life."  There he speaks of 
the divine nature.  Or again, "They crucified the Lord of glory," where he speaks of the 
property of the humanity.”78  
                                                             
77
Translation by Christopher Brown. WA 39/II, 104a. Si Christus esset verus Deus, eiusdem 
essentiae cum patre, non doceret scriptura: Omnia a patre accepit.Sed scriptura ita dicit: Ergo non est verus 
Deus. Respondeo ad minorem: Quod ad suum ministerium et humanitatem. Nam in divinitate est aequalis 
potentia cum patre.” 
78Translation by Christopher Brown.  WA 39/II, 102a. “Pater non vult, ut humana natura debeat 
gerere dicta divina, etiamsi sit unitas, sed tamen aliquando loquitur de se tamquam Deo, cum dicit: Filius 
hominis crucifigetur. Crucifigi est unum idioma naturae humanae, sed quia duae naturae sunt in una 
persona unitae, tribuitur utrique naturae. Item, qui credit in filium habet vitam aeternam. Ibi de divina 
natura loquitur. Item dominum gloriae crucifixerunt, de idiomate humanitatis loquitur.” This passage is 
excerpted from the third argument, recorded in the published transcripts of the public debate. 
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This text embodies the descriptive tension, which lies at the center of the question treated 
throughout this chapter. On the one hand, Luther seems to endorse a two way 
communication of attributes by suggesting that the property of „being crucified‟ is 
“attributed to both natures.”79 On the other hand, this endorsement is forcefully 
overturned by restrictive statements, which limit Christ‟s „being crucified‟ exclusively to 
His humanity. What can be made of this internal variegation?  
 The tension appears again in the second half of the fifth argument, as recorded 
in the disputation‟s published transcripts. 
“Question:  It is asked, whether this proposition is true:  The Son of God, the creator of 
heaven and earth, the eternal Word, cries out from the Cross and is a man?” 
 
“Response:  This is true, because what the man cries, God also cries out, and to crucify 
the Lord of glory is impossible according to the divinity, but it is possible according to 
the humanity; but because of the unity of the person, this being crucified is attributed to 
the divinity as well.”80 
 
A divergence interpretation of this text will, no doubt, call attention to the fact that Luther 
ascribes „being crucified‟ to Christ‟s divinity. The text, however, cannot easily be 
reduced to this emphasis. One must account for conspicuous use of secundum quid 
qualifiers, which designate the nature according to which a particular predication is valid. 
If Luther means to expunge the doctrine of divine impassibility, why retain such semantic 
restrictions at all? Is his point simply to acknowledge that the divine nature can‟t suffer 
on its own, but only suffers once united with the humanity of Christ?   
                                                             
79Emphasis mine.   
80
Brown translation. WA 39/II, 103a. “Quaestio: Quaeritur, an illa propositio sit vera: Filius Dei, 
creator coeli et terrae, verbum aeternum, clamat in cruce et est homo? Responsio: Est vera, quia quod 
clamat homo, clamat etiam Deus, et crucifigi dominum gloriae est impossibile secundum divinitatem, est 
autem possibile secundum humanitatem, sed quia est unitas personae, illud crucifigi tribuitur etiam 
divinitati.”  
152 
 
 
 
 Such a „diachronic‟ rendering fails to comport, though, with the thrust of 
Luther‟s rejoinder to Caspar Schwenckfeld. In this rejoinder, the mechanics of semantic 
specification are enlisted to demonstrate the legitimacy of ascribing human attributes to 
Christ while retaining the unaltered integrity of the divine nature (I.E. God‟s abiding non-
creatureliness). When the same qualificatory pattern is applied to the present context, it 
becomes clear that it is the divinity of Christ that Luther has in mind, when he states that 
„being crucified‟ is “impossible according to the divinity”81. He is not simply conceding 
the point that „pre-incarnate deity‟ cannot suffer and die.82 Luther‟s use of traditional 
restrictive qualifications denotes an ongoing commitment to the doctrine of divine 
impassibility.  
 The core of the 1540 disputation rests finally, as in the case of the 1528 
“Confession concerning Christ‟s Supper” and the sermons on John from the late 1530‟s, 
upon the ascription of human properties to the single person of Christ.
83
 The purpose of 
Luther‟s enlisted specificatory discourse is to identify the nature according to which 
ascriptions are valid. The resultant „partitive analysis‟ also makes it abundantly clear that 
descriptive characterizations of Christ do not necessarily apply symmetrically to each of 
Christ‟s two natures. Many predicates, which are true of Christ as human, are decidedly 
not true of Christ as divine.  
 To this point, the present section has argued in favor of a „non-divergence‟ 
reading of Luther‟s 1540 disputation on the basis of two main factors. In the first place, 
                                                             
81That is, the referent is not the pre-incarnate divine Son, but the incarnate Christ. Emphasis mine.   
82After all, Luther‟s response to Schwenckfeld is not that pre-incarnate divinity is not a creature. 
Such anargument would only confirm the semantic suspicions that Luther set out to allay.   
83That is, the tensions that proceed from the juxtaposition of traditional qualificatory discourse 
beside an apparent endorsement of a two-way exchange between natures.   
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this interpretation comports with the grain of Luther‟s response to Caspar Schwenckfeld. 
His response does not depend upon a diachronic ontological shift within the nature of 
deity, but focuses instead upon the person of Christ as the one proper recipient of all 
property ascriptions. Second, a non-divergence interpretation makes clearer sense of 
Luther‟s prolific use of secundum quid qualifiers. These qualifiers register his ongoing 
commitment to the unaltered integrity of the divine nature as non-creaturely and 
impassible, before and after the event of the incarnation. 
  In addition to these considerations, there is a third compelling source of 
counter-evidence, which has not yet been the direct object of this chapter‟s examination. 
It consists in Luther‟s employment in the disputation of the distinction between abstract 
and concrete predication, which represents a second means of semantic qualification. The 
importance of this distinction is highlighted by its conspicuous frequency of appearance 
in the opening series of theses.
84
      
“1. This is the catholic faith, that we confess one Lord Jesus Christ, true God and man.” 
“2. From this truth of the double substance and the unity of the person follows the 
communication of attributes [communicatio idiomatum], as it is called.” 
“3. So that those things which pertain to man are rightly said of God, and, on the other 
hand, those things which pertain to God are said of man.” 
“4. It is true to say:  This man created the world, and this God suffered, died, was buried, 
etc.” 
“5.  But these are not correct in the abstract (as it is said) of human nature [in abstractis 
humanae naturae].” 
“6.  For it cannot be said, Christ is thirsty, a servant, dead; therefore he is thirst, servitude, 
death.” 
“7.  Wherefore this [statement] too is condemned:  Christ is humanity, even though it is 
said:  Christ is divinity.” 
“8.  Even though man and humanity are otherwise synonyms, as are God and divinity.” 
“9.  In the divine predicates or attributes there is not a difference of this kind between the 
concrete and the abstract.”85 
                                                             
84A smaller portion of these theses has already been surveyed in the previous chapter.  
85
Brown‟s translation. WA 39/ II, 93. “1. Fides catholica haec est, ut unum dominum Christum 
confiteamur verum Deum et hominem. 2. Ex hac veritate geminae substantiae et unitate personae sequitur 
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Theses four and five of this series demonstrate the importance of the distinction between 
abstract and concrete predication for ascertaining Luther‟s conception of divine 
passibility, because they insist rather directly that the statement “God suffered” is valid 
only when spoken in the concrete, and not when spoken in the abstract. What does Luther 
intend to emphasize by means of this distinction?
86
  
 Divergence interpreters are accustomed to think that Luther‟s distinction between 
„abstract‟ and „concrete‟ description reflects the diachronic ontological shift, which 
conditions post-incarnate deity.
87
 Suffering is not possible for the divine nature, in other 
words, until it forms a single „concretion‟ together with Christ‟s humanity. Thus, when 
Luther states that God does not suffer “in the abstract”, Dennis Ngien takes him to mean 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
illa, quae dicitur, communicatio idiomatum. 3. Ut ea, quae sunt hominis, recte de Deo et e contra, quae Dei 
sunt, de homine dicantur. 4. Vere dicitur: Iste homo creavit mundum et Deus iste est passus, mortuus, 
sepultus etc. 5. Non tamen haec rata sunt in abstractis (ut dicitur) humanae naturae. 6. Non enim dicere 
licet, Christus est sitiens, servus, mortuus, ergo est sitis, servitus, mors. 7. Unde et illa damnatur: Christus 
est humanitas, etiamsi dicatur: Christus est divinitas. 8. Licet homo et humanitas sint alias synonyma, sicut 
Deus et divinitas. 9. In divinis praedicatis seu idiomatibus non est differentia talis inter concreta et 
abstracta.”  
86The distinction itself shows up rather frequently in many of Luther‟s other written texts. Two of 
the more conspicuous examples include his already mentioned sermons on the Gospel of John, and his 
commentary on Isaiah 53, which he composed in 1544.  
 87 For instance, Kjell Ove Nilsson, Simul  as Miteinan er von G ttlichem un  Menschlichem in 
Luthers Theologie, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Bd. 17 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1966), 255-7. Nilsson‟s interpretation of the distinction is clearly expressed in a summary 
description he provides on page 257: “Erst die unauflösliche Personeinheit macht—in concreto—eine 
Vermittlung zwischen den Naturen möglich. Also: die Vermittlung ist realis, nicht nominalis; sie geschieht 
im genus idiomaticum sowohl als auch im majestaticum und tapeinoticum.” Schneider defines the 
concretion in terms of a dynamic union of opposites. Florian Schneider, Christus praedicatus et creditus: 
die reformatorische Christologie Luthers in den  Operationes in Psalmos      -        argestellt mit 
 est n igem  ezug zu seiner Fr hzeitchristologie (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2004), 184. See also 
Jens Wolff, Metapher und Kreuz: Studien zu Luthers Christusbild (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 440. 
Schwarz is less clear, perhaps, but also seems to assign a similarly „diachronic‟ meaning to Luther‟s use of 
specificatory discourse. He acknowledges, for instance, that Luther uses the qualification „according to the 
humanity‟, but this does not mean, in his judgment, that Luther denies the genuine suffering of the divinity. 
Instead, he thinks it is intended to denote the nature from whom the attribute in which both now share is 
properly derived. Reinhard Schwarz, “Gott ist Mensch”, 311-3. The prominence of this diachronic 
hermeneutic is expressed by the fact that Paul Fiddes, a contemporary systematic theologian, simply 
assumes it accurately to represent Luther‟s rendering of divine suffering. See Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative 
Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 29.  
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that God‟s being does not (and cannot) suffer prior to the incarnation.88 Ngien‟s implicit 
definition of this distinction is representative, and could be condensed as follows:  
 Abstract Predication: Predication referring to one of Christ‟s natures conceived 
outside of, or prior to its participation within the reciprocal, ontologically conditioning 
relationship it shares with its counterpart in the hypostatic union.    
 
 Concrete Predication: Predication referring to one of Christ‟s natures as 
ontologically conditioned by its union with its counterpart inside the hypostatic union.
89
 
 
By adopting a version of this interpretation, Ngien sidesteps the implication that Luther‟s 
employment of the abstract/concrete distinction attenuates or restricts his apparent 
endorsement of divine passibility. He is, after all, only acknowledging that the genuine 
suffering of the divine nature comes as a result of its union with humanity, and not from 
within its own discrete experience. This strategy mirrors the divergence thesis‟ diachronic 
rendering of other partitive analyses, such as secundum quid qualifiers.
90
  
 A „diachronic‟ interpretation of Luther‟s differentiated specificatory analysis 
succeeds, however, only if their medieval provenance is entirely ignored.
91
 Luther‟s use 
                                                             
88This is why we are referring to this interpretation as „diachronic‟. Ngien is aware that a stark 
emphasis upon this „shift‟ creates awkward problems for maintaining an agential continuity between God‟s 
being and act. This is why he suggests, somewhat in the manner of Jürgen Moltmann, that the divine Son is 
always proleptically conditioned by the incarnation, even before the decisive ontological shift actually 
takes place.   
89This definition is sometimes used as a means of characterizting Luther‟s theological 
epistemology. According to this application, it is precisely knowledge of God in the „abstract‟ that Luther 
rejects. The point represented here often carries with it a clear polemical edge. Wheras scholasticism is 
content simply to define God and Christ on the basis of detached speculation, Luther allows God to define 
Himself. He thus allows God to be God in God‟s own way, rather than imposing upon Him human 
philosophical projections. There is not space to address this particular extension of the divergence 
interpretation. 
90That is, Ngien‟s apparent assumption that God suffers according to the humanity really only 
means that the divine nature suffers on account of its union with the humanity (since prior to this union, 
divinity cannot suffer).  
91By differentiated specificatory analysis, I refer to analysis that identifies and distills the specific 
reality or entity by virtue of which a given predication is deemed valid or true. Whatever interpretation of 
Luther‟s Christology one finally defends, the fact that Luther enlists such specificatory and restrictive 
discourse must be acknowledged and therefore interpreted. The crucial question is whether this discourse 
ought to be seen as “diachronic, differentiated specificatory analysis” or as “synchronic, differentiated 
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of the abstract/concrete distinction is not, in other words, a semantic device of his own 
innovation, but a practice he appropriates rather unambiguously from medieval discursive 
custom. Qualificatory mechanisms such as those treated within this chapter are employed 
within the medieval period as a means for testing and articulating the internal consistency 
of Christian belief, a project whose very impetus presumes the prima facie dissonance of 
divine and human predicates (E.G. passibility and impassibility).
92
 While the origins and 
development of the abstract/ concrete distinction, in particular, exceed the scope of the 
present discussion, it behooves us here to reflect briefly upon the christological 
application of this distinction in representative examples of late medieval discourse.
93
  
 The salience of such medieval antecedents for the present section consists in the 
unequivocally non-diachronic significance their use of the abstract/concrete distinction 
reflects, so far as the analysis of christological predicates is concerned. The primary 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
specificatory analysis”. The following argument will argue in favor of the latter, in light of 1) the late 
medieval provenance of these distinctions (I.E. Luther obviously has absorbed them from the medieval 
textbooks perused throughout his education and beyond); and 2) Luther‟s own explicit reflections upon this 
discourse; specifically the abstract/concrete distinction.   
 92 For instance, the fact that Christ is both passible and impassible is an ostensible contradiction 
that medieval theologians seek to avoid by specifying the restricted „respect‟ according to which each 
predication is valid. Presumed in all this is the fact that a genuine union between divinity and humanity 
must preserve all of the essential attributes of the same, and this includes the humanity‟s intrinsic capacity 
to suffer, and the divinity‟s intrinsic incapacity to suffer. In the absence of these commitments, no 
qualificatory discourse would be necessary, because Christ‟s „suffering‟ would not raise the specter of 
latent contradiction at all. All of this raises the question, if Luther does not share these commitments, then 
why would he bother so extensively with the same medieval qualificatory discourse that is begotten from 
them? For more on the role of qualificatory propositions in relation to establishing the non-contradictory 
consistency of the doctrine of the incarnation, see Allan T. Bäck, “Aquinas on the Incarnation,” New 
Scholasticism 56 (1982): 127-45; and Allan T. Bäck, “Scotus on the Consistency of the Incarnation and the 
Trinity,” Vivarium 36 (1998): 83-107. 
93The distinction traces ultimately to the theory of predication espoused by the philosopher 
Aristotle whose work was re-introduced into the Western theological tradition during the early medieval 
period. Luther expresses his own awareness of the distinction‟s Aristotelian derivation in argument twelve 
of the transcribed debate. See WA 39/II, 108a. For more on Aristotle‟s views on predication, see Allan T. 
Bäck, Aristotle’s Theory of Predication (Leiden: Brill, 2000). Another important instance of Luther‟s 
extended utilization of the distinction between abstract and concrete is to be found in his 1544 commentary 
on Isaiah 53. See WA 40/3, 707-8. 
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intent of the distinction‟s application during this period is to distinguish between those 
predicates, which refer to single person of Christ (concrete), and those, which denote 
each nature as such (abstract).
94
 The fundamental purpose of this differentiation is to 
ensure that discrete modes of statement analysis not become jumbled with one another; a 
possibility that, from the vantage point of medieval theology anyways, would carry with 
it seriously problematic christological consequences. So far as the predication of human 
properties to Christ is concerned, the medievals insist that such ascriptions take place 
only in the concrete, and never in the abstract.
95
  
 A discussion found in the work of William of Ockham is illustrative. He stipulates 
that, while one may licitly say that „Christ is man‟ (a predication that denotes the concrete 
person possessing a human nature), it cannot be said that „Christ is humanity‟, because 
„humanity‟ refers to the abstract nature on account of which Christ (the concrete) is 
rightly characterized as fully human. Christ is no more to be identified with „humanity‟ 
on account of his being human than the person of Socrates is to be identified with 
„whiteness‟ on account of his being white.96 Christologically, Ockham‟s stipulation 
effectively prohibits an interpretation of the abstract/ concrete distinction that hinges 
upon a diachronic, ontological shift. The distinction has to do with the way in which 
Christ is human, not whether deity is considered pre- or post-incarnation. The analysis, in 
other words, is clearly „synchronic‟ in nature.   
                                                             
94Note this application of the distinction, for instance, in Aquinas‟ treatment of the communication 
of attributes as discussed in Ernst Borchert, Der Einfluss des Nominalismus auf die Christologie der 
Spätscholastik, 40.  
95See, for instance, the manifestations of this restriction in the writings Konrad of Soltau, Petrus of 
Candia, Pierre, D‟Ailly, Nicholas d‟ Oresme, and William of Ockham. Ibid., 78, 98, 100, 106, 110.  
96For more on this restriction, see Marilyn McCord Adams, “Relations, Inherence and 
Subsistence”, 68-9.  
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Is Luther‟s appropriation of the abstract/concrete distinction marshaled to an 
equivalent restrictive purpose? Theses six and seven of the 1540 disputation suggest an 
affirmative response to this question. Here, the reformer practically repeats Ockham‟s 
stipulation verbatim.
97
  Perhaps most explicit in this regard is the published record of 
argument twelve that one finds in a transcribed version of the public debate.  
“Argument:  "Man" and "humanity" have the same meaning.  Therefore it is rightly said 
that Christ is humanity.” 
 
“Response:  This is not conceded, but rather that Christ is man, because this is a concrete 
term with personal signification, whereas an abstract signifies the mode of nature, or 
naturally, so that therefore it is false that Christ is human nature, that is, humanity, or that 
Christ is humanity. Aristotle says that abstract terms refer to nature, and concrete terms to 
a person.”98 
   
 Contra Ngien‟s interpretation of Luther‟s qualificatory discourse, this text 
illustrates Luther‟s appropriation of a medieval rendering of the abstract/concrete 
distinction, with its differentiation of person-oriented predicates, and nature-oriented 
predicates. The differentiation expressed by this distinction is clearly not a function of 
diachronic ontological adjustment. It refers, instead, to the internally differentiated unity 
of the incarnate Christ, and seeks to reflect the peculiar nature of this unity through a 
correspondingly differentiated mode of discourse. The distinction between abstract and 
concrete possesses, for Luther, an explicitly „synchronic‟ significance. Thus, when he 
denies in thesis five that the statement “God suffered” is true in the abstract, the 
underlying intent is clear. He means by this qualification to ascribe „suffering‟ to the 
                                                             
97This is not to suggest that the point originates with Ockham.  
98
Translation by Christopher Brown. WA 39/II, 108a. “Homo et humanitas significant idem. Ergo 
recte dicitur: Christus est humanitas. Responsio: Illa non conceditur, sed illa: Ergo Christus est homo, quia 
est hoc concretum significans personaliter, sed abstractum significat modum naturae vel naturaliter, sicut 
igitur falsum est: Christus est humana natura, id est, humanitas, sic Christus est humanitas. Aristoteles dicit: 
Abstracta sonant naturam, concreta personam.” 
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single person of Christ who is both God and man. By stipulating in this same section that 
all predicates of the humanity may be applied to Christ only in the concrete, Luther 
unambiguously proscribes any implication that the „suffering of God‟ in any way 
conditions the divinity of Christ as such. Luther‟s emphasis rests again upon the single 
personal agency of Christ, who is the rightful recipient of all divine and human 
predicates. The overarching intent of this emphasis along with its accompanying 
qualificatory discourse is to demonstrate, just like the medieval theologians surveyed in 
the previous chapter, that one may affirm the mysterious realities of the incarnation 
without falling into contradiction, or violating the integrity of the divine nature by 
ascribing to it exclusively human attributes.
99
   
 Is Luther‟s use of qualificatory discourse sufficient to displace the prima facie 
evidence, which seems to evince a reciprocal doctrine of the communication of idioms? 
The qualifications surveyed above certainly furnish significant reason to doubt that a 
„two-way‟ understanding is what Luther has in mind. The lingering riddle, however, is 
why Luther sometimes speaks as if there is a mutual sharing of attributes, even if 
contextual qualifications ultimately prohibit this view. This section has sought to 
illuminate Luther‟s theological intent by attending both to the broader context of his 
argument, and to the specificatory discourse that accompanies its development. So long 
as the primary „divergence statements‟ remain unexplained, however, there will be space 
for the identification of a divergence „strand‟ within Luther‟s Christology, be this strand 
                                                             
 99This intent is clear from what we have already observed about Luther‟s primary response to 
Schwenckfeld‟s concern that referring to Christ as a creature compromises his divinity. Luther grants the 
concern, but denies the simplistic semantics that fund Schwenckfeld‟s criticisms. His task, in other words, 
is to show how traditional christological speech does not entail that divinity changes, or suffers ontological 
defect. The traditional speech is necessary, though, for maintaining the doctrine of the incarnation, which 
he suspects Schwenckfeld implicitly to deny.  
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ever so slender in its textual support. Once again, the decisive question hinges upon the 
recognition of „novelty‟ in Luther‟s language. So far as the „two-way‟ statements are 
concerned, this novelty consists in Luther‟s suggestion that human predicates be ascribed 
not simply to „God‟, but to „divinity‟ as well. The preceding section has suggested, in 
effect, that although this sounds like a predication, which ontologically conditions the 
divine nature, it actually refers to the Person of Christ, who is God. Is there historical 
warrant for such an interpretation?  Are there theologians before Luther who sometimes 
enlist „nature-vocabulary‟ in order to refer to predications, which actually apply to 
Christ?
100
 The third volume of Gabriel Biel‟s Collectorium circa quattuor libros 
Sententiarium provides crucial background for addressing this question.
101
  
 In question one of distinction seven, Biel asks whether the properties of Christ‟s 
divine and human nature may accurately be predicated of one another other within the 
communicatio idiomatum, so long as this predication is conceived of in the concrete.
102
 
Biel addresses this question in a few stages. In the first place, he reminds his reader that 
the „communication of idioms‟ refers to the exchange of properties that takes place 
within the Person of Christ.
103
 Biel continues, on the basis of this preliminary definition, 
to note that this exchange includes within it a mutual ascription of properties between 
                                                             
 100 In other words, do others suggest that “suffering is ascribed to divinity”, and really mean 
“Christ who is God suffers—I.E. God suffers”? 
 
101
 This discussion is to be found in Gabriel Biel, Wilfrid Werbeck, Udo Hofmann, Martin Elze, 
Renate Steiger, Hanns Rückert, and Volker Sievers, Gabrielis Biel collectorium circa quattuor libros 
Sententiarum: Liber tertius, 153f. 
 102Ibid., 153. “Utrum per idiomatum communicationem concreta utriusque naturae Christi, 
divinae scilicet et humanae, praedicantur de seinvicem vere et affirmative.”   
 103Ibid., 154. “Quantum ad primum notandum circa istum terminum »communicationem 
idiomatum«, quod „idioma‟ graece est „proprietas‟ latine; et accipitur hic pro concreto importante 
proprietatem alicuius. Dicitur ergo „communicatio idiomatum‟ communicatio proprietatum.”  
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Christ‟s two natures, all of which apply to the single suppositum, which is Christ 
Himself. The governing proviso, however, which constrains the meaning of this 
description is Biel‟s preliminary insistence that such mutual ascription is valid only „in 
the concrete‟. In order to illustrate his point, Biel recalls Nicholas Oresme‟s influential 
tractate on the communication of idioms. Along with Oresme, Biel affirms a „concrete‟ 
discourse of mutual predicate ascription and furnishes several interesting examples of 
what such predication looks like: 
“A first example: as that which, with respect to the divine nature in the concrete, 
that is, „God‟, is predicated „de concreto‟ of the human nature, that is „man‟, and vice 
versa, it is to be said that: „Man is God‟, „God is man‟, „man is eternal, infinite, creator‟, 
and etc. [It is also to be said that] „God is temporal, corruptible, passible, mortal‟, and etc. 
Or the second example: „Christ is God‟, and „Christ is man‟, etc. This is spoken of 
concrete things, because abstract things of the natures are not predicated of one 
another.”104  
 
This text from Biel provides a crucial hint for determining for why Luther occasionally 
speaks as if Christ‟s divine nature is the recipient of communicated human properties.105 
Like Luther, Biel refers in this text to a mutual attribution between the divine and human 
natures of Christ.  He even defends the validity of statements, which advance the 
potentially scandalous notion that, in Christ, God is temporal, corruptible, passible, 
mortal, etc. The key for understanding these descriptions, of course, resides in Biel‟s 
                                                             
104Ibid., 154“Exemplum primi: Ut quod concretum divinae naturae, scilicet „Deus‟, praedicatur de 
concreto humane naturae, scilicet „homo‟, et econverso, dicendo: „Homo est Deus‟, „Deus est homo‟, 
„Homo est aeternus, infinitus creator‟ etc., „Deus est temporalis, corruptibilis, passibilis, mortalis‟ etc.—
Exemplum secundi: „Christus est Deus‟, „Christus est homo‟ etc. Dicitur notanter »concretorum«, quia 
abstracta naturarum non predicantur de seinuicem”.  
 105Luther‟s close familiarity with Biel is reflected in Phillip Melanchthon‟s anecdotal remark that 
the reformer was capable of referencing entire sections of Biel‟s theological and pastoral writings from 
memory. Although Luther was by no means content with every aspect of Biel‟s theology, he continued to 
recommend his works in a number of respects even later in his life. See Heiko A. Oberman, Luther: Man 
between God and the Devil, trans. Eileen Walliser-Schwarzbart (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 138. What 
is rather clear from all this, is that Luther was deeply influenced by his study of Biel, a fact that may go 
some way in explaining the characteristically nominalist character of several of his late disputations.   
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supervisory insistence that mutual predications apply only “in the concrete”. They really 
refer, in other words, to the single acting subject (Christ) who is both God and man. What 
we observe in Biel, however, is the appearance of a crucial nuance in the semantics of 
„nature‟. He often refers to the Person of Christ either as the divine nature in the concrete, 
or as the human nature in the concrete. Moreover, Biel evinces no awareness that such 
linguistic practice is revolutionary, or even remarkable.
106
 The salient point, so far as 
interpreting Luther is concerned, is the implication that „divine nature‟ can denote either 
divinity itself, or Christ the divine Person, depending upon whether this descriptive 
phrase is considered in the abstract, or in the concrete.  
 This distinction helps make sense of why Luther will occasionally speak as if 
there is a two-way exchange of attributes between natures even in a context whose 
accompanying restrictive discourse effectively proscribes such a view. Speaking in this 
manner does not, in itself, introduce anything fundamentally new within Luther‟s 
treatment of the communicatio idiomatum when considered against the background of 
late medieval discourse.
 107
 Like Biel, Luther‟s explicit restriction that all ascriptions of 
human properties to divinity refer to God in the concrete makes it clear that the object of 
                                                             
106It would be worthwhile, in a future study, to chart the origins of this descriptive pattern. For 
present purposes, it suffices to observe that referring to Christ as „divinity in the concrete‟ appears in the 
work of a late medieval theologian with whose writings Luther was intimately familiar.   
107Are there any direct indications in Luther‟s discussion that he accepts such a nuanced 
distinction? In argument fifteen of the public debate, Luther responds to the argument that, because Moses 
asserts God to be one, that Christ must therefore not be divine. In order to devalidate this syllogism, Luther 
reinforces the classical distinction between one divine essence, and three divine persons. As a means of 
illustrating this distinction, however, Luther returns to the question of divine suffering, and asserts the 
following. “Cum ergo dicitur: Divinitas est mortua, tunc includitur, quod etiam pater et Spiritus sanctus sint 
mortui. Sed hoc non est verum, quia tantum una persona divinitatis, sed filius est natus, mortuus et passus 
etc. Ideo natura divina, quando capitur pro persona, est nata, passa, mortua etc., hoc est verum. Est ergo 
distinguendum. Si intelligis divinam naturam pro tota divinitate seu unitate, tunc argumentum est falsum, 
quia solus Christus non est tota trinitas, sed tantum una persona trinitatis. WA 39/ II, 110a. Emphasis mine. 
Although not nearly as clear as the passage translated by Biel, this text furnishes at least one instance in 
which Luther explicitly admits using the language of „divine nature‟ when the intended referent is actually 
„persona‟. 
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reference is always the one person of Christ, and never the divine nature as such. By 
acknowledging this point, even the previously acknowledged prima facie warrant for a 
divergence interpretation of Luther‟s christological language effectively erodes away.  
Conclusion to Chapter 3 
In the course of this chapter, we have argued that the textual evidence adduced in 
favor of a divergence reading of Luther‟s doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum fails 
adequately to defend its claim that the reformer endorses a participatory suffering of the 
divine nature of Christ. Most of the textual evidence directed in support of this claim 
relies upon a false identification of novelty within Luther‟s preferred modes of 
christological description. Because of this mistaken identification, divergence interpreters 
often attach an inordinate degree of significance to texts whose contents turn out to be 
rather mundane once situated within the discursive landscape of Luther‟s intellectual 
environment. A case in point is Luther‟s mere ascription of human properties „to God‟, 
which is frequently vested with revolutionary theological import. A divergence appraisal 
of such texts egregiously overlooks the fact that such ascriptions had been the well-worn 
semantic custom of mainstream christological reflection for over a millennium before 
Luther‟s birth.  
A far smaller assemblage of textual loci do seem to lend prima facie support for a 
divergence interpretation of Luther‟s Christology. Upon closer investigation, however, 
even these texts have been shown specifically to proscribe the suffering of Christ‟s divine 
nature as such. In the analysis of these texts, it has been crucial to note that Luther‟s 
novel tendency to describe a mutual communication of attributes between Christ‟s 
natures, actually possesses important precedent in the work of Gabriel Biel, a late 
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medieval scholastic with whose work Luther was intimately familiar. Luther‟s prolific 
use of the distinction between abstract and concrete predication (and secundum quid 
qualifiers) makes it abundantly clear that, despite whatever occasional ambiguities may 
exist in his descriptive vocabulary, his intent is consistently to affirm the single 
subjectivity of Christ as the rightful recipient of predicates belonging to the divinity and 
humanity. In expressing this intent, Luther specifically rejects any notion that the divine 
nature is directly conditioned by the human properties of Christ. He prohibits this 
implication by enlisting characteristically medieval qualificatory discourse. God suffers, 
for Luther, only in the sense that the one person who is both God and man, suffers on 
account of His genuine humanity. In light of all this, the widely accepted divergence 
interpretation of Luther‟s doctrine of the communication of idioms must be rejected. So 
far as the suffering of God is concerned, Luther‟s writings evince fundamental agreement 
with the patristic and medieval authors who precede him.  
Conclu ing Reflections on Luther’s Allege  Christological Divergence 
The past two chapters of this study have sought to address two very specific 
questions: 1) Does Luther reject or retain the medieval conception of Christ‟s divine-
human person in terms of suppositional carrying?; and 2) Does Luther endorse or 
proscribe a two-way doctrine of the communication of attributes between natures in 
which the divine nature of Christ suffers along with the humanity?
108
 Recent literature on 
Luther‟s Christology often presupposes an answer to these questions, which points rather 
                                                             
 108Its intent is not, in other words, to ask whether Luther‟s theology comports with medieval 
norms in every respect. Such a task would involve a vast array of concerns, and, as such, falls outside the 
scope of this chapter. Accordingly, the argument for continuity here is neither comprehensive nor 
necessarily programmatic. Its focus rests entirely upon the issues distilled above.    
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decisively in the direction of a divergence reception of his thought. According to this 
view, Luther loosens the shackles of the classically developed doctrine of God by 
executing a two-fold reconfiguration of traditional Christology. The adjustments are 
deemed necessary, in retrospect, in order to affirm the passionate involvement of God 
within the events of salvation history. 
In its attempt to assess the allegation of two-fold christological reconfiguration, 
chapters two and three have capitalized upon the fact that most important proponents of a 
divergence view readily concede that broad swaths of Luther‟s writing reproduce 
decidedly traditional views on the matters in question. Because of this concession, the 
preceding discussion has occupied itself almost exclusively with specific texts adduced 
by scholars as sites of unambiguous deviation, either with respect to his conception of the 
hypostatic union, or as it pertains to the communication of attributes. The last two 
chapters have demonstrated that even these texts evince a robust continuity with 
characteristic late medieval christological intent, as expressed in the heuristically distilled 
four desiderata provided in chapter two. Like his medieval predecessors, Luther enlists 
the doctrine of suppositional carrying in his attempt to speak intelligibly (albeit 
analogically) about the doctrine of the incarnation in a way that avoids fundamental 
contradiction, and guards against compromising the integrity of Christ‟s impassible 
divinity.  
All this being the case, it must be concluded that a divergence interpretation of 
Luther‟s Christology lacks substantive evidentiary warrant.  On the contrary, it may be 
affirmed: 1) that Luther retains the doctrine of suppositional carrying; and 2) that Luther 
rejects the attribution of Christ‟s suffering to the divine nature. This twofold conclusion 
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is significant on its own historical terms. It is also important, however, because it 
represents a fundamental destabilization of many, long-standing appropriations of 
Luther‟s Christology within contemporary reflection. An analysis of the implication that 
attends this destabilization must await discussion in chapter five. The following chapter 
turns its attention to the way in which Luther‟s commitment to divine impassibility fits 
within the fabric of his soterio-logic.  
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ONLY THE IMPASSIBLE GOD CAN HELP: LUTHER ON THE SUFFERINGS OF 
CHRIST AND THE INVIGORATION OF HUMAN DEBILITY 
   
 
Although divergence thesis is based upon the identification of a christological 
adjustment in Luther‟s writings, this alleged adjustment has at its axis a decidedly 
soteriological orientation. When harmonized in relation to one another, the result is a 
programmatic, hermeneutical symmetry: 1) a re-engineered doctrine of the hypostatic 
union, which admits the suffering of Christ‟s divinity; and 2) a correspondent 
soteriological vision, which requires this admission. This doctrinal alignment purports to 
identify a crucial synthetic continuity within Luther‟s thought, and thus a means for 
perceiving its underlying conceptual commitments.
1
 Thus enlisted, the „passibilist 
symmetry‟ has proven, in the course of numerous books, essays, and articles, to possess 
remarkable explanatory appeal for those seeking to make broad sense of Luther‟s overall 
significance within the stream of Christian theological development. The result of its 
widespread application, is the now broadly accepted view that Luther represents an early 
hinge point in the development of modern theologies of divine suffering; a harbinger of 
the many 20
th
 century theologians who would later seek to denude the Christian doctrine 
of God of its purportedly pagan accretions.
2
     
The previous chapters have disrupted the first half of the operative „passibilist 
symmetry‟. They refuted the notion that Luther recalibrates the doctrine of the hypostatic 
                                                             
1 That is, the notion that Luther recalibrates traditional Christology for the sake of a passibilist 
soteriology. This notion is „synthetic‟ because it proposes a way of relating various aspects of Luther‟s 
theology together with one another. This differs from previous chapters, which treated questions of a more 
circumscribed nature, without asking the why question in so direct a manner.   
2For one example of how Luther is interpreted as part of the „pre-history‟ for these recent 
developments, see Victor Keding, “Wider das Apathieaxiom: Die theopaschitische Christologie des späten 
Elert und ihre Wirkungsgeschichte”, in Mit dem Menschen verhan eln   er  en Sachgehalt  es 
Evangeliums   ie  e eutung  er Theologie Werner Elerts f r  ie Gegenwart, hrsg. Keller, Rudolf, and 
Michael Roth (Erlangen: Martin-Luther-Verlag, 2004), 83. 
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union in order to procure the suffering of Christ‟s divine nature. The present chapter turns 
to the symmetry‟s second half, and asks whether Luther‟s conception of Christ‟s saving 
work includes an endorsement of divine passibility. Does God become genuinely 
vulnerable in the redeeming work of Christ according to Luther‟s conception? Is divine 
vulnerability necessary for this work to succeed in its purported task?  In the course of 
pursuing these matters, the following discussion seeks to refute the claim that Luther‟s 
soteriology evinces a commitment to divine passibility. It argues ultimately that the 
passibilist doctrinal alignment, which resides at the axis of the divergence thesis actually 
inverts the logic of Luther‟s soteriology, and thus fails as an accurate characterization of 
his thought. In order to redeem sinful human beings in the midst of their suffering, Luther 
insists that Christ must be wholly incorruptible on account of his divine nature, and thus 
finally invulnerable to the destructive powers, which fall upon Him during the course of 
His passion.  
The argument of this chapter unfolds in three progressive stages. The first seeks to 
situate the specific locus of divine suffering within the larger macro-structure of Luther‟s 
christocentric soteriology. This preliminary exercise is included in order to locate 
Luther‟s reflection upon the redemptive sufferings of Christ within the larger topography 
of his thought. This task allows the subsequent investigation of divine suffering within 
Luther‟s thought to proceed with the requisite focus needed either to refute or verify the 
divergence interpretation.
3
 The second section of the chapter presents and evaluates a 
                                                             
3This „location‟ is also necessary, lest the specific focus of this chapter leave the unintended 
implication that Luther‟s view of God‟s suffering lies at the heart of his doctrine of salvation. By exploring 
this question, in other words, we are not seeking to identify the central emphasis of Luther‟s theology, nor 
even narrate the whole of his soteriology. In the opinion of the present author, Luther‟s understanding of 
Christ places its emphasis primarily elsewhere. However, none of this alters the fact that Luther does 
address the matter of divine suffering, and believes this question to be an important aspect of soteriological 
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divergence rendering of Luther‟s soteriology. This evaluation addresses the crucial 
question of whether certain of Luther‟s soteriologically oriented texts express a clear 
endorsement of Christ suffering according to His divinity, as so many of his modern 
interpreters are wont to claim. On the basis of a negative response to this query, the final 
section unfolds an alternative construal of Luther‟s soterio-logic, which reinforces, 
through consultation of pertinent texts throughout the reformer‟s life time, the 
indispensable role that the doctrine of divine impassibility (and its conceptual corollaries) 
fulfills within Luther‟s understanding of redemption.  
Situating the Question  Christology an  Soteriology in Luther’s Thought 
Embedded within the divergence notion of a „passibilist symmetry‟ resides the 
latent, and logically prior assumption that Luther‟s soteriology and Christology form 
together a kind of reciprocally informing doctrinal inter-relation. Can such an assumption 
be sustained? Of course, much depends in this case upon how one defines the admittedly 
vague concept of a „doctrinal inter-relation‟ in the first place. That Luther views salvation 
as inextricably bound up with the person and work of Christ hardly needs to be 
defended.
4
 But what is the precise nature of the relation between these doctrines for 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
reflection. It is the more restrictive goal of this chapter to ascertain: 1) what redemptive „divine suffering‟ 
denotes for him; and 2) how this relates to the broader themes of his soteriological vision.  
4That such a coordination exists is, moreover, a claim that enjoys broad scholarly support within 
modern Luther scholarship. A few examples of this claim are available in Ulrich Asendorf, Die Theologie 
Martin Luthers nach seinen Predigten. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 62; Hans-Martin 
Barth, Der Teufel und Jesus Christus in der Theologie Martin Luthers, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und 
Dogmengeschichte, Bd. 19. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1967), 35; Sammeli Juntunen, “The 
Christological Background of Luther‟s Understanding of Justification” Seminary Ridge Review 5:2 (2003): 
21; and Dorothea Vorländer, Deus incarnatus: die Zweinaturenchristologie Luthers bis 1521, 
Untersuchungen zur Kirchengeschichte, Bd. 9 (Witten: Luther-Verlag, 1974), 11. Vorländer also cites a 
helpful list of others who articulate some version of this conviction on page 11, note 2.  As subsequent 
discussion will demonstrate, we have no interest in seeking to overturn the legitimacy of this broad 
affirmation. The question under consideration is how this coordination is to be parsed in relation to 
Luther‟s understanding of the suffering of God. 
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Luther? In what specific ways does he tailor christological inquiry in order for it to 
comport with his own account of the salvation that Christ achieves? Space naturally 
precludes any comprehensive treatment of this question. A cursory overview, however, 
will provide a conceptual map upon which the subsidiary matter of God‟s suffering can 
be located.  
At the heart of Luther‟s joint reflection upon Christology and soteriology is the 
theme of redemptive union. Christ and the Christian are baked together into one cake.
5
 
They form together a redemptive union, which is procured through living faith, and 
nourished by Word and sacrament. Theological reflection upon this union naturally 
proceeds in one of two directions. In the first place, because salvation is identified as 
union with Christ, it inevitably encourages a decidedly „objective‟ focus upon Christ 
Himself (I.E. 1. who He is; 2. what He has done; and 3. why it is, on account of all this, 
that participation in and with Him conveys salvation to the believer). The theme of union 
also invites reflection upon the specific means through which the Christian comes to 
participate in Christ and thus appropriate His redemptive benefits. One detects the core 
centrality of this union theme in an oft-referenced remark from Luther‟s 1535 preface to a 
series of published Galatians lectures originally delivered in 1519. 
“For in my heart there rules this one doctrine, namely, faith in Christ. From it, 
through it, and to it all my theological thought flows and returns, day and night; yet I am 
aware that all I have grasped of this wisdom in its height, width, and depth are a few poor 
and insignificant first fruits and fragments”6. 
   
                                                             
5See Ian D. Kingston Siggins, Martin Luther’s Doctrine of Christ, Yale Publications in Religion, 
14 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 156.  
6LW 27, 145. WA 40/I, 33. “Nam in corde meo iste unus regnat articulus, scilicet Fides Christi, ex 
quo, per quem et in quem omnes meae diu noctuque fluunt et refluunt theologicae cogitationes, nec tamen 
comprehendisse me experior de tantae altitudinis, latitudinis, profunditatis sapientia nisi infirmas et 
pauperes quasdam primitias et veluti fragmenta.” 
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Texts like this one express rather vividly the christocentric nature of Luther‟s self-
understanding as a theologian. The emphasis in this text does not rest solely upon Christ 
per se. It calls attention, rather, to the faith through which the Christian relates to Christ. 
This does not indicate any eschewal on Luther‟s part of rigorous dogmatic description. It 
simply illustrates that Luther felt it important always to reflect upon both the subjective 
and objective elements of salvation as they exist in relation to one another.
7
 This explains 
why it is that Luther so often commends the necessity of two-nature Christology on 
decidedly soteriological grounds. For Him, Christ must be both fully human and fully 
divine, because otherwise, the life, death and resurrection of Christ are of no redemptive 
benefit.
8
 Insofar as these considerations legitimate the identification of an inter-doctrinal 
„symmetry‟ within Luther‟s theology, then the divergence interpretation‟s 
methodological point of departure can be affirmed as legitimate. The inter-dependency of 
Christology and soteriology within Luther‟s thought renders it perfectly reasonable to 
triangulate Luther‟s understanding of divine suffering along both doctrinal axes. 
                                                             
7By „subjective‟ I refer to the means through which the Christian enters into salvific union with 
Christ. Objective, on the other hand, refers directly to Christ‟s person and work considered on its own 
terms. There exists a tendency in some scholarship to suggest that Luther only really cares about the 
subjective elements, and views reflection upon Christ per se as entirely worthless. The textual basis for 
such a claim is Luther‟s oft-expressed conviction that understanding of Christ per se is not sufficient 
soteriologically. This point falls well short, however, of the subjectivism Luther is alleged to insist upon. 
To conclude from these statements that Luther has no time for objectively-focused christological inquiry is 
unconvincing on its own terms, and blatantly ignores the fact, demonstrated in the previous chapters, that 
Luther does engage in such discourse elsewhere in his writing. In terms of the theological implications of 
this perennial bifurcation, Walter Kasper is surely correct when he states: “The choice between an 
ontological and a functional Christology is therefore, theologically speaking, illusory and a position into 
which theology must not allow itself to be manoeuvred.” Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ (London: Burns 
& Oates, 1976), 24. It is to Kasper‟s credit that he acknowledges Luther‟s retention of an objective focus, 
despite the many theologians who espouse a „pro nobis soteriological reductionism‟. See his discussion of 
Luther on page 22.   
8One way of describing the task of this chapter, would be to summarize that it is occupied with 
specifying why and how the suffering Christ must be divine for Luther. The divergence interpretation 
supplies its own treatment of this question, which will be scrutinized in the second section. In the third 
section, we will furnish a better alternative. Lest such an argument be recruited too hastily as evidence of a 
soteriological reductionism in Luther‟s theology, we will do well to recall that many patristic authors argue 
a similar point in defense of orthodox trinitarian theology.  
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It bears mentioning as a precaution against overstatement here that Luther‟s 
tandem conceptualization of Christ and redemption is not so radically „unique‟ a feature 
of his theological modus operandi as is often supposed. The mere fact that such a 
relational coordination exists within his thought must not be enlisted too hastily in the 
service of sharply drawn, trans-historical contrast. Theologians of the patristic period, for 
instance, are often guided by a decidedly soteriological orientation, which many scholars 
have observed to be instrumental in the early formulations of conciliar dogma.
9
  Despite 
semi-conventional denigrations to the contrary, it must also be acknowledged that 
medieval reflection upon the person of Christ is characterized by a similar attentiveness 
to soteriological desiderata.
10
 It cannot be imagined, as is sometimes alleged, that 
mainstream christological discourse immediately prior to Luther had somehow 
deteriorated into little more than an arcane and rigidly speculative „logical problem‟, 
wholly abstract in its focus and thus hermetically detached from any real soteriological 
concern.
11
 Scholars who assume this to be the case will only propagate what must finally 
                                                             
9On the formation of dogma in the patristic period, see Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An 
Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); John Behr, 
The Nicene Faith (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2004); R. P. C. Hanson, The Search for 
the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy 318-381 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988); Paul L. 
Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); John Anthony McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological Controversy 
: Its History, Theology, and Texts (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994). Representative of this sensibility is the well-
known dictum, “What God has not assumed, He has not redeemed” that guides various layers of 
christological reflection during the patristic period.   
10For sustained reflection upon of this soterio-christological inter-relation in the medieval period, 
see Marilyn McCord Adams, What Sort of Human Nature?: Medieval Philosophy and the Systematics of 
Christology, The Aquinas lecture (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1999). Another source that 
illustrates this inter-relation, though confined to the Christology of Bonaventure is Zachary Hayes, The 
Hidden Center: Spirituality and Speculative Christology in St. Bonaventure (New York: Paulist Press, 
1981).  
11The indictment against scholastic theology expressed in this description goes some distance in 
explaining how the characteristically medieval portions of Luther‟s late christological writings have often 
been interpreted with a decidedly non-medieval hermeneutical lens (with the salient exception of Graham 
White). If scholasticism is presumed to entail the sort of theological discourse described by the above-
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be regarded as an inordinately severe and untenable distortion of medieval theology. The 
descriptive hazard created by this distortion, so far as Luther scholarship is concerned, is 
that it encourages an inflated account of Luther‟s uniqueness, and invites injudicious 
adjudications of the way in which the reformer‟s self-avowed christocentrism is really 
significant.
12
 
The perils of overdrawn trans-historical contrast should not, of course, be 
exchanged for the equally misleading implication that Luther‟s christo-soteriological 
intent coincides seamlessly with all those who precede him. He undoubtedly differs, for 
instance, regarding what salvation precisely entails, and why or how the person and work 
of Christ are uniquely able to procure it.
13
 How best to identify and interpret these 
differences in any comprehensive manner is not a task that falls with the scope of this 
chapter. Its sole concern is rather to ascertain whether one aspect of the uniqueness that 
belongs to Luther‟s construal of these matters consists in a soteriologically motivated 
rejection of divine impassibility. Divergence interpreters are correct to assume that such a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
described caricature, then it becomes nearly impossible to imagine that Luther could make any constructive 
use of its descriptive tools. For more on how such a bias has shaped the study of Luther‟s Christology, see 
the following chapter.    
12Among the exaggerations this mode of description can encourage are the following: 1) That 
Luther‟s Christology simply is soteriology (that is, that Luther really doesn‟t reflect upon christological 
questions, but is exclusively concerned with matters soteriological); and 2) That Luther is the first person in 
hundreds of years to think that Christ is soteriologically important. Like Schwarz‟s harsh presentation of 
suppositional carrying criticized in the previous chapters, the grim notion of medieval Christology as purely 
speculative and non-soteriologically-oriented creates a historically inaccurate picture of pre-reformation 
theology in order to furnish a convenient foil for Luther‟s revolutionary genius.  
13Of course, we must remind ourselves here that patristic and medieval theologians are also 
internally differentiated on these matters, so the fact that Luther renders things likewise in his own creative 
manner should not be taken ipso facto as evidence of some kind of architectonic ground shift in his thought. 
Luther must be extended the courtesy of differing without rebelling and appropriating with parroting. The 
fact that Luther is sometimes afforded no space for theological nuance is undoubtedly a function of his 
looming significance in the history of western Christianity. The present study does not mean to suggest that 
this perceived significance is misplaced—as if the reformation was all just one colossal misunderstanding! 
The point is rather to insist that the nature of Luther‟s significance be carefully located, and neither 
fabricated nor overstated. 
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rejection would represent a major point of departure from preexisting theological norms. 
The question to which this chapter must attend, however, is whether this rejection really 
appears in Luther.   
So far, the present section has noted that the „passibilist symmetry‟ espoused by 
the divergence thesis depends upon the validity of a „reciprocal coordination‟ between 
Luther‟s Christology and soteriology. Although the symmetry itself remains very much in 
question, the underlying coordination provides a legitimate point of entry into Luther‟s 
understanding of Christ‟s redemptive suffering.14 The divergence interpretation seeks to 
direct and mold the theological significance of this inter-doctrinal coordination in a very 
particular way. It does so by culling to the foreground Luther‟s alleged endorsement of 
divine suffering, and identifying this endorsement specifically as an essential element of 
his theological vision. Accordingly, the divergence interpretation narrates the relational 
coordination between Christology and soteriology in Luther‟s thought as follows:  
1. The divine nature of Christ must suffer in order for human beings to receive 
true salvation. 
2. Therefore, the divine nature of Christ can and does suffer.  
 
The goal of the second section will be to adjudicate whether such a construal can count as 
plausible. Before doing so, the present section must provide a clearer specification of 
how the sufferings of Christ fit within the broader framework of Luther‟s soteriological 
vision. This synthetic vantage point will make it possible to evaluate the role, if any, that 
Luther assigns to the suffering of Christ‟s divinity.  
The recurrent patterns of Luther‟s soteriological vision find an important vehicle 
of descriptive integration in his oft-enlisted metaphor of a „joyful exchange‟ between 
                                                             
14In other words, the present study affirms the identification of this coordination, even if it 
qualifies it customary description with a few significant caveats. See above.  
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Christ and the believer.
15
 Recent scholarship especially has recognized and called 
attention to the importance of this metaphor as an enduring element of Luther‟s 
theological vocabulary.
16
 The image itself emphasizes that a redemptive sharing of 
attributes joins Christ to human sinners who participate in Him through faith. Christ takes 
upon Himself all of the sin, death, curse, and punishment of sinful flesh, and imparts to 
Christians all righteousness, life and innocence. What previously belonged exclusively to 
the former, now applies equally to the latter, and vice versa.  Creative elaborations of this 
exchange pattern literally pervade Luther‟s writings from the beginning of his career to 
its end. By far the best-known instance appears in Luther‟s 1520 treatise “On the 
Freedom of a Christian”.17  
                                                             
15This is not to negate the tremendous flexibility attending Luther‟s usage of this metaphor, as 
subsequent discussion will explicitly acknowledge.  
16Among the most important studies are: Uwe Rieske-Braun, Duellum mirabile: Studien zum 
Kampfmotiv in Martin Luthers Theologie, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Bd. 73 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999); and Walter Allgaier, Der "froehliche Wechsel" bei Martin 
Luther; eine Untersuchung zu Christologie und Soteriologie bei Luther unter besonderer 
Beruecksichtigung der Schriften bis 1521, Dissertation (Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1966). Another chapter 
treatment of Luther‟s use of this theme is available in Raymund Schwager, Der wun er are Tausch  zur 
Geschichte un  Deutung  er Erl sungslehre (München: Kösel, 1986). Theobald Beer also provides 
copious citations, which demonstrate the importance of this image throughout Luther‟s lifetime, although 
the present author strongly disagrees with the manner in which Beer seeks to interpret Luther‟s soteriology. 
Theobald Beer, Der fröhliche Wechsel und Streit: Grundzüge der Theologie Luthers (Leipzig: St. Benno-
Verlag, 1974). This chapter will assume what each of these books amply demonstrates, namely, that 
Luther‟s soteriology is often expressed in terms of a joyful exchange, and that the metaphor itself furnishes 
something like an organizational nerve center for Luther‟s understanding of redemption.    
17The Latin version of this description is available in WA 7, 54-5. “Tertia fidei gratia 
incomparabilis est haec, Quod animam copulat cum Christo, sicut sponsam cum sponso. Quo sacramento 
(ut Apostolus docet) Christus et anima efficiuntur una caro. Quod si una caro sunt verumque inter eos 
matrimonium, immo omnium longe perfectissimum consumatur, cum humana matrimonia huius unici 
figurae sint tenues, Sequitur, et omnia eorum communia fieri tam bona quam mala, ut, quaecunque Christus 
habet, de iis tanquam suis praesumere et gloriari possit fidelis anima, Et quaecunque animae sunt, ea sibi 
arroget Christus tanquam sua. Conferamus ista, et videbimus inaestimabilia. Christus plenus est gratia, vita 
et salute, Anima plena est peccatis, morte et damnatione. Intercedat iam fides, et fiet, ut Christi sint peccata, 
mors et infernus, Animae vero gratia, vita et salus: oportet enim eum, si sponsus est, ea simul quae sponsa 
habet acceptare et ea quae sua sunt sponsae impartire. Qui enim corpus suum et se ipsum  illi donat, 
quomodo non omnia sua donat? Et qui corpus sponsae accipit, quomodo non omnia quae sponsae sunt 
accipit? Hic iam dulcissimum spectaculum prodit non solum communionis sed salutaris belli et victoriae et 
salutis et redemptionis. Cum enim Christus sit deus et homo eaque persona, quae nec peccavit nec moritur 
nec damnatur, sed nec peccare, mori, damnari potest, Eiusque iustitia, vita, salus insuperabilis, aeterna, 
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In this text, Luther likens the union of Christ and the believing Christian to the 
nuptial bond that unites husband and wife. Just as the material possessions carried into 
marriage become the shared „property‟ of both spouses, so is it between Christ and those 
who live in union with Him through faith. Luther expands upon the specific soteriological 
entailments of this analogy at some length. The following excerpt is representative. 
“Accordingly the believing soul can boast of and glory in whatever Christ has as 
though it were its own, and whatever the soul has Christ claims as his own. Let us 
compare these and we shall see inestimable benefits. Christ is full of grace, life, and 
salvation. The soul is full of sins, death, and damnation. Now let faith come between 
them and sins, death, and damnation will be Christ‟s, while grace, life, and salvation will 
be the soul‟s; for if Christ is a bridegroom, he must take upon himself the things which 
are his bride‟s and bestow upon her the things that are his. If he gives her his body and 
very self, how shall he not give her all that is his? And if he takes the body of the bride, 
how shall he not take all that is hers?”18 
 
The spiritual goods detailed in this text as the substance of redemptive exchange do not 
represent anything like an exhaustive or determinate list, which consistently appear in all 
other instantiations of the metaphor throughout Luther‟s career. There exists, rather, a 
remarkable diversity in Luther‟s extension of the exchange motif; a fact on whose basis 
Uwe Riesko-Braun rightly cautions against any facile reduction of this metaphor‟s 
meaning to a single, abiding trajectory of emphasis.
19
 The pluripotent fecundity of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
omnipotens est, Cum, inquam, talis persona peccata, mortem, infernum sponsae et propter annulum fidei 
sibi communia, immo propria facit et in iis non aliter se habet quam si sua essent ipseque peccasset,  
laborans, moriens et ad infernum descendens, ut omnia superaret, peccatumque, mors et infernus eum 
absorbere non possent, necessario in ipso absorpta sunt stupendo duello. Nam iustitia sua omnium peccatis 
superior, vita sua omni morte potentior, salus sua omni inferno invictior. Ita fit anima fidelis per arram fidei 
suae in Christo, sponso suo, omnibus peccatis libera, a morte secura et ab inferno tuta, donata aeterna 
iustitia, vita, salute sponsi sui Christi. Sic exhibet sibi sponsam sine macula et ruga gloriosam, mundans 
eam lavacro in verbo vitae, id est per fidem verbi, vitae, iustitiae et salutis. Sic sponsat eam sibi in fide, in 
misericordia et miserationibus, in iustitia et iuditio, ut Oseae 2. dicit.” English translation for this passage is 
available in LW 31, 351-2.  
18 LW 31, 351.  
19For a sense of the range of emphasis available to Luther through this metaphor, see the following 
studies: Uwe Rieske-Braun, Duellum mirabile; Walter Allgaier, Der "froehliche Wechsel" bei Martin 
Luther; eine Untersuchung zu Christologie und Soteriologie bei Luther unter besonderer 
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image affords Luther an impressive range of possible soteriological applications, and thus 
nicely accommodates the situation-specific malleability of his theological style.
20
  
  Despite this diversity, however, the metaphor of the joyful exchange may be 
divided into two essential christological components: 1) The real condescension of Christ 
into the condition of sinful humanity; and 2) the real exaltation of the Christian with 
Christ from the condition of sinful humanity.
21
 At least this much is necessary in order for 
Luther‟s notion of a mutual exchange to possess any validity. Insofar as Christ is said to 
be united with sinners, He must enter fully into the depth of humanity‟s plight, and 
appropriate it existentially as His own. The radical condescension this entails is a 
function of the fact that Christ, the bridegroom, shares in all things that belong to His 
bride, the company of believers united to Him. Insofar as this union is redemptive, 
however, Christ must also emerge victorious from the depths of human suffering, 
condemnation and death, and translate all that pertains to His post-resurrection mode of 
human existence to those united with Him through faith. The christological shape of 
redemption for Luther is thus „parabolic.‟ Becoming like humanity in all things, Christ, 
the Son of God descends into the depths of sin‟s abyss. From this low estate, however, 
He emerges triumphant, and ascends into glory along with those who, through faith, live 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Beruecksichtigung der Schriften bis 1521 (Dissertation: Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1966); Carl Heinz Ratschow, 
"Christologie und Rechtfertigung : Luthers Christologie nach seinen Disputationen", in Iustificatio impii 
(Helsinki: Suomalaisen Teologisen Kirjallisuusseura, 1977): 204-226. 
20This semi-non-determinate malleability is partially the cause of long-standing debates within 
Luther scholarship over how best to characterize Luther‟s soteriology. For a very helpful overview of these 
debates, see Uwe Rieske-Braun, Duellum mirabile, 23-65; and Hans-Martin Barth, Der Teufel und Jesus 
Christus in der Theologie Martin Luthers, 50-73. Part of the problem with many aspects of the debates 
described in these books is the reductive presupposition that many of its participants share; namely, that 
Luther‟s soteriology must finally be distilled into a single, governing point of emphasis.   
21This is an exaltation, of course, in which Luther insists the believing Christian genuinely to 
participate.  
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in union with Him. Christ conquers sin, death, and Hell, as it were, from the inside out. 
He plunges into the dark depths of human misery, and only thus defeats it. In His glorious 
resurrection, Christ openly divests the principalities of their counterfeit power. They 
expend themselves in an attempt to extinguish Him, and yet He rises up in unqualified 
triumph, crushing them beneath His feet.  
The soteriological „parabola‟ just described raises interesting questions about 
Luther‟s Christology. For instance, how is it that Christ can enter so fully into the pits of 
human misery? In what precise way does He do so? Also, what are the underlying 
christological mechanics that explain for Luther why Christ does not remain, languishing 
in the abyss, but bursts forth in unfettered victory? In order to address these questions, 
one must attend to the way in which Luther coordinates his so-called „exchange 
soteriology‟ with two-nature Christology. In particular, it must be asked how the divine 
nature related to the self-abasement of Christ, which is so viscerally on display in the 
Passion narratives of the four Gospels. These are the precise questions that the divergence 
interpretation of Luther‟s soteriology purports to answer through recourse to the 
previously described notion of a „passibilist symmetry‟. This chapter‟s adjudication of the 
legitimacy of this proposal will hinge primarily upon whether or not the „answer‟ it 
generates comports adequately with pertinent textual evidence derived from Luther‟s 
corpus. This is the task with which the following section is principally occupied. 
 This preliminary section has sought to situate the matter of divine suffering within 
the framework of Luther‟s soteriology. In order to do so, we have deemed it necessary to 
bring this matter gradually into contextual focus through a number of progressively-
organized, prefatory affirmations: 
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1) The divergence interpretation of this issue is correct to identify a close association 
between Luther‟s Christology and his soteriology, despite the fact that the 
historical and theological significance of this assumption has sometimes been 
greatly exaggerated.  
2) The relation between these doctrines is mediated predominantly by the reformer‟s 
oft-utilized metaphor of the „joyful exchange‟. 
3) Although pluripotent in its particular applications, this metaphor‟s essential shape 
consists in two abiding components—1) the humble solidarity of Christ in the 
abject condition of sinful humanity; and 2) the exalted victory of Christ over sin, 
death, the devil, and Hell.  
 
The purpose of these prefatory affirmations has been to locate this chapter‟s focus upon 
God‟s suffering in Christ within the broad landscape of Luther‟s soteriological vision. 
The central quaestio yielded by this overview concerns how best to coordinate Luther‟s 
two-fold narration of redemption, with his underlying conceptualization upon the 
doctrine of two natures. Why must Christ be divine and human to save? The following 
series of questions gets to the heart of the matter: 
1) How does the divine nature relate to the „solidarity motif‟ embedded within 
the metaphor of exchange? 
2) What role does Christ‟s divinity fulfill in the suffering and death of His 
passion? 
3) What are the precise soteriological „mechanics‟ through which Luther deems 
it possible for humanity to be translated from its „low‟ estate (in suffering and 
death) to the exalted status bestowed upon it through Christ?  
4) What, according to him, accounts for this transition christologically? 
 
The following section presents and criticizes a „divergence construal‟ of these concerns.  
The Re emptive Sufferings of Christ’s Divinity  A Presentation an  Critique of the 
Divergence Rendering 
 
 
The proviso enunciated in the introduction of this study bears repeating. The so-
called „divergence interpretation‟ of Luther‟s Christology is not a monolith. The moniker 
of „divergence‟ furnishes a convenient label for designating an otherwise variegated 
number of scholars and theologians whose work has served (whether intentionally or 
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inadvertently) to reinforce the widespread contemporary reception of Luther‟s 
Christology described at length in chapter one of this work. It does not denote a neatly 
delineated and internally harmonious group of scholars self-consciously laboring towards 
a common narratival goal. So far as the present chapter is concerned, the divergence 
group includes all who affirm some version of the notion that Luther‟s doctrine of 
redemption either evinces or somehow demands the essential passibility of Christ‟s 
divine nature.  
Scholars who endorse such a perspective argue in its favor through a variety of 
different means. Rather than attend to every possible strand of this internal diversity, this 
section will present a conceptually organized outline of the most nuanced and outwardly 
explicit defenses of a divergence position. The intent of this exercise is to frame the 
divergence interpretation of Luther‟s soteriology in its clearest and most compelling form 
of articulation. This will make it possible subsequently to identify and evaluate the 
essential interpretive elements necessary either for its refutation or verification.  
Outline of a Divergence Coordination of Luther‟s Christology and Soteriology 
 
Conceptually basic to the divergence interpretation is the conviction that the 
suffering of Christ‟s divinity is necessary to Luther‟s soteriology. This much is clear 
already in what has previously been identified as the „passibilist symmetry‟, which is 
crucial for a divergence reception of his thought. What is it about Luther‟s soteriology, 
though, that commends so specific a verdict regarding the precise modality of Christ‟s 
sufferings? Why must the suffering solidarity of Christ with human beings be parsed in 
such a way that the divine nature is ontologically affected? A range of potential responses 
to this question is available to those who defend a divergence interpretation of Luther‟s 
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theology.
22
 The most compelling rationale leans heavily upon the „solidarity motif‟, 
which is so deeply ingrained in Luther‟s soteriology. 
 In order for the suffering solidarity of Christ with sinners to possess its full 
redemptive potency, this rationale argues, Christ must be capable of suffering not simply 
as a man, but also as God. This is because a Christ impassible according to His divinity 
would ostensibly signify a God incapable of real condescension. If the incarnate Son 
remains somehow „untouched‟ or „invulnerable‟ in the midst of His passion, then the 
downward bend of Luther‟s redemptive parabola would stop short of genuine intersection 
with its symptotic baseline. The bridegroom would thus not really be one in all things 
with His bride, because Christ would not genuinely share the desperate condition of 
human beings hopelessly entangled in the deleterious effects of their sin.
23
 In short, God 
must become „vulnerable‟, because that is precisely the estate of those He condescends to 
redeem.  
In this way, the „solidarity of God‟ motif presupposed by Luther‟s exchange 
soteriology functions as a conceptual wedge, urging upon readers the intra-systemic 
                                                             
22Ian Kingston Siggins contends, for instance, that it is Luther‟s particular substitutionary 
rendering of the atonement that necessitates the disposal of divine impassibility, although he admits, 
somewhat grudgingly, that Luther seems never to have drawn this conclusion for himself. Ian Kingston 
Siggins, Martin Luther’s Doctrine of Christ, 241. The logic underlying Siggins‟ claim is also undermined 
by the fact that a great many Protestant theologians embrace a substitutionary doctrine of the atonement in 
the 16th century, and do so without ever detecting a fundamental contradiction between this commitment 
and the doctrine of divine impassibility. At the very least, Siggins owes his reader a more specific account 
of how these two convictions combat one another.   
23It is fairly common for divergence interpreters to volley the charge of docetism against 
soteriologies that stop short of a passibilist solidarity. See, for instance, Marc Lienhard, Luther, Witness to 
Jesus Christ: Stages and Themes of the Reformer's Christology (Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 
1982), 175-6; 335-6. There is irony in this charge, however, since the patristic theologians responsible for 
identifying „docetism‟ in the first place were themselves deeply committed to the doctrine of divine 
impassibility. It seems illegitimate to apply the nomenclature of „docetist‟ in a way that cuts against its 
original meaning. For more on the history of the doctrine of divine impassibility in relation to patristic 
debates over Christology and the doctrine of God, see Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible 
God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought, The Oxford Early Christian studies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004).  
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necessity for Luther to reject the doctrine of divine impassibility. It is on the basis of this 
fundamental rationale that the divergence thesis furnishes its passibilist interpretation of 
the inter-relation between Luther‟s Christology and soteriology. The synthetic result of 
this view is the identification a closely-knit reciprocal parallelism between Luther‟s 
interpretation of the communicatio idiomatum (the exchange of attributes between the 
two natures of Christ) on the one hand, and the redemptive communicatio or „exchange‟ 
between Christ and the believing Christian on the other. Just as a mutual, ontologically 
conditioning relationship unites Christ‟s divinity and humanity via hypostatic union, so 
also is Christ conditioned, in both his natures, by the redemptive exchange with sinful 
human beings that takes place as the result of this union. In both instances, the 
„communication‟, which stands at the center of the parallelism, is genuinely symmetrical 
in nature. The divinity of Christ is no less conditioned by the condescension of the 
incarnate Son, than believers are transformed by participation in the exaltation of Christ 
through faith.
24
 
 The exchange motif, as interpreted by the divergence thesis, thus amounts to a 
kind of redemptively-oriented inversion of Christ‟s divine and human attributes. Divinity 
is brought low, so that the humanity might be raised up. Applied soteriologically, Christ, 
who is God, suffers and dies according to both natures, and a moribund human race, 
enmeshed in the suffering, death and corruption of sin, is healed and raised up to life 
immortal. What are the soteriological mechanics that account for this transition? How is 
it that Christ does not simply meet human beings in the mire, but also pulls them up from 
                                                             
24It is important to observe the extent to which this account presumes the interpretation of Luther‟s 
Christology that the previous chapters have sought to displace. In the absence of this interpretation, the 
above-described parallelism simply cannot get off the ground.   
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it? If the second Person of the Trinity truly suffers and dies according to His divinity, 
why is it not the case that He simply remains dead, obliterated in the jaws of defeat?
25
 
Divergence interpreters of Luther‟s soteriology account for the redemptive transition at 
issue in these questions primarily through recourse to a mechanism of dialectical 
mediation. The negations of sin, death, and hell are resolved, according to this view, on 
the basis of a doctrine of God‟s ontological historicity.26 The dialectical unfolding of 
God‟s historically mediated process of „becoming‟ constitutes the underlying theological 
reality finally responsible for Luther‟s two-fold pattern of solidarity and exaltation, as 
interpreted by many advocates of the divergence view.
27
 It is therefore not just the event 
of salvation that is „parabolic‟, but God‟s own being (as expressed by and related to this 
event) as well. The pain and plight of fallen human beings truly becomes a part of the 
divine life. It is assumed as an ontologically conditioning, and thus constitutive aspect of 
God‟s own self-actualization.28   
                                                             
25Many modern theologians and philosophers have assigned such a meaning to the phrase „death 
of God‟, and concluded that God, whether defined in terms of a concept or as a genuine reality, is truly 
annihilated as a necessary step for humanity coming of age. I have in mind especially the so-called „left 
wing‟ of Hegelianism, which traces its lineage through Feuerbach. Luther has no room for such a 
perspective, however. He notes explicitly that Christ did not die in order to remain in the grave. See 
Luther‟s comments from 1544 in WA 40/3, 732. 
26For a list of the various scholars and theologians who credit Luther with the historicization of 
God‟s being, see the summary provided in chapter 1.   
27Care must be exercised to avoid an overly determinate account of what the historicity of God 
entails for various modern interpreters of Luther. As in contemporary theology, the term itself may be 
invoked in a number of different ways. In this context, we are using it to denote any view that includes 
within it the idea that God‟s being has a history that is conditioned in some way by the events of salvation 
history. Whether this is explained entirely in terms of a free, self-electing prolepsis as some Barthians today 
argue, or through Pannenberg‟s idea of eschatological analepsis is not important to the point we are trying 
to make here. These and many other views would all fall together within the general trend that divergence 
interpreters believe Luther to anticipate.    
28This interpretation of the relation between Luther‟s Christology and soteriology has led a 
number of scholars to detect conceptual resonances between Luther and G.W.F. Hegel. The question of 
what counts as „Hegelian‟ with respect to the doctrine of God is often contested in modern theological 
discourse. Jürgen Moltmann, for instance, emphasizes the historicity of God‟s being, but has consistently 
rebuffed the accusation that this emphasis stems from directly Hegelian influences. For our purposes, we 
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The fundamental soteriological mechanics operative in a divergence interpretation 
of Luther‟s doctrine of redemption could therefore be summarized in the following 
manner  
God becomes truly vulnerable in Christ by entering into the depths of human 
corruption. Christ resolves the defects of sinful existence by subsuming them within the 
historical process of God‟s own dialectically mediated self-existence. Those in union 
with Christ through faith are caught up, as it were, in the onward trajectory of a process, 
which absorbs the previously ruling negations of sin, death, and hell, and consigns them 
to the sublated rubble of God‟s trans-historical self-actualization. In Christ, God 
identifies His own being with sinful humanity‟s past and present, so that they might, in 
turn, share in His eschatological future.  
 
The conceptual progression embedded within this interpretation proceeds as follows: 
 
Guiding Principle: The radical solidarity of God as sympathetic suffering 
Requisite Conceptual Sub-Structure: A Christology of divine vulnerability 
Soteriological Mechanics: The dialectical historicity of God 
 
The chief consolation for those bound up in sin, suffering and death, in other words, 
consists in the fact that God truly suffers for us, and with us. He identifies with the plight 
of humanity in sympathetic condescension and allows the defects of post-lapsarian 
finitude to condition His very being. Because He becomes frail or vulnerable as humans 
are, so also can those who live in union with Him hope to share in the final telos of God‟s 
own parabolic, trans-historical development.  
 This sub-section has sought to furnish a thick description of the divergence 
interpretation, as it has been extended by a number of its most nuanced defenders. The 
conceptual outline that has emerged from this exercise does not, it must be repeated, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
can only document the shared trajectory many interpreters of Luther have identified regarding the notion of 
God‟s essential historicity.  There are any number of theological directions in which this basic insight can 
be, and has been, directed. For more on Hegel‟s point of view, see the pertinent sections of Peter Crafts 
Hodgson, Hegel and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); Quentin Lauer, Hegel's Concept of God (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1982); and Cyril O'Regan, The Heterodox Hegel (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1994). 
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apply equally to all interpreters of Luther who understand his soteriology to contain an 
intrinsic commitment to divine passibility. Neither can it characterize with one stroke of 
the descriptive brush the many contemporary theologians for whom Luther‟s alleged 
endorsement of divine suffering constitutes a major building block of their constructive 
reception of his work. The intent of the outline, more modestly, has been to provide an 
overview of the divergence interpretation of Luther‟s soteriology in its most explicit and 
conceptually developed form of articulation. The common root uniting all versions of the 
divergence thesis, however, is the fundamental assumption that Luther‟s soteriological 
commitments either evince or require a rejection of divine impassibility. The next sub-
section will explore whether or not the textual evidence adduced in the defense of this 
assumption is adequate.  
Evaluation of the Divergence Interpretation 
  
On what textual basis is the legitimacy of the divergence interpretation of Luther‟s 
soteriology defended? Are there specific texts in which Luther is alleged unambiguously 
to embrace a dei-passibilist doctrine of salvation? Without question, the text cited most 
frequently as evidence of this view is derived from Luther‟s 1539 treatise “On the 
Councils and the Church”.  
“We Christians should know that if God is not in the scale to give it weight, we, on our 
side, sink to the ground. I mean it this way: if it cannot be said that God died for us, but 
only a man, we are lost; but if God‟s death and a dead God lie in the balance, his side 
goes down and ours goes up like a light and empty scale. Yet he can also readily go up 
again, or leap out of the scale! But he could not sit on the scale unless he had become a 
man like us, so that it [sic] could be called God‟s dying, God‟s martyrdom, God‟s blood, 
and God‟s death. For God in his own nature cannot die; but now that God and man are 
united in one person, it is called God‟s death when the man dies who is one substance or 
one person with God.”29 
                                                             
29LW 41, 103-4. WA 50, 590. “Denn wir Christen muessen das wissen, wo Gott nicht mit in der 
woge ist und das gewichte gibt, so sincken wir mit unser schuessel zu grunde, Das meine ich also: Wo es 
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In light of the previous sub-section‟s description of the divergence interpretation, it is not 
difficult to anticipate the way in which this text has been often enlisted in its defense. 
 This text clearly represents an instance what we have so far referred to as the 
„solidarity motif‟, which is intrinsic to Luther‟s two-fold soteriological vision. He insists 
in it that God must condescend into the condition of sinful human beings. Creaturely 
death, martyrdom, and physical vulnerability all belong to God as the result of His 
solidarity with humanity. Only in this way, the logic of Luther‟s „scale‟ metaphor insists, 
can believers hope to rise up with God from their manifold afflictions and attain to 
salvation. This text does not clearly identify why it is that God, unlike human beings, can 
enter death and yet spring up from it.
30
 The mere fact, however, that death and other 
human defects are ascribed blatantly to God is enough for divergence interpreters 
definitively to conclude that Luther‟s soteriology demands the rejection of the classical 
doctrine of God‟s impassibility.   
 Dennis Ngien‟s comments on the 1539 text aptly illustrate such a conclusion. 
“[In this text] Luther justifies his remarks on the suffering and death of God in Christ on 
soteriological grounds. Already in his Church Postil (1522), Luther says that if it is true 
that only the human nature suffers and the divine nature has no part in it, then Christ is of 
no more use to us than any other saint because his death is merely that of a human being. 
Christ‟s achievement would then become a pure model for the faithful, turning Christ 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
nicht solt heissen, Gott ist fur uns gestorben, sondern allein ein mensch, so sind wir verloren, Aber wenn 
Gottes tod und Gott gestorben in der wogeschuessel ligt, so sincket er unter und wir faren empor, als eine 
leichte ledige schuessel, Aber er kan wol auch wider emporfaren oder aus seiner schuessel springen. Er 
kuendte aber nicht in die schuessel sitzen, Er mueste uns gleich ein mensch werden, das es heissen kuendte, 
Gott gestorben, Gottes marter, Gottes blut, Gottes tod, Denn Gott in seiner natur kan nicht sterben, Aber nu 
Gott und Mensch vereinigt ist in einer Person, so heissts recht Gottes tod, wenn der mensch stirbt, der mit 
Gott ein ding oder eine Person ist.” 
30 If a dei-passibilist interpretation of this text is correct, then it is understandable why the 
„historicization of God explanation‟ has been such an attractive way of filling in this transitional gap. If 
God can „become‟, then suffering is just one aspect of His triune history. He can bend His own being to our 
level, in a manner of speaking, and conduct us onwards to His own eschatological future.  
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simply into an exemplar. In order to redeem human beings from the power of death, God 
has to co-suffer and co-die in Christ. That is why Luther makes use of the image of the 
scale, to illustrate that God can go down, can rise and jump out of his pan. God lets 
himself be overtaken by death in the suffering and dying of Jesus, and yet he remains the 
victor over death. The divine nature was present throughout the earthly life of Jesus, and 
was not untouched by the whole affair of the incarnation. With this it becomes clear how 
closely the two-nature Christology and soteriology are linked in Luther‟s thinking. It is a 
theological axiom that Christ be affected by suffering even according to his divine nature, 
otherwise salvation through Christ‟s suffering is inconceivable to him.”31  
 
Ngien‟s analysis is multi-faceted, and touches upon a number of elements already 
introduced in the previous sub-section as ingredient to the divergence interpretation of 
Luther‟s soteriology.32 These various elements all rely, however, upon the seminal 
assumption that the 1539 text clearly endorses the suffering of Christ‟s divine nature. Is 
such an assumption warranted?  
 A major reason why Ngien identifies an endorsement of divine passibility within 
Luther‟s discussion here is the fact that he presupposes what the previous chapter has 
determined to be an illegitimate „semantic equation‟. He tacitly assumes, in other words, 
that „God suffers‟ is equivalent, for Luther, with „divinity suffers‟. Because Luther 
ascribes death and suffering to God, Ngien thinks it fair to conclude that the final target 
of such predicate ascription is Christ‟s divine nature. Chapter three has already shown, 
however, that „God‟ is not always equivalent to „divine nature‟ in Luther‟s christological 
semantics. If the equation were valid, moreover, then not just Luther, but nearly every 
orthodox theologian from Chalcedon onwards could justifiably be suspected to reject the 
                                                             
31Dennis Ngien, “Chalcedonian Christology and Beyond,” 59.  
32Perhaps most important in this regard is the transparent coordination in Ngien‟s explanation 
between Luther‟s two-nature Christology and soteriology; a coordination that we have referred to in terms 
of a „passibilist symmetry.‟   
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doctrine of divine impassibility!
33
 Luther, after all, is by no means the only theologian to 
apply human predicates generically to God, nor the first to insist upon doing so for 
soteriological grounds.
34
 The mere appearance of such predicational applications in the 
1539 text is hardly adequate evidence for the revolutionary shift Ngien seeks to attach to 
Luther‟s metaphorical explanation. 
 Ngien‟s passibilist interpretation also proceeds at the direct expense of immediate 
and peripheral qualificatory discourse in the text itself. Luther clarifies in the very 
paragraph Ngien references that God cannot die in His nature.
35
 What can be the purpose 
of this qualification, if not to indicate Luther‟s abiding assumption that a crucial 
differentiation of meaning separates predications directed to „God‟, and those directed to 
the „divine nature‟?36 Ngien, of course, insists that the differentiation is wholly diachronic 
in nature. He argues that it reflects a sequential ontological shift, which qualifies God‟s 
being as the result of the incarnation.
37
 By interpreting Luther‟s qualificatory discourse in 
this way, Ngien apparently sidesteps the conclusion that Luther retains the traditional 
practice of distinguishing between what applies to the person of Christ and what applies 
to each of His natures. Because of this eschewal, he is also able to avoid the implication 
that Luther preserves the doctrine of divine impassibility through this distinction‟s use. 
                                                             
33For documentation of this point, see the previous chapter. Ngien is clearly aware that not all who 
affirm the phrase „God suffers‟ endorse divine passibility. He concedes as much in the opening pages of his 
argument, where he notes traditional interpretations of the communicatio idiomatum. What I am arguing in 
this section, however, is that, although Ngien is aware of the distinctions I am highlighting, he fails to see 
that Luther makes use of them in the very texts he suggests to overcome the traditional view. 
34Of course, such predication always presumes the reality of the incarnation in traditional 
discourse, and also for Luther.  
35Emphasis mine. WA 50, 590. “Denn Gott in seiner natur kan nicht sterben”.  
36In other words, if Luther evidently thinks this distinction is important, why are we warranted to 
interpret his language as if it is not?   
37For more on how Ngien interprets Luther in diachronic fashion, see chapter 3.  
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The previous chapter, however, has already established compelling reasons why a 
diachronic interpretation of Luther‟s qualificatory discourse is simply implausible. Like 
the sermons on John and the disputation of 1540, careful consultation of the broader 
context in Luther‟s treatise “On the Councils and the Church” unambiguously overturns a 
divergence interpretation of the data. 
 As he writes the (in)famous „God on the scale‟ passage, Luther is in the midst of a 
historical description and theological critique of the 5
th
 century bishop Nestorius, whose 
publically expressed christological opinions were among the major impetuses responsible 
for the convention of the council of Ephesus in 433, and Chalcedon in 451.
38
 Nestorius is 
known, above all, for his refusal to ascribe human predicates to God, even when those 
predicates serve a clear christological function. He declines, for instance to refer to 
Christ‟s mother Mary as the „bearer of God‟, or Θεοτόκος‟. By insisting upon the 
ascription of death and suffering to God, Luther means to cut at the heart of Nestorius‟ 
error, and levy against it, as a kind of orthodox counter-balance, the claim that human 
predicates must apply to God, because Christ is both human and divine. But how and why 
does Luther believe Nestorius to err by denying this semantic practice? Why exactly does 
he interpret Nestorius‟ reticence to affirm „humanity-originating‟ God-ascriptions as 
wrong-headed?
39
    
                                                             
38Luther, however, deals with Nestorius primarily in relation to the council of Ephesus; a 
reflection, no doubt of the insufficient historical resources with which he was working. This portion of 
Luther‟s description reflected in this section‟s discussion is available in WA 50, 583-92. An English 
translation may be found in LW 41, 95-106.  
39The reader will note that we are asking how Luther interprets Nestorius, and not seeking, on the 
basis of recent scholarship, to identify what the real Nestorius actually thought. Along with other 
theologians writing in the late medieval period, Luther‟s knowledge of the 5th century conciliar debates was 
limited, and, by modern standards, therefore deficient in a number of respects. For a treatment of Nestorius 
and the debates he ignited, see John Anthony McGuckin, St. Cyril of Alexandria: The Christological 
Controversy.  
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 Ngien assumes that Luther‟s dissatisfaction has to do with Nestorius‟ commitment 
to the doctrine of divine impassibility.
 40
 Nestorius errs because he imports a 
philosophically determined concept of God, and artificially restricts christological 
discourse on its basis. He wrongly assumes that „divinity‟ is incapable of suffering or 
death. Ngien‟s interpretation does not accurately represent Luther‟s criticism of 
Nestorius, however, at least as this criticism is expressed in the 1539 treatise. Luther 
nowhere chastises Nestorius because he assumes that divinity is incapable of suffering. 
He criticizes the 5
th
 century bishop, rather, because he supposes that the ascription of 
human predicates to God entails a coextensive application of the same predicates to 
Christ‟s divinity.  
 Unlike most appraisals of the Nestorian heresy, Luther does not imagine that 
Nestorius actually taught a bifurcation of subjects in his doctrine of Christ. He grants that 
Nestorius surely intended to proscribe the disintegration of Christ‟s personal unity. 
Luther‟s accusation is that Nestorius practically (better, semantically) betrays this unity 
by denying that there is a single object of ascriptive reference.
 41
 What Nestorius does not 
                                                             
40Dennis Ngien, The Suffering of God according to Martin Luther, 75. Ngien cites the 
interpretation of Reiner Jansen as corroboration of this view. 
41LW 41, 100-101. “Thus Nestorius‟ error was not that he believed Christ to be a pure man, or that 
he made two persons of him; on the contrary, he confesses two natures, the divine and the human, in one 
person—but he will not admit a communicatio idiomatum. I cannot express that in one word in German. 
Idioma means that which is inherent in a nature or is its attribute, such as dying, suffering, weeping, 
speaking, laughing, eating, drinking, sleeping, sorrowing, rejoicing, being born, having a mother, suckling 
the breast, walking, standing, working, sitting, lying down, and other things of that kind, which are called 
idiomata naturae humanae, that is, qualities that belong to man by nature, which he can and must do or 
even suffer; for idioma in Greek, proprium in Latin, is a thing—let us, for the time being, call it an 
attribute. Again, an idioma deitatis, “an attribute of divine nature,” is that it is immortal, omnipotent, 
infinite, not born, does not eat, drink, sleep, stand, walk, sorrow, weep—and what more can one say? To be 
God is an immeasurably different thing than to be man; that is why the idiomata of the two natures cannot 
coincide. That is the opinion of Nestorius.” WA 50, 587. “So ist nu Nestorij jrthum nicht der, das er 
Christum fur einen puren Menschen helt, auch nicht zwo personen draus macht, Sondern zwo natur, Gott 
und mensch, in einer person bekennet, Aber Communicationem idiomatum wil er nicht zugeben, das kan 
ich mit einem wort nicht deudsch reden, Idioma heisst, was einer natur anhangt oder jr eigenschafft ist, Als 
sterben, leiden, weinen, reden, lachen, essen, trincken, schlaffen, trauren, freuen, geborn werden, mutter 
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realize is that the hypostatic union and the communicatio idiomatum stand or fall 
together. It is logically incoherent to try to preserve one while excluding the other. 
Nestorius‟ heresy, in other words, is the inadvertent product of his logical incompetence, 
not an intentional perversion of doctrine through malice.
42
  
 The attentive reader will note a striking similarity between Luther‟s criticism of 
Nestorius, and the argument he levies against Caspar Schwenckfeld in the disputation of 
1540, surveyed in the previous chapter.
43
 In both cases, the problem is not that Christ‟s 
divinity is presumed to be incapable of ontological defect. Nestorius and Schwenckfeld 
err only when, on account of this presupposition, they deny the application of human 
predicates to the person of Christ, who is God. Luther‟s quarrel is not with what 
Nestorius‟ semantic proscription aspires to avoid (the suffering of divinity), but with 
what it inadvertently fails fully to affirm (the hypostatic union). Nestorius is caught on 
the horns of an illusory dilemma. He assumes that he must choose either 1) to protect the 
integrity of deity; or 2) to affirm the application of human predicates to God in Christ. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
haben, brueste saugen, gehen, stehen, erbeiten, sitzen, ligen, und was des mehr ist, heissen idiomata naturae 
humanae, das ist eigenschafft, die einem menschen von natur anhangen, als die er thun oder leiden kan 
auch wol mus, Denn Jdioma griechisch, proprium latine, ist ein ding, Lasts uns dieweil ein eigenschafft 
heissen. Widerumb, Jdioma Deitatis, Goettlicher natur eigenschafft ist, das sie unsterblich, allmechtig, 
unendlich, nicht geborn, nicht isset, trinckt, schlefft, stehet, gehet, trauret, weinet und was sol man viel 
sagen? Es ist gar ein unmeslich ander ding, Gott, weder ein mensch ist, darumb koennen die idiomata 
beider natur nicht ubereinkomen, Dis ist die meinung Nestorij.” 
42LW 41, 102-3. “This crude, unlearned man did not see that he was asserting the impossible when 
simultaneously he seriously took Christ to be God and man in one person and yet declined to ascribe the 
idiomata of the natures to the same person of Christ. He wants to hold to the truth of the first, but what 
follows from the first should not be true—he thereby indicates that he himself does not understand what he 
is denying.” WA 50, 589. “Denn der große ungelerte Man sahe das nicht, das er unmueglich ding furgab, 
das er zugleich Christum ernstlich fur Gott und mensch in einer Person hielt, und doch die Jdiomata der 
naturn nicht wolt derselben Person Christi zugeben, Das erst wil er fur war halten, und das sol nicht war 
sein, das doch aus dem ersten folget, damit er anzeigt, das er selbs nicht verstehet, was er verneinet.”  
43Luther explicitly lumps Nestorius and Schwenckfeld together in his 1544 commentary on Isaiah 
53. See WA 40/3, 703. There are also deep resonances with Luther‟s oft-expressed criticism of Ulrich 
Zwingli. Luther draws this connection within the 1539 treatise. WA 50, 591.  
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The choice is a false one. The dilemma only exists because Nestorius fails to distinguish 
between ascriptions that refer to the Person of Christ, and those that refer to the natures 
of Christ.
44
  
 The besetting christological problem, which afflicts both Nestorius and Caspar 
Schwenckfeld, is an inability to discern when a particular predication requires another as 
its correlate, and when not. Nestorius imagines that the application of creaturely 
predicates to God logically demands that Christ‟s divinity is ontologically conditioned. 
On the other hand, he evidently does not think it follows from the incarnation that all 
predicates must be ascribed to the single agent who is both God and man.
45
 Nestorius is 
wrong on both counts. This is why Luther credits his error not to an inadequate doctrine 
of God, but to a lack of logical sophistication. The inadvertent byproduct of the 
confusion, however, is an implicitly heretical doctrine of Christ. Nestorius is right to 
insist upon the impassibility of Christ‟s divinity, but wrong to conclude, by virtue of this 
insistence, that one may not ascribe Christ‟s human predicates to „God.‟46 His denial 
                                                             
44 This is the very distinction Luther‟s qualificatory discourse seeks to express.   
45Luther articulates this basic criticism throughout his treatment of Nestorius. Perhaps the most 
forthright example appears in the following. LW 41, 101-2. “Thus his folly is exactly that against which 
one teaches in the schools, “One who admits the premise of a good conclusion cannot deny the 
conclusion.” In German we would say, “If the one is true, the other must also be true; if the second is not 
true, then the first is not true either.” Whoever admits that Greta is your wife cannot deny that her child (if 
she is pious) is your child. If one teaches these things in the schools, no one thinks that there could be such 
crude people; but ask the regents and jurists whether they are not often confronted by such parties, who 
admit something and still do not want to grant what follows from it.” WA 50, 588 “Und ist seine narrheit 
eben die, dawider man leret in den schulen: Qui concedit antecedens bonae consequentiae, non potest 
negare consequens, Auff Deudsch reden wir also: Jst eines war, so mus das ander auch war sein, ist das 
ander nicht war, so ist das erst auch nicht war. Wer das zugibt, das Greta dein ehefrau sey, der kan nicht 
leugnen, das jr kind (wo sie from ist) dein kind sey. Wenn man solchs in der Schulen leret, so denckt 
niemand, das solche grobe Leute sein koennen, Aber frage die Regenten und Juristen drumb, ob sie nicht 
haben offt solche Part fur sich gehabt, die ein ding bekennen und doch nicht zulassen wollen, was daraus 
folget.”  
46Luther actually affirms that Nestorius is right to deny that human predicates apply to divinity as 
such. He grants as much by insisting that referring to Mary as the mother of God does not mean that 
Christ‟s divinity is truly derived from Mary‟s womb. In the same way, Nestorius‟ intent is simply to say 
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splits Christ into more than one „agent‟, since human and divine properties never coincide 
for him upon a single acting subject. This bifurcation is the ineluctable consequence of 
Nestorius‟ ill-informed christological semantics. 
 It is because Ngien misconstrues the nature of Luther‟s criticism of Nestorius that 
he is able to affirm a passibilist interpretation of the excerpt copied above from the 1539 
treatise, even when the text itself contains clear specificatory discourse that proscribes 
such a view. Once situated within this broader context, however, this interpretation is 
shown to be implausible, just as we found to be the case in a divergence interpretation of 
Luther‟s sermons on John from the late 1530‟s. Like Luther‟s criticism of Caspar 
Schwenckfeld in the disputation of 1540, the 1539 text does not reject, but actually 
affirms Nestorius‟ seminal reticence to apply human predicates directly to Christ‟s 
divinity. Ngien‟s interpretation misses this because it assumes the very semantic equation 
whose illegitimacy forms the basis of Luther‟s counter-argument; namely, that „God 
suffers‟ is basically the same as „divinity suffers.‟47    
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that Christ, in His divinity, is immortal, and in this, Luther agrees with him. WA 50, 589. The problem is 
what Nestorius denies more than he needs to in order to preserve this belief. Once again, Luther ultimately 
credits his incompetence for his inadvertent heresy. 
47Further reason to reject Ngien‟s reading is furnished by the fact that Luther elsewhere enlists this 
same image of God on the scale, and clearly reminds his reader in the immediate context that the divinity of 
Christ is not crucified. Ironically, this parallel text comes from the very series of sermons on John that 
Ngien previously argues to establish Luther‟s embrace of a two-way understanding of the communication 
of attributes. “Daruber haben die aldten veter sehr gekempfft und es widder die ketzer erhalten, das in 
Christo zweierlej naturen sind, aber nicht zwo person, sondern nur ein Sohn. Also redet die Schriefft, und 
wir sollen auch also reden. Nach der Menscheit, do ist wohl gecreutziget, und nach der Gottheit allein 
Himel und Erden geschaffen, aber dieweil diese Person Got und mensch ist, so wird recht gesaget: Gottes 
Sohn ist Schopffer himmels und der erden und wirdt auch gecreutziget. Man mus die Person nicht 
zutrennen, als, das alleine die Menscheit da bliebe, sondern sie auch Gott gewesen ist, wie den S. Hilarius 
saget: Christus passus est requiescente verbo. Und wen wir auch das nicht erhalten, das diese person sej 
Gott und mensch, so am creutz gestorben ist, so musten wir ewiglich verdampt und verlorn sein, den wir 
mussen einen Heiland haben, der mehr sej, dan ein Heilige oder Engel, den wen ehr nicht mehr, grosser 
und besser were, so wurde uns nicht geholffen. So ehr aber Gott ist, so ist der Schatz so schweer, das ehr 
nicht allein wegkwieget und auffhebt die Sunde und den todt, sondern auch gibt das ewige leben. Das 
kondte sonst kein Mensch geben noch thun, oder den Teuffel und tod uberwinden.” WA 47, 87. This 
paragraph is excerpted from a sermon on John 3, which Luther preached in 1538. 
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 Ngien‟s construal of the 1539 text relies upon semantic analyses, which previous 
chapters have already shown to be inadequate. This tangibly illustrates the profound 
extent to which the divergence interpretation of Luther‟s soteriology has its roots in a 
divergence interpretation of the reformer‟s Christology. The inter-dependency of tiers 
one and two manifests itself in a shared exegetical pattern.
48
 The source of the pattern is a 
perceived, intra-systematic requirement. A divergence interpretation of Luther‟s 
soteriology demands as its conceptual pre-requisite the existence of a reciprocal, 
ontologically-conditioning, communicative relation between the divinity and humanity of 
Christ. Unless Luther‟s doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum fulfills this structural 
condition, the divergence rendering of his doctrine of salvation forfeits its coherency.
49
  
 In order to retain the descriptive plausibility of its proposal, a divergence account 
of Luther‟s soteriology must assume something like the interpretation of Luther‟s 
Christology criticized in the previous two chapters to be valid. To the extent that this is 
so, however, the argument contained in chapters two and three kills two birds with one 
stone. If a divergence exegesis of Luther‟s Christology is illegitimate, then so is a 
divergence interpretation of his soteriology. This is because these two interpretations are, 
in the end, one and the same. All that is really required to delegitimize the second „tier‟ of 
the divergence thesis, in the final analysis, is simply to reiterate all that has already been 
established in the refutation of the first. By doing so, one effectively crumbles the 
foundation on which the divergence interpretation of Luther‟s soteriology stands.  
                                                             
48Ngien, in other words, is simply one especially clear example of how the second „tier‟ of the 
divergence thesis continues and relies upon strands of interpretation forged first in relation to Luther‟s 
Christology.  
49How could one persist in the argument that Christ does suffer according to His divinity for 
Luther, once it is conceded that Luther‟s treatment of two-nature Christology prohibits such suffering in the 
first place?   
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  The Deathless Might of Christ: Unfolding a Non-Divergence Alternative 
  The divergence thesis does not merely claim that Luther endorses divine 
passibility. It also furnishes an explanation of why this endorsement is necessary to 
Luther‟s theology, and how it comports especially with the governing commitments of 
his doctrine of redemption. It tries to convey why Luther‟s insistence upon the suffering 
of God is an essential part of his thought. A divergence explanation of these matters 
proceeds outwards from the underlying presupposition that Christ‟s divinity and 
humanity are mutually conditioned through their hypostatic union with one another. It 
seeks, on the basis of this presupposition, to demonstrate how the various components of 
Luther‟s soterio-logic fall into alignment with this fundamental reality. So far, this 
chapter has factually delegitimized the divergence view by exposing the weaknesses of 
its textual evidence. It remains necessary, however, to provide an alternative synthetic 
construal of the question the divergence interpretation seeks to answer: In what way is 
God engaged in the sufferings of Christ? The following discussion must demonstrate that 
an impassibilist account makes better „textual‟ and „systematic‟ sense of Luther‟s 
soteriological commitments.
50
  
 Luther clearly presupposes that something is uniquely true of Christ, on account 
of His being divine, that allows Him to enter into death and yet live; to fall under 
                                                             
50This is to concede that the implicit questions posed by the divergence thesis concerning Luther‟s 
doctrine of redemption are legitimate ones, even if its answers are finally insufficient. Why is it, for 
instance, that Luther is so adamant that the suffering Christ be divine? In what way does Luther perceive 
the „divinity‟ of the suffering Christ to be soteriologically necessary? While the 1539 text‟s famous 
metaphor of „God on the scale‟ may not commend the suffering of Christ‟s divinity, it certainly expresses 
an ardent insistence, on Luther‟s part, upon the radical immanence of God in Christ. What kind of 
immanence does Luther have in mind, and what is its particular soteriological function within the economy 
of redemption? The present section will attend to these systematic questions, and seek to demonstrate how 
Luther‟s christological commitment to divine impassibility forms an integral part of his soteriological 
vision as well.  
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condemnation, and yet attain vindication; to suffer, and yet not be destroyed. In a sermon 
preached on John chapter one in 1537 Luther comments: 
 “If Christ is not true and natural God, born of the Father in eternity and Creator of 
all creatures, we are doomed. For what would Christ‟s suffering and death avail me if 
Christ were merely a human being like you and me? As such He could not have 
overcome devil, death, and sin; He would have proved far too weak for them and could 
never have helped us.”51 
 
 In Christ, God is indeed radically involved. He enters into the condition of sinful 
humanity. He does not do so, however, in such a way that renders Him the helpless 
victim of powers beyond His control. This introduces a tension, which the present section 
must address. Luther portrays the incarnate Christ as vulnerable in one sense and 
invulnerable in another. What accounts for the apparent incongruity? Luther nicely 
encapsulates the tension here in view in a sermon preached in 1538: “The incarnate God, 
who was born of the Virgin Mary, suffered the old serpent‟s sting and bite, but without 
being devoured and destroyed.”52 Framed in the terminology of this text, two questions 
must be posed: 1) How is Christ „stung‟? and 2) Why is He not thereby destroyed? In 
other words, how does Luther understand Christ to be genuinely vulnerable, and yet 
really invulnerable at one and the same time?  
                                                             
51 LW 22, 21. WA 46, 554. “…denn bleibet Christus nicht warer, natuerlicher GOTT, von Vater in 
ewigkeit geboren, und Schoepffer aller Creaturn, so sind wir verloren. Denn was were mir mit der HERRN 
Christi leiden und sterben geholffen, wenn er ein Mensch nur were wie ich und du? so hette er den Teufel, 
Tod und die Suende nicht uberwinden koennen, er were jnen viel zu schwach gewesen, hette uns auch nicht 
helffen koennen.” 
52 LW 22, 469. WA 47, 180. “Sondern der Gott, der do ist mensch worden, geborn von Maria der 
Jungfrauen, der leidet den stich und biss der altten schlangen. Aber ehr wirdt drumb nicht gahr 
auffgefressen und verschlungen.” Luther‟s main point in this section is to illustrate the impotence of all 
assaults against Christ, of which the rejection of Christ‟s teaching as heresy is foremost. Luther likens this 
impotence, however, to the fact that Christ truly dies (thus appearing to be vanquished) and yet rises again 
in victory.  
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 This tension possesses a christological point of derivation. It exists essentially 
because Luther believes that two sets of radically different properties are true of the 
incarnate Christ at one and the same time. Luther accentuates this parity of attributes with 
evident relish throughout his lifetime, often as a means of highlighting the great and 
incomprehensible mystery of the incarnation. One early example appears in a reflection 
upon Psalm 69, written in 1513. In this text, Luther marvels of Christ that “He is at the 
same time cursed and blessed, at the same time alive and dead, at the same time grieving 
and rejoicing.”53 Contrastive litanies like this one are common in Luther‟s writings. 54 
They accentuate the tension already identified as resident to Luther‟s presentation of the 
„solidarity motif‟ in other texts. The sheer simultaneity of Luther‟s two-fold designation 
of Christ forecloses any potential resolution of the tension through diachronic sequence. 
The various contrastive predicates cannot be distributed into chronologically 
differentiated compartments along the parabola of Luther‟s redemptive narrative. The 
incarnate Christ is not first blessed, and then cursed; first alive, and then dead; first 
invulnerable, and then vulnerable. No, there is a synchronic concurrence of contrastive 
attributes, which continues throughout the life of Christ, and reaches the apex of its 
intensity precisely at the nadir of the parabola‟s downward swing; the radical solidarity of 
God with sinners enacted in the crucifixion of Jesus. If the divergence account were true, 
                                                             
 53 LW 10, 364-5. WA 3, 426. “Non intellexerunt etiam, quod maledictio ista non potuit totam 
personam absorbere, sed fuit absorpta, quia deus erat nulli potens maledictione subiacere, sed tantummodo 
caro eius. Et ideo simul maledictus et benedictus, simul vivus et mortuus, simul dolens et gaudens, ut 
omnia in se absorberet mala et omnia ex se conferret bona. Benedictus dominus noster Amen.” The reader 
will note, in this broader context, that Luther explains the un-conquerability of Christ in light of His 
divinity which renders His person incapable of being swallowed up and destroyed. Subsequent discussion 
will highlight the implications of this point for „aligning‟ Luther‟s soteriology and Christology.  
54A later manifestation of this sharp contrast is to be found in Luther‟s 1544 commentary on Isaiah 
53. See WA 40/3, 700-706. In this section, Luther is addressing the criticism that Christ cannot be the 
Messiah, or God, because He is described as deformed and unsightly. Luther‟s fundamental response is that 
Christ is both true man, and true God at one and the same time.  
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we would expect to find evidence for such a diachronic resolution. At the nadir of 
Christ‟s passion, on the cross, one would expect to find only grief, death, suffering, and 
condemnation—since Christ is understood, by this view to be vulnerable at that moment 
according to both natures. The fact that Christ remains alive even while dead introduces 
an element that the divergence thesis cannot easily reconcile.   
 Soteriologically, the resultant unification of contrastive properties in the person 
and work of Christ introduces what can provisionally be described as a massive strife of 
contraries.
55
 The low point of God‟s descent into the condition of sinful humanity 
emerges as the site of a great redemptive battle; an epic struggle between life and death; 
sin and righteousness; corruptibility and incorruptibility; God‟s power and the devil‟s 
sting. This is why the redemptive image of a „duel‟ or „conflict‟ so often accompanies 
expressions of Luther‟s exchange soteriology.56 It finds lapidary expression, once again, 
in the 1520 treatise “On the Freedom of a Christian”, although this text is by no means 
exceptional in its presentation of the „battle motif‟. 
 “Here we have a most pleasing vision not only of communion but of a blessed 
struggle and victory and salvation and redemption. Christ is God and man in one person. 
He has neither sinned nor died, and is not condemned, and he cannot sin, die, or be 
condemned; his righteousness, life, and salvation are unconquerable, eternal, omnipotent. 
                                                             
55It is essential to note, on this point, that conflict need not entail an abiding, unresolved „stasis‟ or 
„fissure‟, as Theobald Beer‟s interpretation assumes it does. These contraries are truly united in Christ on 
account of the hypostatic union, which Beer wrongly assumes Luther inadvertently to eschew. There is, 
moreover, a soteriological resolution of these contraries in which the sinner becomes genuinely righteous, 
the mortal becomes immortal, and so on.   
56The centrality of the so-called Kampfmotiv in Luther‟s soteriology of exchange has been well 
documented especially by Uwe Rieske-Braun in his book Duellum mirabile: Studien zum Kampfmotiv in 
Martin Luthers Theologie, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, Bd. 73 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999). Space precludes establishing here what Rieske-Braun‟s work amply 
demonstrates; namely, that the „battle motif‟ pervades Luther‟s theology from its earliest stages of 
development until the works published during the year of his death. This pervasive quality is a major 
assumption of this chapter, albeit one for whose legitimacy we must rely upon the labors of other secondary 
studies. One late manifestation of the „battle motif‟ is to be found in Luther‟s 1544 commentary on Isaiah 
53, where Christ is likened to the „strong man‟ who defeats all the enemies fighting against humanity by 
overpowering them. See WA 40/3, 733; 741-2.  
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By the wedding ring of faith he shares in the sins, death, and pains of hell which are his 
bride‟s. As a matter of fact, he makes them his own and acts as if they were his own and 
as if he himself had sinned; he suffered, died, and descended into hell that he might 
overcome them all. Now since it was such a one who did all this, and death and hell could 
not swallow him up, these were necessarily swallowed up by him in a mighty duel; for 
his righteousness is greater than the sins of all men, his life stronger than death, his 
salvation more invincible than hell.”57 
 
A more poetic depiction of epic „battle‟ appears in the fourth stanza of Luther‟s 1524 
Easter hymn, “Christ Lay in the Bonds of Death”.  
“That was a right wondrous strife 
When Death in Life‟s grip wallowed: 
Off victorious came Life, 
Death he has quite upswallowed. 
The Scripture has published that— 
How one Death the other ate. 
Thus Death is become a laughter. Alleluia!”58 
These descriptions, it must parenthetically be observed, exhibit positively no interest in 
the permanent reification of antithesis for its own sake. The „strife of contraries‟ that 
attends Christ‟s radical solidarity with sinners possesses rather a very clear, redemptive 
terminus. The life of Christ is stronger than His death, and thus overcomes it.  The 
contrast gives way, so far as the enduring distinction between God and humanity permits, 
to a redemptive resolution.
59
 The epic battle yields a supreme victor. 
                                                             
57 LW 31, 351-2. WA 7, 55. “Hic iam dulcissimum spectaculum prodit non solum communionis 
sed salutaris belli et victoriae et salutis et redemptionis. Cum enim Christus sit deus et homo eaque persona, 
quae nec peccavit nec moritur nec damnatur, sed nec peccare, mori, damnari potest, Eiusque iustitia, vita, 
salus insuperabilis, aeterna, omnipotens est, Cum, inquam, talis persona peccata, mortem, infernum sponsae 
et propter annulum fidei sibi communia, immo propria facit et in iis non aliter se habet quam si sua essent 
ipseque peccasset,  laborans, moriens et ad infernum descendens, ut omnia superaret, peccatumque, mors et 
infernus eum absorbere non possent, necessario in ipso absorpta sunt stupendo duello. Nam iustitia sua 
omnium peccatis superior, vita sua omni morte potentior, salus sua omni inferno invictior.” 
58LW 53, 257. WA 35, 444. “Es war eyn wunderlich krieg, da todt und leben rungen, Das leben 
behielt den sieg, es hat den tod verschlungen. Die schrifft hat verkundet das, wie eyn tod den andern fras, 
Eyn spott aus dem tod ist worden.” 
59That is, the humanity of Christ becomes immortal, but does not become identical with the divine 
nature. There remains a distinction between the natures of Christ, just as there remains a distinction 
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 The so-called Kampfmotiv furnishes a crucial lens through which Luther 
coordinates the drama of redemption with two nature Christology.
 60
  By attending to 
texts, which explicate this coordination, it becomes possible to distill the underlying, 
christological sub-structure of Luther‟s exchange soteriology. An examination of this 
sub-structure will specify the relation Luther envisions between the divinity of Christ and 
the abject lowliness of Jesus‟ passion. It will also further elaborate the precise character 
of Luther‟s christo-soteriological symmetry, which the first section of this chapter has 
only begun to sketch.  
 Not all of the contrastive soteriological predicates, which apply to Christ may be 
aligned neatly with one particular nature, to the complete ascriptive exclusion of its 
counterpart. Luther does not think, for instance, that Christ is „righteous‟ only on account 
of His divinity, and thus reckoned a sinner because of an intrinsic defect of the humanity 
He assumes.
61
 There is a degree of internal variety within Luther‟s christo-soteriological 
alignment, which the present investigation must exercise care not to trample with 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
between Christ and the redeemed Christian; even though they now exist in the highest possible union with 
one another. 
60This does not suggest, in any way, that „soteriological functions‟ are natures for Luther, as 
Theobald Beer claims. The point is simply that Luther believes each of Christ‟s natures to be engaged in 
the redeeming work of God in its own respective way. This is an assumption, it hardly bears mentioning, 
that he shares with a great host of patristic and medieval theologians before him. Beer‟s attempt to derive 
from this assumption the notion that natures are entirely reducible to combative functions for Luther, is one 
that the present author finds rather strange indeed. It simply does not follow that because Christ‟s natures 
have soteriological functions, that they simply are soteriological functions. For Beer‟s claim that Luther 
„functionalizes‟ nature language, see, for example, Theobald Beer, Der fröliche Wechsel und Streit, 382.  
61Luther believes that Christ is perfect in obedience to the law according to both natures. He is like 
us in our humanity in all things except for sin. Luther affirms the innocence of Christ‟s humanity, for 
instance, in his 1544 commentary on Isaiah 53. See WA 40/3, 696. How it is for Luther that Christ is 
nevertheless truly condemned as a transgressor by God, the law, the devil and human beings, is a question 
that cannot detain us here. The reason this condemnation does not „stick‟, in a manner of speaking, is the 
infinite righteousness of Christ, which is never displaced even as Christ is condemned as a sinner. This 
theme lies much closer to the center of Luther‟s soteriological emphasis than does the matter of divine 
suffering. Yet, the lesser degree of centrality does not mean that Luther fails express a clear opinion on the 
latter, nor that it is not an essential aspect of his doctrine of redemption.  
201 
 
 
 
unguarded generalizations. Its focus is restricted to the examination of christological 
predicates, which express the simultaneous vulnerability and invulnerability of Christ. 
Included within this more restrictive concentration is the tension created between Christ‟s 
genuine death and His purportedly unconquerable life; the mystery of His suffering in 
contrast with His incorruptibility. Concerning these matters, Luther postulates a rather 
clear and straightforward christo-soteriological alignment. 
The alignment to which I refer is rendered explicit, for instance, in a 1537 sermon 
of Luther‟s on Luke chapter 1, where he states: “Therefore, [Christ] dies as a human, and 
lives as God. Death is swallowed up in life, and the immortality of God devours the 
mortality of human beings.”62 Christ‟s vulnerability is identified in this text rather 
directly with His mortal humanity, and Christ‟s invulnerability with His immortal deity. 
This identification yields, as its conceptual correlate, a particular determination of the 
christo-soteriological mechanics responsible for the redemptive transition of Christ from 
death to life. The Person of Christ cannot die, nor His human flesh molder in the grave, 
because the divine nature with which this flesh is personally united is invincible.
63
 The 
                                                             
62WA 45, 436. “Moritur igitur ut homo, Et vivit ut Deus,Et mors absorbetur in vita, et immortalitas 
Dei devorat mortalitatem  hominis.” In the broader context of this text, Luther is fashioning an apologetic 
for the legitimacy of two-nature Christology. On the basis of the passage from Luke 1, Luther isolates 
aspects of Christ‟s identity that point either to His divinity or humanity. For instance, because Christ is 
declared to be the Son of David, He must be genuinely human and thus mortal as other humans are. On the 
other hand, because the messianic kingdom promised to Him is without end, Christ must also be immortal 
and therefore fully divine. Luther‟s reflection upon the death of Christ seeks to filter this broader insight 
concerning the intrinsic duality of Christ‟s existence, and apply it to the death of Christ. 
63The following excerpt from a 1533 sermon of Luther‟s furnishes a similar instance of this logic 
at work. The Devil kills Christ‟s humanity, but the Person lives on account of the divine nature. Because 
the Person of Christ lives, however, His humanity cannot really die either, and thus Christ attains victory. 
WA 37, 28-9. “Die humanitatem hellt er ihm fur, lest ihn drauff stechen, wueten &c.. ubi hoc effecit et 
occidit, occidit quidem humanitatem, sed persona vivit, quae est Got et homo zu samen, ut symbolum, 
cum igitur persona non mortalis, ergo nec humanitas. Er hieb nur der person ein wunden i. e. Er schlug auff 
die menscheit, die G|ottheit kund er nicht treffen, schrecken, gesetz &c.. et ang|riffen person, quam non 
&c.. Ibi cogitur mors nidderl⌊iegen und T|eufel unter fus, quia hat all sein gifft und zorn &c.. et tamen non 
die recht person troffen. Hactenus die r|echten getroffen. Sed quia non ius zu ihm, ideo zerreist im Christus 
ventrem, os &c.. Non solum, quod non deb|uit mori, sed quod non potuit. Es hat mors, infernus &c.. an der 
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lynchpin of this explanation is an unambiguous affirmation of the invulnerability of 
Christ‟s divinity. Without this affirmation, the logic of Luther‟s soteriological description 
cannot get off the ground.  
 Luther reinforces the same „christological alignment‟ in a wide range of colorful 
metaphors enlisted to explain how Christ is victorious over corruption, death, and the 
devil. In an Easter sermon of 1526, Luther likens the person of Christ to the burning bush 
depicted in Exodus 3. Just as fire is unable to burn or consume the branches of the bush, 
Christ‟s humanity likewise cannot be destroyed in death, but is raised up immortal. This 
is so, because Christ‟s divinity inhabits its assumed humanity in bodily form, and renders 
it impossible for death to overcome it. Under ordinary circumstances, Luther notes, fire 
ought to be stronger than a bush‟s combustible branches. In the same way, Christ the 
human being should be devoured by the sheer depth of His sufferings and death, and thus 
utterly annihilated by them. Nevertheless, on account of the deathless might of divinity 
united with Christ‟s frail humanity, the incarnate Son is “morte fortior”.64 In the midst of 
death, He yet lives. The essential invulnerability of Christ‟s divine nature is, for Luther, 
an intrinsic presupposition of resurrection.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
person verlorn, quia accusa|verunt ut pec|catorem, ut ubeltheter &c.. ut purum hominem, ist nicht war. Ideo 
quare, peccatum, mors, diabole schendlicher, accusas me? Ibi nihil possunt dicere. Ideo iam dicimus non 
solum, quod verus deus, sed unschuldig secundum humanitatem. Ideo facienda persona magna. Si hoc, tum 
etiam historia resurrectionis auch gros. Est deus et verus deus in humanitate, verus dei filius et virginis, 
Maior caelo et terra. 2. unschuldig. Non peccatum fecit. Ideo maius hoc quam omnes diaboli, peccata &c.. 
wigt tausent mal mher. Si Christianus hanc magnitudinem personae fasset, agnoscit fructus magnitudinem, 
quam gering diabolus gegen ihm. Si maior caelo et terra, peccato, morte &c.. Ideo quicquid facit, patitur 
&c.. mus seer gros sein.” 
64
 WA 20, 354-5 “Rubus est Christus, in quo habitat deus et est viridis, quia est innocens homo 
absque omni culpa. Sicut rubus crevit in deserto absque ulla hominis opera, sic ipse natus absque virili &c.. 
Deus est in rubo, ideo non potest comburi i. e. rubus i. e. humanitas Christi steckt mitten im leiden, stirbt et 
tamen non moritur, certe mirum. Sic hic Christus non solum purus homo, alias Satan eum het hin gefurt, 
aber da die deitas corporaliter in eo homine habitabat, erat ergo impossibile, ut comburatur, sed in media 
morte oportet ista persona vivat. Es sol ja das feuer sterckher quam busch, sed contrarium. Sic mors 
debebat Christum vorare, sed Christus morte fortior est &c..” Emphasis mine. 
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There is perhaps no metaphor more frequently enlisted by Luther to express this 
theme than mythological image of the „baited Leviathan‟.65 In this image, Luther likens 
death and the devil to a great and ferocious beast. Like a fish lured in by the angler‟s 
worm, the devil is deceived by the ostensible weakness of Christ‟s humanity, and thus 
tricked into devouring Him. He does not recognize, however, that Christ is also fully 
divine, and thus incapable of destruction. The divine nature of Christ is to death and the 
devil very much like a clandestine fishing hook concealed beneath its „bait‟ (in this case, 
the frail vulnerability of the humanity). Once „swallowed‟ (a metaphorical concept that 
closely approximates what we have so far referred to as the „solidarity motif‟ in Luther‟s 
exchange soteriology), Christ therefore shreds death, the devil, and Hell from the inside 
out.
66
 An emblematic occurrence of this motif appears in a sermon on John 3:16, 
delivered by Luther on the third week after Trinity Sunday in 1538. 
                                                             
65For a survey of the various patristic and medieval theologians through whose work Luther likely 
came into contact with this image, see Uwe Rieske-Braun, Duellum mirabile,115-226, and especially 171-
8. See also Theobald Beer, Der fröliche Wechsel und Streit, 328; 346-7. Beer, of course, must try to argue 
that, although Luther closely echoes many of these antecedents, he actually warps their thought in a way 
that disfigures chalcedonian Christology. The present author is not convinced that the essential features of 
Luther‟s use of this theme differ in any dramatic way from what one finds in the patristics and medievals 
that Beer and Rieske-Braun cites. Luther conducts the metaphor‟s emphasis in his own way, to be sure, but 
the governing soteriological mechanics are the same so far as the functional alignment of Christ‟s two 
natures is concerned.   
66One especially clear example of this sequence appears in an Easter sermon delivered on March 
31, 1521. WA 9, 661. Here Luther states:  “Der Todt schlecht den rachen daher und will die Person fressen, 
wie er allen menschsen fressen hatt, trifft aber ein sulch person, die do ist got und mensch. Got kan nicht 
sterben und styrbt dennoch nach der menscheyt. Darumb gibt die schrifft der gantzen person, was einem 
widerfert. Alß wen ainer an kopff verwundt wirt, Szo ist nur der leyb vorwundt, dennoch sagt man, der 
menschs sey vorwund. Drumb wie leyb und seel ein mensch ist, Szo ist Christus ein person auß einem 
menschsen und gotth. Was der menscheyt widerfert, Ist Christo widerfaren, und was Christus thut, das hat 
Gotth than. Szo ist der Todt in dem leben erseufft, wie Paulus sagt. Drumb wirt in Christo alle sundt und 
boeß gewissen erseufft, Szo dw in yn glawbst, das es dir nichs thuen kan. Das wirt anzeygt Iob 40, Do er 
sagt vom Behemoth „In oculis eius quasi hamo capiet eum‟ &c. „An extrahere poteris Leviathan hamo‟ &c. 
Eben wie der vischer den hamen sencket ins basser, das man in nicht siecht, mitt einem regenwurm, und 
kummet der visch, meinett, er woll in fressen, Schlecht mit dem rachen in hamen und wirt alßo gefangen. 
Szo auch hie mit Christo. Die angelschnur ist das geschlecht Jesu Christi von Abraham her, ist gebunden an 
die menschlich natur. Der angel ist die gotlich natur, die hat er anzcogen mit der Menschlich, die hat 
muessen leyden und ist voracht gewest wie ein regenworm. Do kam der todt und gedacht: har, ich wil in 
vorschlinden. Nymant sach, das er got waß: Szo meinett er, er woll den menschen fressen, Szo trifft er 
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“Christ died; death devoured the Son of God. But in doing so death swallowed a thorn 
and had to get rid of it. It was impossible for death to hold Him. For this Person is God; 
and since both God and man in one indivisible Person entered into the belly of death and 
the devil, death ate a morsel that ripped his stomach open. 
It was the counsel of God the Father from eternity to destroy death, ruin the kingdom 
of the devil, and give the devil a little pill which he would gleefully devour, but which 
would create a great rumpus in his belly and in the world. Now the Lord wants to say: 
“Dear Nicodemus, it is miraculous, as you see, that God should spend such a great and 
precious treasure for our rebirth. For is it a miracle that I, the Son of man and the Son of 
God in one Person, am sacrificed to death and enter the jaws of death and the devil? But I 
shall not remain there. Not only will I come forth again, but I will also rip open deaths 
[sic] belly; for the poison is too potent, and death itself must die.”67 
 
The crucial element of this soteriological explanation is once again the invulnerability of 
Christ‟s divinity. The solidarity of God in Christ, for Luther, does not mean that the 
divine nature comes to share in frailty and weakness. To align Luther‟s soteriology and 
Christology in this way is to invert its fundamental logic. It is precisely because Christ 
cannot be harmed or destroyed according to His divine nature that He can plunge into the 
abyss of human affliction, and emerge victorious.
68
  
Why, then, is Christ described by Luther as simultaneously vulnerable and 
invulnerable? It is because both ascriptions belong properly to Him as one who is both 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
gotth. Do wirt er gefangen, und Christus zceucht in her fuer und macht in zcu schanden fur aller weltt.” For 
an extensive record of the many occurrences of this metaphor within Luther‟s corpus, see Theobald Beer, 
Der fröliche Wechsel und Streit, 339-44. See also Hans-Martin Barth, Der Teufel und Jesus Christus in der 
Theologie Martin Luthers, 77, esp. n. 496. 
67
LW 22, 355. WA 47, 80. “Christus ist gestorben und hatt der Tod den Sohn Gottes verschlungen, 
aber der tod hatt an ihme einen angel geschlungen, das er ihnen hat mussen widergeben, den es wahr 
unmuglich, das ehr im tode bleiben soltte. Den die person ist gott, und do Gott und Mensch in einer person, 
unzertrennet, in des todes und Teuffels bauch gefharen ist, so hatt der todt ein bisslein an ime gessen das 
ihme den Bauch zureist. Das ist auch Gottes des vaters rath von ewigkeit gewesen, das ehr also den tod 
verschlingen und des Teuffels reich zerstoren woltte und dem Teuffel ein kleine pillen geben, die ehr mitt 
lust fressen soltt, aber darmit in seinem bauche und in der welt ein solch gerumpel anrichten. Nun will der 
herr sagen: Lieber Nicodeme, du sihest recht ein Mirackel, das Gott einen solchen grossen, theuern schatz 
an unser Widergeburtt wendet. Den ist es nicht ein wunderwerck, das ich des menschen Sohn und Gottes 
Sohn bin, in einer person, und in den todt dahin gegeben, das ich dem Teuffel und tode in rachen fhare? 
Aber ich werde nicht drinnen bleiben und nicht allein wider heraus fharen, sondern ime auch den bauch 
zerreissen, den die gifft ist zu starck, das der tod mus dran sterben.” 
68To remove this affirmation from Luther‟s vocabulary is to collapse his soteriology, at least so far 
as it touches upon the redeeming work of Christ in freeing human beings from suffering and death.  
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fully human and fully divine. Both are deemed by Luther to be soteriologically necessary 
in the following way. The frailty of humanity is essential in order for Christ truly to enter 
into solidarity with sinners in their abject condition of affliction and weakness. Like other 
human beings, Christ suffers, experiences fear, and bears the sting of corruption at its 
fullest extent. But, for all this, He is not destroyed. This is because Christ, for Luther, is 
no mere man. He remains fully divine even at the nadir of His condescension, and retains 
all the properties pertaining thereunto. This retention of unaltered divine properties is 
necessary for Luther‟s soterio-logic to function properly. If Christ‟s divine nature were 
diminished by condescension and made to be weak even as the humanity is weak, then 
Christ would be utterly devoured in the abyss.
69
 
Luther does not believe that Christ‟s divinity and its attendant properties are 
„conditioned‟ by His human weakness, but rather „clothed‟ by it. He expresses as much in 
a sermon on John 4, from 1540.  
“Therefore since we could not bear to hear God in His majesty, He humbly 
adopted flesh and blood, assuming not only our nature, that is, flesh and blood, but also 
all the frailties with which body and soul are afflicted, as, for example, fear, sadness, 
anger, and hatred. This is really burying and concealing His divine majesty! Now this is 
preached to us. We are told that He was weak, that He was like any other man in body 
and soul, that He made Himself subject to all human infirmities, that He hungered and 
thirsted, that He experienced all the wants of flesh and blood. In this weakness the true 
and eternal God shows Himself. For me He humbles Himself; and for me He is finally 
crucified, although He is at the same time very God, who redeems me from sin and 
death.”70 
                                                             
69This is the point that lies behind Luther‟s statement, which divergence interpreters often quote, 
that a Christ who suffers only as a human being would need His own savior. The point is not that the divine 
nature must also suffer, as many conclude it to be. Luther insists, rather, that a non-divine suffering Christ 
will be just as helpless in the face of death and corruptions as all other mortal flesh. He would be consumed 
and annihilated by the principalities of this world.   
70LW 22, 507. WA 47, 212. “Darumb so durffen wir Gott nicht hoeren in seiner Maiestet, do ehr 
dan untreglich ist, sondern ehr hat sich gesenckt auffs tieffste ins fleisch und bluth, das ehr nicht allein 
unser natur annimpt, das ist: leib und seel, Sondern auch alle gebrechen, die leib und seel anhangen, als 
furcht, traurigkeit, zorn, Hass &c.. Das heist ja tieff beschorren die gottliche Maiestet, und dasselbige wirdt 
uns geprediget, das ehr schwach sej und gleich sej als ein ander mensch an leib und Seel und alle gebrechen 
an sich genommen hab als ein anderer mensch, der do durstet und hungert und alles, was fleisch und bluth 
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In the incarnation, God genuinely reveals Himself to human beings. At the same time, 
however, and precisely in so doing, He also shields or „covers‟ His true majesty from 
their sight.
71
 He presents Himself to the world in the form of frail humanity.
72
 God 
perpetrates no docetic masquerade in doing so, for Christ truly is human on account of 
the hypostatic union of divinity and humanity in Christ.
73
 Nevertheless, despite this frail 
appearance and the underlying doctrinal reality it expresses, Christ‟s divinity is not weak, 
nor can it ever become so. He remains „unconquerable life‟ even in the midst of death, 
just as He remains „infinite righteousness‟ even in the likeness of sinful flesh. If the 
divergence reception of Luther‟s Christology were correct to conclude that the suffering 
and death of Christ is truly constitutive of the divine life, then why would this dialectic of 
revealing and covering be necessary? If God simply is what we see in the passion, death, 
and resurrection of Jesus, then Luther‟s characterization of these events as a „covering‟, 
and, in some cases as the revelation of God „under the form of His opposite‟ makes no 
sense.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
anhenget. Jn dieser schwacheit lest sich der ewige, warhafftige Gott finden und fur mich demuttiget ehr 
sich also bis ans creutz und ist gleichwohl warhafftiger Gott, der mich von sunden und todt erloset.” In a 
1534 sermon, Luther also comments how the earthly appearance of Christ could often be an obstacle for 
faith to those who saw Him. Who could believe that such a weak person could be God Himself, the king of 
kings? See WA 37, 655.  
71Luther reflects upon the hiddenness of God in Christ‟s abject weakness in his 1544 commentary 
on Isaiah 53. It is because of this „covering‟ that many in Jesus‟ lifetime found it impossible to 
acknowledge His true identity. See WA 40/3, 711. This exposes another weakness of the divergence 
interpretation. If Christ reveals to human beings that God really suffers (I.E. displaces classical notions of 
God as immutable and impassible), then why is the self-revelation of God in Christ characterized by Luther 
as a veiling? If God suffers, why is the suffering of Christ described as a covering of God‟s true majesty; in 
some cases, as a the revelation of God‟s very opposite? 
72The interplay between appearance and reality is accentuated in Luther‟s metaphorical description 
of death and Satan being „tricked‟ by Christ‟s ostensible weakness.  
73Christ, moreover, really dies in His humanity according to Luther. See his comments from 1544 
in WA 40/3, 743.  
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That Christ is vulnerable in humanity and invulnerable in divinity is an abiding 
presupposition of Luther‟s soteriological mechanics. He invites this conclusion in the 
1540 sermon‟s next statement: 
“Thus the evangelist has a twofold message regarding Christ: first of all, he 
proclaims His glory and informs us that He comes to us in splendor and divine majesty 
that we might know that He is truly God; then he tells us that He also comes to us clad in 
weakness and in the greatest humility. When He died, he tore hell to shreds and removed 
sin, which is a divine work and reflects sheer deity. Then He also demonstrates that He is 
true man, when He decides to leave Judea and takes flight before those great prelates, the 
Pharisees, whom He, of course, could have felled with a breath.”74 
 
The divinity of Christ is therefore not altered or conditioned by the frailty of its assumed 
humanity. This much is clear from the passages surveyed throughout this section. At the 
same time, the humanity of Christ is altered and conditioned by its union with 
incorruptible divinity.  The deathless might of God inhabits the humanity of Christ, and 
enlivens His mortal flesh as fire radiates through glowing iron.
75
 This is why it is not only 
                                                             
74LW 22, 507. WA 47, 212-2. “Also prediget der Euangelist zweierlej von Christo, Erstlich, das 
ehr hehrlich sej und in pracht und Gottlicher maiestet zu uns komme. Darnach, das ehr auch in schwacheit 
und hochster demuth kompt, auff das wir wissen, ehr sej warhafftiger Gott. Dan ehr ist gestorben und hat 
die helle zurissen, die sunde wegkgenommen, das ist eittel gottheit und eittel gottliche werck. Darnach 
beweist ehr, das ehr warhafftiger mensch sej, dan ehr fleucht und wil nicht in Judea bleiben fur den 
hehrlichen Prelaten, den Phariseern, die ehr doch kondte mit einem odem umblasen.” The reader will note, 
in passing, how many of the citations provided in this section are derived from Luther‟s sermons on John 
from the late 1530‟s and early 1540‟s. This pattern is by design of the author, because it provides further 
corroboration of the point argued against Ngien in a previous chapter that these texts represent no exception 
to the rule in Luther‟s other writings that Christ does not suffer according to His divinity.  
75Luther reflects upon the divinization of Christ‟s flesh in relation to the eucharist in a sermon on 
John 6 from the early 1530‟s.WA 33, 190-91. “Darumb spricht Christus: „das brott, das ich gebe, ist mein 
fleisch‟. Was meinstu vor fleisch? nicht kalbfleisch oder riendtfleisch, so in stellen ist, das ist auch wohl 
sein fleisch, aber ehr saget: „das ich geben werde fur das leben der welt‟, Es ist ein lebendig fleisch undt 
todt fleisch, so gestorben ist, das dardurch die gantze welt lebe. Do gehöret kein Iohannes Baptista noch 
Maria zu oder einiger Engel, Sondern diese einige person Christus, doran wil uns gott haben gefasset undt 
gebunden. Ausser der person, so von Maria geboren ist, undt hat warhafftig fleisch undt blutt undt ist 
gecreutziget worden, sol man gott nicht suchen noch finden, den gott sol man allein durch den glauben 
ergreiffen undt kriegenn im fleisch undt blutt, undt das das fleisch undt blutt nicht fleischert noch bluttert 
undt doch fleisch undt blutt sei, Sondern beides vergöttert sei, wie ich den vom Zuckerwasser gesagt habe. 
Jtem Eisen, wen es ohne feur ist, so ists auch Eisen, wen es aber gluendt gemacht wirdt undt feuer oder 
hitze drein kompt, so kan ich den sagen: dis eisen das eisert itzt nicht mehr, sondern es fewert gahr, Es ist 
wohl Eisen, aber es ist so gahr durchfeuert, das, wen du es sihest oder angreiffest, das dein auge nicht sagen 
kan: Es ist Eisen, Sondern du fhulest eitel feur, so gahr ist eitel feur fur augen. Wen du nun wilt ein loch 
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the Person of Christ that survives death. The humanity is restored and invigorated as 
well. Because Christ‟s humanity is united with God through an inseparable, though 
irreducibly distinct union, it too cannot finally be destroyed, but rises up in radiant 
immortality.
76
 The glorification of Christ‟s flesh is thus a reality perceived in its fullness 
only in the resurrection, where the form of human weakness gives way to deathless 
vitality.
77
 In all this, we see clearly that the logic of Luther‟s soteriology rests upon a 
christological sub-structure, which admits only a mono-directional doctrine of exchange 
between Christ‟s natures. The humanity is conditioned on account of its union with 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
darmit durch ein fas bohren oder ein zeichen auff etwas brennen oder machen, do thuts das Eisen nicht, 
Sondern das feur thuts, dan wen ich ein ander eisen neme, das nicht gluendt were, so wurde ich noch lange 
nicht ein Zeichen brennen, Sondern Jch mus das Eisen nemen, dorinnen das feur ist, undt widerumb wil das 
feur seine arbeit nirgendts thun dan in dem Eisen. Also ist hie gott in Christo auch leibhafftig undt thut, wie 
ein gott thun sol, oder thut, wie das feur im eisen thut, man sihet wohl nur fleisch undt blutt, aber der 
glaube sihet einen solchen menschen, ein solch fleisch undt blutt, das do sei wie ein feurig eisen, den es ist 
durchgöttertt.” Despite the abject humility of its appearance, Christ‟s humanity genuinely mediates the 
fullness of divinity, and comes through union with it also to share in its majesty. The effect is likened 
metaphorically by Luther to golden coins enclosed within a purse. WA 47, 636. This christological pattern 
is the basis for Luther‟s reflection upon other, secondary media of God‟s presence such as Holy Scripture 
and the sacraments. The believer is tempted, by virtue of the lowly earthliness of God‟s chosen vessels, to 
doubt their legitimacy. For one example of this conceptual extension, see Luther‟s continuing discussion in 
the 1540 sermon on John 4 in WA 47, 212f.  
76According to Luther, only passing glimpses of this transformative union peek through the Gospel 
narratives of Jesus‟ life, as in the evident power operative in His miraculous works, or in the apocalyptic 
splendor of the transfiguration. See, for instance, the description in Hans-Martin Barth, Der Teufel und 
Jesus Christus in der Theologie Martin Luthers 46; and Sammeli Juntunen, “The Christological 
Background of Luther‟s Understanding of Justification”, 29.   
77For an example of this contrast, see Uwe Rieske-Braun, Duellum mirabile, 205. This does not 
mean for Luther that Christ ceases to be human. His is, however, a „divinized‟ humanity, different in some 
important respects from the corruptible flesh of other human beings wholly conquered by the grave. See, 
for instance, the following comments from a 1527 controverial text on the sacrament. WA 23, 243. “Es 
mangelt den schwermern alles daran, das sie Christus leib „nicht unterscheiden‟ (wie S. Paulus sagt .1. Cor. 
xi.) von anderm fleisch und reden nicht anders davon denn als were es ein vergenglich verdewlich 
verzerlich fleisch, das man ynn denn scherren keufft und ynn der kuchen kocht. So grobe hempel sind sie, 
das sie nicht sehen, wie dis fleisch ist ein unvergenglich unsterblich unverweselich fleisch, wie der .xv. 
Psalm singet von yhm: „Du wirst deinen heiligen nicht lassen verwesen, Und mein fleisch wird rugen ynn 
hoffnunge‟. Der tod hat sich wol ein mal dran versucht und wolts verzeren und verdawen, Aber er kund 
nicht, sondern es zureis yhm den bauch und hals mehr denn ynn hundert tausent stuck, das dem tod die 
zeene zu stoben und zu flogen sind, und bleib lebendig. Denn die speise war dem tod zu starck und hat den 
fresser verzeret und verdawet. Es ist Gott ynn diesem fleisch, Ein Gotts fleisch, Ein geistfleisch ists, Es ist 
ynn Gott und Gott.” 
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deathless, invulnerable divinity, but the latter suffers none of the defects that apply to 
Christ on account of His human nature. 
Why is it then, on the basis of all these considerations, that Luther is so adamant 
that the suffering Christ be fully God? Why must God plunge to the low-point of the 
scale, and how is the „divinity‟ of the suffering Christ soteriologically necessary? The 
answer to all these questions hinges upon Luther‟s abiding insistence upon the 
invulnerability of Christ‟s divine nature. The suffering Christ must be fully God, because 
only a person invulnerable in divinity can withstand the awful power of death and hell, 
and tear it to shreds. It is on account of this deathless might that Luther confesses Christ 
to be dominus mortis, the „Lord over death‟.78 All that afflicts weary sinners in body and 
soul genuinely collapses upon Him in the weakness of His humanity. These powers, 
however, cannot finally destroy Him. They expend themselves against Him, and break 
apart upon His deathless might.
79
 Thus, Christ taunts the devil, saying: “Oh Devil, all evil 
has fallen upon me, and yet I live!”80 The „passibilist symmetry‟ advanced by the 
divergence interpretation fails in its apprehension of Luther‟s insistence upon the 
suffering of God, because it overlooks the critical function of divine invulnerability 
                                                             
78Luther refers to Christ as the Lord over life and death in a sermon preached in 1525. See WA 
17/1, 79. He also refers to Him as the Lord over death and Satan in a sermon of 1529. WA 29, 290b.   
79A crucial instance of this motif appears in Luther 1544 commentary on Isaiah 53. WA 40/3, 721. 
“Deus posuerat illum, ut ferret impetum Satanae, mortis, legis, totius mundi et omnium hominum peccata; 
peccatum occidit eum, sed eum, qui occidi non potuit; occisus secundum nativitatem carnis, et tamen 
dicitur vere occisus filius Dei. Non potuit occidi propter illum aculeum in Euangelio, quod ipse Deus vivus, 
ut dicit: „Ego vivo, et vos vivetis‟; Ego quidem morior pro vobis, sed tamen moriendo vivam, quia Deus 
sum et homo. Mors potest me mordere et occidere, sed retinere non poterit in morte.” For another text that 
refers to all evil being expended upon Christ, see ibid.., 731. Luther expresses Christ‟s destruction of death 
in a more visceral way by dubbing Him „Todfresser‟ in a sermon of 1537. WA 45, 43b.  
80WA 15, 518. This statement is taken from a sermon on the resurrection delivered in 1524.  
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within the soterio-logic that accompanies this insistence. In a previous section, the 
resultant construal has been represented in the following way: 
Guiding Principle: The radical solidarity of God as sympathetic suffering.  
Requisite Conceptual Sub-Structure: A Christology of divine vulnerability.  
Soteriological Mechanics: The dialectical historicity of God. 
 
In the light of the argument developed throughout the remainder of the chapter, however, 
the following structural summary is clearly preferable. 
Guiding Principle: The radical solidarity of God as site of eschatological battle 
Requisite Conceptual Sub-Structure: A Christology of divine invulnerability 
Soteriological Mechanics: The deathless might of God victorious over the powers of 
corruption 
 
Conclusion  
 In the course of this chapter, no attempt has been made to furnish a 
comprehensive treatment of Luther‟s theology of salvation. Neither has it been suggested 
or implied that the relation of impassible divinity to the suffering solidarity of Christ 
constitutes a central focal point of Luther‟s soteriological vision. It has sought merely to 
evaluate the „passibilist symmetry‟ postulated by proponents of the divergence thesis, and 
assess its widespread claim to legitimacy. In order thoroughly to refute the accuracy of 
the „passibilist symmetry‟, the present chapter has proceeded in three stages. The first 
examined aspects of Luther‟s larger theological framework that together serve to situate 
the narrower question of divine suffering within the landscape of his soteriology. The 
second section demonstrated that the textual evidence adduced in defense of a passibilist 
interpretation of Luther‟s soteriology is deeply problematic. A careful examination of the 
pertinent texts shows that Luther unambiguously affirms the doctrine of divine 
impassibility. The third major section cemented this criticism by furnishing a synthetic 
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re-presentation of Luther‟s reflection upon the immanence of God in the sufferings of 
Christ. This alternative highlighted the extent to which a divergence understanding of 
these matters inverts the conceptual mechanics of Luther‟s soteriology. A Christ 
vulnerable according to His divinity would be, for Luther, a Christ who simply could not 
redeem. Only if Christ‟s divinity remains wholly incorruptible in the jaws of death can 
Christ plunge into humanity‟s low estate, and rise up victorious from it.   
This chapter concludes the historical portion of this study. As such, it is 
worthwhile briefly to take inventory of what has so far been argued. The first chapter of 
this study suggested that a divergence reception of Luther‟s Christology relies for its 
historically-traced legitimacy upon three, sequentially organized assumptions: 
1. That Luther re-calibrates the traditional theology of the hypostatic union in 
order to accommodate an insistence upon suffering divinity.  
2. That Luther espouses a soteriological vision that both requires and openly 
affirms the sympathetic sufferings of Christ‟s divine nature. 
3. That these two basic doctrinal modifications effect as their consequence an 
implication-laden adjustment to the doctrine of God, which consists primarily 
in the intrinsic historicization of divine being.  
 
Chapters two and three demonstrated that stages one and two of this logical progression 
are historically unjustified. Because of this demonstration, it naturally follows that the 
divergence reception of Luther‟s theology reflected in the third stage of this summary 
rests upon a highly tenuous understanding of Luther‟s theology. Theologians and 
historians may continue, of course, to insist upon theological or philosophical grounds 
that Luther ought to have pursued these various conceptual adjustments. They may even 
make the case that adjustments of this sort would have comported well with many of 
Luther‟s most basic theological insights; at least as these insights are perceived from the 
212 
 
 
 
retrospective vantage point of contemporary concerns.
81
 So far as any real fissure 
between Luther and the doctrine of divine impassibility is concerned however, all such 
arguments must confine themselves to the domain of subjunctive, volative, or optative 
description, and take care no longer to eclipse the fact that historical evidence for such a 
fissure simply does not exist.
82
  
                                                             
81Of course, such an argument would need to admit that Luther perceived the logic of his 
soteriology to point in exactly the opposite direction. For him, the ontological invulnerability of Christ‟s 
divinity possesses axiomatic importance. A removal of this commitment may build upon elements of 
Luther‟s emphasis, but directs the theological raw material to an alien purpose.   
82That is, one may explore whether Luther‟s Christology and soteriology could, would, might or 
ought have rejected the doctrine of divine impassibility, but must admit, in doing so, that Luther did no 
such thing.  
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DEATHLESS MIGHT IN THE FORM OF MORTAL WEAKNESS: TOWARDS A 
RENOVATED APPROPRIATION OF LUTHER‟S CHRISTOLOGY 
 
 
In light of all that has been argued to this point in this study, the present chapter 
turns to a question of constructive theological import: how is Luther‟s Christology 
significant for modern reflection upon the immanence of God in Christ? Taken as a 
whole, the divergence thesis represents an attempt to provide a substantive response to 
this question. Despite its widespread appeal, this proposal fails because it builds a 
constructive edifice upon a fractured historical foundation. The passibilist symmetry, 
which stands at the base of a divergence reception, represents a mistaken specification of 
Luther‟s christological views. In its association of Luther with modern reconfigurations 
of the doctrine of God, the divergence thesis does not extend, but contradicts the 
reformer‟s Christology. This counter-verdict consolidates, in nuce, what the preceding 
chapters of this study have sought, from a variety of critical angles, to demonstrate. The 
salient consequence of this argument, as it pertains to the question addressed in this 
chapter, is that constructive appraisals of Luther‟s ongoing significance ought no longer 
to proceed under the assumption that the reformer‟s Christology advances a recalibration 
of the communicatio idiomatum for the sake of a soteriologically-ordered, participatory 
suffering of Christ‟s divine nature. Trajectories that begin the complicated process of 
appropriating Luther‟s Christology with this assumption set out upon a wayward 
heading.
1
 
 This critical verdict, however, does not represent progress in the attempt to 
reconsider the nature of Luther‟s ongoing significance. It does not yet provide any 
                                                             
1This point is binding only to the extent that such trajectories purport to extend historically 
legitimate aspects of Luther‟s theology.  
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indication of how contemporary appropriations of Luther‟s Christology ought to proceed 
in the wake of the divergence thesis‟ refutation. In its attempt to address these subsidiary 
concerns, this chapter presupposes that the problem with the divergence thesis is not the 
mere fact that it tries to retrieve Luther‟s insights for modern consideration. If Luther had 
executed a passibilist reconfiguration of two-nature Christology, then the divergence 
reception would represent a fairly non-controversial appraisal of the reformer‟s 
significance in the history of dogma. The presupposed reconfiguration, however, is not 
valid. What are the implications of this verdict for the reception of Luther‟s theology? 
More to the point: how ought Luther‟s contemporary significance be re-calibrated in 
accordance with a non-divergence interpretation of his Christology?  
The multi-faceted argument advanced in previous chapters has hollowed out the 
necessary space in which to address these constructive questions, although the present 
chapter can hope only to scratch the surface of the necessary receptive adjustment. The 
basis of its preliminary response to constructive question resides in the multiply 
significant observation, developed in earlier chapters, that Luther‟s Christology treats the 
radical immanence of God in Christ and the doctrine of divine impassibility not as 
mutually cancelling, but mutually reinforcing theological commitments. The non-
competitive „symmetry‟ that emerges between these commitments in Luther‟s theology 
blatantly disrupts the historical letter of the divergence reception. It also challenges the 
constructive theological „spirit‟, which has encouraged its proliferation. It represents the 
contravention of a widely presumed doctrinal antinomy between these commitments, and 
therein lies both its destructive and constructive dogmatic potential.
2
  
                                                             
2Luther‟s Christology is deconstructive in the sense that it tears down prevalent presuppositions 
about how God‟s immanence ought to be conceptualized. It is constructive in the sense that Luther also 
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The present chapter, then, deals no longer entirely within the circumscribed 
confines of historical inquiry as such. In its attempt to re-map the contours of Luther‟s 
contemporary significance within the light of a non-divergence presentation of his 
Christology, the forthcoming investigation is obliged to engage intellectual currents, 
questions and concerns, many of which are inescapably foreign to Luther‟s 16th century 
frame of reference. This does not mean, however, that the gleaned insights of historical 
exegesis are left behind, or somehow bracketed in the interest of securing contemporary 
relevance. The goal of this chapter is to reflect, in a historically responsible manner, upon 
legitimate ways in which Luther‟s christological ideas may „transition forward‟ and 
engage constructively with major currents of modern theological reflection.
3
  
Setting the Stage for Constructive Engagement: The Relation between Impassibility and 
Immanence within Recent Theology 
 
 It is characteristic of a great deal of recent theology frankly to suppose that the 
doctrine of divine impassibility simply cannot be reconciled with a robust 
acknowledgment of God‟s immanence in Christ. These commitments are presumed to 
signify conceptual affirmations, which stand unavoidably at odds with one another. A 
major reason for the widespread perception of this antinomy is the conceptual 
specification of „impassibility‟, which its alleged incompatibility with God‟s immanence 
presupposes. Impassibility, this antinomy suggests, is essentially a conceptual byproduct 
of divine transcendence poorly understood. It denotes an aloof deity, differentiated from 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
cares deeply about expressing the immanence of God, and thus shares the goal of contemporary theology, 
even if he adopts an alternative means of securing it.   
3The potential difficulties associated with this receptive enterprise are sufficient to warrant a 
discussion of a few neuralgic, methodological considerations. Readers concerned about the task of 
theological reception may consult this discussion as it appears in the „appendix‟ of this study.  
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finite reality by the insertion of quantitative, ontological distance.
4
 To be „impassible‟, 
according to this construal, is to be „remote and detached‟; to be essentially removed 
from any substantive involvement in events that include change or defect.
5
 This rendering 
of God‟s otherness falters, because it creates insurmountable obstacles for affirming 
biblical portrayals of God as intimately involved in the events of human history. In other 
words, it forecloses a robust affirmation of divine immanence. Immanence, after all, 
denotes the very opposite of unsullied abstraction. It suggests a radical and meaningful 
proximity; a relation of intimate presence, or closeness. An agent who is „immanent‟, in 
short, is one who draws near and enters into the circumstances of another.  
 Thus specified, divine impassibility and divine immanence appear for many 
contemporary theologians to represent two extremes of a univocally polarized spectrum. 
By specifying the „otherness‟ of God in terms of ontological remoteness divine 
impassibility appears to describe divine transcendence quantitatively, and thus 
                                                             
4That is, God is distinguished from the sphere of finite existents, by the insistence that He is 
entirely removed from any involvement in its malleabilities.   
5Books within contemporary theology, which take issue with the doctrine of divine impassibility 
are legion. One example of its equation with „remoteness‟ is to be found in Heribert Mühlen, Die 
Ver n erlichkeit Gottes als Horizont einer zuk nftigen Christologie (Münster: Aschendorff, 1969), 8-9. A 
helpful overview of reasons for the widespread contemporary rejection of this doctrine is available in Paul 
S. Fiddes The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 16-45. A sampling of the myriad 
recent publications that address the debate over divine suffering include Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God 
Suffer? (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame, 2000); D. Stephen Long, Speaking of God: Theology, 
Language, and Truth (Grand Rapids, Mich: Wililam B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 2009); David Bentley Hart, The 
Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans, 2003); 
David Bentley Hart, "No shadow of turning: on divine impassibility." Pro Ecclesia 11, no. 2 (March 1, 
2002): 184-206; James Keating and Thomas Joseph White, Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human 
Suffering (Grand Rapids, Mich: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 2009); Daniel Castelo, The Apathetic God: 
Exploring the Contemporary Relevance of Divine Impassibility (Milton Keynes, U.K.: Paternoster, 2009); 
Richard E. Creel, Divine Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986); Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, and 
Authorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the 
Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought, The Oxford Early Christian studies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); and Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997). A fuller bibliographical overview of its scope and origins may be found in the citations contained 
within these materials. 
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intrinsically to proscribe any affirmation of God‟s immanence whatsoever.6 The attempt 
to maintain both simultaneously terminates in descriptive incoherence. A conceptual 
integration of these commitments would require one absurdly to suggest that God is 
involved, yet uninvolved; intimately close, yet infinitely remote—a being Who is 
immanent, and yet not immanent at one and the same time. To define God as immanent 
and impassible is to embrace contradiction in principle. Those who do so tear open a 
fissure of meaning, which runs through the heart of pre-modern conceptualizations of 
deity. A lot of contemporary theologians presume the mutual exclusivity of immanence 
and impassibility on the basis of this description. They insist, in effect, that impassibility 
must give way to Immanuel; the God who truly is with us (immanence).
7
      
 For most, impassibility is but one manifestation of a much deeper conceptual 
polarity that stretches across traditional reflection on the doctrine of God.
8
 The putative 
source of this polarity is presumed widely to be an early philosophical corruption in the 
history of mainstream dogmatic development, in which pagan conceptualities were 
                                                             
6By „quantitative‟, I refer to a mode of negotiating the God-world relation, which locates God 
upon the same plane of being or existence as finite existents. Within such a framework, the only way to 
express God‟s transcendence is to abstract His being from all proximate contact with creation. Accordingly, 
impassibility manifests an underlying zero-sum ontological game in which God and the world exist under 
the same metaphysical umbrella and must therefore, in a sense, compete for space. The distinction is 
quantitative, because God‟s being is charted on the same „plane‟ as it were, simply ontologically enlarged 
in order to highlight his otherness. For many theologians, as the following discussion will demonstrate, this 
mode of locating divine otherness (or transcendence) gets at the heart of the problem. This particular 
vocabulary is taken from Reinhard Hauber, “Christologie und metaphysicher Gottesbegriff bei Werner 
Elert” Kerygma und Dogma 35 (1989): 136, although the same theme shows up in the work of theologians 
other than Elert, whom Hauber is describing.  
7Jürgen Moltmann suggests, for instance, that a God who is deemed impassible would need to be 
“evacuated” away from any involvement with the man Jesus, who hangs upon the cross. Jürgen Moltmann, 
The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1974), 214. 
8They are indicative, for Werner Elert, of an underlying bad metaphysics. See Volker Keding, 
“Wider das Apathieaxiom: Die theopaschitische Christologie des späten Elert und ihre 
Wirkungsgeschichte” in Mit  em Menschen verhan eln   er  en Sachgehalt  es Evangeliums   ie 
 e eutung  er Theologie Werner Elerts f r  ie Gegenwart, eds. Rudolf Keller and Michael Roth 
(Erlangen: Martin-Luther-Verlag, 2004), 97.  
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allowed to stand alongside authentically Christian insights. The problem enters when 
such conceptualities are permitted subsequently to fulfill a criteriological function in the 
codification of church dogma.
9
 The resultant admixture of commitments can never 
progress beyond mere juxtaposition. This is because, as the doctrines of divine 
immanence and divine impassibility illustrate, they signify mutually exclusive 
conceptualizations of God‟s being. Their dogmatic integration has generated a series of 
theologically descriptive incompatibilities. The result of the philosophical corruption, 
again, is an unresolved fissure of doctrinal meaning, which tears the doctrine of God into 
two, conceptually divergent ascriptive compartments.
10
           
The critical perspective summarized in the previous paragraph does not 
necessarily require a uniform repudiation of pre-modern developments of dogma. To be 
sure, patristic and medieval theologians labor extensively and expertly to achieve a 
coherent synthesis among the intrinsically disparate trajectories of its multiform 
conceptual patrimony. Some contemporary theologians are eager to identify a measure of 
progress within this struggle for dogmatic integrity. Wolfhart Pannenberg insists, for 
instance, that early Christian thinkers subtly modify pagan philosophical commitments as 
these commitments are enlisted in the service of theological inquiry. The resultant 
„christianization of Hellenism‟, which this relatively circumspect appraisal of dogmatic 
                                                             
9The polarity, in other words, is built into the classic statements of Christian orthodoxy, even if 
most contemporary theologians who accept a version of this view go on to insist that the problematic 
elements may be shorn away without forfeiting orthodoxy‟s doctrinal essence.  
10So, Pannenberg comments: “Die Gedanken von Gott als Weltprinzip und als freim Herrn der 
Geschichte bleiben within unausgeglichen nebeneinander stehen. Die unterschiedliche Herkunft der 
Elemente des altkirchlichen Gottesbegriffs blieb daher aufdringlich sichtbar. Die großen, umfassenden 
Konzeptionen verknüpften die heterogenen Elemente doch nur oberflächlich.” Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Die 
Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie" 
Zeitschrift Für Kirchengeschichte 70, no. 1-2 (January 1, 1959): 43.  
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development expresses, markedly attenuates the severity of the underlying polarity.
11
 
Despite this concession, however, Pannenberg persists in the fundamentally critical 
verdict. The assimilating progress of early Christian development expires well short of an 
ultimately satisfying doctrinal integrity. The prolonged attempt doctrinally to integrate 
the necessary, metaphysical Weltprinzip of Hellenistic thought, with the free triune God 
revealed through Christ thus proves finally to be unsuccessful.
12
 The polarity lingers 
because the disparate conceptual commitments of theology‟s past fundamentally resist 
harmonization.
13
  
For those who share this diagnostic analysis of the early church, classical 
formulations of two-nature Christology do not heal, but rather ossify the underlying 
polarity into a formalized system of bifurcating analysis. The bad fissure coalesces, as it 
were, into an authorized grammar. This grammar legitimates the juxtaposition of 
statements, which appear otherwise obviously contradictory, beneath the misleading 
appearance of some higher, metaphysical unity. The traditional doctrine of the 
                                                             
11Pannenberg affirms the task of theology‟s engagement with pagan thought forms, and is 
therefore less harsh in his evaluation of the apologists, for instance, than either von Harnack or Loofs. 
Nevertheless, he still believes there is legitimacy to the charge of „hellenization‟ even once the severity of 
the charge is somewhat softened. See, for instance, Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Die Aufnahme des 
philosophischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie", 15-6. 
12So, although Pannenberg acknowledges the importance of early Christianity‟s sustained 
interaction with pagan thought (thus softening the verdict advanced by Loofs and von Harnack), he 
ultimately concludes: “Diese Aufgabe kritischer Umschmelzung des philosophischen Gottesgedankens ist 
in der frühchristlichen Theologie nicht von Grund auf gestellt und nicht allseitig durchführt worden.” 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der 
frühchristlichen Theologie", 45. 
13 That is: It is logically impossible for theology and Greek philosophy to share the same 
criteriological air space without one implicitly displacing the other. See Reinhard Hauber, “Christologie 
und metaphysicher Gottesbegriff bei Werner Elert”, 141; and 143. Hauber also suggests on page 145 that a 
retention of divine immutability (part of this philosophical inheritance) requires theology to create two 
„sectors‟ of God‟s existence. See also Heribert Mühlen, Die Ver n erlichkeit Gottes, 19-20. Eberhard 
Jüngel speaks in terms of an „aporia‟. See God As the Mystery of the World: On the Foundation of the 
Theology of the Crucified One in the Dispute between Theism and Atheism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1983), 39-42, 203.   
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communicatio idiomatum is the locus where the smuggled polarity materializes most 
blatantly. It not only permits, but actually encourages the application of mutually 
exclusive predicates to the Son of God by way of logical-semantic distinctions. One is 
licensed to assert, for instance, that the Son of God suffers and yet does not suffer; that 
He changes, and yet remains the same; that He is all-powerful, and yet frail; that He is 
radically immanent with human beings, and yet never ceases to be the simple, immutable, 
impassible, and radically transcendent God. By justifying such bifurcations 
christologically, this discourse appears to reconcile the underlying incoherence. In 
reality, however, the communicatio idiomatum only explicates and widens the preexisting 
fissure.
14
 Christology in the tradition of Chalcedon is not a solution, but an exacerbation 
of the problem. Its conceptually bifurcating grammar is an enabler. It allows subsequent 
reflection to retain and promulgate the immiscible conceptual polarity. The culprit, in all 
                                                             
14Heribert Mühlen therefore denigrates two-nature theology as a docetic façade. See Die 
Ver n erlichkeit Gottes, 16-7. Moltmann is similarly critical in The Crucified God, 227-35. He states: “But 
theological reflection was not in a position to identify God himself with the suffering and death of Jesus. As 
a result of this, traditional Christology came very near to docetism, according to which Jesus only appeared 
to suffer and only appeared to die abandoned by God: this did not happen in reality. The intellectual bar to 
this came from the philosophical concept of God, according to which God‟s being is incorruptible, 
unchangeable, indivisible, incapable of suffering and immortal; human nature, on the other hand, is 
transitory, changeable, divisible, capable of suffering and mortal. The doctrine of the two natures in Christ 
began from this fundamental distinction, in order to be able to conceive of the personal union of the two 
natures in Christ in the light of this difference.” This excerpt appears on pages 227-28. See also, Volker 
Keding, “Wider das Apathieaxiom”, 92. Keding demonstrates how Elert believed the fundamental problem 
with classical Christology is that it ironically did not allow the incarnation to determine what is true about 
God, but allowed a predetermined doctrine of God to stipulate what is true of Christ. This is why Elert 
refers to Chalcedon as a „fall‟ of sorts, as Keding describes on page 94. Reinhard Hauber reinforces this 
verdict, when he surmises (in a manner reminiscent of Schwarz) that classical Christology presumes, a 
priori, that God and humanity cannot be united. Thus, he insists, the problems of classical Christology only 
emerge if one operates with a non-christologically determined doctrine of God. Chalcedon tries, of course, 
to resolve this tension, but ends up with two subjects. See Reinhard Hauber, “Christologie und 
metaphysicher Gottesbegriff bei Werner Elert”, 135; 155-7. For similar conclusions, see Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, “Christologie und Theologie." Kerygma Und Dogma 21, no. 3 (July 1, 1975): 164; "Die 
Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie", 
31; and Eberhard Jüngel, "Vom Tod des lebendigen Gottes : ein Plakat." Zeitschrift Für Theologie Und 
Kirche 65, no. 1 (January 1, 1968): 100    
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this, is an exaggerated, and wrongly specified polarity between divine transcendence and 
divine immanence of which the doctrine of impassibility is but one, especially blatant 
manifestation. The classically developed doctrine of God originates and terminates in 
incoherence. 
Healing the Polarity with Wittenberg Balm? 
 
 
 According to the divergence reception, Luther‟s theological contribution to 
contemporary theology is that he heals the fatal polarity christologically by eliminating 
impassibility as a legitimate designation of the incarnate Son of God in His divine nature. 
From this preliminary entry point, Luther inaugurates an implicit reconfiguration of 
God‟s transcendent otherness, which is no longer constrained by philosophical 
assumptions that tend in the direction of „detached remoteness‟. Luther‟s Christology 
purifies the immiscible mixture of philosophy and theology precisely where the absurd 
juxtaposition reaches its dogmatic climax.
15
 He burns off the Hellenistic dross of 
traditional reflection, and resolves the latent polarity by driving away its underlying 
„pseudo-god‟; the abstract Weltgrund of pagan philosophical projection.16 By doing so, 
Luther appears to anticipate and point the way forward to a whole host of modern 
theological trajectories, which seek likewise to heal the fateful polarity afflicting classical 
                                                             
15
In other words, Luther is supposed to reverse what classical reflection upon Christ gets exactly 
backwards. The latter begins with a set doctrine of God and then squeezes christological reflection within 
its parameters. Luther‟s procedure is precisely the opposite. It allows the incarnation itself to inform our 
doctrine of God. In this way, Luther‟s contribution is an enormous privileging of theology over philosophy. 
See, for instance, Volker Keding, “Wider das Apathieaxiom”, 92-3. A similar reflection upon the 
importance of Luther‟s Christology is to be found in Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, 232-5. 
16Eberhard Jüngel suggests, for instance, that Luther‟s debate with Zwingli is significant because it 
specifies: “von woher sich der Gottesbegriff theologisch zu konstituieren hat.” Eberhard Jüngel, "Vom Tod 
des lebendigen Gottes”, 103. 
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accounts of the divine being.
17
 Many practitioners of this restorative venture explicitly 
single out Luther among its earliest progenitors, but this is by no means universally the 
case. The trend here in mind extends well beyond the circumscribed reaches of Luther‟s 
personal reception-history.
18
  
 How do recent theologians propose the polarity ought to be mended? A cursory 
survey of modern discourse in this area unveils a degree of variety that makes any 
comprehensive response to this question infeasible. Most proposals share in common, 
however, a generic attempt to reconfigure the relation between divine transcendence and 
divine immanence in such a way that the two are no longer situated upon a univocally 
polarized spectrum, which precludes their peaceful coexistence. Permutations of this 
proposal tend to insist, in particular, that conceptualizations of God‟s transcendence must 
be recalibrated, since a corruption in this area is supposed to be primarily culpable for the 
fatal polarity‟s development in the first place. The goal, as Werner Elert helpfully 
expresses it, is to formulate a „qualitative‟, rather than „quantitative‟ specification of 
God‟s ontological otherness; an account that avoids artificially driving transcendence and 
immanence apart onto two antithetical poles of a univocal spectrum, which therefore can 
                                                             
17
Another, very prominent permutation of this trajectory is the tendency within contemporary 
trinitarian theologies to eschew any distinction between the immanent and economic Trinity, or at least to 
deny that this distinction somehow protects the impassible integrity of the divine essence. Most who adopt 
this approach claim to follow in the footsteps of Karl Rahner. For a helpful analysis of the range of 
perspective included within this trend, see Fred Sanders, The Image of the Immanent Trinity: Rahner's Rule 
and the Theological Interpretation of Scripture (New York: Peter Lang, 2005).   
18In other words, although a divergence reception of Luther‟s theology has often provided impetus 
and support to these trajectories, it is important to note that their contemporary emergence is the result of 
multiple factors beyond mere Luther interpretation. The theologians surveyed in this section do tend to cite 
Luther, but the themes their work represents is shared by many who do not. Again, the point in this section 
is not to focus upon the merits of these trajectories as an extension of Luther, but to see how Luther (as 
reinterpreted in non-divergence fashion) might make a contribution within contemporary discourse. The 
fact that a wayward interpretation of Luther happens to have funded major aspects of this discourse is, for 
the purposes of this chapter, only incidentally significant.   
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never be joined somewhere in the middle.
19
 The most sophisticated permutations of this 
approach do not wish to overcome the distinction altogether (as if God were somehow 
only immanent), but seek rather to complicate it in such a way that God‟s transcendence 
does not restrict His capacity for immanence, but actually enables it.
20
 Eberhard Jüngel 
helpfully represents this goal when he explains: 
 “The God who is in heaven because he cannot be on earth is replaced by the 
Father who is in heaven in such a way that his heavenly kingdom can come into the 
world, that is, a God who is in heaven in such a way that he can identify himself with the 
poverty of the man Jesus, with the existence of a man brought from life to death on the 
cross.”21 
 
 Perhaps the most prominent constructive avenue enlisted to secure this „polarity 
complication‟ without loss to either transcendence or immanence, is the widespread 
suggestion that God sovereignly chooses, or elects (in freedom) to exist in co-suffering 
immanence with His creation. In this way, divine sympathetic involvement does not 
come at the cost of God‟s transcendence. It is not the result of external constraint or 
coercion (as if God‟s being were simply tangled up in the same exigencies experienced 
by finite creatures), but emerges from an internal movement of God‟s free will. God is 
ontologically conditioned by His interactions with creatures, in short, because He 
                                                             
19Reinhard Hauber, “Christologie und metaphysicher Gottesbegriff bei Werner Elert”, 136. I am 
using Elert‟s rendering of the distinction as a useful description for what many other theologians propose, 
albeit sometimes with a different vocabulary.   
20Paul Fiddes helpfully demonstrates the extent to which this prescriptive problematic echoes 
through the halls of contemporary theology, in various varieties and forms. See The Creative Suffering of 
God, 110-43. The final paragraph of this section represents Fiddes‟ constructive proposal, which nicely 
expresses the polarity complication that I am here trying to describe. “The transcendence of a suffering God 
can only be understood as a transcendent suffering, not a transcendence beyond suffering. Only the thought 
of God as Trinity can make sense of transcendent suffering, for only a God who happens as an event of 
relationships can be both other than and yet inclusive of the world. He can include all suffering in himself 
as he includes all human relationships, yet he is other than the world in his unique suffering, taking our 
suffering into himself out of the depths of the more profound and terrible suffering which remains his 
own.”    
21Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 209.  
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determines that it should be so.
22
 The ostensible dogmatic gain, in specifying 
transcendence in this way, is the fact that God‟s otherness is no longer bound by a 
restrictive philosophical framework, which ironically limits divine freedom precisely 
where it seeks most ardently to protect it.  
It avoids stipulating a priori what God can and cannot do, as divine impassibility 
is assumed somewhat egregiously to do. It deflects the imposition of philosophical 
conceptualities, which specify, on the basis of deductive reasoning, which properties 
ought to apply abstractly to „divinity‟, which pagan philosophical projection presumes to 
be the metaphysical foundation of all that exists.
23
 It is perhaps rather ironic that the 
perceived problem with the classical rendering, as explicated in the adjudications of 
recent theologians, is that it grossly underestimates the extent of God‟s otherness.24 
Quantitative accounts implicitly confine reflection upon God‟s being to an ontologically 
closed system. They do this by defining God as the world‟s metaphysical base—a 
philosophically abstracted plane of stability hovering undisturbed above or beneath the 
                                                             
22See Fiddes discussion of this view in ibid., 66-71. How exactly God‟s self-election for suffering 
is explained varies somewhat dramatically from theologian to theologian. The strategy itself represents an 
important aspect of Karl Barth‟s ongoing legacy, although it remains a point of somewhat rancorous 
contention whether Barth himself espoused a version of this view; and if he did, what exactly he meant by 
it. 
23This characterization of Greek philosophy is extremely prominent, as is the assumption that early 
Christian theology‟s attempt to reason about God in a similar way has hamstrung its ability to speak clearly 
about the God revealed in Christ. See, for instance Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Die Aufnahme des 
philosophischen Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie, 5; 28; and 43. 
Note also Reinhard Hauber, “Christologie und metaphysicher Gottesbegriff bei Werner Elert”, 128; 161-2; 
Heribert Mühlen, Die Ver n erlichkeit Gottes, 7; 15; and Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, 214. 
Eberhard Jüngel also develops the thesis that the defect in classical, metaphysical determinations of God‟s 
being, which is intensified with the advent of modernity, is that God‟s being is defined in terms of 
„necessity‟—a kind of ontological prop designed to secure the stability of the world, or human security. 
This, however, is inescapably at odds with what Jüngel considers to be faithful reflection upon God through 
God‟s own self-revelation. In theology‟s attempt to do both, there tears open an aporia in the tradition. See, 
for instance, Eberhard Jüngel, God As the Mystery of the World, 249. 
24Pannenberg insists that theology needs a more radical account of God‟s otherness; an otherness 
beyond the scope of the world‟s intelligibility. See his essay, "Die Aufnahme des philosophischen 
Gottesbegriffs als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie", 44. 
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pervasive malleability of all else that exists. This account of divine otherness comes at a 
cost. It places intrinsic and unavoidable limitations upon God‟s capacity to act, and thus 
hamstrings His ability for genuine immanence.
25
 Divine transcendence comes at the 
expense of divine mercy.
26
 
 Eberhard Jüngel, who articulates an especially rich permutation of this 
iconoclastic narrative, insists, on the contrary, that God exists beyond the sphere of causal 
necessity altogether, and concludes that He therefore must not be defined on the basis of 
a purely abstractive reasoning.
27
 In making this case, Jüngel seeks to enlarge divine 
transcendence (qualitatively), precisely to make space for a robust doctrine of divine 
immanence.
28
 The death of Christ no longer contradicts the transcendent being of God, as 
classical theism has presupposed to the detriment of its own coherence. Jüngel hopes to 
overcome the “aporias” of metaphysical polarities by suggesting that the divine essence 
can be thought together with death, and indeed that it ought to be.
29
 In doing so, a 
                                                             
25Note Pannenberg‟s emphasis upon divine freedom in ibid., 2; 14; 29-30; 36-39.  
26There is significant reason to doubt that the historical figure often identified with this point of 
view are accurately interpreted as such. The present author has severe reservations about the capacity of 
this narrative rightly to characterize patristic and medieval development. The main point of focus here, 
however, are the constructive values embedded within the narrative itself.   
27
By abstractive reasoning, I mean reflection, which proceeds upwards from the observation of 
worldly realities to God on the basis of causal reasoning. A very clear articulation of this point is to be 
found in Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 33.   
28It is the common mistake of both modern and pre-modern conceptions of God, according to 
Jüngel, to conceive of divinity in such a way that God becomes a prop for the intelligibility of the world, or 
the security of the human subject. See, for instance, ibid., 181; 197. This shared perspective is ultimately a 
midwife to atheism, since it ironically makes the existence of God dependent upon our need of him. This 
diagnosis of modern atheism, and the identification of classical theism‟s complicity in its genesis, accounts  
for a major section of Jüngel‟s study.   
29See ibid., 231-4; 100; 188. For Jüngel, there is really no choice but to speak in this way of God, 
since modern atheism demonstrates that the metaphysical God of absolute nature has now run its course, 
and is no longer plausible. He argues, for instance: “Christian theology today must make a decision. It must 
decide whether it will follow Fichte and his theological heirs and renounce the thinkability of God. Or it 
must (as the only possible alternative, in actuality) be prepared to destroy the presupposed understanding of 
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theology of the cross deconstructs the doctrine of God forged on philosophical grounds, 
and allows God‟s own self-revelation in Christ to unveil the true nature of His deity.30 In 
this way, the fatal polarity is healed. Dogmatic integrity is restored by expunging 
inadequate conceptualizations of divine transcendence.  
The rejection of divine impassibility is but one subsidiary facet of the larger 
counter-proposal, but represents, nevertheless, the crucial point at which Luther‟s 
Christology is presumed to align with contemporary sensibility. Impassibility functions in 
modern theology somewhat like a shibboleth of conceptual commitments. That Luther 
apparently rejects impassibility for the sake of a more robust doctrine of divine 
immanence is the necessary lynchpin for his contemporary recruitment. It pilots accounts 
of his significance, which identify him as a resource for the constructive proposal 
sketched throughout this section. The passibilist Luther appears to reinforce not only the 
intent, but also the reconstructive means adopted by modern „theologians of the cross‟ in 
their attempt to codify a qualitative account of God‟s otherness.   
But if Luther  oesn’t reconfigure two-nature dogma in the manner suggested by 
the divergence thesis (as demonstrated in chapters 2-4), and therefore does not pit divine 
impassibility against divine immanence, how ought the engagement between his 
Christology and recent trajectories be recast? Must his ideas, thus reinterpreted, simply 
fade back into the already well-populated mélange of thinkers before and after him who 
appear wrongfully to propagate a fatal polarity within the doctrine of God? Is 
contemporary theology left with the same deconstructive agenda, even if it must recruit 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the divine being „superior to us‟ (supra nos) in order to think God in the way that he has revealed himself in 
his identity with the man Jesus.” This explanation occurs on page 187.   
30Ibid., 13; 159-69. See also Jüngel‟s essay, “Vom Tod des lebendigen Gottes”, 105-6; 112.   
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alternative historical resources for its advance? In various ways, each of these questions 
seeks to ascertain whether Luther‟s Christology can still possess anything other than a 
merely passing, antiquarian interest, now that his ideas are shown no longer to reinforce 
contemporary sensibilities? The following section will address this „receptive‟ question, 
by providing a few programmatic gestures of how Luther can constructively inform 
ongoing theological discourse.  
A Non-Divergence Account of Luther’s Contemporary Significance  
Luther understands immanence and impassibility not as mutually cancelling, but 
mutually reinforcing commitments. His Christology directly challenges the validity of the 
widely presumed antithesis between these doctrines, which occupies a central position in 
the theological trajectories surveyed in the past section. It could be the case, of course, 
that Luther is simply inconsistent. He is, after all, by no means the only pre-modern 
theologian to speak emphatically about the doctrine of divine immanence. Like his 
predecessors, Luther may simply articulate an incoherent admixture of immiscible 
conceptual elements without realizing it. If divine impassibility is accurately defined in 
the terms specified by the previous section (I.E. aloof remoteness), such a conclusion 
would be largely inescapable. This, however, is precisely the point where Luther‟s 
Christology makes its initial contribution. It suggests an alternative specification of 
divine impassibility, which disrupts the contemporary tendency to interpret this doctrine 
as an obstructive impediment to an adequate recognition of God‟s intimate involvement 
with human history in Christ. 
Divine impassibility, for Luther, does not signify an abstract, ontological 
remoteness, which somehow denudes all affirmations of divine immanence of their 
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substantive meaning (I.E. God is involved and yet uninvolved). Impassibility refers, for 
him, to the „mode‟ of God‟s radical immanence; a maximally radiant nearness of 
incorruptible divinity in the midst of abject human weakness; the triumph of deathless 
might in the very jaws of mortal defeat. An impassible mode of presence specifies, for 
him, what God‟s involvement in human suffering must be like in order for such 
involvement to count as redemptive. Only He who is incorruptibly divine can be the Lord 
over sin, death, and the devil. Only such a One may radiate human weakness with 
deathless might, and break the power of death and Hades. For God to be present in a 
mode other than this would stipulate, for Luther, that Christ requires a savior of His own. 
Luther‟s soterio-logic also presupposes, more seriously, that a god immanent otherwise 
than thus specified would not actually be God at all. Impassibility, in other words, is not 
an abstract means of protecting some predetermined notion of divine transcendence in 
spite of God‟s presence in Christ. It is not an ascriptive counterbalance, which restricts 
affirmations of divine immanence by heaping qualificatory weight on the opposite side of 
a univocal, ontological ledger. God is present impassibly, because only a God thus 
present can redeem—and only a God who can redeem is truly God.31  
Luther‟s Christology disrupts the polarity narrative‟s governing equation of 
„impassibility‟ with „detached remoteness‟, and thus calls into question the accuracy of 
its critical diagnosis in the first place. Divine impassibility does not assert something to 
be true of God, which the reality of divine immanence intrinsically contradicts.  It is not a 
philosophically polarized abstraction from the ephemera of finitude.  It specifies a 
modality of presence appropriate to Christ‟s divinity; a form of involvement 
                                                             
31For textual corroboration of this summary, see the appropriate portions of chapter 4.  
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characterized by un-circumscribed, and unassailable, deathless vitality. In this sense, 
impassibility denotes not a „lack‟, but a plenitude of sorts. Contemporary defenders of 
divine impassibility have sometimes expressed a similar point in relation to the question 
of how an immutable God can act. Luther‟s emphasis is complementary, but somewhat 
different. His  rendering of impassibility in the terms of an incorruptible fullness of life 
describes why it is that the incarnate Christ can enter death, and yet save.  
 Christ enters death, but never ceases in so doing to be the living God. Immanence 
and impassibility do not compete for space along a univocal, descriptive spectrum of 
attributes. To pit them as necessarily opposed to one another is, in effect, to commit a 
category mistake. By illustrating this to be the case, Luther‟s Christology exposes the 
polarity narrative to depend upon an opposition of conceptualities, which are actually 
compatible with one another.
32
 A divergence reception of Luther is therefore wrong 
precisely because it is right. It argues, in effect, that Luther does not affirm divine 
impassibility because he does affirm divine immanence. The argument tacitly assumes, of 
course, that the two commitments cannot coexist. But if Luther affirms divine immanence 
(as the divergence thesis rightly claims), and also affirms divine impassibility, then the 
assumption turns out to be invalid, from both a historical and theological point of view. 
This disruptive observation represents an important facet of the reformer‟s contemporary 
significance.   
Despite these various points of disagreement, however, the efforts of 
contemporary theology to bypass a quantitative polarization of divine attributes 
                                                             
32Of course, this is only true if „impassibility‟ is shown not to be equivalent with „detached 
remoteness‟. In contexts where the operative definition of impassibility directly proscribes God‟s 
substantive involvement with created realities, the polarity narrative would be valid, even if its proposed 
solution is not the only one.  
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nevertheless reflects constructive values that Luther‟s Christology genuinely embodies. 
Like many contemporary theologians, Luther treasures a rich affirmation of divine 
immanence, and evidently understands the transcendence of God to represent no obstacle 
to it. Insofar as transcendence and immanence meet in Luther‟s doctrine of Christ, it 
qualifies as a legitimate proposal of the very sort of „qualitative complication‟ 
contemporary authors seek to articulate. His Christology enacts an understanding of 
God‟s transcendence that does not compete with, but actually enables His immanent 
involvement.
33
 
 In this qualified sense, it may be suggested that Luther and his contemporary 
interlocutors think along an analogous dogmatic trajectory. His significance need not be 
interpreted as purely subversive. His ideas do not simply wag a disapproving finger in 
judgment of modern improprieties. Luther and modern theology can engage with one 
another constructively and, to some extent, collaboratively in the pursuit of a common 
goal.
34
 The crucial question is whether divine impassibility represents a „help‟ or 
„hindrance‟ in the constructive effort to outline a complementary distinction between 
divine transcendence and divine immanence. Is impassibility an impediment to this 
enterprise? Is it truly a marker of transcendence wrongly construed (I.E. „remoteness‟)? 
                                                             
33The divergence reception understandably assumes that the overlap of intent represented here 
constitutes a major reason why Luther jettisons divine impassibility in the first place. This is because 
contemporary assessments of the doctrine assume it inescapably to reproduce the bad, quantitative polarity, 
which Luther‟s strident emphasis upon divine immanence seems unavoidably to deconstruct. This line of 
receptive reasoning, however, confuses substantive overlap of theological intent with an alignment of 
instrumental means. The fact that Luther retains divine impassibility as a critical component of his theology 
of divine immanence raises the constructive question whether a theology of divine suffering actually 
represents substantive progress in the attempt to specify a qualitative account of divine otherness, as its 
contemporary advocates are wont to insist.  
34The goal is a profound, and conceptually viable emphasis upon God‟s radical involvement 
within human history. I do not mean to suggest, however, that Luther is the only pre-modern theologian 
who shares this goal.   
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Or is impassibility a necessary affirmation for formulating an adequate conceptualization 
of God‟s immanence in Christ? 
The logic of Luther‟s Christology suggests that a rejection of divine impassibility 
creates more problems for the transcendence-immanence relation than it solves. A major 
aspect of his intent, in maintaining the partitive specificatory discourse of classical 
christological reflection, is to ensure the fact that the „god‟ who is radically present in 
Christ is the one, true God. The motivation here is primarily soteriological in nature. 
Only the God who is incorruptible in the midst of sufferings, and immortal in the midst of 
death can enter the depths of the human condition and emerge victorious. At a deeper 
conceptual level, however, this redemptive logic presupposes what a passibilist proposal 
intrinsically denies; namely, that the relation between God and the world is ontologically 
non-competitive. At first glance, this seems an outrageous claim. It is the self-avowed 
intent of modern theologies of divine suffering to suggest that God really intersects with 
created reality, and does so without ceasing to be God. But is divine passibility consistent 
with this goal? There is reason to suppose, on the basis of Luther‟s Christology, that an 
acceptance of divine impassibility procures this emphasis more transparently than its 
denial. 
 Luther‟s point of view presupposes an abiding complementarity between the 
radical transcendence of the divine being and His equally radical immanent involvement 
in the events of human history. The impassibility of Christ‟s divinity means that 
immanence does not require any sympathetic „adjustment‟ of God‟s being. All of this 
points to a decidedly qualitative rendering of God‟s otherness—an ontological distinction 
that eschews univocally derived polarities. God and the world simply do not compete for 
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space within Luther‟s Christology. Can the same be said of a passibilist rendering of 
divine immanence?  
To insist that God „suffers‟ presupposes (minimally, at least) that divine 
involvement with creation elicits, perhaps even requires, a consequent, sympathetic 
affect, which „conditions‟ God‟s mode of existence in a way that would not obtain in the 
absence of such involvement. The intersection of deity with sin-warped, creaturely reality 
entails an ontological „yielding‟ of sorts. God is affected. He experiences pain, suffering, 
loss, weakness, and defect—all as the result of His „collision‟, so to speak, with post-
lapsarian finitude. Does the presupposition of this requisite „affect‟ make sense, though, 
if God and the world exist on qualitatively distinct planes of being? Doesn‟t the oft-
purported necessity of divine suffering inadvertently imply that a zero-sum ontological 
game is still being played; that Creator and creature are nudging about for space upon a 
univocal playing field of causal interaction? 
If the outward conditioning of God‟s being is treated tacitly as a prerequisite of 
authentic immanence, then divine suffering appears merely to be the ontological cost 
exacted by God‟s genuine interaction with finite existents.35 One finds a dramatic 
manifestation of this view in the theology of Jürgen Moltmann. He insists that the act of 
creation itself requires a self-contraction of God‟s being, in order to make space for the 
integrity of the other.
36
 Appraised by the constructive framework set up in this chapter, 
however, doesn‟t this view simply erect a competitive ontological relation between 
                                                             
35This applies, whether or not God‟s decision to suffer is constrained or free. The point is that 
suffering is treated as a requirement of God‟s immanence.  
36See, for instance: Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 108-11; Ron Highfield, “Divine Self-Limitation in the Theology 
of Jürgen Moltmann: A Critical Appraisal,” Christian Scholars Review 32 (2002): 47-71; and Siu-Kwong 
Tang, Go ’s History in the Theology of J rgen Moltmann (Bern: P. Lang, 1996), 161-72.   
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transcendence and immanence from the start? Eberhard Jüngel‟s suggestion that God‟s 
being must be conceptualized beyond the limits of necessity is far more satisfying. Yet, 
Jüngel also toys with the idea that God‟s relation to creation is, from the first instance, a 
matter of a struggle with nothingness.
37
 To what extent do Moltmann and Jüngel actually 
presuppose the quantitative (and thus competitive) ontological distinction that each wants 
to avoid?   
Why should the prerequisite of divine suffering exist in the first place, if the 
distinction between transcendence and immanence is qualitative rather than quantitative? 
The underlying metaphysical assumption would need to be that God and creation cannot 
converge upon the same existential space without an attendant ontological 
displacement.
38
 This assumption shows that univocal polarity is still operative, however, 
albeit now manifest in an inverted form. The passibilist proposal retains the governing 
presupposition that substantive involvement requires a change on God‟s part. It differs 
from an incoherent polarization of transcendence and immanence, only in the sense that it 
deems the reality of immanence worth the steep theological cost of admission. In short, it 
does not heal the fatal polarity at all, but reproduces it. Despite its best efforts to the 
contrary, a passibilist reconfiguration still forces an artificial choice between 
transcendence and immanence. Ironically, this is precisely the dilemma that much 
contemporary theology has labored to overcome. 
The logic of Luther‟s soteriology, on the other hand, urges that it is finally 
impossible truly to have either immanence or transcendence without always having both. 
The ontological transmutation of God‟s being is not necessary in order to secure the 
                                                             
37See Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 217-22.   
38
Divine being, in other words, would not exist above the laws of Newtonian physics.  
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genuine immanence of God in Christ. Such a transmutation actually undermines 
immanence, because it suggests that the agent with whom humanity deals is someone or 
something other than the one, true God.
39
 In this case, God is ironically neither 
transcendent nor immanent.
40
 From the perspective of Luther‟s Christology, then, 
contemporary theologies of divine suffering legitimately seek to avoid a potential, 
conceptual pathology, which threatens to endanger a robust affirmation of divine 
immanence. The lingering risk, to which these perspectives bear witness, is to so construe 
the nature of divine transcendence that the equally necessary affirmation of divine 
immanence consequently withers to little more than a husk; an exercise in naked assent 
without genuine content. 
 A substantive engagement with Luther‟s Christology demonstrates, however, that 
recent theology has applied this diagnosis with insufficient discretion, especially in its 
critical narratives of dogmatic development. It has assumed that a one-to-one 
correspondence exists between the pathological polarity, whose development it seeks to 
foreclose, and substantive assent to doctrine of divine impassibility. Luther demonstrates, 
however, that divine impassibility is not a reliable indicator.
41
 The attempt to rectify 
                                                             
39Does this same criticism apply to passibilist proposals, which retain divine immutability by way 
of either protological prolepsis, or eschatological analepsis? Such models are relatively more successful 
and promising than other accounts of God‟s suffering, because they avoid the implication that God must 
become something other than Himself in order to draw near in the Person of Christ. These proposals are 
still problematic, however, because they presuppose the same ontologically competitive playing field. 
Whether or not God decides from the beginning to be a certain way, the fact that proximity requires 
suffering signals that the same framework is operative.   
40 Is this alternative conceptually coherent? It may seem not, on the grounds that immanence and 
impassibility cannot plausibly describe the same agent at the same time. Such an objection merely begs the 
qualitative question, however, and curiously reproduces the very univocally charged polarity that so much 
recent theology has labored to heal; namely, the a priori assumption that the nearness of God comes only at 
the expense of ontologically competitive loss.  
41This is not to imply that the pathology is not itself a genuine risk. Surely such a problematic 
rendering of divine transcendence is at least feasible. The more important question, for present purposes, is 
when and how the problem would actually manifest itself. Perhaps ironically, Paul Gavrilyuk‟s book on 
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matters through an unqualified rejection of this doctrine is therefore not an adequate 
prophylactic solution for the potential problem. More seriously, the renunciation of 
divine impassibility actually harms more than it heals.
42
 Theologies of divine suffering do 
not overcome the polarity, but merely invert it. Luther‟s Christology, on the other hand, 
insists with the help of impassibility that God is truly present, and present truly as God. 
In this, he reinforces contemporary theological intent, but subverts its commonly elected, 
instrumental means. Luther points a more fruitful way forward, which, ironically, is, at 
the same time, also a way back. The reformer whose theology has so often been 
identified as a fault line in the developmental history of dogma, actually provides the path 
for a constructive retrieval of pre-modern conceptualities in a contemporary theological 
setting.  
 Conclusion 
 Luther‟s Christology is significant for modern reflection upon the immanence of 
God in Christ on account of the following observations:  
1. It disrupts widely held assumptions about the doctrine of divine impassibility as a 
marker of transcendence wrongly identified.  
 
2. It challenges an influential narrative of dogmatic development, which supposes 
classical reflection quantitatively to pit divine transcendence over against divine 
immanence. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
patristic doctrinal development demonstrates, in effect, that many of the heresies rejected in the early 
church were rejected precisely on the grounds of their artificially polarized account of God‟s otherness. See 
Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). In this sense, we must hasten to acknowledge that Luther‟s contribution is 
not exclusive to him alone, though certain emphases in his thought may enhance its ability uniquely to 
engage with modern concerns.  
42So far as securing an affirmation of divine immanence is concerned, the logic of Luther‟s 
Christology suggests that God‟s natural suffering is perhaps sweet to the taste (it seems to denote radical 
involvement), but burns like fire in the belly (it undercuts the reality of redemption).   
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3. It provides an alternative account of God‟s qualitative otherness, which is more 
consistent in the pursuit of this task than theologies of divine suffering geared 
towards the same. 
 
4. It clarifies that the point of Christology is not that God is capable of ontological 
self-limitation, but that He is free intimately to engage with creaturely existents—
even entering into union with sinful human beings—without changing „who‟ or 
„what‟ He is.  
 
On a proscriptive level, these observations foreclose the suggestion, which this 
study may provoke, that the „husk‟ of Luther‟s demonstrated adherence to divine 
impassibility can easily be winnowed apart from the genuine „kernel‟ of his robust 
commitment to God‟s radical immanence. The intent of such an argument would be to 
urge that Luther‟s bequeathal to contemporary theology should remain, nevertheless, 
much as specified by the divergence reception, albeit perhaps now qualified with the 
passing historical caveat that Luther never quite articulated his own best insights with full 
integrity.
43
 The legitimacy of this proposal would depend, however, upon the assumption 
that divine impassibility is, at best, an ancillary idiosyncrasy within Luther‟s theology; a 
non-essential conceptual pith, which can be shorn away without substantive loss. The 
soteriological integration of divine impassibility and divine immanence within Luther‟s 
theology effectively obstructs this receptive avenue.
44
 The divergence reception does not 
extend the logic of Luther‟s Christology, but cuts against it.   
                                                             
43Some already endorse a version of this view, as outlined in chapter 1.  
44A tumor, for instance, can be surgically removed and ought to be in order to preserve the 
integrity of a human person. An appendix can also be removed, but doesn‟t necessarily need to be, unless 
extraordinary circumstances arise. Other organs of the body, however, cannot be removed without 
considerable damage to the person to whom these organs belong. In some cases, surgical extraction would 
actually disrupt this person‟s bodily integrity to the point of its annihilation. Those who hesitantly 
acknowledge Luther‟s occasional endorsement of divine impassibility have tended to see this doctrine as a 
tumor, which can and ought to be removed. They have assumed, in other words, that divine impassibility 
does not intrinsically belong to the governing commitments of Luther‟s theology. If, however, impassibility 
is a major aspect of Luther‟s soteriological logic, then it cannot be surgically removed without severely 
altering Luther‟s animating theological presuppositions. It is impossible to say, along with Ritschl, that 
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More constructively, Luther‟s Christology furnishes an opportunity for a 
theologically fruitful reflection upon the modality of God‟s immanence in the redemptive 
sufferings of Christ. In this respect, the content of his theology remains remarkably 
pertinent to widespread modern concerns, though not in the manner often supposed to be 
the case. In contrast with the majority of crucicentric theologies developed in previous 
decades, Luther retains the doctrine of divine impassibility precisely in order to speak 
adequately about the nature of God‟s radical immanence in Christ. The mutual 
complementarity of these affirmations within Luther‟s theology therefore represents a 
multiply significant aspect of his contemporary importance.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Luther must be pit against Luther in order thus to guide his thought to a deeper level of internal 
consistency.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The preceding chapters of this study defend a thesis, which possesses far-reaching 
implications for the analysis and contemporary appraisal of Luther‟s Christology. This 
conclusion will provide a retrospective overview of the main argument, and suggest a few 
lingering questions, which warrant future inquiry.   
Reprise 
  This study has focused upon a prevalent reception of Luther‟s theology, to 
which it has generically referred as the „divergence thesis‟. The distinguishing feature of 
this reception is its consistent tendency to identify in Luther‟s Christology the seeds of a 
far-reaching conceptual reconfiguration of the classically developed doctrine of God. It 
supposes Luther, above all, to bequeath unto modern theology the deceptively simple 
idea that God suffers. In this, Luther departs from the views of previous thinkers of the 
tradition, for whom the impassibility of God represents something of an axiomatic, 
governing commitment. Luther‟s rejection of impassibility alleged by the divergence 
thesis to reside in a critical adjustment of two nature Christology, specifically as it 
pertains to the communicatio idiomatum. The root of this adjustment consists in the 
reformer‟s heretofore unprecedented insistence that Christ‟s divine nature shares equally 
in the sufferings of His humanity.  
 Luther‟s apparent affirmation of a reciprocal communication of attributes is 
perceived by many theologians to mark a major turning point in the history of dogmatic 
reflection. Above all, it is supposed to create the space necessary for a new, and better 
conceptualization of God‟s immanence. God is present among His people, for Luther, not 
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as an aloof bystander, somehow protected from the contaminating defects of post-
lapsarian corruption. Instead, He shares in human suffering, and takes up death into His 
own divine life. Luther‟s Christology, in other words, is supposed by the divergence 
reception to make it possible for theology to acknowledge the mystery of a God who 
truly gives of Himself and allows the sufferings of humanity to condition His very being; 
a God immanent in the form of passionate, and costly solidarity. For many systematic 
theologians writing, these insights constitute the marrow of Luther‟s dogmatic 
significance.  
  The divergence reception of Luther‟s theology has garnered widespread appeal, in 
part, because it provides a historical point of departure from which to address pressing 
contemporary concerns. For nearly a century, the doctrine of divine impassibility has 
been widely perceived to represent a serious obstacle to the doctrine of divine 
immanence. The notion that God cannot suffer has appeared increasingly difficult to 
reconcile with the biblical attestation of a God substantively involved in the events of 
human history.
1
 The residual trauma engendered by 20
th
 century atrocities has only 
intensified the impression, palpable in the writings of many recent theologians, that a 
God incapable of suffering is a God who can neither love nor help.  
  The divergence interpretation of Luther‟s Christology possesses explanatory 
power, in part, because it directly intersects with these theological concerns. It facilitates 
a constructive recruitment of Luther‟s Christology within contemporary spheres of 
discourse. Luther‟s passibilist adjustment of two-nature Christology is deemed 
significant, in many instances, because it appears to forge a path beyond the opaque 
                                                             
1This is especially true as it pertains to the revelation of God in the history of Jesus.   
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conceptualities of pre-modern dogma and onwards to a more transparent rendering of 
God‟s immanence in the Person and work of Christ.2 The divergence thesis has garnered 
widespread influence, therefore, because it functions so effectively as a midwife to trans-
historical relevance. It construes Luther‟s Christology in a way that underscores his 
importance for theological questions now hanging in the balance. The contentious status 
of divine impassibility within modern discourse is especially important in this respect. It 
represents a major reason why a divergence rendering of Luther‟s Christology has 
attracted the amount of attention that it has.  This is as true of those who applaud Luther‟s 
dogmatic deviation as necessary and salutary, as it is of theologians who evaluate the 
alleged rejection of divine impassibility as grave doctrinal error. In either case, Luther‟s 
Christology is supposed, by virtue of the divergence interpretation, to possess a latent, 
constructive potential for informing the labors of contemporary reflection. The narrative 
of a seminal dogmatic divergence effectively culls this formative potential to the 
foreground.  
 In its attempt to assess this widespread appraisal of Luther‟s significance (that is, 
the identification of Luther as a pioneer of divine passibilism), this study has emphasized 
the fact that the divergence reception is based upon a specific and largely stable analysis 
of Luther‟s theological texts. Whether or not this analysis is historically accurate thus 
represents the rather urgent question, which the majority of the preceding chapters have 
sought to address. The test of historical accuracy is a criteriological hinge, upon which 
                                                             
2In this sense, the divergence reception embodies Jürgen Moltmann‟s programmatic claim, 
enunciated in the opening paragraphs of The Crucified God, that the theologian‟s goal of contemporary 
relevance ineluctably makes it difficult to maintain a degree of continuity with the past that is sufficient to 
preserve the integrity of Christian identity. See Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God, 7-31. In the case of 
the divergence reception‟s implicit appraisal of impassibility, the cost of continuity weighed against 
relevance is evidently deemed too steep.  
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the reception‟s constructive legitimacy may be evaluated. The interpretation of Luther‟s 
Christology, which the divergence reception presupposes, includes essentially three 
constitutive elements. 
1) Luther rejects the doctrine of suppositional carrying, and substitutes for it a 
composite doctrine of Christ, capable of expressing a more intimate union 
between divinity and humanity.  
 
2) Within this more intimate union, Luther reconfigures the traditional doctrine of 
the communicatio idiomatum in order especially to affirm the participatory 
suffering of Christ‟s divinity. 
 
3) The suffering of divinity is an essential part of Luther‟s soteriology, and thus 
central to the fabric of his thought.   
 
These claims represent the three pillars upon which the divergence reception rests. Its 
status as a viable appraisal of Luther‟s theological significance remains intact only if each 
assertion is shown to be valid.
3
  
 The primary goal of this study has been to demonstrate the historical inaccuracy 
of these three claims. Chapters two through four expose the exegetical deficiencies 
associated with the defense of each. These chapters also outline an alternative 
specification of Luther‟s Christology, which is based upon the careful analysis of 
pertinent texts. Chapter two illustrates Luther‟s continuing employment of the doctrine of 
suppositional carrying as an analogical description of the hypostatic union. Chapter three 
treats the communication of attributes, and demonstrates that Luther retains the doctrine 
of divine impassibility as a controlling commitment of his analysis. Chapter four shows 
how the invulnerability of God in the midst of human suffering represents a crucial aspect 
of Luther‟s soterio-logic. Besides its documentation of the divergence thesis‟ historical 
inaccuracy, this sequential refutation also entails a proscriptive conclusion for the 
                                                             
3It must demonstrate, in other words, that the structure of Luther‟s theology secures (claims one 
and two) and requires (claim three) the affirmation of divine passibility.  
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constructive appropriation of Luther‟s theology. Appraisals of Luther‟s significance, 
which rely upon a divergence specification of his Christology, must come to terms with 
the fact that Luther retains the doctrine of divine impassibility. Appraisals that assert 
otherwise may secure for Luther an appealing degree of „relevance‟, but do so at the cost 
of historical accuracy. This, in any case, is the central thesis, which the preceding 
chapters have sought, at length, to defend and develop. 
  A de-validation of the divergence reception does not, however, render Luther 
mute in the face of modern concerns. The central argument of this study intends neither 
to obfuscate nor eschew the reality of Luther‟s ongoing theological importance. It should 
therefore not be perceived as an attempt to discourage the appropriation of Luther as a 
resource within contemporary reflection. The goal is not to place an opprobrium upon 
constructive retrievals of Luther‟s Christology altogether, but rather to redirect the nature 
of Luther‟s constructive potential in the light of a „non-divergence‟ specification of his 
ideas. Such „redirection‟ creates the conditions necessary for an alternative appropriation 
of Luther‟s theology, which is based upon a more stable historical foundation. 
  The fifth chapter of this study represents a preliminary gesture of how the 
constructive potential of Luther‟s „non-divergence‟ Christology might be realized. It 
returns to the question, treated so often within divergence appropriations of Luther‟s 
theology, of how Luther‟s Christology is significant for ongoing attempts to rethink the 
dogmatic conceptualization of divine immanence. Luther makes an interesting 
contribution in this area, not because he urges the rejection of outmoded conceptualities, 
which are already the object of contemporary suspicions. He insists, rather, upon a 
modality of God immanence, which disrupts and reconfigures the ordinary terms of the 
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discussion itself. The inability of God to suffer, for Luther, is no sign of ontological 
remoteness, but a marker of the fact that God is present in the midst of death always as 
the immortal and living God.
4
 In this way, he tacitly contends that it is really only the 
non-suffering God who can truly help. This insight appears provocative indeed, when 
counterposed against the predominant theological sentiments of the contemporary milieu. 
Prospect 
 The bulk of this study has been occupied with the elaboration and defense of a 
fairly straightforward, historical thesis. It has argued that the divergence thesis 
misrepresents the character of Luther‟s Christology when it detects in his writing a 
fundamental swerve regarding the capacity of God to suffer. This relatively 
uncomplicated thesis, however, is pregnant with any number of far-reaching implications 
for the study, evaluation and appropriation of Luther‟s theology. Some of these 
implications have been explored with a necessarily partial brevity within the context of 
preceding chapters.
5
 This brevity signifies to the reader that the sequential refutation of 
the divergence thesis advanced throughout this study is less a determinate conclusion 
than it is a point of departure. It represents programmatic verdict, which elicits far more 
questions than it definitively settles. The most portentous of these questions warrant 
cursory recognition in the closing pages of this conclusion. By reflecting upon them, it 
                                                             
4We catch a glimpse of this radical simultaneity in a comment Luther makes about the 
transfiguration, which is cited by Ian Kingston Siggins, Martin Luther’s Doctrine of Christ, 218. “In the 
transfiguration, for example, God revealed „the future splendor and glory of our bodies. For it was a thing 
of wonder that Christ should be glorified while still in His mortal and passible body. By it, He showed the 
splendor of immortality in the very midst of mortality. What will it be, when mortality is at the last taken 
completely away and there is nothing but immortality and splendor?!‟”  
5Even chapter five, which addresses the matter of implications more directly, is little more than a 
preliminary „gesture‟ when it comes to the subsequent task of elaborating upon the variegated importance 
of the divergence thesis‟ refutation.   
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will also be possible to indicate a few significant areas for future research, which sprout 
up from the soil of this study‟s main argument.  
Luther and Late Medieval Scholasticism 
 The refutation of the divergence thesis encourages a renovated appraisal of the 
relation between Luther‟s Christology and the views of late medieval scholasticism. The 
present study secures only two, relatively modest historical claims, which inform this 
relation. Like his medieval forebears, Luther 1) enlists the doctrine of suppositional 
carrying as a descriptive model for making sense of the incarnation, and 2) rejects that 
Christ‟s divinity experiences a participatory suffering along with the humanity, which He 
assumes.
6
 A „non-divergence‟ interpretation does not mean that Luther‟s Christology 
aligns seamlessly with the theology of his predecessors. It is merely an attempt to 
demonstrate that Luther does not deviate from late medieval Christology so far as these 
two circumscribed loci are concerned. Such a claim is significant, in a very real sense, 
only because of the many past interpreters of Luther who argue in defense of its 
alternative. Taken on its own merits, this study‟s „non-divergence interpretation‟ 
represents merely a slight contribution to the much more complex task of specifying 
Luther‟s relation to late medieval Christology in general. 
 The divergence thesis has cast a long shadow across generic characterizations of 
this relation within recent theological literature. Luther‟s „reformational Christology‟ is 
often counter-posed diametrically over against preexisting reflection, thus reinforcing the 
overarching perception of a sheer discontinuity within the reformer‟s theological 
                                                             
6Chapter four demonstrates the way in which especially the latter affirmation materializes within 
Luther‟s soteriology. It does not provide any extensive specification of the extent to which Luther‟s 
application of divine impassibility represents a continuity with preexisting tradition.  
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development. In some cases, it is practically suggested that Luther differs from the 
medievals at the level of theological first principles. His reflection upon Christ proceeds 
upon a new heading. It embodies values, which are entirely different from the traditions 
that precede him.
7
  
 Sites of discontinuity between Luther and the scholastics surely exist. Precisely 
where these differences lie, however, is a question that emerges with a renewed degree of 
explanatory urgency in the wake of this study.
8
 This is because the previous chapters 
have refuted the principal interpretive claims, which have perennially mediated the 
perceptions of Luther‟s christological distinctiveness. In the absence of these orienting 
claims, it is necessary to reassess the nature of Luther‟s constructive appropriation of 
prior tradition. The natural place to begin in addressing this task would be the execution 
of a critical, comparative analysis between Luther‟s late christological texts and the major 
scholastic treatises through which he became familiar with medieval investigations of the 
Person and work of Christ. Of particular significance for such a comparison would be 
Gabriel Biel‟s Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum, which chapter three of 
this study briefly accessed.
9
 Luther is familiar with this work. A record of his early 
critical interactions with it survives in the form of marginal notations published in the 
                                                             
7In many cases, it is Luther‟s soteriological focus, which is singled out as the point of departure 
from medieval reflection, which is derided as merely speculative. For more on this trend, see the pertinent 
discussion in chapter four.    
8In this sense, a non-divergence interpretation of Luther calls for the same re-evaluation of 
Luther‟s relation to late medieval scholasticism that other facets of his thought have received in the past 
several decades as the result of scholars such as Heiko Obermann, Dennis Janz and Steven Ozment. The 
goal in such re-evaluation is never to mute difference, but rightly locate it.   
9This text is available in critical edition. See Gabriel Biel, Hanns Rückert, Wilfrid Werbeck, Udo 
Hofmann, William, and Vendelinus Steinbach, Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum (Tübingen: 
Mohr, 1973).   
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Weimar edition of his writings.
10
 Reinhard Schwarz interacts with these notations 
extensively, but regards them to be only a point of departure. In his view, they represent 
doctrinal judgments from which Luther would later swerve in his theological rejection of 
late scholastic dogma. Schwarz draws this conclusion, however, because he believes it is 
clear that Luther defines the person of Christ in his christological disputations in 
compositional terms.
11
 Now that the divergence interpretation of Luther‟s later works has 
been set aside, it is time to return to Schwarz‟s original task with new and better 
questions.
12
  
 The comparative analysis between Luther and Biel could easily be multiplied by 
interacting with other commentaries on the Sentences from the late medieval period. 
Luther was himself acquainted with this tradition of reflection, and interacted with 
Lombard‟s text directly in 1510-1511.13 It is interesting to note, for instance, that 
although Luther‟s intense debates with Zwingli over a decade later are often perceived by 
contemporary interpreters to be indicative of a fundamental break with conceptual 
commonplaces of scholastic Christology (of which Zwingli is assumed to be 
representative), Luther‟s own subsequent recollection of these debates suggests that it 
was actually the reformer‟s familiarity with Lombard that led him to criticize Zwingli in 
                                                             
10See WA 59, 29f.  
11The only important remaining question, for Schwarz, is precisely when Luther shed the 
nominalist Christology of his early development.   
12This is precisely the strength of Graham White‟s book Luther as Nominalist. It seeks to interpret 
Luther‟s disputations within the context of late medieval logic. The future study, which I have in mind in 
this section would be similar in approach to White, but would focus even more directly than White does 
upon matters of technical Christology.  Also important for this task would be Luther‟s 1544 commentary on 
Isaiah 53, which treats these matters at considerable length.   
13See WA 9, 28-94.   
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the first place.
14
 Neither this observation nor the larger findings of this study may be 
taken as evidence that a comprehensive theological uniformity unites Luther and the late 
medieval scholastics. Surely, this is far from the case. It will be important, however, for 
future research into Luther‟s Christology to specify sites of continuity and discontinuity 
more carefully. Only then, will an accurate understanding of Luther‟s relation to the 
dogmatic vocabulary of late scholasticism emerge. The refutation of the divergence thesis 
merely suggests that long standing perceptions of this relation are ripe for critical re-
assessment.
15
  
Luther‟s Christology and Confessionalization 
 The divergence interpretation of Luther‟s Christology has also influenced recent 
descriptions of Lutheran confessionalization. This influence materializes in at least two, 
major evaluative renderings of the period. A great deal of literature characterizes 
confessional development as a betrayal of Luther‟s divergence legacy, because this 
period purportedly reinserts the doctrine of divine impassibility as a controlling 
commitment of christological reflection.
16
 Others, however, detect in the very same 
                                                             
14Eberhard Jüngel detects a swerve in Luther away from scholasticism in Luther‟s treatise against 
Zwingli, published in 1528. See Eberhard Jüngel, "Vom Tod des lebendigen Gottes : ein Plakat." Zeitschrift 
Für Theologie Und Kirche 65, no. 1 (January 1, 1968):, 102-4. For Luther‟s recollection, see WA 50, 591. 
English translation is available in LW 41, 105.  
15Future study could also seek to identify which of the many strands of medieval reflection upon 
which Luther is most dependent for his understanding of the hypostatic union. In chapters two and three, 
the medieval point of view is treated in a way that reflects points of general consensus. This should not 
obscure the fact that many important differences that distinguish between the thinkers and various schools 
of the medieval period. It would be interesting to chart where Luther‟s christological views seem best to fit 
in relation to this wide diversity.   
16A few examples of this common interpretation include Sibylle Rolf, “„Christum und nichts 
anders‟: die Kommunikation von Gott und Mensch und die Predigt des Evangeliums” Luther 80, no. 3 
(January 1, 2009): 158 n. 26; and Marc Lienhard, Luther, Witness to Jesus Christ: Stages and Themes of 
the Reformer's Christology (Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1982), 340-41.Werner Elert, for whom 
Luther clearly affirms divine suffering, admits that neither Martin Chemnitz nor Johannes Brenz reject 
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process (alternatively interpreted) the substantive extension of Luther‟s divergence 
legacy, on the grounds that many of the reformer‟s theological heirs appear to retain his 
revolutionary redefinition of Christ‟s person not as a suppositional carrier of humanity, 
but in compositional terms.
17
 Each of these „narratives‟ presupposes some version of the 
divergence thesis, and uses this presupposition as a reference point for how subsequent 
theological developments within Lutheranism ought to be characterized.
18
 If the 
divergence interpretation of Luther is historically inaccurate, then it follows that a 
reappraisal of the confessional period is necessary, at least so far as it pertains to the 
description of Lutheran christological developments in the latter half of the 16
th
 century.  
 Such reappraisal could begin with the application of the same diagnostic 
questions, which have directed the present study, to various influential theologians of the 
confessional period such as Martin Chemnitz, Johannes Brenz, Jakob Andreae, etc. That 
is: do these theologians 1) reject suppositional carrying in unambiguous terms?; 2) 
embrace divine passibility?; and 3) envision redemption in terms of suffering solidarity? 
Johannes Hund and Hans Christian Brandy engage some of these questions, but do so 
with the assumption Luther initiates a prior christological divergence, upon which the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
divine impassibility. See Werner Elert, The Structure of Lutheranism (Saint Louis: Concordia Pub. House, 
1962), 228. 
17The most extensive articulation of this view appears in Johannes Hund, Das Wort ward Fleisch: 
eine systematisch-theologische Untersuchung zur Debatte um die Wittenberger Christologie und 
Abendmahlslehre in den Jahren 1567 und 1574, Forschungen zur systematischen und ökumenischen 
Theologie, Bd. 114 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006). Hund is not alone in defending the 
„extension‟ reading, however. A similar view is articulated in Hans Christian Brandy, Die späte 
Christologie des Johannes Brenz. Beiträge zur historischen Theologie, 80. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (P. 
Siebeck), 1991; and Johann Anselm Steiger, F nf  entralthemen  er Theologie Luthers un  seiner Erben: 
Communicatio, Figura, Imago, Maria, Exempla. Leiden: Brill, 2002, among others. 
18A variation of the first appraisal is found in the work of Theobald Beer, who highlights the 
dramatic christological difference between Luther and Melanchthon. Beer suggests that confessionalization 
is actually the correction of Luther‟s divergence legacy, because he views Luther‟s apparent redefinition of 
Christ to be theologically disastrous. See Theobald Beer, Der fröhliche Wechsel und Streit: Grundzüge der 
Theologie Luthers (Leipzig: St. Benno-Verlag, 1974), 513-20.  
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confessional writers rely. Since this assumption is incorrect, might it be the case that the 
theologians of Lutheran confessional development have been similarly mischaracterized?  
 The present author suspects that a careful investigation of these matters will yield 
a combination of the two descriptions outlined above as accurate. The „betrayal 
description‟ is correct in its interpretation of Luther‟s confessional heirs (I.E. they 
maintain divine impassibility), but wrong in its assumption that this represents a 
departure from Luther. The „extension description‟ is wrong in its interpretation of Luther 
and the confessional writers, but right in its identification of an abiding continuity 
between them. Martin Chemnitz, for instance, who was a major architect of confessional 
formulation in the late 1570‟s, explicitly proscribes the suffering of Christ‟s divinity in 
his 1561 treatise De Duabus Naturis in Christo. Perhaps most significant, in this respect, 
is his application of the abstract/ concrete distinction, which mirrors its appropriation of 
Luther as described in chapter three of this study.  
“…the words which denote the united yet distinct natures we call abstract. And those 
which indicate the person are called concrete. Therefore, one nature is not predicated of 
the other in the abstract. The deity is not called the humanity. The rule of the Scholastics 
is that the substantial attributes of the one nature are not attributed to the other when we 
consider it in the abstract, but they are communicated to the person in the concrete, that 
is, by a term which indicates the hypostasis. For it is not correct to say that the humanity 
is an essence generated from the Father from eternity, or that the deity is pierced with 
nails or wounded with a spear; but it is perfectly correct to say concretely that the Son of 
Man ascended where He was before, that the Lord of glory is crucified.”19 
 
   Chemnitz‟s insistence that the Person of Christ suffers even as the divine nature 
remains impassible is taken up in article eight of the Solid Declaration, which states: 
 “Because of this personal union, without which this kind of true communion of 
the natures is unthinkable and impossible, not only the bare human nature (which 
possesses the characteristics of suffering and dying) suffered for the sins of the entire 
                                                             
19Martin Chemnitz, The Two Natures in Christ, trans. J. A. O. Preus (St. Louis: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1971), 175.  
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world, but the Son of God himself suffered (According to the human nature) and, 
according to our simple Christian creed, truly died—although the divine nature can 
neither suffer nor die.”20 
 
One searches these texts in vain for any recognition of a departure or correction of 
Luther‟s christological views. In many cases, the impassibilist restriction is based upon 
Luther‟s writings themselves.21 
  Of course, neither the Solid Declaration nor Chemnitz‟s treatise are 
representative of the diversity of opinion, which circulated within Lutheranism especially 
during the latter half of the 16
th
 century. Future study would need to attend to this 
diversity, and specify whatever subtle differences of opinion distinguish the various 
authors of the period.
22
 Even if some theologians were found to embrace divine 
passibility, however, the confessional norms of  late 16
th
 century Lutheranism appear 
unambiguously to reject such a view.
23
 This fact, accompanied by the refutation of the 
divergence thesis, provides sufficient reason to reassess appraisals of Luther‟s heirs, 
                                                             
20Robert Kolb, Timothy J. Wengert, and Charles P. Arand, The Book of Concord: The Confessions 
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 619.  
21See ibid, 619f. This fact intensifies the irony of the fact that the „scale passage‟ from Luther‟s 
1539 treatise “On the Councils and the Church” is so often recruited as evidence of passibilist divergence. 
The very same paragraph appears within this section of the Solid Declaration; that is, within an 
environment in which divine impassibility is presupposed! See ibid, 624. For Chemnitz‟ direct treatment of 
Luther in relation to these questions see Martin Chemnitz, The Two Natures in Christ, 190-94. Also helpful 
is Bengt Hägglund, “Majestas hominis Christi: Wie hat Martin Chemnitz die Christologie Luthers 
gedeutet?”, in Luther Jahrbuch 47 (1980): 71-88. Hägglund brackets, however, the question of whether 
Chemnitz faithfully represents Luther‟s points of view.    
22Johannes Hund admits, for instance, that the Braunschweig branch of Lutheranism (to which 
Chemnitz belongs) agrees with the Melanchthonians in Wittenberg concerning how to conceive of the 
hypostatic union, even though the former group also insists upon real Eucharistic presence. In doing so, 
however, Hund believes that theologians like Chemnitz depart from Luther‟s conceptualization of the 
person of Christ, which is better expressed, in his view, by the theologians from Württemberg, including 
Brenz. The point here is not to suggest that writers like Hund are entirely wrong in their interpretive 
judgments. His magisterial work provides a tremendously helpful point of entry into the pertinent debates. 
The present study merely raises the question whether certain of Hund‟s claims ought to be reassessed, since 
he presupposes the validity of the divergence thesis as the point of departure for Lutheran confessional 
debates. See his interpretation of Luther in Johannes Hund, Das Wort ward Fleisch, 45-65. 
23That is, if there are Lutheran divine passibilists, they seem to have constituted a minority of 
opinion.   
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which construe confessionalization either in the terms of a passibilist extension or 
impassibilist betrayal of Luther‟s legacy.   
Rezeptionsgeschichte 
 If the divergence thesis originates neither in Luther, nor in the writings of his 
confessional heirs (a point that would, of course, first need to be proved), where does it 
first originate and why? Why is it that that Luther‟s Christology has come so widely to be 
associated with contemporary theological trajectories, which emphasize the passibility of 
deity, despite the lack of evidence within Luther‟s corpus to support this association? In 
order to address these questions, future study will need to examine the “reception history” 
of Luther‟s Christology, specifically as it pertains to developing perceptions of the 
reformer‟s interpretation of Christ‟s suffering.  Such an investigation would help to 
illuminate which contextual factors are operative in the development of the divergence 
thesis in the first place. 
 A promising place to begin such a survey would be the religious writings of G. 
W. F. Hegel, whose unique appropriation of Luther‟s „death of God‟ language has been 
widely influential within contemporary theology. An identification of the first interpreter 
to defend the claim that, for Luther, Christ suffers in His divinity, would enable a clearer 
understanding of the divergence thesis, by locating its genesis within a particular setting. 
A thorough reception history could also help to explain why a „passibilist Luther‟ has 
proven to be so appealing for such a wide range of 20
th
 century theologians. 
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Ecumenical 
 Luther‟s Christology has often been identified as an inter-confessional line of 
sharp demarcation. It represents the decisive point at which irreconcilable tensions 
threaten to preclude the development of any meaningful rapprochement between 
Lutheranism and her various ecumenical conversation partners. The purported source of 
the insoluble disparity is variably defined. Risto Saarinen, for instance, calls attention to a 
prominent rendering of this fissure, which percolates with some regularity within modern 
Luther scholarship. This view insists that Luther‟s theology (expressed in his doctrine of 
Christ) inhabits and relies upon an alternative set of philosophical first principles, and 
these principles cannot be made to interact intelligibly with the traditionally presupposed 
categories of „substance-thought‟, embraced by other traditions.24 In another vein, 
Althina Lexutt suggests that the difference resides in Luther‟s intense coordination of 
Christology with soteriology—an observation on whose basis she regards recent 
ecumenical progress on the doctrine of justification as ultimately hollow.
25
     
 Some recent literature has adapted the fundamental claim of inter-confessional 
demarcation on the basis of the divergence thesis. Luther‟s christological adjustment 
helps further to explain the widely presupposed, inter-confessional Grunddifferenz, which 
many perceive to exist in this area. Johannes Hund, for instance, erects a rather sharp 
barrier between Lutheran theologians who reject suppositional union as an adequate 
                                                             
24Risto Saarinen, Gottes Wirken auf uns: die transzendentale Deutung des Gegenwart-Christi-
Motivs in der Lutherforschung (Stuttgart: Steiner Vlg Wiesbaden, 1989), 1-4.  
25 Athina Lexutt, "Christologie als Soteriologie: ein Blick in die späten Disputationen Martin 
Luthers." in Relationen (Münster: LIT, 2000) 201-216. Lexutt could easily reinforce her proposal on the 
basis of the study by Florian Schneider, which argues that Luther develops a distinctly „reformational‟ 
Christology; that is, tailor-made to correspond with his entirely „new‟ soteriology.   
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rendering of Christ‟s Person, and the Reformed and Roman Catholic theologians (along 
with a handful of Melanchthon‟s students) who retain the late medieval view, along with 
the rest of its conceptual baggage.
26
 The ecumenical result of this historical narrative is 
the identification of an inter-confessional fork in the road, beyond which never the twain 
shall meet. 
 Theobald Beer‟s earlier study corroborates the basic trajectory of Hund‟s 
assessment, a fact from which Beer draws a sobering ecumenical conclusion.
27
 Despite 
the optimism circulating at the time when Beer‟s book was first published, Beer raises the 
question whether the „progress‟ responsible for this optimism is entirely superficial. If 
Luther presupposes a conceptualization of Christ, which deviates from established 
dogmatic norms, then such „progress‟ only conceals underlying incongruities that impair 
and actually emasculate the artificially drafted points of apparent, inter-confessional 
agreement.
28
 Beer‟s solution, of course, is severely to criticize Luther‟s rejection of 
medieval Christology. Luther‟s modern apologists respond in kind. They insist, in effect, 
that Luther‟s adjustment was necessary in order to overcome the detached speculations of 
scholastic reflection. Although the resultant crossfire has not yet spilled over into the 
official documents of ecumenical dialogue, much of the scholarship surveyed in this 
study gives legitimate reason to wonder whether even marginal agreement on questions 
                                                             
26The source of the bifurcation, for Hund, is a fundamental difference of christological opinion 
between Melanchthon and Luther, which later Lutheran writers were forced to reconcile. See his 
description of these two poles in Johannes Hund, Das Wort ward Fleisch,  45-96. 
27We have already noted the bifurcation, which Beer identifies between Luther and Melancthon 
regarding the conceptualization of the hypostatic union. See Theobald Beer, Der fröhliche Wechsel und 
Streit, 513-20.   
28
Ibid, 13-5.  
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of Christology between Lutherans on the one hand, and Roman Catholics and Reformed 
on the other is even possible.
29
  
 The refutation of the divergence thesis does not warrant the reduction of all inter-
confessional christological differences to indistinguishable shades of ecumenical gray. It 
does, however, lend an important reminder of an underlying dogmatic commonality, 
which some recent scholarship has been wont to overlook. It manifests the fact that 
Lutheranism, Roman Catholicism and each of the Reformed churches conceive of the 
hypostatic union in remarkably similar ways, despite whatever neuralgic points of 
difference may linger beyond the broader, foundational consensus.
30
 The elevation of 
lingering difference to the threshold of architectonic demarcation is neither historically 
accurate, nor ecumenically useful. Further examination of Luther‟s relation to late 
medieval scholasticism may reveal that much of the discourse, promulgated on all sides 
of the confessional divide, has been nothing more than an assault upon polemical 
windmills.
31
    
 
 
                                                             
29Of course, one could plausibly ask whether Beer‟s work is influential enough to warrant any real 
concern. In addition to what has already been said to address this objection, it should also be noted that the 
Swiss Roman Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar, whose writings are justifiably the object of 
extensive study within contemporary theology, relies almost entirely upon Beer‟s characterization of 
Luther‟s theology. To be sure, this fact possesses little significance for Luther scholarship per se, but 
portends much for the popular perception of Luther‟s theology among systematic theologians today. For 
Balthasar‟s use of Beer, see Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Action, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1994), 284. For a creative engagement between Luther and Balthasar, see Steffen Lösel,  
Kreuzwege  ein  kumenisches Gespr ch mit Hans Urs von  althasar (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2001). 
30There are important differences, for instance, regarding the extent and modality in which Christ 
participates in divine predicates in the communicatio idiomatum.  
31That is, it may be the case that Protestant dismissals of the late medieval tradition as quasi-
docetic, and Roman Catholic denigrations of Luther as a christological deviant both aim at illusory targets. 
Like Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, they trot out to war against attacking giants, which turn out to be the 
hallucinations of historical misinterpretation.    
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Theological 
 This study has focused upon the theological significance of Luther‟s impassibilist 
soteriology especially for ongoing conceptualizations of divine immanence. This 
constructive trajectory focus was adopted, because the formulation of an adequate 
rendering of God‟s immanence represents a central preoccupation of contemporary 
theology, and a major reason for its widespread rejection of divine impassibility. Besides 
the desideratum of dogmatic transparency, however, the rejection of this doctrine has also 
been impelled, perhaps even more conspicuously, by the pervasive belief that only a God 
who suffers can offer human beings any real consolation. Dennis Ngien summarizes the 
salient point with lapidary concision:  
“Of what help to wounded people is a God who knows nothing of pain himself? "Only 
the suffering God can help," Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote from his death cell. God helps 
not through supernatural miracles, but through his own wounds—his suffering with 
victims and sufferers.”32 
 
Later in the same essay, Ngien elaborates upon the main point: 
“If it were not the very God himself who became sin and suffered for us, what hope of 
life is left? What God cannot participate in, he cannot redeem. If God has not entered into 
our suffering and death, then there is no hope for redemption of our pain.”33    
 
 The rhetorical force of Ngien‟s appeal is drawn from the nerve center of 
everyday, Christian piety. What hope do the sufferings of Christ lend the believer, when 
confronted by existential distress and difficulty? For many, the fact that God suffers 
offers an assurance and consolation, which easily surpasses the well-worn paths of 
traditional theodicy. The doctrine of divine passibility is necessary, this perception urges, 
                                                             
32Dennis Ngien, “The God Who Suffers: If God Does Not Grieve, Then Can He Love at All? An 
Argument for God‟s Emotions” Christianity Today 41 (1997): 40.  
33Ibid, 41.  
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lest Christianity be forced to fall silent in the face of a resurgent atheism, impelled by an 
intense recognition of human history‟s undeniable atrocities.34 What does the refutation 
of the divergence thesis mean, then, for Luther‟s pastoral consolation? If God cannot 
suffer, what hope can the doctrine of Christ really provide? More pointedly: what comfort 
is the recognition of Christ‟s suffering to the believing Christian when she is overcome 
by the shadow of death?
35
  
 The divergence thesis is surely right to suppose that Luther cares about these 
questions. The reformer‟s sermons often draw direct connections from reflection upon 
Christ to the consolation of Christian despair. In a sermon preached in the year 1537, 
Luther provides an instance of this orientation.  
 “Thus the most precious treasure and the strongest consolation we Christians have 
is this: that the Word, the true and natural Son of God, became man, with flesh and blood 
like that of any other human; that He became incarnate for our sakes in order that we 
might enter into great glory, that our flesh and blood, skin and hair, hands and feet, 
stomach and back might reside in heaven as God does, and in order that we might boldly 
defy the devil and whatever else assails us.”36 
 
The refutation of the divergence thesis raises the following question for future research: 
What comfort does Luther believe that the sufferings of Christ furnish the Christian, if it 
                                                             
34The depth of this indignance has its roots especially in the immediate awareness of 20th century 
events of mass violence.   
35The future study of this question could also make a contribution to the examination of Luther‟s 
cross-piety in comparison with late medieval antecedents. For some preexisting literature on this topic, see, 
for instance Martin Elze, "Das Verständnis der Passion Jesu im ausgehenden Mittelalter und bei Luther," in 
Geist und Geschichte der Reformation (Berlin: W de Gruyter, 1966), 127-151; and Robert Guy Erwin, The 
Passion and Death of Christ in the Piety and Theology of the Later Middle Ages and Martin Luther, Thesis 
(Ph. D.)--Yale University, 1999. 
36LW 22, 110. WA 46, 631. “So ist nu der edelste schatz und hoehester Trost, den wir Christen 
haben, das das Wort, der ware, natuerliche Son Gottes, ist Mensch worden, der allerding fleisch und blut 
hat wie ein ander Mensch und umb unsern willen mensch worden, das wir zu der grossen herrligkeit 
komen, damit unser fleisch und blut, haut und har, hende und fuesse, bauch und ruecken oben im Himel 
Gott gleich sitzen.”  
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is true that he explicitly rules out the existentially resonant claim that God is 
sympathetically conditioned by human weakness? In the space that remains, we can 
provide only a sketch of how Luther‟s Christology addresses this question. 
 The determinative frame of reference for this matter consists again in the 
redemptive union, which Luther envisions between Christ and the believing Christian. 
The hope and consolation of the believer rests in her belief that, just as Christ was raised 
up victorious over death on account of the deathless might of His divinity, she too will 
pass through the jaws of death and hell unharmed, because she participates in the 
unconquerable Christ. Here one rightly detects the echo of an operative parallelism or 
analogy between Christ and the Christian, which courses throughout Luther‟s theological 
writings. Like Christ, the Christian is susceptible to a decidedly „partitive‟ analysis. 
Though weak in the flesh and apparently powerless in the face of death and devil, the 
believer is actually mightier than death on account of Christ.  This „parallelism‟ is at 
work in a sermon on John 3 from the late 1530‟s: 
“In Acts 2:24 St. Peter says that death was not able to hold Christ, since deity and 
humanity were united in one Person. In the same way we, too, shall not remain in death; 
we shall destroy death, but only if we remain steadfast in faith and cling to death‟s 
Destroyer.”37 
 
Commenting on the same chapter of John, Luther later observes  
“In this way you also become heavenly and will ascend to heaven, and the devil 
with all hell will not be able to restrain you. We will ascend from the midst of sin and 
death, and from the jaws of the devil; for a Christian has become a heavenly man.”38 
 
The consolation that Luther extends to the Christian in these texts is not that God 
experiences human vulnerability as a conditioning impingement upon His very being. It 
                                                             
37LW 22, 356.  
38LW 22, 460-61. 
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is rather that Christ truly became man, and by doing so overcame death from the inside 
out. The Christian may hope, in other words, because even though she too descends in 
her abject frailty into the abyss, she is united with the One who will bear her up in 
eschatological victory.  
 An especially rich exposition of this theme appears in Luther‟s treatment of John 
6:56, which belongs to a series of sermons composed beginning in the year 1530. In this 
text, Luther considers what it really means to „abide‟ in Christ, and addresses how the 
Christian may rightly meditate upon and receive consolation from Christ even in the 
midst of present struggles. Not all forms of reflective piety are adequate to the task. 
Luther comments: 
“Now there are those who hold with us and declare that Christ abides in them. But 
when trials confront them and they are faced with loss of life, honor, or goods, and 
particularly with death, when it is a question of sacrificing their life, then Christ is not 
found dwelling in them. Then mere thoughts are inadequate, for these are nothing but 
your work, power, natural reason, and a feeble creature. But if the terrors of a bad 
conscience are to be subdued, if the devil is to be frightened away and repelled, if death is 
to be overcome, then a divine force and not a mere thought is required. Something else 
must reside in you, so that your enemies will have to cope with a power which will prove 
too strong for them, a power which they fear, from which they flee, and which will 
permit you to carry off the victory.”39 
 
The necessary power of which Luther speaks exhibits itself, for him, in the lives of 
Christian martyrs, who do not waver in their faith, even in the face of intense suffering 
and death. He continues: 
                                                             
39LW 23, 145. WA 33, 226. “Also seindt ihr auch wohl, die es mit uns halten, die do furgeben, das 
Christus in ihnen sei undt sie in Christo, aber wen es kompt zur Anfechtung, das sie schaden sollen leiden 
am leibe, ehre oder gutt undt sonderlich, wen man sterben sol oder verbrennet werden, do ist Christus nicht 
doheim, da werden es die gedancken nicht thun. Dan was seindt deine gedancken anders dan deine werck, 
krafft undt naturliche vernunfft undt eine Creatur? solle aber ein schrecken des gewissens untergedruckt 
werden, der teuffel verjagt, der todt uberwunden werden, da wirdt eine göttliche gewalt zugehören undt 
nicht ein gedancken, es mus ein anders in dir sein, das ehr finde eine krafft in dir, die ihm zu starck sei, 
darfur ehr sich scheue, fliege undt du ihm obsiegest.” 
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“Something must be found in you which will prove too strong for [Satan]. This 
was apparent in the martyrs. How bold they were, what spirit and courage they displayed 
when they confronted the judges, fully aware that life and limb, honor and goods were at 
stake! Such conduct calls for consolation, not for a mere thought. It must be a matter of 
the heart that a person can face death and every trial cheerfully and say: “Honor, goods, 
life and limb, and all that is earthly, begone! I am determined to remain here, right here!” 
Then it will become manifest whether or not a person is a Christian and remains constant 
by means of his thoughts.”40 
 
 What is it, then, that furnishes such consolation and imbibes such confidence for 
Luther? It is not the knowledge that Christ‟s deity shares in human weakness, but that by 
faith in the Word made flesh, human beings who are weak participate in His divine 
strength. 
“Now this is a precious dwelling place and something to glory in, that through 
faith in Christ and through our eating we poor sinners have Him abiding in us with His 
might, power, strength, righteousness, and wisdom.”41 
 
Luther later summarizes: 
“Christ is serious when He says that you will abide in Him and He in you if you 
believe in Him. He says: “It matters not if you are still somewhat weak, for I am in you. 
If you lack anything, I have an abundance of righteousness, holiness, and wisdom; I have 
no weaknesses. But if you are weak, your weakness is in Me, and I will see to it that I 
help you, that I drown your weakness in My strength and power, that I delete your sin in 
My righteousness, that I devour your death in My life.” This is the true meaning and 
significance, the sum and substance, of this text, that He abides in him who believes in 
Him.”42 
                                                             
40LW 23, 145. WA 33, 226. “ehr mus etwas in dir finden, das ihm zu starck sei. Solches sihet man 
an den lieben Merterern, wie kecke sie gewesen sindt, undt einen muth undt hertz darzu gehabt, wen sie fur 
den Richtern gestanden sindt undt gesehen, das es ihnen geltte leib undt leben, Ehre undt gutt. Da gehörtt 
ein muth zu undt nicht ein gedancken, es mus im hertzen stecken, das einer das hertz frölich mache wider 
den todt undt alle anfechtung undt sagen könne: fahre hin, Ehre undt gutt, leib undt leben undt alles, was 
auff erden ist, hie wil ich bleiben. Do sindet sichs dan wohl, ob einer mit gedancken ein Christ wirdt undt 
bestendig bleibet oder nicht.” 
41LW 23, 146. WA 33, 228. “So ist nun das eine kostliche wonung undt ruhm, das wir arme 
Sunder durch den glauben an Christum ihnen haben in uns mit seiner macht, krafft, stercke und 
gerechtigckeit undt weisheit.” 
42LW 23, 147-8. WA 33, 230. “Darumb so ists dem herrn Christo ein ernst, das ehr saget, wen du 
an ihnen gleubest, so soltu bei ihm bleiben, ob du schon noch etwas gebrechlich bist, das schadet nicht, den 
ich bin in dir, undt mangelt dir etwas, so habe ich gerechtigckeit, heiligckeit undt weisheit die fulle. Jch 
habe keine gebrechen, hastu aber schwacheit, so ist sie in mir undt ich wil sehen, das ich ihr rathe undt 
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The point emphasized in this final section must not be misunderstood. It does not 
mean to suggest that the history of Christ is no longer genuinely „parabolic,‟ as if Christ 
does not experience frailty in His humanity. The incarnate Son truly enters into the 
condition of suffering human beings. This „condescension motif‟ of Luther‟s soteriology 
is not altogether devoid of consolatory significance. The consolation it provides, 
however, is not that the divinity of Christ tastes human vulnerability, and thus joins us in 
our helplessness. It is rather that, by participation in Christ through faith, the believer 
shares in the deathless might, which is manifest in the Son‟s glorious resurrection.43 A 
closer examination of these matters would be significant for tracing the history of 
Christian piety during the reformation era. More important for the purposes of the present 
study, their further exposition would continue to fill out the constructive potential of a 
non-divergence specification of Luther‟s Christology. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
deine schwacheit in meiner krafft undt stercke erseuffe undt deine Sunde in meiner gerechtigckeit 
untergehe undt dein todt in meinem leben verschlungen werde. Diess ist die rechte meinung undt verstandt 
dieses Textes, das, wer an ihn gleubet, bei dem ist ehr.” 
43Another text, which develops similar themes is Luther‟s commentary on the book of Hebrews, 
composed in 1517-1518. So, for instance, Luther states: “Sicut enim Christus per unionem immortalis 
divinitatis moriendo mortem superavit, ita Christianus per unionem immortalis Christi (que fit per fidem in 
illum) eciam moriendo mortem superat ac sic Deus diabolum per ipsummet diabolum destruit et alieno 
opere suum perficit.” WA 57, 129. Also significant are many of Luther‟s Easter sermons, preached over the 
course of his career. For a helpful overview of these sermons, see Uwe Rieske-Braun, Duellum mirabile: 
Studien zum Kampfmotiv in Martin Luthers Theologie, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 
Bd. 73 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 201-226. See especially the material, which Rieske-
Braun treats on pages 204-5,   
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APPENDIX: PROLEGOMENA ON THE THEOLOGICAL  
RECEPTION OF A HISTORICAL FIGURE 
 
 
  Perhaps a historically inclined reader will object that the very notion of a contemporary 
theological reception of Luther‟s Christology is itself the divergence thesis‟ most basic, besetting 
deficiency. According to this view, the fundamental error of all that has heretofore been 
criticized resides not so much in the divergence thesis‟ symptomatic elicitation of inaccurate 
textual exegesis. The problem lies deeper, lingering at the more insidious plane of its implicitly 
over-optimistic historical methodology. In this sense, the very attempt of this reading to 
appropriate Luther‟s ideas within an intellectual context predominantly foreign to him is 
practically fated for anachronistic distortion. If this verdict is accurate, then the present study 
does not rectify the problems previously identified in the divergence thesis, but actually 
reproduces its incipient methodological defect. By seeking to recruit Luther‟s Christology as a 
constructive contribution to modern discussions concerning divine immanence, it risks merely 
exchanging one bad anachronism for another. According to this view, the „receptive task‟ can 
hardly terminate otherwise than in a procrustean deformation of 16
th
 century data. 
 Perhaps it would be better simply to concede that theological receptions represent an 
essentially a-historical enterprise, and conclude on this basis either: 1) that the receptive task 
ought altogether to be foreclosed in order to avoid doing inevitable violence to the ideas of past 
thinkers; or 2) that it ought to proceed altogether undisturbed, so long as its non-historical nature 
is forthrightly acknowledged. Depending in large part upon the predisposition of one‟s 
disciplinary vantage point, either conclusion could convincingly be defended on the basis of 
chapters two through four, which demonstrate the exegetical inadequacies of the divergence 
interpretation. The sharp demarcation of history and theology, which both conclusions urge, 
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possesses an initially appealing simplicity, which seems to address the underlying pitfall of 
anachronism. Tempting though this demarcation appears, however, neither of its permutations is 
finally satisfying.  
 To be sure, both trajectories express legitimate insights that must not be overlooked. The 
former identifies a danger, which ought assiduously to be avoided; namely, violating the 
integrity of a historical figure‟s ideas in the interest of „using‟ them in support of a predetermined 
agenda. The latter, however, acknowledges an equally urgent task, which ought intentionally to 
be engaged; that is, allowing ongoing theological reflection to be informed by substantive 
interaction with giants of bygone generations. Though an independent recognition of these 
distinct insights tends to migrate in the direction of two very different programmatic conclusions, 
both rest upon a shared assumption. Each presupposes that a historically-mediated contemporary 
reception of Luther‟s theology is logistically impractical. Both stress the communicative barrier 
created by the multifaceted cultural and chronological breech, which separates Luther from 
modern currents of discourse. 
The two proposals compensate for the communicative breech by emphasizing trans-
historical incommensurability to the point of a reductionism. They urge, in effect, that Luther‟s 
ideas are so removed from the present context that all receptions must be regarded either as 
equally bad (proposal 1), or equally licit (proposal 2). But are all receptions created equal? Can it 
plausibly be claimed that a reception, which demonstrably misrepresents Luther‟s christological 
ideas, is qualitatively equivalent with another, which does not? Why not appropriate the valid 
insights of both conclusions, and thus bypass the Scylla of a naïvely defined emphasis upon 
trans-historical commensurability and the Charybdis of a reductionistic emphasis upon trans-
historical incommensurability, which is its corrective opposite? Such a posture would 
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acknowledge the legitimacy (perhaps even unavoidability) of the receptive task, while 
sufficiently attending to the risk of anachronistic projection. Is such an approach feasible? What 
would it look like if applied to the reception of Luther‟s Christology? 
Gui ing Principles for a Historically Responsi le  Contemporary Reception of Luther’s 
Christology 
 
 
 The goal of this study (especially chapter five) is to facilitate a genuine and constructive 
trans-historical conversation between Luther‟s christological views and contemporary theology 
on the topic of God‟s immanence in Christ.1 The very notion of a „conversation‟ presupposes the 
input of no less than two communicative agents. In order for such a conversation to count as 
genuine, the views of its participants must naturally be represented accurately and  
sympathetically. Doing so requires sensitivity to the communicative structures and particularities 
of each participant‟s cultural and conceptual vernacular. In the absence of such sensitivity, a 
constructive conversation may well emerge, but one that will tend all too easily to collapse the 
intended communicative exchange into masked monologue.
2
 This risk is all the more serious in 
the case of a „trans-historical conversation‟, in which the temptation will always be to allow 
modern peculiarities to dictate the grammar of engagement. Luther must be allowed truly to 
                                                             
1These two adjectives are italicized because they helpfully encapsulate the kind of conversation this chapter 
has in mind. It is genuine in the sense that participants are allowed truly to speak; that is, neither is forced artificially 
into the vernacular of another. It is constructive, however, because the authentic views of each participant is carried 
into dialogical collision or intersection with the views of others. They do not pass each other by, as it were, on 
parallel lines of incommensurable discourse.  
2
In a crucial essay criticizing recent distortions of Augustine‟s trinitarian theology, Michel Barnes rightly 
names the consequence when the importance of this preliminary task is minimized: “The dialogue between 
systematic theology and historical theology is transformed into a conversation between a ventriloquist and her or his 
prop”. Michel Barnes, “Augustine in Contemporary Trinitarian Theology” Theological Studies 56 (1995): 243-44. 
This chapter concedes the risk that Barnes‟ essay expresses, but insists nevertheless that theological reception is 
necessary. The author recognizes that the preparatory stage of historical analysis (I.E. recovering Luther‟s genuine 
voice in the conversation) can never exist within a wholly objective and detached, analytical vacuum. There is no 
way to achieve a methodologically pure „historical moment‟ in which all constructive biases are somehow bracketed 
or set aside. To acknowledge the inevitable imperfections that attend the pursuit of this goal, however, does not 
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speak, and do so within the plausibility structures of his own natural intellectual habitat. Only 
once the task of exegetical „listening‟ is sufficiently indulged, may his ideas profitably be 
extended forward into genuine constructive engagement with contemporary currents of 
discourse.
3
 
 Even when due historical diligence has been exercised, the execution of the crucial, 
„conversational extension‟ remains intrinsically prone to fundamental risks. The breadth of the 
contextual gap that contemporary reception attempts to span raises the real possibility that Luther 
and his contemporary interlocutors will simply speak past one another in mutually unintelligible, 
theological dialects. In this case, the elicited trans-historical conversation would admittedly be 
genuine (both sides really speaking on their own terms), but hardly constructive, at least not in 
any tangible way. Those who enlarge trans-historical incommensurability to the threshold of 
reductionism will insist that this communicative caesura cannot really be avoided. This objection 
again registers an important insight, but needlessly exaggerates. Luther‟s theological interests are 
not limited only to matters, which are entirely incommensurate with the preoccupations of 
modern inquiry. There exist, alongside the obvious elements of trans-historical discontinuity 
(which must surely be acknowledged), also discursive sites of substantive trans-historical 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
entail (as options 1 and 2 suggest) that all trans-historical engagements are therefore either equally fallacious, or 
equally legitimate.  
3
Richard Muller helpfully expresses a similar point with respect to Calvin by driving a distinction between 
„listening‟ to a historical figure and „using‟ him. He states: “A clever theologian can accommodate Calvin to nearly 
any agenda; a faithful theologian—and a good historian—will seek to listen to Calvin, not to use him.” Richard A. 
Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition (New York: Oxford 
University, 2000), 188. I am indebted to Chris Ganski for calling my attention to this helpful distinction.  Muller‟s 
point indirectly illuminates an ethical dimension to the problem addressed in this introductory section. To the extent 
that contemporary theology seeks engagement with past figures, it is morally incumbent upon its practitioners to 
represent such thinkers accurately, lest one, in effect, bear false witness against her ancestral neighbor. Kevin 
Vanhoozer helpfully explicates this same insight, albeit in relation to the task of biblical hermeneutics. Hence, the 
subtitle in his magisterial book Is There a Meaning in This Text: The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary 
Knowledge (Grand Rapids, Mich: Zondervan, 1998).  It is the role of historical study—the patient and prolonged 
analysis of texts—to specify and preserve Luther‟s distinct „voice‟, as carefully and accurately as possible. This is a 
265 
 
 
 
commonality: a shared canon of Scripture, a shared history of theological reflection, shared 
questions and concerns, etc.  
These sites of overlap are what enable (and actually urge) the task of theological 
reception in the first place.
4
 They explicate the fact that Luther is a formative influence in the 
pre-history of the modern theological milieu (along with a variegated host of others). His 
writings and ideas stand „upstream‟ in a prolonged (though admittedly circuitous) process of 
dogmatic reflection within which contemporary theology still stands. However remote the 
discursive point of contact, these tangible strands of continuity oblige recognition of the fact that, 
when Luther and contemporary theologians together ask, for instance: “Does God suffer?,” their 
otherwise disparate modes of theological discourse genuinely and substantively intersect with 
one another. There exists, in other words, a shared theological „object‟ about which both purport 
to speak, even if in different ways, and by divergent means.
5
 This referential concurrence creates 
the conditions necessary for a topically circumscribed, and thus historically responsible, mode of 
trans-historical engagement. It enables a genuine conversation between two communicative 
agents without procrustean deformation. Luther and modern theologians may speak with 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
task that will always be incomplete, but not to the extent that the enterprise is therefore altogether futile. Here again, 
there exists a latent temptation towards reductionism (in two directions) that the present study hopes to avoid.  
4They urge the pursuit of such reception because of a second risk, which tends to be overlooked by those 
concerned primarily with the hazards of a-historical, anachronistic projection. The risk of anachronism we have 
already acknowledged, and hope not, in subsequent sections, to transgress. However, it must also be asked, whether 
there is any less „danger‟ from a theological vantage point, to seek definite, historical knowledge of a past figure 
without allowing such knowledge to inform ongoing constructive reflection? Wouldn‟t theological amnesia invite 
problems at least as serious as historical anachronism?  
5Or, at the very least, they are asking about the same object that both agree to exist; namely, the God who 
reveals Himself in the person of Jesus Christ as described in the Christian Scriptures. They are both asking, on the 
basis of Scripture, reason, tradition, etc., whether the God thus presented suffers in His being. This is not to trivialize 
or minimize the many differences that surround this point of commonality. Such points represent, however, genuine 
strands of discursive continuity upon which an enterprise such as the present one (geared towards genuine trans-
historical engagement) may capitalize.  
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different theological „languages‟, „dialects‟ and „accents‟, but they speak, in the case of these 
coincident nodes of continuity, nevertheless about the same thing.
6
  
 The final, constructive chapter of this study focuses upon the relation between divine 
immanence and divine impassibility. It does so because both Luther and a wide array of 
contemporary theologians express clear and identifiable assumptions about this relation, even if 
these assumptions are carried into expression with uneven degrees of directness.
7
 It furnishes a 
doctrinal point of focus around which each of the trans-historical conversation‟s participants may 
engage one another.  By attending carefully to how these participants characterize immanence 
and impassibility in relation to one another, it becomes possible to engender a genuine and 
constructive engagement between them, and thus responsibly discern how Luther‟s ideas remain 
significant for ongoing theological discourse. Because chapters two through four attend to the 
precise nature of Luther‟s views (thus allowing him to „speak‟ in his own words), the bulk of 
chapter six focuses upon the views of his modern interlocutors.
8
 In the wake of these descriptive 
tasks, the constructive discussion in the latter half of chapter six turns to trans-historical 
                                                             
6
The task of constructive reception is helpfully compared to the translation process necessary for cross-
linguistic and cross-cultural communication. A businessman from downtown Manhattan will be able to 
communicate with an aboriginal tribesman only once a great many of the underlying linguistic, cultural, and 
experiential incommensurabilities are addressed. The success of this endeavor will undoubtedly come only as the 
result of great labor and difficulty, and nothing like a complete translation of meaning between these figures will 
likely ever materialize. Despite all this, genuine communication is nevertheless possible because, despite the breadth 
of incommensurability, which separates these individuals, there exists also a deeper element of continuity that 
enables a mutual understanding between them—even if that understanding will always be partial in nature. To 
suggest otherwise is to deny contemporary experience (in which such translations do take place) and forfeit to 
reductionism. This chapter assumes the same dynamic to be true of the relation between Luther and contemporary 
concerns.  
7Luther, for instance, nowhere raises the intersection of these commitments as a discrete object of 
examination. The same is true of many contemporary theologians, whom the following discussion will engage. Both 
groups, however, express stable assumptions about this relation in the course of their distinct theological proposals.   
8This survey includes several figures who seek to appropriate Luther in line with a divergence reception, 
but the point here rests no longer upon the importance of this environment for the interpretation of Luther per se. 
The focus will be limited to the theological convictions expressed by these authors, which foster a particular relation 
between impassibility and immanence. These convictions extend beyond those who attempt directly to recruit 
Luther in their defense.  
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engagement, and asks how Luther‟s christologically mediated specification of the relation 
between divine impassibility and divine immanence can make a contribution to an ongoing 
conversation.
9
 
                                                             
9This is not to suggest that there is only one, single strand of legitimate significance belonging to Luther‟s 
Christology. There is a surplus of meaning that must be respected, even if this chapter assumes that „receptions‟ of 
Luther that honor his own historically expressed views possess a clear superiority over receptions, which 
misrepresent his ideas. For a fascinating reflection upon the theological reception of Luther, see Eberhard Jüngel, 
The Freedom of a Christian: Luther's Significance for Contemporary Theology, Trans. Roy A. Harrisville 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1988).  
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